Nouvelles

(B2) L'Union européenne doit reconsidérer sa relation avec les Etats-Unis et l'OTAN pour faire émerger une stratégie de défense européenne. C'est ce qu'a défendu Jolyon Howorth, professeur émérite à la Harvard Kennedy School, durant les seconds entretiens européens de la défense à Paris jeudi (16 mai) Face à la création d'une armée européenne, trois obstacles... Les Américains s'inquiètent des conséquences d'une défense européenne pour leur leadership. Les Britanniques jouent l'ambivalence pour ne pas froisser les États-Unis. Les Européens peinent à se mettre d'accord sur la marche à suivre. Trois obstacles qui ont fait « échouer » les deux premières tentatives de forger une armée européenne, la Communauté Européenne de Défense (CED) dans les années 1950 et la première version de la politique de défense (la PESD ou politique européenne de sécurité et de défense) à la fin des années 1990 début 2000, et qui continuent à freiner les nouvelles initiatives. Les Américains, d'accord sur le principe d'une défense européenne Les Américains, souvent critiqués pour le retard que prennent les initiatives européennes en matière de défense, n'étaient pas toujours défavorables à l'idée et ne s'y « opposent pas par principe, au contraire ». Mais une question les taraude, celle des « conséquences pour le leadership de l'Alliance, voire pour son avenir » si une défense européenne crédible devait se former. D'où l'ambivalence des États-Unis sur cette idée que Eisenhower regardait pourtant en 1951 comme un des objectifs de l'Alliance, idée légitimée par les multiples injonctions américaines à augmenter les budgets européens de défense. Cette position confuse s'inscrit dans le débat existentiel qu'est la définition de la prochaine « grand strategyaméricaine », explique Jolyon Howorth. ... mais des inquiétudes subsistent sur leur leadership au sein de l'Alliance Après « quarante ans de leadership incontesté des alliés européens », le courant « liberal hegemon » qui définit la politique des Etats-Unis depuis longtemps se voit contester par les partisans de « l'offshore balancing ». Lesquels prônent un repli américain sur « un nombre fort limité de bases stratégiques » et un « transfert aux Européens de la responsabilité principale de leur propre sécurité ». La question reste ouverte alors que Donald Trump « semble s'y associer », sans toutefois « comprendre un instant le sens profond de ce débat stratégique ». Les Britanniques, réfractaires à toute intégration européenne Les Britanniques ont été, eux, « beaucoup plus réfractaires que les Américains au projet dès le début ». Et ils continueront de « freiner l'avancée des Européens vers une autonomie stratégique », rendant l'axe Paris-Berlin « d'autant plus urgent ». La vision britannique est celle d'une sécurité européenne b'tie sur une « clé de voûte » : l'OTAN. Les Européens étant simplement relégués à un rôle « complémentaire ». C'est pourquoi « Londres a bloqué toute avancée » qui aurait pu mener à une armée européenne tout en réclamant pourtant « à cor et à cri » un « engagement inconditionnel » à la sécurité européenne, selon le professeur, lui-même British. Pourtant fermement soutenue par Winston Churchill dès le début, la défense européenne a vite inquiété outre-Manche, le Royaume-Uni anxieux de « préserver le partenariat avec les États-Unis ». Le pays avait par exemple refusé la CED dès 1953, craignant que « le succès de l'armée européenne n'entraîne le désengagement américain ». Les Européens indécis et divisés Mais au final, les Européens sont leurs propres ennemis. Les divisions nationales sur la manière de construire l'Europe persistent et se retrouvent, « de façon profonde, au sein des familles politiques ». Mais avec le nouveau contexte géostratégique, de plus en plus complexe et multidimensionnel, « l'Union européenne ne peut plus se permettre le luxe de ses divisions internes ». Il faut repenser notre stratégie pour « passer de l'Europe de la défense, à la défense de l'Europe ». Ces divisions cristallisent l'opposition entre « l'intégrationnisme » prôné par Monnet et « l'intergouvernementalisme », selon le modèle gaullien. La politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) a, depuis Saint-Malo, et la déclaration franco-britannique de 1998, été développée dans le cadre de ce dernier, un modèle « de plus en plus mis en question ». Les dernières évolutions en matière de défense nous placent à nouveau « face à la confrontation de ces deux méthodologies contradictoires ». Trois défis majeurs aujourd'hui Définir une stratégie européenne propre Il faut développer une « grand strategy » à l'européenne martèle Jolyon Howorth. L'un des problèmes fondamentaux de la première version de la PSDC fut son « manque d'ambition » par « crainte de froisser » les Américains. Pourtant, « la seule ambition qui vaille pour l'Union européenne est d'assumer sa propre défense collective ». Et donc d'arrêter de penser qu'il est impossible pour l'Europe de se défendre sans le soutien américain. Et il faut « pouvoir s'adapter à la nouvelle donne planétaire ». « Après Trump, il n'y aura pas de retour à la case départ ». À quel prix « L'armée européenne ne s'achètera pas parmi les soldes de chez Tati ». Les États membres de l'OTAN ont dépensé « 264 milliards de dollars » sur les questions de défense en 2018. Si tous les pays avaient atteint l'objectif fixé par l'OTAN de 2% du PIB, cela aurait majoré la somme de « près de 102 milliards de dollars ». Mais une armée européenne autonome pourrait représenter jusqu'à « 467 milliards de dollars supplémentaires » rappelle l'universitaire, se basant sur une étude récente du International Institute for Security Studies (IISS) qui fait l'hypothèse d'un retrait américain d'Europe. Un engagement conséquent donc. Et avec qui ? Si beaucoup pensent que l'armée européenne sera forgée « à l'extérieur de l'OTAN, sans les Américains, voire contre », Jolyon Howorth n'en est pas persuadé. Une armée européenne ne doit pas être construite contre les Américains, mais « en bonne intelligence avec eux ». Car l'Alliance ne va pas se dissoudre de sitôt. Et elle peut avoir un rôle moteur alors qu'il existe actuellement « quatre-vingt projets de coopération » entre l'OTAN et l'UE, et que les Américains « n'arrêtent pas de nous demander des efforts accrus, de nous encourager à assumer le leadership stratégique dans notre voisinage ». Il faudrait plutôt revenir au scénario initial : une alliance « rééquilibrée » dans laquelle les Européens « prennent graduellement la part du lion » et les Américains jouent « le rôle de facilitateurs ». Pour former une alliance qui ne soit pas « structurée par la dépendance, encore moins par la servitude ». (Coline Traverson st.) https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2019/05/23/entretiens-europeens-de-la-defense-2019-une-grand-strategy-pour-leurope-j-howorth/

DARPA's Defense Sciences Office (DSO) will host Discover DSO Day (D3) on June 18, 2019, to facilitate discussion of technical research thrusts outlined in a new office-wide Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) solicitation expected in mid-June. Additionally, D3 will familiarize participants with DSO's mission and streamlined business practices designed to simplify the proposal process and accelerate the timeline from idea approval to research start date. The event will take place in the DARPA Conference Center, Arlington, Virginia, from 8:45 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. EDT, and the audio also will be webcast. Registration is required to attend in person or via webcast. One of six technical offices at DARPA, DSO identifies and pursues high-risk, high-payoff research initiatives across a broad spectrum of science and engineering disciplines and transforms them into game-changing technologies for U.S. national security. “D3 is an opportunity for the broader science and technology community to engage with DSO as we highlight key technical areas we're focusing on in the coming year,” said Valerie Browning, director of DSO. “We encourage potential proposers from small companies, universities, research centers and large companies to join us. We especially encourage those who've never done business with DARPA to come and learn about DSO and let us hear your novel ideas in the areas we're interested in.” Panels of DSO program managers will discuss concepts and ideas they are pursuing in each of the four technical areas listed below. Participants will have the opportunity to ask questions following each panel presentation: Frontiers in Math, Computation & Design: The increasingly complex, technologically sophisticated, fast-paced and dynamic military operational environment imposes fundamental challenges in how we design and plan for future military needs. The DoD implications of these trends drive a need for new math, computation, and design tools that enable trusted decision making at increased speed and with known confidence levels. Topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) mathematical, computational, and design frameworks and tools that provide robust solutions to challenging DoD problems such as planning, optimization, and platform design; (2) fundamental scientific underpinnings and limits of machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI); and (3) alternative computing models, architectures, and substrates for faster, more robust decision making. Limits of Sensing & Sensors: Sensing and measurement of signals ranging from “DC to daylight” are ubiquitous to military systems and missions. Surveillance, navigation, warfighter health monitoring, and target ID/tracking are just a few examples of missions and/or applications that rely on various sensing modalities. Topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) new sensing modalities, (2) fundamental sensing limits, (3) engineered materials that enable novel optics and imaging capabilities, (4) fundamental and practical limits of quantum enabled sensing and metrology, and (5) practical and deployable sensing and sensor designs. Complex Social Systems: Understanding social behavior and the dynamics of complex social networks is critically important for many military operations including stability, deterrence, compellence, counter-terrorism, shaping the environment, training, and mission planning. Additionally, increasingly robust machine capabilities in the form of automation, platforms, and artificial intelligence (AI) will fundamentally change how human teams frame problems, plan, and operate at tempo and manage complexity. Topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) accurate and scientifically validated models of the social dynamics underlying different kinds of conflict; (2) capabilities to improve understanding of causality in complex social systems; (3) artificial intelligence and other tools that enable improved human-machine symbiotic decision-making; and (4) new concepts in war-gaming and simulations to identify and understand options for deterrence and stability operations. Anticipating Surprise: Ultimately, the goal of DSO R&D investments is to ensure that U.S. warfighters have access to the most advanced technologies. Research funded under this thrust area supports scientific and technological discovery that leads to “leap ahead” capabilities for enhanced military readiness across multiple operational domains. Example topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) novel functional and structural materials and manufacturing processes; (2) materials for harsh environments; (3) defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Weapons of Mass Terror (WMD/WMT) threats; (4) energetic materials; (5) new propulsion concepts; and (6) novel approaches to energy storage and power generation. For D3 agenda and registration instructions, please visit: https://www.fbo.gov/spg/ODA/DARPA/CMO/DARPA-SN-19-52/listing.html https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-05-20a

By THERESA HITCHENS BOSTON: BAE Systems, the third-largest defense contractor in the world, is funding innovative small startups to get innovative technology quickly to its Defense Department customers. Through an initiative called FAST Labs, BAE is both providing seed capital directly to startups and funding a number of accelerators to widen the potential market. The standard tactics include simply buying a smaller company to gain its technology or investing in a startup in order to control the direction of its research. Instead, BAE's FAST Labs is attempting to serve as a middle man connecting startups with DoD customers and BAE's various units. “By giving [the startups] the feasibility money, we can expose them to those harsh requirements that exist in the aerospace and defense world, but we can also in turn do social engineering inside our company,” Jerry Wohletz, the vice president and general management of BAE FAST Labs, told me. The idea is to introduce the startups' designs to BAE's factory and engineering work force, he said, “because we need to get it out of R&D land and get it into those products and services” that BAE knows its defense customers are looking for. FAST Labs is focused on research related to next-generation electronics, intelligent autonomous systems, cyber, electronic warfare, and sensors and processing. Wohletz explained that BAE does in-house research on capabilities that are solely of interest to DoD and the Intelligence Community, but it is reaching out to startups in order to partner on products and services based on commercial market needs. “A lot of aerospace and defense companies have venture capital funds,” Wohletz said. “That's not what we are trying to do. This is not an equity play to drive bottom line performance. We talk here about innovation velocity. We want speed to market.” Therefore, BAE is also putting its money — but more importantly its time — into a number of technology accelerators, such as Techstars in Boston, Capitol Factory in Austin, Texas, and MASSChallenge with hubs in both cities. FAST Labs has a team of scouts whose job is to attend pitches all across the country. “This is not based on ownership. We leave them their freedom,” Francesca Scire-Scappuzzo, who heads the scout team, told me. “We want innovation not just to support our market, we want to support their own innovation” for the commercial market. “Other defense contractors are trying to get involved with venture capital, but they for the most part don't really get it. BAE was in early, and they had the benefit of being linked with us,” Lt. Col. Dave Harden, chief operating officer of AFWERX, the Air Force's innovation hub, told me during the Techstars Air Force Accelerator Demo Day here last Thursday. Indeed, BAE cosponsored the event, and put upfront investment in at least three of 10 start-up companies participating. Neither Wohletz or Scire-Scappuzzo would tell me the size of BAE's budget for startup investment, but Wohletz said “it's getting bigger every year.” Further, the company is using accelerators not just to help itself innovate, Wohletz said, but also to find foreign companies to partner with in bids where the buying country requires offsets, such as India. “It's a completely different way of looking at this than we have done in the past,” he summed up. https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/bae-makes-big-bet-on-small-companies-fast-labs/

We fund innovation through two main mechanisms, the Open Call for Innovation and Themed Competitions. Open Call for Innovation The Open Call exists to offer suppliers the opportunity to submit their ideas to defence and security stakeholders. The Open Call welcomes innovations that address defence and/or security challenges. Please see some examples of work we have funded here. The Open Call is open for proposals all year round, with assessment dates scheduled across the year. More information on assessment dates can be found here. Themed Competitions Themed Competitions exist to offer suppliers the opportunity to submit proposals around specific government areas of interest. Themed competitions may only run for a short time and have set closing dates. DASA has had various themed competitions covering a range of topics. For details on past competitions, please see here. To see examples of projects that have been funded through themed competitions, please see here. Competitions currently open for application Closing Date Competition Title 28 May 2019 Countering drones - finding and neutralising small UAS threats 11 June 2019 Developing the Royal Navy's autonomous underwater capability 18 June 2019 Semi-autonomous reconnaissance vehicles for the Army 26 June 2019 Space to innovate 1 July 2019 Future screening for aviation and borders 9 July 2019 Open Call for Innovation - Cycle 2 Various Help us scope future competitions We also host a number of events; please see here for a list of our upcoming events. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/apply-for-funding

By PAUL MCLEARY Europe has bristled at a letter sent to the EU from the Pentagon and State Department, which says proposed EU defense programs are unfair to the US defense industry. WASHINGTON: Pentagon and State Department officials have told the European Union they're “deeply concerned” over plans to potentially exclude US defense firms from competing for billions worth of new arms deals, suggesting the US could slap restrictions on buying European defense equipment in retaliation. At issue is the proposed $14 billion European Defence Fund, and a host of procurement programs under the the Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, the European economic alliance is undertaking. While the May 1 letter from Ellen Lord, Pentagon procurement chief, and Andrea Thompson, State's undersecretary for arms control and international security, expressed general support for the EU initiatives, it made clear the US would like to see significant changes in the draft language before the 28-country bloc votes on them as early as next month. The language in both documents, the US argues, feature intellectual property and export control restrictions that would act as “poison pills” to “effectively preclude participation by any company that uses U.S.-origin technology.” Overall, Lord and Thompson write, the conditions outlined in the EDF and PESCO documents “represent a dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defense sector.” If the restrictions are kept in place, the US officials warn, “it is clear that similar reciprocally imposed U.S. restrictions would not be welcomed by our European partners and Allies, and we would not relish having to consider them in the future.” But EU officials defended their efforts this week. Asked about the US letter, an EU spokesperson replied in an email that the EDF and PESCO will “complement and strengthen NATO,” at a time in which the Trump administration has made that a key policy goal, and “enable Europe to shoulder its fair share of the burden and responsibility for global security.” But it's clear the letter has rankled the Europeans. “The EU has an open and competitive defense procurement framework, in fact more so than the US procurement market,” the spokesperson wrote. “In the EU, there is no ‘Buy European Act.' 81 percent of the total value of international defense contracts in Europe go to US firms. The US defense market is three to four times larger than that of the EU, and yet imports from the EU are marginal for the US, while EU imports from the US are significant.” The official said that American companies with subsidiaries in the EU will remain eligible for funding under the EDF subject to security conditions “which are similar – in fact less restrictive – to the ones that EU companies face in the US.” The EU's High Representative Federica Mogherini told reporters Tuesday that PESCO projects aren't meant to be a vehicle to increase transAtlantic ties, and the EU will gladly continue doing business with non-EU defense companies. The program “is not defined to be an instrument for partnership,” she said. “It does not substitute other partnerships, including in the defense industry and research that we have already in place and that are essential for us,” she added. For years, non-NATO countries like Sweden and Finland have drawn closer to NATO and have increased ties with US defense firms while also building their own domestic defense capabilities, though the relationship hasn't always been smooth. While the US government is concerned over US companies being excluded, the PESCO effort has been developed explicitly to bolster the ability of European countries to produce their own weapons systems, cyber capabilities, and surveillance technologies. So-called “third states” — non EU members — may ask to participate in PESCO projects, but all of the member states must vote to allow them in. Lord and Thompson argue that walling-off EU projects from NATO efforts would lead to duplication and waste, while decreasing interoperability between the EU and NATO. It could also “potentially tum the clock back to the sometimes divisive discussions about EU defense initiatives that dominated our exchanges 15 years ago.” In the end, the US letter is just the latest turn in what has been a complex, up and down relationship between the US and Europe under the Trump administration. The president has loudly condemned Washington's closest allies in Europe for not spending enough on their own defense, while threatening to pull out of NATO. At the same time, the US has increased troop levels in Europe and pumped over $11 billion into the European Deterrence Initiative over the past two years, in an effort to upgrade US and allied basing, increase joint exercises, and modernize equipment on the continent to counter the Russian threat. https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/state-dod-letter-warns-european-union-to-open-defense-contracts-or-else/

By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — The most valuable role for U.S. special operations forces within the National Defense Strategy is to build relationships with countries in hot spots around the globe to keep Russia and China at bay. But that effort can't be at the expense of its counterterrorism mission, which remains the No. 1 priority of special forces, according to leadership within U.S. Special Operations Command. SOCOM plans to issue a report to Congress on a comprehensive review of its roles and missions this month, according to Mark Mitchell, the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, who was speaking during a recent hearing with the House Intelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. One of the main priorities for SOCOM is to carry out counterterror missions, but the National Defense Strategy focuses on great power competition against near-peer adversaries Russia and China, so House lawmakers wanted to know how special forces fit in a strategy that focuses less on counterterrorism and more on powerful adversaries. “We've been the tip of the spear on the [counterterror] fight,” SOCOM Commander Gen. Richard Clarke said during the hearing. “However, moving forward, particularly in great power competition, our special operations forces are not necessarily going to be in that fight because the whole idea of the strategy is to avoid a kinetic” confrontation, he added. Clarke said he's examining SOCOM relationships with U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Transportation Command as well as the global combatant commanders to see “how we can best integrate our forces and provide support to those in other domains.” “I think the special operations community is uniquely suited to build networks of partners and allies around the globe to put us in a position, first of all, to compete for that influence and legitimacy in peacetime,” Clarke added. Special forces also have an important role to play within the military information support operations center in Tampa, Florida, which is aligned with the State Department's Global Engagement Center, which “allows us to compete in the space ahead of time and make sure that we're countering some of the vitriol that's coming out of Russia at this time and the falsehoods,” Clarke said. According to Clarke and Mitchell, it's unlikely the reach of special forces around the globe will wane. “A [counterterror] deployment to Africa is also a part of that great power competition against the Russians and Chinese,” Clarke noted as an example. “We are trying to look at our employment of the SOF force from a holistic view to ensure that we're maximizing the return on that investment to our counterterrorism mission and our great power competition.” The relationships that U.S. special forces develop with other countries is also unique, Clarke noted. “A small team, a small element of Special Operations forces, can bring a significant impact working with foreign forces.” “Remember,” Mitchell added, “Chinese and Russian threats are global, and that's part of the reason why we're in 80 countries.” For example, Mitchell added, SOCOM received recent congressional approval to move forward with an important counterterror effort in the Philippines, but that is also a critical component of building influence within the country and “keeping Chinese at arm's length.” While the NDS is focused on great power competition, the strategy still recognizes the need to combat violent extremist organizations, which “is not going away, and we've got to balance that,” Mitchell said. So some new concepts for employment of special forces will likely emerge, according to Mitchell. “We're working with the services to ensure that we are integrated with their development efforts,” he added. But there are a few tasks where, if given the chance, SOCOM would take off its plate, particularly to improve its deployment ratio with double the time spent at home compared to overseas. Clarke said special forces in Africa could be better optimized. “That's not necessarily ‘take away the mission,' but I see reduction internal to some of these missions,” he said. Additionally, the mission to counter weapons of mass destruction is also an increasing burden on the force, Clarke said: “I think it's a right-sizing in the mission internal to make sure we have the right force allocation against it.” And SOCOM is looking at how the Army's security force assistance brigades might be better suited for certain security force assistance-type missions. “SOF should be in places where it's a light footprint, it's politically sensitive, with a small team, that is training other special operations forces primarily,” Clarke said. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/05/17/where-do-special-forces-fit-in-the-national-defense-strategy/

By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army has been building a virtual world in which to train soldiers for war, and it's expected to award contracts in June for reconfigurable virtual air and ground trainers and for a common synthetic environment that includes complex and real-life terrain. Maj. Gen. Maria Gervais, who leads the Synthetic Training Environment Cross-Functional Team, which is part of Army Futures Command, told reporters during a recent media roundtable that she's “encouraged” to see what her team accomplished since it formed roughly 18 months ago. While the service, at a time, led the charge when it came to developing virtual environments, it has clung to relics of the '80s and '90s — stove-piped training systems lacking in realism. As the Army shifts its focus to fighting in a multidomain environment, the service wants a new system that enables collective training across air, ground, sea, cyber and space with greater fidelity that can be used not only as a trainer but also as a mission-planning tool. Before the synthetic training environment, or STE, was prioritized through the establishment of Army Futures Command, it wasn't going to be ready until 2030, but Gervais shrunk that timeline through new approaches in development and acquisition by involving industry and soldiers in a collaborative and agile manner. What is the STE? Over the last 18 months, the components of the STE have taken shape and will consist of One World Terrain — which compiles realistic and accurate virtual maps of territory — training simulation software, a training management tool and virtual collective trainers. All of this will make up the soldier/squad virtual trainer and the reconfigurable virtual collective trainer. The idea is to be able to click on any place on a virtual globe and go there. Soldiers can then train virtually in an exact environment in which they can expect to operate in reality. Just a few years ago, building One World Terrain was painstaking, tedious and expensive, but through new technology applications, what used to take nine months to build can now take eight hours. The training simulation software will support training simultaneously across many locations and training platforms. The training management tool allows users to build training scenarios through simulation databases. The virtual trainers are being designed for dismounted, air and ground formations to train from a squad level through battalion, and ultimately at higher echelons. The trainer for the soldier and squad will support individual and collective task at the smallest formation. The reconfigurable virtual collective trainers, or RVCT, will represent Army and Marine Corps air and ground systems for training at the unit level and will be used for mission rehearsals at every echelon. Ready player one The Army plans to award contracts next month to build both an RVCT for aircraft and an RVCT for ground vehicles that are reconfigurable based on changes to platform inventories. The STE conducted an initial user assessment of what had been developed in March 2018, Gervais said. Since then, the Army has conducted more than 20 “touch points” with industry partners, which led to a user assessment in Orlando, Florida — where the STE cross-functional team is based — of One World Terrain, the training management tool as well as the training simulation software. Meanwhile, Gervais said, the team is in the middle of a user assessment of an RVCT—Air prototype at Fort Carson, Colorado, which began in April and is supported by soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division. The service completed its assessment of a ground simulation platform that went to Fort Riley, Kansas. Crew members for Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Stryker combat vehicles of the 1st Infantry Division supported that effort. One World Terrain is already in use and under evaluation by a Marine battalion as well as three divisions in the Army and Naval Special Warfare Command. It's also used at the National Training Center and by the 3rd and 7th special forces groups. All of the users are providing feedback, according to Gervais. A contract was awarded in September 2018 to build the squad advanced marksmanship trainer, which is a product of the Close Combat Lethality Task Force initiative to improve soldier lethality and survivability, and the capability is already fielded to the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York. The new trainer takes what was a tethered system and — while it still uses projectors and screens — allows users to move around a base with more flexibility, which is more operationally realistic. Ultimately, the projectors and screens could be replaced by a headset, which is in keeping with the service's requirement to bring trainers to an operational unit in the field or at home station. This means the system must be easy to set up and transport. “We will continue to field that out to the Army the rest of this [fiscal year],” Gervais said. Taking it to the next level The Army plans to use the other transaction authority, or OTA, contracting mechanism to award contracts next month to move quicker and more agile than the standard and often lengthy acquisition process. The service previously used OTAs for STE development. “What the existing OTAs have done for us is they have actually allowed us to get a quick look from industry on where they were with the capabilities,” Col. Marcus Varnadore, the project manager for the STE CFT, said during the media roundtable. “It was very important for us right up front to identify where industry really was with respect to the technology, which allowed us to then make some decisions about what path to go forward with, and it also allowed us, with that first OTA, to kind of get an idea of how we needed to structure our follow-on OTAs,” he added. With the upcoming OTA contract awards, “we are kind of taking that and moving it to the next level using OTAs to bridge our gap here to get to the [initial operational capability] ... before we transition ultimately into a production [full-operational capability] environment,” said Brian Serra, the branch chief of Army Contracting Command—Orlando. “We are using the flexibility of OTAs,” he added, “to adjust as we go so we are not married to a 100-page specification.” That translates to the CFT taking a two-year process and shrinking it to six months max. The incremental process has also allowed the STE CFT to track industry's progress in this arena. Gervais noted that in some cases, companies might have overstated a specific technology's capabilities, and in turn the serve may need to bolster funding for internal science and technology efforts to improve that specific tech. Alternatively, the Army might notice it's been developing technology that is already well-developed in the commercial world. “I'm very confident and comfortable that our efforts to date are going to keep us on track to meet an initial operational capability of fourth-quarter FY21,” Gervais said. To reach initial operational capability, Gervais expects to field a battalion set of the RVCT—Air and RVCT—Ground — running on the common synthetic environment made up of One World Terrain, the training management tools and the training simulation software — to at least four installations. Over the next two years following initial operational capability, the Army will expand that fielding to include all installations where the capability is required in order to reach full operational capability by FY23. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/05/17/us-armys-jumping-to-next-level-in-virtual-training-world/

Nicolas Gros-Verheyde (B2) Mois après mois, les résultats tombent. Quand ils ont le choix, certains Européens préfèrent acheter américain plutôt qu'européen. Pourquoi ? Un achat de défense n'est pas uniquement un achat En matière de défense, un pays n'achète pas seulement un matériel, il répond à une histoire — tradition maritime, terrestre, etc. —, une géopolitique intérieure — neutralité, non aligné, aligné, autonome —, une affirmation de soi — volonté de prouver au peuple, à ses voisins sa puissance —, un contexte géopolitique — proximité ou non d'adversaires ressentis ou réelle —. La volonté d'avoir une autonomie d'équipements, ou non, découle de tous ces facteurs. La meilleure défense face à un adversaire ... Face à la Russie, nombre de pays européens estiment que la meilleure défense reste les États-Unis. Il ne s'agit donc pas de desserrer les liens qui existent avec les USA, mais de les resserrer. Et le meilleur moyen reste alors les achats d'équipement, qui solidifient de façon claire ce lien euro-atlantique. La duplicité de l'appel à dépenser plus C'est toute la duplicité de l'appel à dépenser davantage pour la défense. Appel largement soutenu par les Américains. Au-delà de l'objectif, justifié, de partage du fardeau entre Européens et Américains, la pression a un objectif purement économique : favoriser l'industrie américaine qui est la seule à répondre à la fois aux objectifs industriel (les matériels), opérationnel (l'interopérabilité), économique (le moins disant) et politique. La panoplie complète des Américains La fourniture des équipements militaires s'accompagne de la logistique, des armements et de la formation. Un ‘package' ordinaire pour ce type d'armements. Mais les Américains ont une panoplie beaucoup plus complète, qui va de l'outil de financement à crédit au soutien logistique dans les opérations extérieures, en passant par la présence de troupes ou de matériels dans les pays concernés, destinés à les rassurer face à des voisins inquiétants, un forcing permanent de leurs politiques, sans oublier l'accueil de jeunes ou moins jeunes officiers ou sous-officiers stagiaires dans leurs écoles. Un effort notable américain de formation Rien que pour la Roumanie, par exemple, pays qui préside actuellement aux destinées de l'Union européenne, ce sont 700 officiers qui franchissent le seuil d'une des écoles militaires US, des écoles de guerre réputées aux simples écoles de gardes nationaux. Cela forge des réflexes, une culture commune, des camaraderies, une solidarité... et l'habitude d'utiliser certains matériels. Peu étonnant ensuite que chacun soit convaincu dans l'armée roumaine qu'il faille acheter ces équipements. Une réflexion à engager Si les Européens veulent un tant soit peu défendre leurs équipements, il va falloir réfléchir sérieusement à se doter de ces cinq outils : les échanges et l'accueil dans les écoles européennes — l'Erasmus militaire prôné dans la fin des années 2000 est un peu tombé dans l'oubli (1) —, le financement croisé, la présence dans les pays (qui ne soit pas dispersée). (Nicolas Gros-Verheyde) https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2019/05/17/pourquoi-les-europeens-narrivent-pas-a-convaincre-lors-de-lachat-dequipements-militaires/

Orientation de la politique Protection, Sécurité, Engagement La politique de défense Protection, Sécurité, Engagement, tient compte du fait que la collaboration avec des représentants du milieu universitaire et d'autres experts renforce les fondements du processus décisionnel fondé sur des preuves. A cette fin, cette politique fournit une directive en vue d'augmenter l'investissement annuel pour financer un programme de coopération de la Défense remanié et élargi. Le programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) répond à cet appel. S'inspirer de la réussite Le programme MINDS s'inspire de la réussite du Programme de coopération de la Défense (PCD), tout en élargissant judicieusement le programme de manière à obtenir non seulement des résultats plus importants, mais de meilleurs résultats. Les consultations sont au centre de ces efforts de renouvellement. Elles ont débuté dans le cadre de l'examen de la politique de défense et se poursuivent gr'ce à un dialogue continu avec des experts à l'échelle du pays. Le PCD a aidé de façon efficace l'Équipe de la Défense à obtenir des conseils externes par l'entremise de sa série de conférences d'experts et de son programme de subventions de coopération ciblées. Ces éléments du programme qui se sont avérés être un succès se poursuivront. Nouvelle méthode en matière de mobilisation externe Étant une version élargie du PCD, MINDS offre un programme qui : répond aux besoins en matière de conseils pertinents et opportuns de la part des experts de la défense et de la sécurité; favorise le développement de la prochaine génération d'experts et de savants; aide la population canadienne à mieux comprendre les enjeux en matière défense et de sécurité. Le programme MINDS offre toutefois de plus grandes possibilités de collaboration entre l'Équipe de la Défense et la communauté de spécialistes de la sécurité et de la défense. Ce programme comprend les cinq principales catégories suivantes : Série de conférence d'experts, Subventions de coopération ciblées, Réseaux de collaboration, Bourses d'études et Mécanisme d'intervention rapide. Chacune de ces catégories propose différentes façons pour le ministère de la Défense nationale et les Forces armées canadiennes d'accéder rapidement à de l'expertise pertinente qui intègre divers points de vue et fournit des conseils éclairés. Ce programme vise à refléter les principales priorités du gouvernement du Canada dans le travail qu'il accomplit, veillant à ce que l'analyse comparative entre les sexes plus (ACS+) soit intégrée et appuyant la réconciliation avec les Autochtones et les activités de mobilisation des jeunes. Collaboration de l'Équipe de la Défense Le programme MINDS est différent du programme Innovation pour la défense, l'excellence et la sécurité (IDEeS), mais complémentaire à celui ci, utilisant diverses approches pour relever les défis en matière de défense et de sécurité. Le programme IDEeS propose des solutions cruciales aux défis relatifs à la technologie et aux capacités appliquées, tandis que MINDS est axé sur une réflexion stratégique et sur la production de connaissances dans le domaine des politiques publiques. Ensemble, MINDS et IDEeS stimulent l'innovation et contribuent à relever les défis en matière de défense. La politique de défense Protection, Sécurité, Engagement, propose des mesures concrètes pour améliorer la capacité de l'Équipe de la Défense d'anticiper et de comprendre les menaces, les défis et les possibilités. Pour atteindre cet objectif, il est essentiel de faire appel à l'expertise de la communauté canadienne d'experts en matière de défense et de sécurité par l'intermédiaire du programme MINDS. https://www.canada.ca/fr/ministere-defense-nationale/programmes/minds.html