12 novembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre
By Aaron Boyd,
Rust costs the Pentagon more money annually than many of its most expensive weapons systems—up to $21 billion per year, according to a Defense Department-commissioned audit released in March.
The report indicates the corrosion of metals that make up modern weapons systems like fighter jets, ships, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons can sometimes approach one-third of the total operations and maintenance costs of those systems.
The problem is so large, in 2002, the department established the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to ensure big-dollar weapons systems weren't taken offline by oxidation and to help branches determine how much money ought to be spent on rust prevention.
But the data being reported by the military branches has been inconsistent and the office has yet to issue guidance on how funding levels should be categorized, according to a related audit released Thursday by the Government Accountability Office.
For example, “In fiscal year 2017, the Army and Navy used direct costs, such as salary and training costs, to identify their funding levels, but the Army also included other associated costs. The Air Force used the prior year's funding level and adjusted it for inflation,” the report states.
These different methods led to funding requests based on different criteria, making it difficult for Congress to determine what an appropriate funding level should look like.
It has also led to vastly different funding requests. In 2017, the Army requested $2.4 million and the Air Force $3 million, while the Navy only requested $220,000.
Similarly, all three branches either failed to accurately report the supporting data or, in the Air Force's case, did not provide any data at all some years.
“The Army data GAO received did not reconcile with data presented in the Corrosion Office annual reports to Congress for five of eight fiscal years,” auditors wrote. “The Navy data did not reconcile for two of eight fiscal years, and there was no supporting documentation identifying how these figures were calculated. Air Force officials did not provide any figures or supporting documentation for four fiscal years, stating that these figures were not available.”
Army officials told GAO they're not able to accurately report how much is spent preventing or combating corrosion because many of those duties are performed by personnel who do many other things, as well. This includes the Army's lead corrosion executive, who also serves as the aviation logistics and safety officer for the Army G-4 logistics organization.
“The corrosion-related costs of conducting the corrosion executive role are not separated from this other function,” they told GAO.
The Navy had a similar issue but took a different tack. The Navy merely requested $220,000 for the corrosion executive's salary, despite the fact that “this method does not capture other costs, such as personnel assigned to other offices that provide support to the corrosion executive.”
The misreported numbers don't appear to be malfeasance, according to the GAO report, but a natural consequence of a lack of direction from the Corrosion Office on how to identify funding needs and properly report that data.
GAO made three recommendations to the Defense Department:
Defense officials agreed with all three recommendations.
https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2018/11/rust-costs-pentagon-21-billion-year/152709/
6 décembre 2021 | International, Aérospatial
Les Émirats arabes unis ont signé vendredi un accord pour acquérir 80 avions de combat Rafale, une commande record pour l’avion de chasse entré en service en 2004, à l’occasion de la visite à Dubaï du président français Emmanuel Macron.
22 novembre 2023 | International, Terrestre, Sécurité
This milestone is the latest event in a series of ongoing development tests for the radar which will culminate with an operational capability level by the end of the year.
14 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR
Nathan Strout WASHINGTON — As the U.S. Space Force builds out its fiscal 2022 budget, the nascent service is developing a new strategy to govern how it builds and leases satellite communications and services, Lt. Gen. Bill Liquori explained during the Defense News Conference Sept. 9. The strategy follows the Enterprise SATCOM Vision the Space Force released in February. That document formally laid out the military's desire to have a single satellite communication architecture capable of keeping war fighters connected even in contested, degraded and operationally-limited environments. Currently, the Department of Defense relies on a loose federation of stovepiped, government-built satellites and commercial providers to provide connectivity. But moving forward, the Space Force wants war fighters to seamlessly roam from one signal to another to maintain their connection. “At the end of the day, anyone who's using satellite communications doesn't really care where that information comes from,” explained Liquori, the Space Force's deputy chief of space operations for strategy, plans, programs, requirements and analysis. “They really want to know that when they need to use their radio they can use it, and if there's somebody trying to counter them using that radio, that there's an ability for them to pivot to an alternative communications mechanism, because what they care about is getting their message across.” While the service was able to include some aspects of that Enterprise SATCOM Vision in the fiscal 2021 budget, that budget process was already well underway when the Space Force was formally established in December. That budget request included $43 million in research, development, test & evaluation funding to develop the Fighting SATCOM Enterprise, a new designation emphasizing the ability to roam between various communications satellites, regardless of whether they are commercial or government operated. Liquori emphasized that more would be done in the fiscal 2022 budget. “The '22 budget is now the next step if you will, and we've continued to lay in both budget line items for being able to maintain a common operating picture of our SATCOM links in theater as well as continuing on prototypes,” he explained. “There are certainly inputs there for Protected Tactical Waveforms so that we can do protected communications with more than just our traditional military purpose-built systems, but ideally to use that waveform on other systems as well.” Simultaneously, the service is developing a strategy that will govern how the Enterprise SATCOM Vision is implemented. “Obviously the '22 budget submission is big for any service," Liquori said. “We're working on an Enterprise SATCOM strategy that will follow from the vision document, if you will.” Commercial providers have expressed cautious optimism with the Space Force's approach, while arguing that the effort needs more funding and more specifics. https://www.c4isrnet.com/smr/defense-news-conference/2020/09/09/space-force-developing-a-strategy-for-implementing-its-enterprise-satcom-vision/