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12 novembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre

Rust Costs the Pentagon $21 Billion Per Year

By Aaron Boyd,

The Defense Department isn't doing a good job determining how much to spend to prevent damage from nature's basic chemical reactions.

Rust costs the Pentagon more money annually than many of its most expensive weapons systems—up to $21 billion per year, according to a Defense Department-commissioned audit released in March.

The report indicates the corrosion of metals that make up modern weapons systems like fighter jets, ships, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons can sometimes approach one-third of the total operations and maintenance costs of those systems.

The problem is so large, in 2002, the department established the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to ensure big-dollar weapons systems weren't taken offline by oxidation and to help branches determine how much money ought to be spent on rust prevention.

But the data being reported by the military branches has been inconsistent and the office has yet to issue guidance on how funding levels should be categorized, according to a related audit released Thursday by the Government Accountability Office.

For example, “In fiscal year 2017, the Army and Navy used direct costs, such as salary and training costs, to identify their funding levels, but the Army also included other associated costs. The Air Force used the prior year's funding level and adjusted it for inflation,” the report states.

These different methods led to funding requests based on different criteria, making it difficult for Congress to determine what an appropriate funding level should look like.

It has also led to vastly different funding requests. In 2017, the Army requested $2.4 million and the Air Force $3 million, while the Navy only requested $220,000.

Similarly, all three branches either failed to accurately report the supporting data or, in the Air Force's case, did not provide any data at all some years.

“The Army data GAO received did not reconcile with data presented in the Corrosion Office annual reports to Congress for five of eight fiscal years,” auditors wrote. “The Navy data did not reconcile for two of eight fiscal years, and there was no supporting documentation identifying how these figures were calculated. Air Force officials did not provide any figures or supporting documentation for four fiscal years, stating that these figures were not available.”

Army officials told GAO they're not able to accurately report how much is spent preventing or combating corrosion because many of those duties are performed by personnel who do many other things, as well. This includes the Army's lead corrosion executive, who also serves as the aviation logistics and safety officer for the Army G-4 logistics organization.

“The corrosion-related costs of conducting the corrosion executive role are not separated from this other function,” they told GAO.

The Navy had a similar issue but took a different tack. The Navy merely requested $220,000 for the corrosion executive's salary, despite the fact that “this method does not capture other costs, such as personnel assigned to other offices that provide support to the corrosion executive.”

The misreported numbers don't appear to be malfeasance, according to the GAO report, but a natural consequence of a lack of direction from the Corrosion Office on how to identify funding needs and properly report that data.

GAO made three recommendations to the Defense Department:

  • Issue guidance for identifying and reviewing funding levels for performing corrosion executive duties.
  • Ensure that the Corrosion Office develops a process to maintain documentation of its reviews of corrosion planning.
  • Ensure that corrosion executives establish guidance on reviewing the adequacy of corrosion planning.

Defense officials agreed with all three recommendations.

https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2018/11/rust-costs-pentagon-21-billion-year/152709/

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    13 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    China’s stealth fighter goes into mass production after thrust upgrade

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  • In War, Chinese Shipyards Could Outpace US in Replacing Losses; Marine Commandant

    18 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre

    In War, Chinese Shipyards Could Outpace US in Replacing Losses; Marine Commandant

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In the sharply-worded 22-page document, Berger rejects war plans anticipating a Cold War-style confrontation in which huge ships can creep close to shore free from the threat of precision-guided munitions being launched from batteries deep inland. He calls the current configuration of amphibious ships “the most obvious manifestation of this obsolete paradigm” in a draft document obtained by Breaking Defense. In an unsigned draft of the unreleased report, “Naval Campaigning: The 2020 Marine Corps Capstone Operating Concept,” Berger underlines the need for new thinking about how the Marine Corps and Navy will fight an advanced Chinese military that can control islands, coastlines, and vast swaths of the sea with aircraft carriers, a swelling blue ocean fleet and long-distance precision munitions. The old way of thinking “is also exemplified by our current amphibious warships and maritime prepositioning ships, which are large and built for deployment efficiency rather than warfighting effectiveness,” he writes. “These superb, multipurpose ships are extremely expensive—meaning we've never had the desired number.” Berger also raises significant concerns about the United States' ability to replace any combat losses, even in a short, sharp conflict. “Replacing ships lost in combat will be problematic, inasmuch as our industrial base has shrunk, while peer adversaries have expanded their shipbuilding capacity. In an extended conflict, the United States will be on the losing end of a production race—reversing the advantage we had in World War II when we last fought a peer competitor.” The stark admission comes as the Navy's shipyards struggle under the disruptions caused by COVID-19, leading the service to order an emergency call up over 1,600 Reservists to fill labor shortages to do repair work on aircraft carriers and submarines in a desperate effort to get them back out to sea as soon as possible. Berger takes care not to blame the Navy for building expensive, relatively slow amphibious ships to carry Marines across the globe. “These issues should not be construed as a criticism of our Navy partners who built the fleet—to include the types of amphibious warfare and maritime prepositioning ships the Marine Corps asked for—that was appropriate to the security era within the constraints of finite resources.” But that era is now over the Corps wants to build a more dynamic “inside force” of smaller ships that can operate within range of Chinese and Russian weapons and pack a potent offensive punch while offering more and smaller targets than the current amphibious fleet. But these small ships won't replace their bigger cousins — they'll come in addition to them, creating new issues for both Navy budgets and the limited number of shipbuilders who can produce hulls for the sea service. 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The Corps and Navy are also looking to buy as many as 30 Light Amphibious Warships in coming years, which would be much smaller than the current amphibious ships. The draft document doesn't include any those specifics. But Berger has already done that work in previous statements and documents, where he outlined plans: to rethink the role that large amphibious ships play in future; divest of M1 Abrams tanks; cut artillery units; slash helicopter squadrons; and reassess the role F-35s might play in future operations. Berger has admitted he realizes he needs to undertake this transition within existing budgets, leading him to call for cutting tanks, helicopters, and even some end strength. But for the Navy, Wood said, “I think much of this will be added cost because it must maintain current capabilities (types of ships) while developing new capabilities. It does not have the luxury of getting rid of current before new replacements are ready.” A significant omission in all of these plans is the absence of a larger, coherent naval strategy. The 30-year shipbuilding plan, due to Congress in February, continues to be missing in action. A major Navy force structure review was rejected by Defense Secretary Mark Esper earlier this year. The force structure review, currently being taken apart by Deputy Defense Secretary David Norquist, is expected this fall. The Navy's plans are in such a fluid state that Vice Adm. Stuart Munsch, head of the service's Warfighting Development office, cited Chinese attention as a reason to decline to give a progress report in a call with reporters earlier this month. “I'm not going to divulge our intentions,” he said. “I'm very conscious that, if I say anything public, I'm an authoritative source and the Chinese will key on what I say, and likewise any kind of public-facing document that we put out as well.” Pressed to explain what the Navy's strategy for operating in a world with competing great powers looks like, Munsch said, “I'm not sure how you would see that keeping our intentions for warfighting classified is something you would want as an American citizen.” While Berger continues to push out papers and strategies for pushing the Marines into the future, the Navy, which will provide much of the lift he needs, is still at the drawing board. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/in-war-chinese-shipyards-can-outpace-us-in-replacing-losses

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