12 novembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre

Rust Costs the Pentagon $21 Billion Per Year

By Aaron Boyd,

The Defense Department isn't doing a good job determining how much to spend to prevent damage from nature's basic chemical reactions.

Rust costs the Pentagon more money annually than many of its most expensive weapons systems—up to $21 billion per year, according to a Defense Department-commissioned audit released in March.

The report indicates the corrosion of metals that make up modern weapons systems like fighter jets, ships, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons can sometimes approach one-third of the total operations and maintenance costs of those systems.

The problem is so large, in 2002, the department established the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to ensure big-dollar weapons systems weren't taken offline by oxidation and to help branches determine how much money ought to be spent on rust prevention.

But the data being reported by the military branches has been inconsistent and the office has yet to issue guidance on how funding levels should be categorized, according to a related audit released Thursday by the Government Accountability Office.

For example, “In fiscal year 2017, the Army and Navy used direct costs, such as salary and training costs, to identify their funding levels, but the Army also included other associated costs. The Air Force used the prior year's funding level and adjusted it for inflation,” the report states.

These different methods led to funding requests based on different criteria, making it difficult for Congress to determine what an appropriate funding level should look like.

It has also led to vastly different funding requests. In 2017, the Army requested $2.4 million and the Air Force $3 million, while the Navy only requested $220,000.

Similarly, all three branches either failed to accurately report the supporting data or, in the Air Force's case, did not provide any data at all some years.

“The Army data GAO received did not reconcile with data presented in the Corrosion Office annual reports to Congress for five of eight fiscal years,” auditors wrote. “The Navy data did not reconcile for two of eight fiscal years, and there was no supporting documentation identifying how these figures were calculated. Air Force officials did not provide any figures or supporting documentation for four fiscal years, stating that these figures were not available.”

Army officials told GAO they're not able to accurately report how much is spent preventing or combating corrosion because many of those duties are performed by personnel who do many other things, as well. This includes the Army's lead corrosion executive, who also serves as the aviation logistics and safety officer for the Army G-4 logistics organization.

“The corrosion-related costs of conducting the corrosion executive role are not separated from this other function,” they told GAO.

The Navy had a similar issue but took a different tack. The Navy merely requested $220,000 for the corrosion executive's salary, despite the fact that “this method does not capture other costs, such as personnel assigned to other offices that provide support to the corrosion executive.”

The misreported numbers don't appear to be malfeasance, according to the GAO report, but a natural consequence of a lack of direction from the Corrosion Office on how to identify funding needs and properly report that data.

GAO made three recommendations to the Defense Department:

  • Issue guidance for identifying and reviewing funding levels for performing corrosion executive duties.
  • Ensure that the Corrosion Office develops a process to maintain documentation of its reviews of corrosion planning.
  • Ensure that corrosion executives establish guidance on reviewing the adequacy of corrosion planning.

Defense officials agreed with all three recommendations.

https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2018/11/rust-costs-pentagon-21-billion-year/152709/

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  • With challenges aplenty, Europe’s navies are coming to grips with high-end warfare

    23 juin 2020 | International, Naval

    With challenges aplenty, Europe’s navies are coming to grips with high-end warfare

    By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The former head of the U.S. Navy said in June testimony that as the service grapples with establishing the right type of force, it must account for the degraded capabilities of its allies, hinting at the once substantial Cold War-era European navies. “In my mind [there's] been an over-fixation on the total number of ships as opposed to the nuance numbers of specific types of ships that support viable operational plans,” retired Adm. Gary Roughead, former chief of naval operations, said before the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. “There's also the need to understand just how small our allied navies have become, and in the past we have always looked to our allies to support us, but those navies are extraordinarily small.” NATO has for years counted on the U.S. Navy as the centerpiece of its maritime forces, with the individual European navies serving as augmenting and supporting forces. And in the post-Cold War era, Europe's navies have focused on low-end missions like counterterrorism and counter-piracy. And that has led to a precipitous decline in naval power available to surge in the event of a high-end conflict. In a 2017 study, the Center for a New American Security found that Europe's combat power at sea was about half of what it was during the height of the Cold War. “Atlantic-facing members of NATO now possess far fewer frigates — the premier class of surface vessels designated to conduct [anti-submarine warfare] ASW operations — than they did 20 years ago,” the study found. Where they collectively had about 100 frigates in 1995, that number hovers at 51 today. “Similarly, these nations had, in 1995, 145 attack submarines — those dedicated to anti-shipping and anti-submarine warfare missions — but that number has plummeted to a present low of 84,” the study found. But with the U.S. increasingly focused on Asia and amid tension within the alliance, Europe is coming to grips with the need to grow its forces and regain high-end capabilities it once had — a realization that also grew out of Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. “Throughout the 1990s, the focus was low-end missions: counter-piracy, counterterrorism, migration, search and rescue,” said Sebastian Bruns, head of the Center for Maritime Strategy and Security in Kiel, Germany. “And they did so with the legacy platforms of the 1980s and 1990s. You know, sending an ASW frigate to fight piracy, well that's not a lot of bang for your buck. “But 2014, that's really the turnaround. I can't think of any European nation that's not on board with modernizing and growing their navies. But the long-lead times and having to replace the legacy units, it just takes a damned long time to turn the ship around.” But an unfortunate side effect of the long-lead times involved in force design — sometimes a decade or more — is that pre-2014 ship designs that are coming into service now are ill-suited for the high-end fight, Bruns said. The prime example of this mission mismatch is Germany's 7,200-ton Baden-Württemberg-class frigate. It began entering service in 2019, but is designed for low-end operations. “They were designed in the 2000s — they even call it a ‘stabilization frigate' — and they're coming online at a time where the German Navy needs them for presence, but they don't have the kind of teeth you'd expect for a 7,000-ton frigate,” Bruns said. “They're really capable for presence and maritime security operations, but of course that's not so much the world we live in anymore.” But new, more advanced frigates are starting to filter into the market. For example, in 2017, France's Naval Group launched a five-hull intermediate air defense frigate program designed to intercept air threats with the Aster 15 and Aster 30 missiles. And in January, the German Navy announced it had hired Dutch shipbuilder Damen to build at least four new MKS 180 frigates — a 9,000-ton ship designed to operate in waters with ice formations in a nod to the renewed competition in the Arctic. Payloads over platforms It's not just new frigate designs that show Europe gradually upping its game. Similar to the track the U.S. Navy has taken in fielding the Naval Strike Missile on its littoral combat ships and the Marine Corps' approach to fielding it as a shore battery, European navies have begun to upgrade their ships' systems in preparation for a high-end fight, said Jeremy Stöhs, a naval analyst who authored the book “Decline of European Naval Forces.” “What we see now is since 2014 the focus is much more on sea control, lines of communication, territorial defense,” Stöhs said. “But because of the long-lead times, it is not just the ships they're building; it's the sensor suites, midlife upgrades, focusing again on sea-denial capabilities.” Countries like the Black Sea and Scandinavian states are investing in anti-ship missiles and shore-based missile systems, he added, whereas a lot of those weapons were disbanded in the 1990s. In 2016, for example, Sweden announced it was fielding coastal batteries with Saab's RBS-15 anti-ship missile to defend its Baltic coast for the first time since 2000. The Franco-British Sea Venom anti-ship missile is being designed to launch from a helicopter such as the U.K.'s Wildcat. It recently passed its first firing trial. The missile is currently designed for small, fast-moving vessels up to Corvette-sized warships. In the Netherlands, the government announced in 2018 that their De Zeven Provinciën-class frigates would be ditching the venerable Harpoon missile for a new, more advanced surface-to-surface missile by 2024. Evolving threat, evolving politics Europe's evolution toward more high-end naval battles in many ways mirrors the United States' own pivot away from wars in the Middle East and Asia. But it's also informed by changing politics. “I'm seeing European navies pivot back to the basics: How do we handle the GIUK [Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom] gap? How do we patrol the North Atlantic? Anti-submarine warfare, convoy escort, anti-surface warfare: They are starting to come back to that,” said Jerry Hendrix, an analyst with Telemus Group and a retired Navy captain. “And as you are starting to see the new heavy German designs, they're coming back to focusing on a maritime challenger.” But with this evolution has come a realization of Europe's shortcomings and just how dependent those navies have been on the U.S. for some core capabilities. “They're starting to think about a naval force without the US present,” Hendrix said. “[German Chancellor] Angela Merkel has talked about the need for Europe to start thinking about going its own way. And by the way, I don't think that's a bad thing. I do see the interests on the continent and the U.S. going in different directions.” But a European naval construct without the U.S. would prove challenging, as many countries based their investments on the idea of a shared responsibility, with the U.S. as the main high-end capability provider, said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at The Hudson Institute. “NATO, in theory, still has the NATO strategic concept where different countries were going to specialize in different capabilities, which led to the Finns and Swedes really embracing amphibious capabilities for small-scale, special operations forces insertion. The Brits and Italians focused on ASW. But without the U.S. acting as the strategic centerpiece, the strategic concept starts to fall apart. “The concept assumes you have someone that has a multimission capability that you can augment, as opposed to: ‘We're going to pull all this together without the U.S. from a bunch of disparate countries with disparate capabilities.' ” That situation means any NATO action with just European nations would need a lot of participation, he said. “Before, if you had just the U.S. and three or four nations participating, you'd have a pretty robust, multimission capability” Clark said. “But without the U.S., you'd need half the alliance to contribute so as to not miss out on key mission areas.” And without the robust U.S. logistics system, countries would have to replace not just the high-end weapons and sensors, but much of the support infrastructure as well. That could mean even more downward pressure on how much capability Europe can bring to bear. “If you have to expend weapons or do extensive resupply or refueling, the whole model starts to break down,” Clark added. “The way the European navies are structured, they don't have this end-to-end capability to deliver on all the support missions as well. “So if they have to invest in a significant combat logistics force, with budgets for defense being limited, that's going to mean their navies will potentially become even smaller.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/transatlantic-partnerships/2020/06/22/with-challenges-aplenty-europes-navies-are-coming-to-grips-with-high-end-warfare/

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