15 juillet 2021 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

Mises à jour: Achat et mise à niveau d’équipement de la Défense

Chers collègues et partenaires du milieu de la défense,

Comme c'est aussi le cas dans la plupart des secteurs commerciaux et industriels du Canada, la pandémie de COVID-19 a eu une incidence considérable sur une grande partie de notre travail ici au ministère de la Défense nationale au cours des 18 derniers mois. Cependant, nos équipes ont travaillé avec acharnement pour s'assurer que les principaux projets continuent de progresser afin que nos militaires disposent de l'équipement dont ils ont besoin et que l'industrie canadienne ait une charge de travail durable.

Bien que nous ne connaissions pas encore toutes les conséquences de la pandémie, nous vous transmettons aujourd'hui des renseignements à jour au sujet de nos principaux grands projets d'acquisition d'équipement, qui reflètent les effets de la première année marquée par la COVID-19. Comme vous pourrez le constater dans les documents ci‑joints, nous continuons d'évaluer les effets de la pandémie et les changements qu'ils pourraient entraîner sur le calendrier ou les coûts des projets.

Voici quelques‑uns des principaux changements que vous remarquerez :

  • un retard éventuel de 16 mois dans la livraison du dernier navire de patrouille extracôtier et de l'Arctique en raison des travaux d'ajustement causés par la COVID-19 et d'autres considérations. Il ne devrait pas y avoir d'incidence sur les opérations ou la production des futurs navires au même chantier naval, mais nous continuons d'effectuer un suivi étroit du calendrier.
  • d'importants progrès ont été réalisés en ce qui concerne le projet des navires de soutien interarmées; 122 des 123 blocs du premier navire sont en cours de construction. Depuis que les documents en pièce jointe ont été préparés, le progrès continue et tous les 123 blocs sont maintenant en cours de construction, ou presque complété. À la lumière de ces progrès, nous nous attendons à recevoir le premier navire comme prévu, en 2023.
  • le Projet de remplacement d'aéronefs de recherche et sauvetage à voilure fixe progresse; six aéronefs sont maintenant acceptés en Espagne, dont deux ont été livrés au Canada. Nous sommes donc sur la bonne voie de réaliser notre plan d'atteindre la capacité opérationnelle initiale en 2022.
  • des changements importants ont été apportés au Projet de modernisation à mi‑vie du Cormorant, puisque la proposition initiale a été jugée inabordable. Nous continuons de collaborer avec le fabricant d'équipement d'origine afin d'en arriver à une solution acceptable, mais cela pourrait entraîner certains retards dans la réalisation du projet.
  • la production des véhicules blindés d'appui tactique se poursuit; 14 ont été fabriqués jusqu'à maintenant, ce qui nous permet de rester sur la bonne voie d'atteindre la capacité opérationnelle initiale en 2023. Depuis la préparation du document en pièce jointe, la production a continué et le total de véhicules fabriqués est maintenant 22.
  • Le Projet de système de véhicule de soutien moyen et le Projet de véhicule blindé tactique de patrouille sont terminés. Maintenant que tous les véhicules ont été livrés et que la capacité opérationnelle totale a été atteinte, ces projets sont maintenant considérés comme terminés.

Nos pages Web seront mises à jour au cours des prochains jours afin de refléter ces récentes informations, et elles continueront d'être mises à jour lorsque d'autres changements seront apportés à l'avenir. Il est possible d'accéder aux renseignements de tous nos projets d'acquisition majeurs sur le site suivant : https://www.canada.ca/fr/services/defense/achat-mise-a-niveau-equipement-defense.html.

Vos questions et commentaires sont les bienvenus, et nous espérons que vous continuerez à participer à cet effort tout au long de son évolution.

Vance White

Directeur par interim

Direction de Relais d'opinion et allocutions [DROA] | Sous-ministre adjoint (Affairs publiques) [SMA(AP)]

Ministère de la Défense nationale | Gouvernement du Canada

Vance.White@forces.gc.ca | C: 613-222-3272

https://www.canada.ca/fr/services/defense/achat-mise-a-niveau-equipement-defense.html

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