Nouvelles

Mark Pomerleau Government leaders are telling industry they need help with integration as the Department of Defense and individual services push toward a unifying approach to information warfare. Information warfare combines several types of capabilities, including cyber, intelligence, electronic warfare, information operations, psychological operations and military deception. On a high-tempo battlefield, military leaders expect to face against a near peer or peer adversary. There, one-off solutions, systems that only provide one function, or those that can't feed information to others won't cut it. Systems must be multi-functional and be able to easily communicate with other equipment and do so across services. “A networked force, that's been our problem for years. Having built a lot of military systems, a lot in C4 and mission command, battle command, we build them and buy them in stovepipes. Then we think of integration and connecting after the fact,” Greg Wenzel, executive vice president at Booz Allen, told C4ISRNET. “My whole view ... networking the force really is probably the best thing to achieve overmatch against our adversaries.” Much of this networking revolves around new concepts DoD is experimenting with to be better prepared to fight in the information environment through multi domain operations or through Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). The former aims to seamlessly integrate the capabilities of each domain of warfare – land, sea, air, space and cyber – at will. It also aims to integrate systems and capabilities across the services under a common framework to rapidly share data. While not an official program, JADC2 is more of a framework for the services to build equipment. “It's more likely a mish-mash of service level agreements, pre-scripted architecting and interoperability mandates that you got to be in keeping with those in order to play in the environment,” Bill Bender, senior vice president of strategic accounts and government relations at Leidos, told C4ISRNET of JADC2. “It's going to take a long journey to get there because, oh by the way, we're a very legacy force and ... a limited amount of technology has the interoperability that is absolutely required for that mission to become a reality.” The “information warfare” nomenclature can feel nebulous and hard to understand for industry officials that provide solutions to the Pentagon. “It's a pretty broad definition. I think it's something that the DoD is struggling with, that's what we're struggling with in industry and it also makes it challenging because no one really buys equipment that way,” Anthony Nigara, vice president for strategy and business development in L3Harris Space & Airborne Systems, said. “No one really buys stuff to an abstract term like information warfare.” Others agreed that the term “information warfare” may be too broad, an issue that's further complicated as each service tackles information warfare in their own way. Most members of industry C4ISRNET talked with on the need to integrate described the key theme of a more networked force as a unifying way to think about the new push to information warfare. “There's a lot of discussions about the Joint All Domain Operations or the multidomain operations. When we look at that and we want to say ‘okay, what is information warfare really mean to everyone?” Steven Allen, director of information operations and spectrum convergence at Lockheed Martin rotary and mission systems, told C4ISRNET. “We look at it as how can we get the right information to warfighters in order to fight or how do we get the right information for them to plan? How do we move all that data across whether it's different levels of security or different levels of the warfighting and the data associated with it.” Others expressed the need for contractors to be flexible with how DoD is describing its needs. “Industry has learned to be flexible in responding to messaging calling for new situational awareness capabilities while other established capabilities were being mandated for use in cyber exercises,” Jay Porter, director of programs at Raytheon Intelligence & Space, said. The push to a more information warfare-centric force under the guise of larger concepts to defeat adversaries is pushing the DoD as a whole to fight in a more joint manner. Paul Welch, vice president and division manager for the Air Force and defense agencies portfolio at Leidos, explained that there's a consistent view by the services and the department that they must integrate operations within the broad umbrella of activities called information warfare just as they're integrating warfighting capabilities between the services and across the domains. This goes beyond merely deconflicting activities or cooperation, but must encompass true integration of combat capabilities. Some members of industry described this idea as one part of convergence. “When I talk about convergence, my observation is there is a convergence in terms of a family of technologies and of a family of challenge problems and how do they come together,” Ravi Ravichandran, chief technology officer of the intelligence and security sector at BAE, told C4ISRNET. Ravichandran provided five specific challenge problems the military may have in which a married suite of technologies can help provide an advantage against adversaries. They include JADC2, overmatch or the notion of assembling technologies in a way better than enemies, joint fires where one service's sensors may be acquiring a target and passing that target off to another service to prosecute it, sensing in the electromagnetic spectrum and strategic mobility to get forces and resources to a particular place at a particular time. Similarly, Welch provided the notional example of an F-35 flying over an area, seeing something on its sensors and sending that information to either an Army unit, a carrier strike group, a Marine Corps unit, or even a coalition partner to seamlessly and rapidly understand the information and act upon it. These sensors must be incorporated into a joint kill chain that can be acted upon, coordinated and closed by any service at any time. Allen noted that when looking at information warfare, his business is examining how to take a variety of information from sensor information to human information to movement information and pull it all together. “There's a lot of discussion on [artificial intelligence] AI and machine learning and it's very, very important, but there's also important aspects of that, which is hey what's the technology to help the AI, what's that data that's going to help them,” he said. “We tend to look very closely with the customers on how do we really shape that in terms of the information you're getting and how much more can you do for the warfighter.” By bringing all these together, ultimately, it's about providing warfighters with the situational awareness, command and control and information they need to make decisions and cause the necessary effects, be it cyber C4ISR, intelligence or electronic warfare, Nigara said. Porter said at Raytheon's Intelligence & Space outfit, they view information warfare as “the unification of offensive and defensive cyber missions, electronic warfare and information operations within the battlespace.” Integrating EW and IO with cyber will allow forces to take advantage of a broader set of data to enable high-confidence decision-making in real time, he added, which is particularly important in the multi-domain information environment to influence or degrade adversary decision making. From a Navy perspective, the ability to share data rapidly across a distributed force within the Navy's distributed maritime operations concept will be critical for ensuring success. “We will certainly have to include the mechanisms with which we share information, data and fuse that data from node to node. When I say node to node, a node may be a ship, a node may be an unmanned vehicle and a node may be a shore based facility,” Kev Hays, director of information warfare programs at Northrop Grumman, who mostly supports the Navy, said regarding areas Northrop is investing. “Linking all those participants into a network ... is critically important. We have quite a bit of technology we're investing in to help communicate point to point and over the horizon and a low probability of intercept and low probability of detection fashion.” Ultimately, the information space is about affecting the adversary's cognitive space, they said. “When it comes to information warfare, it's a lot less tangible ... It's not tank on tank anymore. You're trying to affect people's perception,” James Montgomery, capture strategy lead for information operations and spectrum convergence at Lockheed Martin rotary and mission systems, told C4ISRNET. As a result, he said, it is critical to take the time with the customer to truly understand the concepts and capabilities and how they all fit together in order to best support them. “Really spending time with them [the customer] and understanding what it is that they're attempting to get at. It helps us better shape the requirements but it also helps us better understand what is it they're asking for,” he said. “When you're moving forward and attempting to come together with both a software hardware based solution to something, it takes a lot of talking time and a lot of touch time with that customer to understand where their head's at.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/information-warfare/2020/07/19/whats-industry-role-in-dod-information-warfare-efforts/

By: David B. Larter Update: The headline of this story was changed to more accurately characterize the incident onboard the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge. WASHINGTON — A rapidly extinguished fire aboard the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge prompted the Navy to issue a “stop work order” Friday to General Dynamics NASSCO shipyard in Norfolk, Naval Sea Systems Command told Defense News Saturday. The incident started when a spark from welding landed on nearby material, which was then quickly put out by the fire watch. Fire watch is a sailor or contractor who stands nearby with a fire hose and/or extinguisher to stop a larger blaze in its tracks. In a statement, Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Rory O'Connor said the “stop work” was to ensure the company followed fire safety protocols. “On July 17, the Navy was informed of a fire aboard USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), currently conducting a Selected Restricted Availability at General Dynamics NASSCO – Norfolk,” O'Connor said. “The fire was quickly extinguished by the fire watch and resulted in minimal damage. In response to this incident, the Navy has issued a stop work order for all ships in maintenance availabilities at GD NASSCO Norfolk to ensure compliance with all established fire protocols and procedures.” In a phone call Saturday, Anthony Paolino, a General Dynamics NASSCO spokesman, said the incident involved an ember landing on plastic, causing it to melt and smoke, but said there was no larger fire. NASSCO was already reviewing its safety protocols prior to the “stop work” order, and that it fully supported the Navy's ongoing safety stand down in the wake of this week's fire aboard Bonhomme Richard, Paolino said. In a phone call Saturday, Anthony Paolino, a General Dynamics NASSCO spokesman, said the incident involved an ember landing on plastic, causing it to melt and smoke, but said there was no larger fire. NASSCO was already reviewing its safety protocols prior to the “stop work” order, and that it fully supported the Navy's ongoing safety stand down in the wake of this week's fire aboard Bonhomme Richard, Paolino said. Once those investigations are finished, Gilday will determine whether a broader examination of the Navy's culture is necessary. “This is a very, very serious incident that I think will force the Navy to stand back and reevaluate itself,” Gilday said. “We've got to follow the facts, we've got to be honest with ourselves and we've got to get after it. My intention, once the investigations are done, is to make this available for the public to debate, including what we need to do to get after any systemic problems that we might have.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/18/us-navy-orders-to-general-dynamics-nassco-to-stop-work-after-fire-on-uss-kearsarge/

La hausse fulgurante de la complexité du développement de logiciels pour les avions a expliqué beaucoup de retards et de dépassements de coûts au cours des dernières années. Une entreprise montréalaise, Mannarino, s'y attaque en présentant cette semaine un nouveau système d'exploitation qui pourrait réduire les coûts de moitié. Publié le 21 juillet 2020 à 8h00 Spécialisée en services informatiques, principalement dans le domaine aéronautique, depuis 20 ans, l'entreprise a reçu il y a deux ans un investissement de 10 millions de dollars US provenant de Lockheed Martin afin de concevoir un nouveau système d'exploitation en temps réel (RTOS) à partir d'une page blanche. Le résultat est apparu lundi, jour d'ouverture de la version virtuelle du Salon aéronautique de Farnborough, qui aurait dû avoir lieu cette semaine en banlieue de Londres. Au cours des années, Mannarino a conçu sur commande des logiciels pour le contrôle des moteurs, la gestion de vol, les communications ou le réapprovisionnement en carburant en vol, par exemple. Chaque fois, elle était limitée par la vétusté des systèmes d'exploitation employés. Le système d'exploitation est le logiciel maître, auquel font appel les autres applications, un peu comme Windows dans un ordinateur ou iOS dans un iPhone. Les exigences envers un système installé à bord d'un appareil sont toutefois nettement plus élevées en termes de fiabilité, ce qui en multiplie les coûts. « Le principal commentaire que l'on recevait de nos clients, c'était que ces systèmes étaient trop chers », explique John Mannarino, fondateur de l'entreprise. « Nous essayons de réduire les coûts de 50 %. » Comme ces systèmes n'étaient pas conçus spécialement pour l'aéronautique, et que les volumes sont relativement faibles dans cette industrie, les clients se plaignaient aussi de la pauvre qualité du service qu'ils recevaient, affirme M. Mannarino. Système plus rapide et moins gourmand En partant d'une page blanche, l'entreprise a conçu un système qu'elle estime être deux fois plus rapide et moins gourmand de moitié en mémoire. Il pourra être employé sur tous les types d'appareils, des avions commerciaux aux hélicoptères militaires, en passant par les avions d'affaires et les drones de taille suffisante pour nécessiter une certification. L'un des marchés pour lesquels on anticipe la plus forte demande est celui des drones. John Mannarino, président de Mannarino Les clients principaux du nouveau logiciel seront vraisemblablement des fabricants d'avionique, dont Lockheed Martin. Le géant américain a fourni 10 millions US dans le cadre du programme de contreparties mis en place par le gouvernement fédéral. En vertu de ce programme, les contrats militaires obtenus par des entreprises étrangères doivent faire l'objet de contreparties équivalentes dans l'industrie locale. De l'entente avec Mannarino, Lockheed Martin n'obtient rien de plus que des crédits lui permettant de combler les exigences de ce programme, assure M. Mannarino. Elle n'est pas propriétaire du logiciel et ne détient aucun droit sur lui. Des discussions sont toutefois en cours pour faire de Lockheed Martin un client. Bien que l'entreprise entende d'abord se concentrer sur le marché aéronautique, dans lequel elle a le plus d'expertise, son système d'exploitation sera éventuellement aussi offert dans d'autres industries, dont la santé et le transport ferroviaire, ou même pour des applications industrielles. https://www.lapresse.ca/affaires/entreprises/2020-07-21/un-nouveau-logiciel-montrealais-au-coeur-des-avions.php

Put simply, Canadian governments have a responsibility to practise smart protectionism where the risks to Canadians' personal security and national security are high. Free trade is good economics. Protectionism is bad. Global supply chains are efficient. Favouring domestic goods, services and industries is inefficient. Canada has long adhered to these orthodoxies. And most of the time it makes sense to do so. However, through the COVID-19 pandemic, both the public and private sectors have seen weaknesses associated with heavy or total reliance on foreign sources and global supply chains for essential goods, notably personal protective equipment (PPE). As of June 2, for example, the Government of Canada had ordered close to 122 million N95 masks from international suppliers, yet 12 million had been received and 9.8 million of those failed Canadian standards. We are learning the hard way that foreign sources cannot necessarily supply the products we need in the time, quantity or quality required during a national or global emergency. China, as the dominant global producer of many of these PPE supplies, has become the focal point for an emerging debate around domestic control over certain goods, technologies, and services. A recent report from the Henry Jackson Society in the U.K., for example, has argued the “Five Eyes”—the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand—are far too reliant on Chinese sources for all kinds of strategically important goods, and that this is a threat to the national security of those countries. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, too, has warned that Canadian companies that produce certain critical technologies are vulnerable to foreign takeovers by entities with agendas hostile to Canada's interests. This is not just an issue with China, though. In Canada, we like to believe that in national or global crises we can rely on the U.S. or other allies for help. Canada, in other words, would be at or near the front of the line with allies. The COVID-19 pandemic, and the behavior of the U.S. and European countries, suggests this is naive. Italy, a founding EU member, requested and was denied face masks from the EU's stockpile at the peak of their COVID-19 outbreak. In April, a presidential executive order gave the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency the power to “allocate to domestic use” several types of PPE that would otherwise be exported. U.S. produced masks bound for Germany, a close American ally, were reportedly diverted back while in transit. Ultimately, Canada was exempt from the U.S. order, but this episode should tell us that global emergencies can lead to “home front comes first” attitudes, even among our closest allies. Fundamentally, the issue comes down to one of efficiency versus necessity. Sometimes, in some areas of the economy, security of supply is more important than efficiency. While this thinking is new to most companies and governments in Canada, it is not new to Canadian companies working in defence and national security. The Canadian defence industry has long highlighted the need for focused sovereign production and control in key national security capabilities—in part to ensure security of supply—as our allies in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere have been doing for generations. The argument has fallen largely on deaf ears. There seems to be a greater aversion in Canada to any kind of protectionism than among our more pragmatic allies. There is also a belief that Canada can always rely on obtaining critical supplies from the U.S., owing to both our close trading relationship and bi-lateral defence agreements dating from the 1950s that purport to establish an integrated North American defence industrial base. Canada puts too much faith in these beliefs, to our peril. While we can still hold free trade and integrated global supply chains as the goal, we also need to recognize that this view of the economy does not always serve our national interests. Put simply, Canadian governments have a responsibility to practise smart protectionism where the risks to Canadians' personal security and national security are high. Christyn Cianfarani is president and CEO of the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI). The Hill Times https://www.hilltimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/072020_ht.pdf

La Libre Eco avec Belga Publié le 17-07-20 à 10h59 - Mis à jour le 17-07-20 à 11h00 Le groupe chimique belge Solvay et l'américain Lockheed Martin ont annoncé vendredi la conclusion d'un accord permettant la sélection de projets d'innovation des universités belges dans le secteur aéronautique, une initiative qui fait suite au choix de l'avion de combat F-35 Lightning II américain par le gouvernement belge. Solvay et Lockheed Martin, ainsi que sept entreprises belges (Asco, Coexpair, Feronyl, SABCA, Safran Aeroboosters, Sonaca et Thales Belgium) ont démarré la procédure de sélection dans le cadre de l'+Innovative Growth University Challenge+ ces 1er et 2 juillet. Soutenus par le gouvernement belge, les projets de l'"University Challenge" s'inscrivent dans une stratégie de renforcement des pôles de défense, d'industrie et de technologie de la Belgique, ont précisé Solvay et Lockheed dans un communiqué conjoint. En tout, plus de vingt projets ont été présentés par sept universités belges, reconnues pour leur expertise de haut niveau dans les matériaux avancés, répondant à l'objectif du "Challenge" qui vise à découvrir ou faire émerger la future génération de composites de l'industrie aéronautique belge. Solvay, Lockheed Martin et les sept autres sociétés feront leur sélection finale d'ici la fin août. Les projets concernent cinq domaines suivants: les matériaux composites de nouvelle génération, la diminution des coûts de production gr'ce aux technologies hors autoclave, le collage de métaux et composites, l'intégration des fonctions et simplification des assemblages et les techniques de réparation des composites. Les projets prévoient la participation d'un ou plusieurs membres des neuf entreprises impliquées pour assister le développement de produits de haute technologie pour le secteur aérospatial, souligne le communiqué. Solvay, Lockheed Martin et les sept autres sociétés avaient signé l'an dernier un accord-cadre visant à développer l'+University Challenge+ et stimuler la recherche et développement dans le secteur aéronautique. Cette initiative s'inscrit dans le cadre de l'accord entre les gouvernements américain et belge pour l'achat de 34 avions de combat F-35 de Lockheed Martin en remplacement des F-16 vieillissants. Selon ses promoteurs, les projets de l'"University Challenge" constituent une "opportunité unique" pour soutenir la recherche et l'innovation aéronautique en Belgique. https://www.lalibre.be/economie/entreprises-startup/f-35-solvay-et-lockheed-promeuvent-l-innovation-universitaire-dans-le-secteur-aeronautique-5f1167e7d8ad58621946a3bb

By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army on Friday issued a draft request for proposals for the preliminary design phase of its delayed optionally manned fighting vehicle, or OMFV, the first major step in a relaunched competition to replace the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The preliminary phase will be open for 40 days, with the goal of gathering industry feedback ahead of the final RFP, which will come later this year. That final RFP will award of up to five design contracts in June 2021, setting the next stage in the competition. “As we continue to progress through the first phase of our five-phased approach for the OMFV program, communication, inclusive feedback and innovative thinking from industry remains key,” Maj. Gen. Brian Cummings, the Army's program executive officer for ground combat systems, said in a statement. “We are looking forward to receiving feedback and learning from industry what's in the realm of the possible as we continue to develop this truly transformational vehicle for our Soldiers.” Added Brig. Gen. Ross Coffman, director of the Next Generation Combat Vehicles Cross-Functional Team: “Accurately defining the desired set of capabilities without over-constraining the design is critically important. “The Army is committed to open communication with industry to ensure the characteristics and eventual requirements of the OMFV are informed by technological advances.” The focus on gathering industry feedback should not be a surprise, given the recent history of the program. When the OMFV program was conceived, the Army planned to hold a prototyping competition, selecting two winning teams to build prototypes with a downselect to one at the end of an evaluation period. But in October, the Army ended up with only one bidder in the OMFV competition — General Dynamics Land Systems — after other competitors dropped out, citing requirements and schedule concerns. As a result, the Army in January announced it would be relaunching the program to ensure more competition going forward — a decision that led to service leaders taking heat from Congress during testimony in March. OMFV is the first large acquisition effort to come out of Army Futures Command. The draft RFP, posted on a government contracting website Friday, drives home the point by stating: “To permit industry design freedom and promote innovation, the Army has avoided quantifying or prescribing critical levels of performance wherever possible.” “We do not want to box industry into a solution,” Cummings said. “We want to incentivize industry as they lean forward and think creatively to bring the Army innovative technologies and solutions necessary to achieve our vision — both in terms of the ability to integrate newer technology we are seeing today and leaving space for future growth on the OMFV platform.” https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/07/17/army-drops-draft-rfp-for-bradley-replacement/

By: Sebastian Sprenger   COLOGNE, Germany — The German government continued another round of talks with vendors Lockheed Martin and MBDA this week about a contract for the TLVS missile defense system. The ongoing negotiations suggest there is still no common ground on the legal framework for costs and risks associated with the next-generation program. Berlin had asked the contractors in early May to submit a revised bid, the third attempt to nail down a replacement for the country's aging Patriot fleet. For its part, the Defence Ministry is still expecting a formal offer later this summer, a spokeswoman told Defense News on Friday. Hiccups lie mostly within the industry team, specifically relating to how and if the U.S. defense giant Lockheed can bend to Berlin's demands that the contractors absorb the majority of risk if problems come up in the program. German officials have so stretched the scope of desired capabilities of the former Medium Extended Air Defense System — the basis for TLVS — that the effort amounts to a new development, including a ramp for integrating defenses against hypersonic missiles. Those high-tech aspirations come packaged in Germany's new defense acquisition process that seeks to right past procurement failures by pushing more liability to companies. The ongoing negotiations come with the understanding that the new offer, if Lockheed decides to go forward sometime next month, equates to a contract-ready agreement that would be presented to lawmakers after the summer break. Next year is an election year in Germany, which means there's little appetite to push big-ticket acquisitions come January. A lot hangs on the TLVS program for Lockheed, as German defense leaders last year connected its outcome to the competition for a new heavy-lift helicopter fleet. Lockheed's subsidiary Sikorsky is offering the CH-53K for that race, going against Boeing's CH-47 Chinook. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/07/17/its-do-or-die-for-germanys-new-missile-defense-weapon/

Nathan Strout Starting in 1961, the National Reconnaissance Office has been tasked with designing, building, launching and operating the United States' fleet of intelligence satellites. Over the years, that mission has evolved, bolting on new components and missions. Now in 2020, the NRO is looking to change once again, moving beyond the status quo by issuing a new set of contracts toward the end of this year that will reshape the intelligence community's relationship with commercial imagery. Peter Muend, the head of NRO's commercial imagery efforts, told C4ISRNET that the agency is “obviously very committed to utilizing commercial imagery to the maximum extent practical in support of defense, national security and all the other mission areas that we serve.” “I think the best philosophy that underpins that is one that says ‘We really are looking to buy everywhere we can and only build what we have to—what's really not available on the commercial market,‘” Muend said. An important condition to that approach is that the commercial imagery market actually have commercial support. In other words, Muend doesn't want any of these companies to exist solely to support government requirements. There should be a real commercial market for these capabilities, which will help drive down costs for the government. To understand the agency's approach to commercial imagery, it's best to go back to 2017, when the NRO took over the role of acquiring commercial satellite imagery on behalf of the intelligence community from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Under this new paradigm, NGA serves as the geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) functional manager, determining what imagery the intelligence community needs and writing those requirements, but it's up to NRO to determine how those requirements are filled. Then in 2018, another step occurred when the NGA's EnhancedView contract was transferred to NRO, which issued a follow-on contract to Maxar shortly thereafter. That single EnhancedView contract has been one of the primary source of commercial imagery for the intelligence community for years. The goal now is to start the move beyond EnhancedView. That process started in 2019, when the NRO issued a request for information (RFI) to see what types, quality and quantity of imagery industry could provide. For Muend, that RFI sent a message to industry: the intelligence community was looking to the commercial sector for imagery that went beyond the requirements, capacity and capability the government had sought in the past. That RFI initially led to a trio of study contracts for Maxar, BlackSky and Planet. “Really, the purpose of those study contracts was to serve a couple purposes, one being to take a look at their systems and really understand their performance from a modeling and simulation standpoint to really see what they can do and how they would measure up and meet our capability,” said Muend. “The other part was really to assess imagery, because of course a lot of the input we got back from the RFI emphasized the quality of the imagery and how much they could deliver. It's one thing to get an RFI response. It's another thing to actually formally assess and measure.” In the year since those first study contracts were issued, the agency has issued a handful of other study contracts, primarily to companies offering different phenomenologies than electro-optical imagery, including synthetic aperture radar and radio frequency sensing. Muend clarified that those study contracts were less focused on purchasing data from those phenomenologies and more focused on ensuring the agency's systems could interface with those phenomenologies. “We certainly see a very vibrant future ahead for those phenomenologies. We're excited for them to continue to mature and we're certainly looking forward to taking advantage of them in the future,” said Muend. “But again, the specific contracts we're moving forward with toward the end of the year are more focused on the electro-optical side.” Back on that electro-optical side of things, the study contracts have been mutually beneficial, said Muend. Not only has NRO learned what capabilities are available commercially and how they can be incorporated, the vendors have gotten a better understanding of what the agency is looking for. “And then on the imagery side, we've certainly learned a lot — certainly some of the differences between what the glossy advertising sheets say and then what's really available when looked at analytically in the way that we and the larger community do,” said Muend. When pressed on that point, Muend declined to characterize whether any company had failed to live up to or superseded its claims. All of those efforts are leading up to source selection and contract awards toward the end of the year. Muend noted that there were likely to be awards to multiple companies and those contracts will specifically pertain to electo-optical imagery. “One thing that we have seen out of our study contracts and our market research is that no single provider can currently meet what we're asking for out of our requirements. So it is going to be an aggregate of capability from multiple vendors, and in addition it's going to be something that they're going to have to grow into over time, that they expand their capabilities to meet our needs,” he explained. As a precursor to that decision, NRO issued an RFI in June to help the agency standardize end user license agreements for imagery. Those agreements govern how the agency is able to use and share the imagery it collects, explained Muend. As NRO prepares to begin purchasing imagery from multiple companies, it wants to make sure those agreements are clear, intuitive and broadly uniform. “We're very, very excited about the future, about establishing a new set of operational imagery contracts to not only take advantage of our current industry base, but the growing new entrants and new providers as well,” said Muend. “We're eager to get moving.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2020/07/17/how-the-intelligence-community-is-approaching-commercial-imagery/

Lt. Col. Brett Lindberg and Jan Kallberg There is always something taken away when there are added functionalities. Does the concept of wearing augmented reality that digitally provides situational awareness create an upside that outweighs what it takes away for rifleman skills? The supercharged hearing, six senses for those equipped, broader view of sight, picking up smells, changes in lights and shadows, slightest change in the near environment: With all these close-action skills, will augmented reality create more distraction than enhancement? Is it too early to push digital situational awareness all the way down to the soldier in maneuver units? Is the upside present? Naturally, all new defense technology takes time to find its place in the fight. The helicopter was invented in the 1930s, and it found a limited military role in the Korean War, not meeting the military expectation of higher impact. But 15 years later, it played a pivotal role in the war in Vietnam. New technology is not only technology — the human component to properly implement it is likely slower than the technological advancements. It is always easier to question than explain, and we understand that many thoughts and thousands of work hours have gone into designing the early augmented reality systems. However, still we find our questions worth discussing because once fielded, utilized and put into action in a conflict, it is too late to raise any concerns. This is the time to discuss. How reliable are the sensors? Can the sensors be easily spoofed? Is it too early to push it all the way down to the individual soldier? A technologically advanced adversary will likely devote research already in peacetime to develop one-time use, tossable, simple, low-cost devices that can — in close combat — create spurious sensor data and derail augmented reality. If the integrity of the sensor data is in question, it will likely force commanders to refrain from using augmented reality. A similar, relevant issue is the extent of the augmented reality technology's electromagnetic signature. Will the interconnectivity of the squad's augmented reality compromise the unit and deliver information to the enemy? What we do not want to face is a situation where adversaries can pinpoint the location or proximity to U.S. forces by simple detection measures. So, worst-case scenario, inexpensive devices can nullify a significant U.S. investment in technology, training and tactics. Added to the loss of usable augmented reality equipment, the soldiers could be “HUD-crippled.” Navy aviators use the term “HUD-cripple” to visualize a complete dependency of heads-up displays in the cockpit. The “HUD-cripple” is the loss of traditional Navy aviator skills such as landing on an aircraft carrier without the heads-up display. Will soldiers have retained the skills to fight effectively without augmented reality if it goes down? Technical advancements bring us new options and abilities, and they increase mission success. But as with all uncharted territory, they also bring surprises and unanticipated outfalls. During the war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, military aviation instruments took a significant leap forward, going from World War II-styled gauges in fixed-winged Douglas A-1 Skyraider planes to an earlier version of today's instrumentation in McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle fighter jets rolled out as the war in Vietnam came to an end. Parallel with the military advancements, these avionic upgrades were transposed into civilian cockpits with increased complexity and variations, as jetliners are multi-engine airframes, where the number of information points and alarms became numerous in the jetliner cockpit. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, civilian aviation faced several accidents that were hard to explain with standard aviation physics and crash evidence. Instead, the conversations recorded in the black boxes revealed these fatal air crashes. Several of the deadly crashes could have had another outcome if the pilots had not become overwhelmed by all the blinking lights, alarms, buzzers and avionics grabbing their attention, so the pilots lost situational awareness and focus. The warnings, avionics and buzzers had the correct information, but the presentation was a tsunami of red blinkers and alarming sounds, lacking any hints on how to prioritize what needs to be done to recover from a dangerous in-flight emergency. In our view, the key to effective augmented reality is to structure and segment what matters and when. Units — and it varies from soldier to soldier — have different experience levels, so information has a variation in value down to the soldier level. In research design, you seek to explain as much as you can with as little as you can without losing rigor. The same challenge goes for augmented reality, where rigor could be said to be the integrity of the information. Transferred to the ground-fighting world, are we, as an engineering-driven nation, so technology-happy that instead of creating tools for increased survivability and mission success, we initially increase the risks for the war fighter and only correct these after we suffered a surprise in combat? We understand that implementing augmented reality is a long process that is just now at the stage of proving the concept; with setbacks and successes, where are we on the learning curve? In our view, synthetic learning environments have already matured and provide an ample opportunity to use the augmented reality technology with a high return on investment. The opportunities reside in knowledge transfer, sharing experiences, preparing for an ever-changing operational environment, and by doing so, increasing soldiers' survivability and ensuring mission success. The question is: Are we ready to rely on augmented reality in combat? Lt. Col. Brett Lindberg is a research scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a simulation operations officer. Jan Kallberg is a research scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, and an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, the U.S. Military Academy or the U.S. Defense Department. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/07/17/augmented-reality-seeing-the-benefits-is-believing/