Contract Awards by US Department of Defense – September 17, 2020

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  February 2, 2018 | Information, Land

  Defence procurement - Land

  The Major projects - Land directorate is responsible for acquisition related to several Department of National Defence projects, including the Medium support vehicle system project and the Tactical armoured patrol vehicle project. Medium support vehicle system Logistic vehicle modernization Tactical armoured patrol vehicle Medium support vehicle system A cornerstone of army transformation, the Medium support vehicle system project will replace the department of National Defence's existing Medium logistics vehicle wheeled with two new vehicles as follows: a quantity of up to 1,500 Standard Military Pattern trucks for operational units as well as logistics support for the life expectancy of the vehicle estimated at 20 years; and a quantity of 1,300 "Militarized" Commercial Off-The-Shelf trucks for Reserve training in Canada. The project will also acquire up to 300 trailers, up to 150 armour protection systems and up to 1,000 Special Equipment Vehicles (SEV) Shelters and associated Kitting. The kits consist of tailored workspaces such as medical units or command posts, which are fitted to the SEV Shelters. Once installed on a truck, they convert that vehicle into a specialized unit such as a dental clinic or an equipment repair facility. Logistic vehicle modernization The Logistic vehicle modernisation project seeks to acquire modern light and have logistice vehicle fleet capabilities. Project deliverables may include, but not be limited to, new vehicles, trailers, flat racks, specialized vehicle mounted modules, special containers and bulk material handling systems. The project is replacing two fleets: the Heavy logistic vehicle wheeled and the Logistic support vehicle wheeled, and two minor fleets: the Heavy engineer support vehicles generations 1 and 2. These trucks will be used to carry light and heavy cargo with various vehicle configurations and roles for domestic and expeditionary training and operations. These fleets of light and heavy logistics vehicles are in need of replacement due to their age and waning ability. Tactical armoured patrol vehicle On June 7, 2012, the Government of Canada awarded Textron Systems Canada Inc. (TSCI), contracts for 500 Tactical armoured patrol vehicles (TAPV), as well as logistics support for the life expectancy of the vehicle estimated at 25 years. TSCI was awarded the contracts after a comprehensive two-stage procurement process involving a Statement of Interest and Qualification phase as well as a Request for Proposal process in which four companies ultimately submitted proposals. Canada's Industrial and Regional Benefit policy was a mandatory element of the TAPV procurement, where TSCI is required to undertake business activity in Canada valued at 100 percent of the value of both TAPV contracts, thereby ensuring a dollar-for-dollar investment in the canadian economy. The TAPV is a wheeled combat vehicle that will fulfill a wide variety of roles including but not limited to reconnaissance and surveillance, security, command and control, cargo, and armored personnel carrier. It will have a high degree of tactical mobility and provide a very high degree of survivability to its crew. Armoured vehicles The Armoured vehicles projects directorate is responsible for the acquisition, integration and in-service support of Wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles. In addition, the Directorate is responsible for managing the procurement of the following projects under the Family of land combat vehicles (FLCV) program, which seeks to upgrade or replace the current fleet of land combat vehicles. The FLCV projects under the directorate responsibility consist of the Light armoured vehicle (LAV III) upgrade and the Force mobility enhancement (FME). Leopard 2 family of vehicles Wheeled light armoured vehicles support Project management office light armoured vehicles and light armoured vehicle III upgrade Light armoured vehicle – Reconnaissance surveillance system upgrade project Leopard 2 family of vehicles The Leopard 2 family of vehicles consists of the Tank replacement project and the Force mobility enhancement project. The Tank replacement project was established in 2007 to loan combat-ready Leopard 2 A6M tanks from Germany to support the operation in Afghanistan and to acquire 100 surplus modern Leopard 2 main battle tanks, from the Netherlands, to meet the operational and training needs of the department of National Defence. The total project value is estimated at $650M. Delivery of the Leopard 2 A4 training tank variant was completed in October 2014. The project also procures Leopard 2-based Armoured recovery vehicles (ARV) to support the Leopard 2 main battle tank fleets. Delivery of the first ARV was completed in November 2014. The last ARV is scheduled to be delivered in December 2015. The Force mobility enhancement project was established in 2009 for the acquisition of Leopard 2-based armoured engineering vehicles to support the Leopard 2 main battle tank fleets and to procure and integrate implements for the various Leopard 2 fleets, such as mine rollers, mine ploughs and dozer blades. The total project value is estimated at $376M. Initial delivery of the vehicles is expected in November 2015. Wheeled light armoured vehicles support Responsible for in-service support of the Canadian Forces fleets of Wheeled Light Armoured Vehicles (WLAV) consisting of 651 LAV III, 203 Coyote, 199 Bison and 75 RG-31. In-service support consists of spare part procurement, repair and overhaul, program management, fleet management and engineering support services. The Optimized Weapon System Support (OWSS) contract for the WLAV is the main procurement instrument, and covers the vast majority of the required support. A significant portion of OWSS for WLAVis sub-contracted. Separate government contracts exist to cover other needs associated with additional armoured protection and specialized armament. In-service support is also provided to other WLAV variants under separate contractual arrangements with their respective Original Equipment Manufacturers. Prime Contractor: General Dynamics Land Systems – Canada, London, Ontario. Project management office light armoured vehicles and light armoured vehicle III upgrade The Project management office (PMO) Light armoured vehicles (LAV) provides strategic procurement leadership, contract management and administration services to the department of National Defence for all LAV projects. It is now delivering the LAV III upgrade project. The LAV III upgrade project valued at $1.4B, will deliver mobility, protection and lethality upgrades on 550 LAV IIIs, with an option for an additional 60, over the next three years. Light armoured vehicle – Reconnaissance surveillance system upgrade project The PMO LAV is also responsible for developing and executing the procurement strategy, as well as for providing contract management, for the Department of National Defence's LRSS Upgrade project. This Project will modernize Land Force reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Modernization will be achieved through the acquisition of new sensor suites, vehicle and ground mounts, operator control stations and silent watch power supplies. These systems and equipment will collectively increase the performance of the LRSS and enhance the capacity to collect, process and disseminate information on the battlefield. The contracting office will be responsible for the overall management of this complex acquisition process, the timely delivery of procurement services, and to provide leadership, expertise and strategic level guidance in sourcing the LRSS from industry. https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/terre-land/index-eng.html

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  May 20, 2022 | Information, Other Defence

  Podcast: The Next World After This: A&D Enters the Metaverse

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  August 27, 2019 | Information, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Avoiding past mistakes: Are the Army’s modernization plans on the right course?

  By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — To avoid past mistakes that have all but crippled the Army's ability to procure new equipment, the service should ensure its top modernization priorities are aligned with its emerging warfighting doctrine, which could mean rearranging some of its top efforts, conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation is arguing in a new report. The assessment comes at a time when the Army is preparing to release a new modernization strategy in short order. “From 2002 to 2014, for a variety of reasons, nearly every major modernization program was terminated,” the report's author Thomas Spoehr writes. Spoehr is the director of the Center of National Defense at Heritage. His former Army career was partly spent helping to develop the service's future year financial plans. Spoehr acknowledges that with the advent of a new four-star command — Army Futures Command — the programs envisioned to modernize the Army “are well-conceived,” but urges the services to look through a lens of how its priorities measure up in Multi-Domain Operations — a concept under development that will grow into its key warfighting doctrine. Spoehr also warns the Army's leaders that there needs to be a balance “of the lure of technology with the necessity" to buy new equipment. The service is steadfastly marching down a path to modernize and develop its capability in Long-Range Precision Fires, Next-Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the network, air-and-missile defense and soldier lethality, in order of importance. But Spoehr is proposing to drop NGCV and FVL to the bottom of the list because they would serve less effective roles when carrying out operations in an environment where territory is well defended against enemies like Russia and China. “The need for long-range precision fires and a precision-strike missile with a range of 310 km, for example, is grounded in the need to strip away Russian surface-to-air missile batteries and gain access,” Spoehr writes. “The linkages of other programs and initiatives are not as obvious and would benefit from an Army effort to make the connections either more explicit or reconsider requirements.” Spoehr points out that it's not clear, for example, how a Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft and a Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft “might survive against near-peer sophisticated integrated air defense capabilities like the Russian's capable Pantsir-S1 SA-22 system. “Even if the aircraft's speed is doubled or tripled, it will not outrun the Pantsir's 9M335 missile,” he writes. “Nowhere in the MDO concept is a compelling case made for the use of Army aviation, combined with a relative youth of Army aviation fleets,” he adds. Instead, Spoehr said, the priorities “should be based on an evaluation of current versus required capabilities, assessed against the capability's overall criticality to success, and all tied to a future aim point-2030, by a force employing MDO doctrine.” This means, he argues, that the Army's network should be prioritized just below LRPF, followed by AMD and soldier lethality. Ranked at number five and six would be NGCV and FVL, respectively. According to Spoehr, “nothing has come forward to suggest that there is a technological advancement that will make a next generation of combat vehicles significantly better.” Additionally, the Army should not try to force the key requirement of making its Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle replacement — the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle — robotically operated or autonomous until the network matures to support the capability, the report notes. The Army needs a network “that is simple, reliable and less fragile than its current systems,” Spoehr says. “These capabilities may need to come at the expense of capacity,” which the Army appears to be doing, he notes. Spoehr also suggests that the Army invest less in hypersonic offensive capability and more in defensive capability. But ensuring effective modernization of the force and avoiding past failures is just as much a management challenge as it is overcoming technological and cost hurdles. One of the phenomena Spoehr observed during his time serving in the military, particularly at the Pentagon, is what he calls “groupthink,” where those who spend time together begin to think alike and make decisions without those around them questioning actions. Additionally, subordinates tend to avoid disagreeing with those in charge. Groupthink has been the culprit when it comes to major failure in development and acquisition programs in the past, so the Army should “zealously promote critical thinking and avoid groupthink,” Spoehr writes. The service should “promote a free and open dialogue in journals and forums” and “exercise caution when senior leaders endorse specific system attributes or requirements to avoid closing down discussion.” The report acknowledges that the Army “is making a concerted effort to change to meet the future,” such as standing up AFC and aligning its future doctrine with materiel solutions more closely. It's important the Army keep sight of what it's actually trying to do with its future capability, the report warns. “Rather than seeking to match and exceed each of our adversary's investments, the Army must focus on enabling its own operational concepts and seeking answers to tough operational and tactical problems,” it states. Elsewhere in the overarching analysis, Spoehr recommends growing the force, as well ensuring its effective modernization to include roughly 50 Brigade Combat Teams and an end-strength of at least 540,000 active soldiers. He suggests reducing investment in infantry brigade combat teams in favor of armored BCTs, but also to keep capability to fight in a counter-insurgency environment as well, such as keeping the Security Force Assistance Brigades. The third such formation is preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. The Army also needs to grow faster and must find ways to resolve recent problems with recruiting, Spoehr said, recommending that the service grow at a rate faster than 2,000 regular Army soldiers per year. And force allocation should also be reconsidered, Spoehr argues, recommending that the Army should create a new field headquarters in Europe and, when appropriate, do so in the Indo-Pacific. Overall, “the task for the Army is no less than to develop a force capable of deterring and defeating aggression by China and Russia, while also remaining prepared to deal with other regional adversaries (Iraq and North Korea), violent extremist organizations, and other unforeseen challenges,” Spoehr said. What's hard for the Army is that it lacks “the certainty of a single principal competitor” — the Soviet Union in 1980s, during the last buildup, for example, he noted. Because of the complicated global environment, Spoehr advocates for the Army to shift from thinking about a 20-year lead time for new, transformative capabilities and instead take a constant iterative and evolutionary approach to building the force. Under AFC, the Army is attempting to do just that. The Army can't wait “until the future is clear before acting,” he adds. “When dealing with a 1-million-person organization, equipping, training, and leader development typically takes at least a decade to make any substantive change,” Spoehr said. “The Army must therefore make bets now to remain a preeminent land power.” https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/08/22/avoiding-past-mistakes-are-the-armys-modernization-plans-on-the-right-course/