19 mai 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
The lesson from this history is simple. Cutting defence spending in times of austerity is a bipartisan affair in Canada. This is owing less to politics than arithmetic. DND's budget –which typically ranges from 1/5 to 1/4 of total federal departmental discretionary spending –is too big to be excluded from any serious spending restraint initiative. This is well understood by Liberals, Conservatives and the Finance Department.
The COVID-19 Recession and its Impact
No one knows how deep or how long the COVID-19-induced recession will be. But every serious analyst agrees it will produce the sharpest drop in output since the Great Depression. The International Monetary Fund, for example, projects a 6.2 per cent annualized decline in GDP for Canada,1nearly double that of the 2009 recession. And already the government's fiscal response is without precedent and will lead to the largest deficit in postwar Canadian history (at least 10 per cent of GDP, or over $200 billion).
This does not mean that Ottawa will snap into austerity mode next year. The economy will likely be too weak for that kind of action and cutting government spending is not in the Trudeau government's DNA to begin with...
One big difference between now and the past is that there will be enormous pressure on Ottawa after the recession to boost spending in a wide range of areas which have been exposed in the pandemic. These include public health funding, medical research, pandemic prevention and mitigation, the social safety net, and industries particularly hard hit during the recession. There are also Liberal election campaign commitments from 2019 to honour –almost none of which had been implemented pre-pandemic –of which national defence is conspicuously absent.
...this could produce a perfect storm for Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE). This was always a big risk associated with a defence policy that had its funding ramped up gradually over many years. As the Harper government amply demonstrated, it is relatively easy to reduce or eliminate the rate of planned increases to defence funding –the government took almost no flak for doing so in 2010. Making matters worse, DND has failed to come anywhere near meeting the spending trajectory profiled in SSE, as David Perry has analyzed thoroughly. Which means flattening DND's budget ramp is even more tempting for any government in austerity or even re-prioritization mode.
Would a change in government matter here? Unlikely. While the Conservatives are more committed to national defence and the Canadian Armed Forces than the Liberals, they would likely see deficit reduction as their top priority, and it is virtually impossible to have meaningful expenditure restraint that doesn't involve national defence [what the Harper government did from 2010 on].
Conclusion
Over the past generation, recessions and the fiscal consolidation that has followed them have had a seriously negative impact on DND's budget. The COVID-19 recession could be the most severe Canada has faced in at least 40 years. It has already resulted in the largest peacetime deficit in Canadian history. And, because of the pandemic, government priorities have changed radically overnight. The future for SSE and its associated funding does not look bright. National Defence probably has a year or two before the crunch hits. Now is therefore the time for strategic thinking and serious priority setting among the political, public service and miitary leadership to ensure that the 2020s don't become another decade of darkness.
Eugene Lang is Adjunct Professor, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute. He was chief of staff to two ministers of National Defence in the Chrétien and Martin governments and served as an official in the Department of Finance.
The 2020s most certainly will be “another decade of darkness”. It is not improbable that the Canadian military, if the Liberals win the next election, will effectively end up as a constabulary/militia force with domestic response to natural disasters of various sorts as its primary function along with very token commitments to UN peacekeeping missions. Bye bye to serious numbers of new RCAF fighters, to serious numbers of new RCN frigates, and to the needed large funding to renew NORAD's North Warning System [see this post: “So Will the Canadian Government Put Some Big Bucks into Modernizing NORAD's North Warning System?“]. And bye bye to any meaningful military participation in NATO.
Canada will then finally be defenceless against help from the US ( the following quote is from the last sentence of this earlier CGAI paper's Executive Summary: “Throughout its 60-year existence, NORAD has been Canada's “defence against help.”). Any American administration will have no hesitation in demanding the use of Canadian territory and waters for its own defence purposes if our efforts fall well below what the US thinks necessary. US Air Force bases at Cold Lake, Yellowknife, Goose Bay and a US Navy one at St. John's anyone?
Take a look at this as an example of an increasingly prevalent Canadian progressive view; and Justin Trudeau's “base” is progressive to the max:
Spending $19 billion on fighter jets won't fight COVID-19 or climate change
Instead of buying a new weapons system, the federal government should disarm and invest in a Green New Deal
There it is. Plus earlier from Mr Lang:
By the way the photo at the top of the post is of the Avro CF-100 Canuck interceptor, the first jet fighter developed in Canada–to defend against Soviet bombers...and US help.
Mark Collins
20 décembre 2023 | Local, Terrestre
“Right now, in Ukraine, we are seeing the fight of tomorrow, where we can learn valuable lessons to help improve our own armed forces,” said Deputy Commander Peter Scott. “Whatever we decide to procure in the future is taking into consideration what’s happening on the battlefield now.”
30 novembre 2018 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Murray Brewster · CBC News The last couple of weeks may go down in the Trudeau government's public record as the point when the desires of deliverology met the drawbacks of defence procurement. Remember 'deliverology'? That lofty concept — measuring a government's progress in delivering on its promises — was the vogue in policy circles at the beginning of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's administration. While it's sometimes derided as an empty concept, deliverology must have seemed tailor-made for a new government inheriting a troubled defence procurement system. The Canadian International Trade Tribunal's decision Tuesday to step into the brawl over which multinational consortium will design and support the construction of the navy's new frigates is another lesson in how (apologies to Robert Burns) the best laid plans of mice and men go awry. The tribunal's decision to order Ottawa to put the frigate project on hold pending the completion of their probe into a complaint by a failed bidder comes at a politically awkward time for the Liberals. One week ago, Auditor General Michael Ferguson delivered an ugly report on the Liberals' handling of fighter jet procurement — specifically, the plan to buy interim warplanes to cover the gap until the current CF-18 fleet can be replaced with new aircraft. Self-inflicted wounds A cynic's reflex (given the checkered history of defence purchasing over the last decade) might be to consider these two events as just another day at the office for the troubled government procurement system. That might not be entirely fair. Still, experts were saying Wednesday that the government is suffering from numerous self-inflicted political and administrative wounds on this file. With a federal election on the horizon, and in a climate of growing geopolitical instability, the question of what the government has actually managed to deliver on military procurement is an important one to ask, said Rob Huebert, an analyst in strategic studies at the University of Calgary. While the system, as the Trudeau Liberals and previous governments have constructed it, seems to be the perfect model of the "evidence based" policy making promised by the champions of deliverology, it's also not built for speed. Some would suggest the deliverology model was followed to the letter in the design competition now tied up before the trade tribunal and in Federal Court. What seemed like endless consultations with the bidders took two years. The government made up to 88 amendments to the tender. And in the end, the preferred bid was challenged by a competitor that claims not all of the navy's criteria were met. Alion Science and Technology Corp. and its subsidiary, Alion Canada, argue the warship Lockheed Martin Canada and BAE System Inc. want to sell to Ottawa cannot meet the speed requirements set by the tender without a substantial overhaul. It does not, the company claims, meet the government's demand for a proven, largely off-the-shelf design. Michael Armstrong, who teaches at Brock University and holds a doctorate in management science, said the government could have avoided the challenges and accompanying slowdowns had it been more precise in its language. "They could have been more clear and firm when they use the words 'proven design'," he said. "Did they literally mean we won't buy ships unless they're floating in the water? Or did they mean that British one that doesn't quite exist yet is close enough? "If they would have been more firm and said, 'We want a ship that actually exists,' that might have simplified things at this stage." Huebert described the auditor general's report on the purchase of interim fighters as an all-out assault on evidence-based policy making. "It is just so damning," he said. A break with reality The Conservatives have accused the Liberals of avoiding the purchase of the F-35 stealth jet through manufacturing a crisis by claiming the air force doesn't have enough fighters to meet its international commitments. The auditor found that the military could not meet the government's new policy commitment and even ignored advice that one of its proposed solutions — buying brand-new Super Hornets to fill the capability gap —would actually make their problems worse, not better. That statement, said Huebert, suggested a jaw-dropping break with reality on the government's part. "They [the Liberals] were just making things up," he said. It might have been too optimistic to expect the Liberals to fix the system, said Armstrong, given the short four years between elections. But Huebert said Ottawa can't carry on with business as usual — that the government now must deliver on procurement, instead of doubling down on rhetoric. The problem, he said, is that governments haven't really paid a price in the past for botched military procurement projects. There was "no political pain for the agony of the Sea King replacement, as an example," he said, referring to the two-decade long process to retire the air force's maritime helicopters. "The thing that makes me so concerned, even outraged, is that we are heading into a so much more dangerous international environment," said Huebert, citing last weekend's clash between Russia and Ukraine over the Kerch Strait and ongoing tension with Beijing in the South China Sea. "When things get nasty, we have to be ready." https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/why-can-t-ottawa-get-military-procurement-right-1.4924800
24 octobre 2023 | Local, Aérospatial
MacDougall shares details of his role with the Snowbirds, what the tryout process is like, and what it feels like to eject from the CT-114 Tutor.