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February 12, 2023 | Information, Other Defence

Information toolkit for suppliers: How to obtain a security clearance

This information toolkit provides quick and easy access to resources and tools designed to help your organization obtain a security clearance with Public Services and Procurement Canada's Contract Security Program (CSP).

The toolkit goes through the steps that your organization and employees must follow before bidding or working on a federal government contract with security requirements. Under each step, you will find links to online resources, guides, videos and training materials.

These resources and tools will give your organization and employees practical advice on how to complete security screening activities and forms, and comply with CSP requirements.

Sections

Step 1: Security requirements and types of security clearance

Understand what are security requirements and which type of security clearance your organization may need to bid or work on a federal government contract.

Step 2: Sponsorship

Learn how your organization must be sponsored to get security screened by the CSP.

Step 3: Organization security screening

Learn the main steps and forms your organization will need to complete to be screened by the CSP.

Step 4: Personnel security screening

Once screened by the CSP, learn how your organization can request the appropriate level of personnel screening for eligible employees.

Step 5: Subcontracting

Learn how to request security screening for subcontractors to ensure they meet the security requirements of a federal government contract.

Step 6: Maintaining compliance

Understand what your organization and employees will be required to do to stay compliant with the security requirements of a federal government contract.

More information

If you have any questions or need one-on-one assistance, please do not hesitate to contact the Contract Security Program's client service centre.

Find out where to send your completed documentation in the submitting request, forms and other documents for contract security.

 

https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/esc-src/ressources-resources/tif-its-eng.html

On the same subject

  • Coronavirus has kept us close to home. It’s a helpful lesson for strengthening national defense.

    September 17, 2020 | Information, Other Defence

    Coronavirus has kept us close to home. It’s a helpful lesson for strengthening national defense.

    Justin P. Oberman Despite being warned, with impressive precision, about the dangers of so-called black swan events, America tends to ignore or downplay them because they seem remote, or the perceived financial, societal and political costs are too great. In the aftermath of 9/11, of Hurricane Katrina and other major domestic tragedies, we too often learn that our relevant capabilities have atrophied. Now, following perhaps the most devastating such event — the COVID-19 pandemic — the defense industrial base is actively seeking billions of dollars to prop it up without necessarily committing to making step-function leaps forward in a highly complex threat environment. And while keeping the thousands of small companies that support the defense primes alive is important, the Pentagon — flush with cash and a mandate to act quickly to react to the pandemic — should use this opportunity to refine its technology acquisition approach, in part by doing more to engage nontraditional defense firms. The reasons for bringing in new ideas for defense are clear. Just last week, the Department of Defense released its annual report to Congress on China, which states that “China has already achieved parity with — or even exceeded — the United States in several military modernization areas.” Even more concerning, DoD analysts describe China's military-civil fusion development strategy as “a nationwide endeavor that seeks to ‘fuse' its economic and social development strategies with its security strategies to build an integrated national strategic system and capabilities in support of China's national rejuvenation goals.” The United States doesn't need and shouldn't pursue a “fusion” strategy; rather, we need a better approach to strengthening the defense industrial base and engaging with innovators. The United States is at risk of losing its ability to manufacture critical national security technology thanks to a combination of byzantine domestic procurement processes, offshoring and overseas competitors. To counter these and other negative trends, the DoD needs a sustainable, continuous innovation model. In Silicon Valley, everyone from the biggest players to the youngest startups view working against or around slow, tired establishment organizations as almost a prerequisite to success (Uber vs. taxis, Tesla vs. legacy automakers, Amazon vs. everybody). Despite the Pentagon's attractive budget and important missions, many innovators are repelled by restrictive requirements, lengthy sales cycles, high costs of bidding and a deck often stacked in favor of large prime contractors. The DoD must throw open its doors to innovators and free itself to make bets; if it does, it will get more world-class tools for its mission owners. The department should: Make requirements less prescriptive, easier to understand and run two ways. Develop an outreach program for innovators that uses channels they're already occupying, in language they understand, with requirements that are compelling. Encourage two-way communication that surfaces non-obvious solutions to critical defense missions. At the Transportation Security Administration, we worked with an In-Q-Tel-backed company that was founded in Las Vegas to catch casino cheats; the Pentagon should look for similar outside-the-box opportunities. Engage substantively with private sector innovation experts. The best investors and executives back successful entrepreneurs, mentor them as they refine their offerings and support world-changing scale. The DoD needs these skill sets and should set up (unpaid) innovation mentoring boards. Insert flexibility into contracting and financing. To remove barriers to entry without sacrificing quality, the DoD should: Create “off-campus” labs to mitigate procurement and security clearance delays. Build on the work of Dr. Will Roper, the assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, technology and logistics. to ensure innovators don't run out of funding. In what would be a great advancement and threshold change, work with Congress to arrange for private sector investment in key technologies to bolster programs of record. Lift government price and margin controls. Cost, often controlled through the anti-innovation technique of lowest-price, technically acceptable contracts, is not the key metric, particularly in emerging, dynamic technologies. What matters are outcomes and value. Restricting profit to a bureaucrat-calculated rate of 15 percent will drive innovative and nimble companies away from the DoD. Cost does not effectively incorporate other important metrics, including risk, prior investment and return on investment. Order quantities and frequency are also critical in determining reasonable costs, as these factors underpin business cases. It's not a coincidence that the world's largest, most innovative economy belongs to the same country that has the world's largest, most lethal military and is the world's most attractive target for emerging threats. The threat environment (intensified by the pandemic) makes clear that we need to change our approach; the state of our economy means that we need to start now. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/09/16/coronavirus-has-kept-us-close-to-home-its-a-helpful-lesson-for-strengthening-national-defense/

  • Defence procurement - Land

    February 2, 2018 | Information, Land

    Defence procurement - Land

    The Major projects - Land directorate is responsible for acquisition related to several Department of National Defence projects, including the Medium support vehicle system project and the Tactical armoured patrol vehicle project. Medium support vehicle system Logistic vehicle modernization Tactical armoured patrol vehicle Medium support vehicle system A cornerstone of army transformation, the Medium support vehicle system project will replace the department of National Defence's existing Medium logistics vehicle wheeled with two new vehicles as follows: a quantity of up to 1,500 Standard Military Pattern trucks for operational units as well as logistics support for the life expectancy of the vehicle estimated at 20 years; and a quantity of 1,300 "Militarized" Commercial Off-The-Shelf trucks for Reserve training in Canada. The project will also acquire up to 300 trailers, up to 150 armour protection systems and up to 1,000 Special Equipment Vehicles (SEV) Shelters and associated Kitting. The kits consist of tailored workspaces such as medical units or command posts, which are fitted to the SEV Shelters. Once installed on a truck, they convert that vehicle into a specialized unit such as a dental clinic or an equipment repair facility. Logistic vehicle modernization The Logistic vehicle modernisation project seeks to acquire modern light and have logistice vehicle fleet capabilities. Project deliverables may include, but not be limited to, new vehicles, trailers, flat racks, specialized vehicle mounted modules, special containers and bulk material handling systems. The project is replacing two fleets: the Heavy logistic vehicle wheeled and the Logistic support vehicle wheeled, and two minor fleets: the Heavy engineer support vehicles generations 1 and 2. These trucks will be used to carry light and heavy cargo with various vehicle configurations and roles for domestic and expeditionary training and operations. These fleets of light and heavy logistics vehicles are in need of replacement due to their age and waning ability. Tactical armoured patrol vehicle On June 7, 2012, the Government of Canada awarded Textron Systems Canada Inc. (TSCI), contracts for 500 Tactical armoured patrol vehicles (TAPV), as well as logistics support for the life expectancy of the vehicle estimated at 25 years. TSCI was awarded the contracts after a comprehensive two-stage procurement process involving a Statement of Interest and Qualification phase as well as a Request for Proposal process in which four companies ultimately submitted proposals. Canada's Industrial and Regional Benefit policy was a mandatory element of the TAPV procurement, where TSCI is required to undertake business activity in Canada valued at 100 percent of the value of both TAPV contracts, thereby ensuring a dollar-for-dollar investment in the canadian economy. The TAPV is a wheeled combat vehicle that will fulfill a wide variety of roles including but not limited to reconnaissance and surveillance, security, command and control, cargo, and armored personnel carrier. It will have a high degree of tactical mobility and provide a very high degree of survivability to its crew. Armoured vehicles The Armoured vehicles projects directorate is responsible for the acquisition, integration and in-service support of Wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles. In addition, the Directorate is responsible for managing the procurement of the following projects under the Family of land combat vehicles (FLCV) program, which seeks to upgrade or replace the current fleet of land combat vehicles. The FLCV projects under the directorate responsibility consist of the Light armoured vehicle (LAV III) upgrade and the Force mobility enhancement (FME). Leopard 2 family of vehicles Wheeled light armoured vehicles support Project management office light armoured vehicles and light armoured vehicle III upgrade Light armoured vehicle – Reconnaissance surveillance system upgrade project Leopard 2 family of vehicles The Leopard 2 family of vehicles consists of the Tank replacement project and the Force mobility enhancement project. The Tank replacement project was established in 2007 to loan combat-ready Leopard 2 A6M tanks from Germany to support the operation in Afghanistan and to acquire 100 surplus modern Leopard 2 main battle tanks, from the Netherlands, to meet the operational and training needs of the department of National Defence. The total project value is estimated at $650M. Delivery of the Leopard 2 A4 training tank variant was completed in October 2014. The project also procures Leopard 2-based Armoured recovery vehicles (ARV) to support the Leopard 2 main battle tank fleets. Delivery of the first ARV was completed in November 2014. The last ARV is scheduled to be delivered in December 2015. The Force mobility enhancement project was established in 2009 for the acquisition of Leopard 2-based armoured engineering vehicles to support the Leopard 2 main battle tank fleets and to procure and integrate implements for the various Leopard 2 fleets, such as mine rollers, mine ploughs and dozer blades. The total project value is estimated at $376M. Initial delivery of the vehicles is expected in November 2015. Wheeled light armoured vehicles support Responsible for in-service support of the Canadian Forces fleets of Wheeled Light Armoured Vehicles (WLAV) consisting of 651 LAV III, 203 Coyote, 199 Bison and 75 RG-31. In-service support consists of spare part procurement, repair and overhaul, program management, fleet management and engineering support services. The Optimized Weapon System Support (OWSS) contract for the WLAV is the main procurement instrument, and covers the vast majority of the required support. A significant portion of OWSS for WLAVis sub-contracted. Separate government contracts exist to cover other needs associated with additional armoured protection and specialized armament. In-service support is also provided to other WLAV variants under separate contractual arrangements with their respective Original Equipment Manufacturers. Prime Contractor: General Dynamics Land Systems – Canada, London, Ontario. Project management office light armoured vehicles and light armoured vehicle III upgrade The Project management office (PMO) Light armoured vehicles (LAV) provides strategic procurement leadership, contract management and administration services to the department of National Defence for all LAV projects. It is now delivering the LAV III upgrade project. The LAV III upgrade project valued at $1.4B, will deliver mobility, protection and lethality upgrades on 550 LAV IIIs, with an option for an additional 60, over the next three years. Light armoured vehicle – Reconnaissance surveillance system upgrade project The PMO LAV is also responsible for developing and executing the procurement strategy, as well as for providing contract management, for the Department of National Defence's LRSS Upgrade project. This Project will modernize Land Force reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Modernization will be achieved through the acquisition of new sensor suites, vehicle and ground mounts, operator control stations and silent watch power supplies. These systems and equipment will collectively increase the performance of the LRSS and enhance the capacity to collect, process and disseminate information on the battlefield. The contracting office will be responsible for the overall management of this complex acquisition process, the timely delivery of procurement services, and to provide leadership, expertise and strategic level guidance in sourcing the LRSS from industry. https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/terre-land/index-eng.html

  • The real obstacle for reforming military spending isn’t in the defence ministry. It’s the Treasury Board

    November 14, 2019 | Information, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    The real obstacle for reforming military spending isn’t in the defence ministry. It’s the Treasury Board

    KEN HANSEN Ken Hansen is an independent defence and security analyst and owner of Hansen Maritime Horizons. Retired from the Royal Canadian Navy in 2009 in the rank of commander, he is also a contributor to the security affairs committee for the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia. For people inside the Department of National Defence, a minority Parliament – coupled with election promises for increased social spending and tax cuts – represents an uneasy calculus. Defence spending is always on the chopping block because it represents the largest pool of discretionary spending in the federal budget, and every party spent the recent federal election campaign being vague about military policy – offering some kind of oversight-body reform or scrutiny over the billions of dollars that have been earmarked, even as they lent their support to ensuring the military has the equipment it needs. In particular, the single largest program in Canadian defence history – the Canadian Combat Ship plan for 15 warships – will be a tantalizing target for politicians looking to get rid of perceived fat. Such cuts to shipbuilding programs have even already become normalized: The order for Halifax-class frigates were trimmed to 12 from 18 in 1983 and the Iroquois-class destroyers to four from six in 1964, to name just two. The political leaders weren't wrong when they said the military procurement system is broken. But regardless of which party had won this past election, and no matter what tweaks at the edges that the Liberal minority government and its potential supporters pursue, the reality is that the core issue remains unaddressed: Treasury Board's bulk approach to purchasing the country's military kit. Treasury Board policy states that bulk buys are how military procurement should be done, to ensure the lowest per-unit cost. But this forces tough decisions about what to buy, since the larger the order, the longer it will take to produce them all – not to mention the problems involved with trying to predict the future of warfare. Information systems become outdated in five years; weapons and sensors in 10. With a planned operating life of 25 years, any ships ordered today will be out-of-date by the time the first are delivered, and fully obsolete by the time the last one arrives. Block purchasing leads to block obsolescence. Traditionally, when technological change threatens to render military systems obsolete, the best way to hedge was to order in batches of the smallest number acceptable. In the years before the world wars, for instance, countries working to build competent naval forces put less emphasis on fleet numbers and more on technology and industrial capacity until the last moments before conflict. Technological competence was as important as numbers for fleet commanders. Another outcome of bulk buys is that the volume means that they happen only every two to three decades (or longer, in the worst cases). With such lengthy dry spells between purchases, it is impossible to retain corporate knowledge in either the defence or civilian branches of government. More frequent purchasing keeps the process alive in both practice and concept, with lessons learned that can be implemented by the same people who made the mistakes in the first place. Such irregularly timed purchases have created desperation among defence planners whose vision of the future consists of short golden days of competence and pride, followed by long years of rust-out and irrelevance. Unwittingly, the dark decades were in large part of the military's own making because of its desperate desire to acquire the absolute best model available – a practice known as “gold-plating” – instead of working steadily to build capacity and skill that would address long-range fleet needs. This is a collision of interests. The Treasury Board looks only at capital-acquisition decisions from the perspective of the buyer. It's left to the military to worry about how long they may have to operate obsolescent or obsolete equipment and systems, and to do the necessary mid-life upgrading, which is partly why costs balloon spectacularly. Life-cycle cost data is actually far more important that the initial sticker shock of the newest and shiniest model advocated by the military's leadership. The mindset needs to change. Politicians who implement bureaucratic change will probably see some improvements in decision-making. But the biggest obstacle to defence procurement is that bulk purchasing is our lone approach, and that it happens only every few decades. Regular, planned capital acquisition is the best path forward, but all paths to the future must first run through the Treasury Board. No amount of political policy adjustment can change that. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-real-obstacle-for-reforming-military-spending-isnt-in-the-defence/

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