1 février 2022 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR

Tigre, drones, MGCS, munitions : les priorités capacitaires de l'armée de Terre

DÉFENSE

Tigre, drones, MGCS, munitions : les priorités capacitaires de l'armée de Terre

L'armée de Terre se prépare pour être apte à s'engager dans tous les conflits, jusqu'à l'affrontement majeur. Elle travaille ainsi à l'acquisition de nouvelles capacités et à la modernisation de ses systèmes d'armes. « Nous sommes au début de la modernisation du segment médian », souligne le général Hervé Gomart, major général de l'armée de Terre. L'armée de Terre compte sur le respect de la LPM (loi de programmation militaire) 2019-2025, qui prévoit entre 2023 et 2025 l'augmentation des crédits pour les armées de 3 Md€ par an. La France travaille aussi, avec l'Espagne, à la modernisation du Tigre, l'hélicoptère de combat, qui équipe les armées françaises, allemandes et espagnoles. De son côté, le char du futur franco-allemand (MGCS) avance sous les radars. Le CEMAT vient de valider un document de concept exploratoire portant sur l'emploi de ce futur système d'armes franco-allemand (Main Ground Combat System), sur lequel la France attend un retour de la partie allemande. Enfin, l'armée de Terre veut revenir à la pointe en matière de drones : « Toutes les unités doivent savoir se servir d'un drone » pour aller au combat, a expliqué le général Hervé Gomart. L'armée de Terre devrait disposer de 3 000 drones en 2023, dont le drone Patroller (de Safran) qui doit entrer en service cette année. En revanche, elle n'a « pas un stock suffisant de munitions » pour mener un combat de haute intensité dans la durée, a admis le général Gomart.

La Tribune du 31 janvier


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  • It will be at least a decade before Canada sees any of its new frigates

    15 février 2021 | International, Naval

    It will be at least a decade before Canada sees any of its new frigates

    New frigates are being packed with more combat capability than comparable ships of allies Murray Brewster It will be 2031, at the earliest, before the navy sees the first of its new frigates; a setback brought about partly by the fact Canada, Britain and Australia are still feeling their way around how to build the ultra-modern warship. The outgoing president of Irving Shipbuilding Inc., which is in charge of constructing combat ships for the federal government, said he anticipates steel will be cut on the first of the new generation high-end warships by mid-2024. "We have been trying to take an honest look at where we are and what it will take to build the ship," said Kevin McCoy who recently announced his retirement from the East Coast shipbuilder. The current estimate is that it will take up to seven-and-a-half years to build the surface combatant, a timeline being used by Britain's BAE Systems Inc., which is constructing the first of what's known as the Type 26 design. Both Canada and Australia are building their own variants. "Early on [in the shipbuilding process] estimates are not very good," said McCoy. "Early estimates are not very good for price; they're not very good for size; they're not not very good for duration," McCoy said. "The British ship has a seven-and-a-half year build cycle. So, we're locked in. We said our build cycle will be seven-and-a-half years as well." If they can find ways to speed up the process, they will, he said. ANALYSIS Battle of the budget: DND gears up to defend cost of new warships in the new year Serving military member sues DND over mould exposure on warship Ottawa awards $2.4B contract to finish building navy's supply ships If that timeline holds, it means the federal government's marquee shipbuilding strategy will be two decades old by the time it produces the warship it was principally set up to create. While Irving has been pumping out smaller, less complicated arctic patrol ships and Seaspan, in Vancouver, is building coast guard and science vessels, the strategy conceived by the former Conservative government was driven by the necessity of replacing the navy's current fleet of Halifax-class frigates. Originally, when the shipbuilding strategy was unveiled, it envisioned Canada receiving the first new frigate in 2017. A lot of water, wishful thinking and even money has gone under the bridge since then. Building off existing design The current Liberal government, since taking over in 2015 and embracing the strategy, has been opaque in its public estimates of the build time; suggesting, in some documents, a delivery time in mid-2020s while other more internal records have pegged the first new frigate in the 2027 timeframe. The Department of National Defence, in a statement, acknowledged some of the design and build intricacies are now better understood, and because of that; the first warship will be "approximately 2-3 years later than the previous estimate." A spokeswoman echoed McCoy's remarks about finding ways to move construction along. "We continue to look for efficiencies and are actively working with industry to accelerate the project in order to deliver this important platform to the RCN as soon as possible," said National Defence spokesperson Jessica Lamirande. One of the ways they could do that, she said, would be to construct some, less complex modules of the warship early, the way it has been in the navy's Joint Support Ship project at Seaspan's Vancouver Shipyard. $1 billion and counting: Inside Canada's troubled efforts to build new warships Industry briefing questions Ottawa's choice of guns, defence systems for new frigates McCoy, a blunt-talking former U.S. Navy admiral, suggested the expectations going to the surface combatant program were ultimately unworkable because the federal government came in expecting to do a so-called "clean sheet" design; meaning a warship built completely from scratch. It was the shipyard, he said, which ultimately inched the federal government toward building off an existing design because of the enormous risk and expense of purpose-built ships, a position the Liberals adopted in the spring of 2016. The selection of the British Type 26 design by the Liberal government has spawned criticism, a court challenge and will figure prominently in upcoming reports by the auditor general and the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Combat capability packed into ship The nub of the complaints have been that the frigate is not yet in the water and is still under construction in the United Kingdom. The defence department acknowledged that adapting the British design to Canadian expectations and desires will take a year longer than originally anticipated and is now not scheduled to be completed until late 2023, early 2024. Canada, McCoy said, can expect to pay no more $2.5 billion to $3 billion, per ship as they are produced, which is, he claimed, about what other nations would pay for a warship of similar capability. "This is a big ship, lots of capability" he said, indicating that full displacement for the new frigate will likely be about 9,400 tonnes; almost double the 4,700 tonnes of the current Halifax-class. How much will Canada's new frigates really cost? The navy is about to find out PBO pushes up cost estimate for Canada's frigate build by $8 billion McCoy said what is not generally understood amid the public concern over scheduling and cost is the fact that the Canadian version of the Type 26 will be expected to do more than its British and Australian cousins. Where those navies have different warships, performing different functions, such as air defence or anti-submarine warfare, Canada's one class of frigates will be expected to perform both because that is what the government has called for in its requirements. Dave Perry, a defence analyst and vice president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, has studied the program and said he was surprised at the amount of combat capability that was being packed into the new warship. "On the one hand, Canada's one [class] of ship will have more combat capability than many of the other classes of ship that our friends and allies sail with, but it also adds an additional level of complexity and challenge getting all of that gear, all of that firepower into one single floating hull and platform," he said. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-shipbuilding-decade-frigates-1.5912961

  • The coronavirus threatens NATO. Let’s move to protect the alliance.

    14 avril 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    The coronavirus threatens NATO. Let’s move to protect the alliance.

    By: Sophia Becker , Christian Mölling , and Torben Schütz The global fight against COVID-19 has devastating economic consequences which might soon be felt in the defense sector. First estimates by OECD and national institutions conclude that the initial economic impact of the measures to fight the virus will by far exceed that of the 2008 financial crisis. The severe socio-economic consequences may tempt European governments to prioritize immediate economic relief over long-term strategic security and defense considerations. The good news is: there is no automatism – it remains fundamentally a political decision. If European governments do decide to slash defense spending as a result of the current crisis, it would be the second major hit within a decade. Defense budgets have only just begun to recover towards pre-2008 crisis levels, though capabilities have not. Nationally, as well as on an EU and NATO level, significant gaps still exist. European armies have lost roughly one-third of their capabilities over the last two decades. At the same time, the threat environment has intensified with an openly hostile Russia and a rising China. With European defense budgets under pressure, the United States might see any effort to balance burden-sharing among allies fall apart. A militarily weak Europe would be no help against competitors either. The US should work with allies now to maintain NATO's capabilities. Improve coordination to avoid past mistakes Europe's cardinal mistake from the last crisis was uncoordinated national defense cuts instead of harmonized European decisions. In light of the looming budget crisis, governments could be tempted to react the same way. This would be the second round of cuts within a decade, leaving not many capabilities to pool within NATO. If domestic priorities trump considerations about procurement of equipment for the maintenance and generation of military capabilities the system-wide repercussions would be severe. NATO defense, as well as the tightly knit industrial network in Europe, will suffer. Capabilities that can only be generated or sustained multinationally – like effective air defense, strategic air transport or naval strike groups - could become even more fragile; some critical ones may even disappear. If Europeans cut back on capabilities like anti-submarine warfare, armored vehicles of all sorts and mine-warfare equipment again, they could endanger the military capacity of nearly all allies. Ten years ago, such capabilities for large-scale and conventional warfare seemed rather superfluous, but today NATO needs them more than ever. This outcome should be avoided at all costs, because rebuilding those critical forces would be a considerable resource investment and could take years. Europe would become an even less effective military actor and partner to the US, resulting in more discord about burden-sharing. Uncoordinated cuts would also affect the defense industry, as development and procurement programs would be delayed or cancelled altogether – hitting both European and American companies. Moreover, their ability to increase efficiency through transnational mergers and acquisitions and economies of scale is limited due to continued national sentiments in Europe. Companies might decide to either aggressively internationalize, including massive increase of defense exports, or leave the market as national armed forces as otherwise reliable clients drop out. Technological innovation would suffer from a shrinking defense industrial ecosystem and duplicated national research and development efforts, risking the foundation of security for the next generation of defense solutions. To safeguard NATO's strategic autonomy, lean on lead nations In order to prevent the loss of critical capabilities and infrastructure within NATO, the US should immediately start working with its European partners to preemptively plan for increasingly tight budgets. NATO should take stock of existing capabilities and offer alternatives for consolidation. Based on a coordinated effort to redefine NATO's level of ambition and priorities, it should offer plans for maintaining the military capacity to act while retiring unnecessary and outdated resources. Such a coordinated effort should include close cooperation with the European Union. Building on the NATO Framework Nations Concept, the United States should work with a network of larger member states, better equipped to weather the economic shock of the current crisis, to act as lead nations. These countries could safeguard critical defense capabilities and provide a foundation of essential forces, enabling smaller partners to attach their specialized capabilities. Such an arrangement allows for a comparatively good balance of financial strain and retention of military capacity. Additionally, NATO should look beyond the conventional military domain and build on lessons learned from hybrid warfare and foreign influence operations against Europe. The way ahead is clear: As ambitions for European strategic autonomy become wishful thinking in light of the current crisis, allies should focus on retaining NATO's strategic autonomy as a whole. For the foreseeable future, both sides of the Atlantic have to live by one motto: NATO first! The authors are analysts at the Berlin-based German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/09/the-coronavirus-threatens-nato-lets-move-to-protect-the-alliance/

  • Bourget 2019 : La vision du futur de MBDA

    18 juin 2019 | International, Aérospatial

    Bourget 2019 : La vision du futur de MBDA

    Par ehuberdeau Le missilier européen a imaginé plusieurs concepts d'armement qui pourraient être intégrés au sein des projets européens de futurs systèmes de combat aériens. Très connectés ces missiles et remote carriers devront pouvoir contrer des systèmes de dénis d'accès. En Europe continentale, comme au Royaume-Uni, les travaux de préparation de systèmes de combat aérien futurs avancent. Ceux ci mettront en réseau des avions de combat, des avions de mission, des moyens satellitaires, des drones et "remote carriers" mais aussi de l'armement. MBDA, spécialiste européen des missiles veut participer à ces développements et profite du salon du Bourget pour présenter des concepts innovants. Les missiles de croisière MBDA a imaginé deux concepts de missiles de croisière qui pourraient être opérationnels à l'horizon 2030 et pourraient donc être appliqués au programme FMAN/FMC (Futur missile de croisière et missile anti navires franco-britannique). Ces missiles bénéficieront de capacités de pénétration accrues par rapport aux systèmes actuels. Cette famille comprend deux concepts. D'une part un missile polyvalent supersonique et d'autre part un missile subsonique furtif. Le missile supersonique (Vitesse supérieure à mach 1) a été imaginé pour frapper principalement trois types de cibles : les centres de contrôle des systèmes de défense aérienne, les navires et les cibles aériennes de haute valeur tel que les ravitailleurs en vol et les avions de conduite et de commandement. Pour ces missions il sera nécessaire d'aller vite et d'être manoeuvrant. Le missile subsonique furtif a été pensé pour réaliser des frappes dans la profondeur. Il bénéficiera d'une grande endurance et emportera une charge militaire conséquente. Il pourra frapper notamment des cibles durcies. Les deux missiles auront un format comparable à celui du SCALP, soit environ cinq mètres de long pour une masse d'environ une tonne. Le missile pourra être emporté par un avion ou tiré depuis un navire. Le guidage ne dépendra pas du GPS et les missiles bénéficieront de portées de plusieurs centaines de kilomètres. Smart Glider/Smart Cruiser MBDA avait déjà présenté sa famille SmartGlider. Les SmartGlider sont des bombes planantes non propulsées, d'une portée de plus de 130 km, équipées d'un autodirecteur à capteurs multiples. Deux variantes ont été imaginées, une lourde de 1 200 kg et une légère de 120 kg. Cet armement met en œuvre l'intelligence artificielle. Des algorithmes devraient aider l'équipage à reconnaître sa cible et donc à être plus réactif. Une fois tirée, l'arme est conçue pour dialoguer avec l'appareil tireur durant l'ensemble de son vol. Les SmartGlider ont été conçues pour être utilisées en essaim. Avec trois points d'emport pour six armes, un Rafale pourrait emporter jusqu'à dix-huit bombes planantes SmartGlider Light. Plusieurs bombes peuvent donc être larguées en même temps pour mener une attaque saturante. Les SmartGlider pourront se coordonner en vol pour adopter des trajectoires complémentaires et perturber les défenses adverses. MBDA propose désormais aussi de développer une version propulsée de l'arme baptisée SmartCruiser. La charge militaire serait réduite mais la portée serait accrue. Remote carriers Le terme « remote carriers » désigne une large gamme de systèmes allant du missile connecté au drone de combat. MBDA propose deux effecteurs capable avant de frapper leur cible de réaliser une variété de missions. Celles-ci pourraient comprendre la reconnaissance, le renseignement ou encore la guerre électronique. Le RC 100 est un véhicule de 100 kg, le RC 200 un véhicule de 200 kg plus endurant et plus performant. Le RC 100 pourrait être intégré par le système Smart Launcher permettant d'emporter aussi des bombes SmartGlider. Un avion de combat pourrait donc lancer simultanément des bombes SmartGladier et un ou des RC 100. Le remote carrier pourrait ainsi participer à la désignation des cibles ou brouiller les systèmes de défense adverses pour améliorer l'efficacité du raid. Anti missile hardkill system Il s'agit ici d'un petit missile de un mètre de long, emporté par un chasseur, capable d'intercepter les missiles qui lui sont destinés. Sur un chasseur de prochaine génération, l'AHS pourrait être intégré directement dans la structure de l'appareil sur des lanceurs prévus à cet effet. Pour des appareils plus anciens il pourrait être emporté en nacelle. Le missile devra être intégré au système d'autoprotection de l'avion de combat et devra pouvoir être mis en œuvre sans perturber la manœuvre évasive du chasseur. https://www.air-cosmos.com/article/bourget-2019-la-vision-du-futur-de-mbda-10361

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