Air Force looks to use fleet’s largest cargo plane for medical evacuations

Sur le même sujet

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  23 septembre 2021 | International, Aérospatial

  Top Air Force officer's plan to 'accelerate change or lose' is picking up speed, one year in

  '€œWe could all use more manpower, more money and more time. But leaders cannot wait for perfect conditions to act or make a decision," Brown said.

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  9 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  DoD must modernize infrastructure to support cutting-edge technology research

  By: JihFen Lei If you're reading this over the internet, you're using technology developed by the Department of Defense science and technology enterprise. For decades, the DoD has cultivated a wide-ranging ecosystem of technical professionals, research infrastructure and partnerships that has made vast contributions to U.S. national security and economic strength. From microchips to the GPS satellites that enabled a revolution in precision warfare, the department's S&T enterprise has been central to creating the security and prosperity our nation enjoys today. Although technology dominance has long been central to the American way of war, U.S. military superiority is increasingly under threat. American adversaries are making rapid technological advancements and incorporating them into newly modernized forces. In response, the department has been working to aggressively position its S&T enterprise to meet the security needs of the 21st century. Long-term success will require concentration in three fundamental areas: First, we must invest for the future while focusing on the present. This requires investing in foundational research that will create the next generation of military superiority. Second, we must cultivate a workforce of scientists and engineers ready to solve the DoD's hardest problems. Finally, we must create and maintain world-class defense laboratories and research facilities, enabling us to work with academic and industrial partners to quickly transition technology into capabilities. Each of these elements are critical to nurturing an innovation ecosystem optimized for the department's needs. The road to the next great scientific or technological advance starts with basic science and research. Basic research is central to the DoD's long-term competitive strategy to create and maintain military superiority for the nation. The DoD has a long history of conducting and sponsoring basic research, focusing on understanding how and why things work at a fundamental scientific level. Although basic research is often performed without obvious or immediate benefit and requires long timelines to realize its impact, the importance of continued investment cannot be overlooked. Without the department's basic research investments — made years ago — in the new areas of autonomy, quantum science, artificial intelligence and machine learning, or biotechnology, the DoD would not possess the innovative and advanced capabilities it does today. Basic research enables the U.S. to create strategic surprise for its adversaries and insulates the nation from technological shocks driven by the advancements of others. Stable and healthy investment in basic research is not only good to have, it is a vital component of the nation's strategy to maintain a competitive advantage. The DoD must use all of the tools at its disposal to develop a skilled, diverse workforce of technical professionals who are knowledgeable about the DoD's missions and capable of advising DoD leaders on technology decisions. This includes the scientists and engineers who will conduct research in DoD laboratories and engineering centers, our industry partners, and the academic research community with whom the department closely collaborates. There is nothing more critical to the American military's ability to innovate than its people. For these reasons, the department relies on authorities provided by Congress to conduct flexible, direct hiring of technical professionals to work in DoD research institutions. The department looks for the best technical professionals to join its ranks as researchers, engineers and trusted advisers to the DOD's senior leaders. When the department attempts to incorporate new knowledge from academia or new technologies from industry, the DoD's S&T workforce must be capable of making smart buying decisions based on sound technical judgment and an understanding of the DoD's unique mission needs. At a time when other nations are prioritizing the recruitment of technology professionals to bolster their military strength, the department must view its S&T workforce as a strategic resource that is fundamental to long-term technological superiority. Many capabilities found at DoD labs are unique national treasures and cannot be found elsewhere. On average, these laboratories, which span 63 locations across 22 states and the District of Columbia, are over 45 years old. As part of its strategy to recruit and retain a world-class S&T workforce, the department must modernize its technical infrastructure, laboratories and engineering centers. The DoD should invest wisely to modernize these outdated facilities and their equipment to support the modern, cutting-edge research that our national defense demands. As the nation once again prepares to engage in long-term strategic competition, the DoD's S&T enterprise is the key to success. Sufficiently resourcing long-term research and technology development activities will ensure America avoids technology surprise while creating a disproportionate advantage for the war fighter. The department must make the investments necessary to educate, attract and retain the world's best talent. As the DoD's National Defense Strategy makes clear, advanced technologies will be central to America's ability to fight and win future wars. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/08/dod-must-modernize-infrastructure-to-support-cutting-edge-technology-research/

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  14 novembre 2018 | International, Terrestre

  BAE Systems Leverages Industrial Network As Ramp-Up Of Armored Vehicle Production Approaches

  Loren Thompson In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, production of heavy armored vehicles like tanks and troop carriers almost became a lost art in America. The Army and Marine Corps repeatedly deferred development of new vehicles, leaving industry with little work besides upgrading combat systems developed during the Reagan years. As a result, there are only two integrated manufacturing sites left where new heavy vehicles can be produced -- one for tanks, the other for almost everything else. I wrote about the nation's sole surviving tank plant on November 2. Today's piece is about the plant where almost everything else is produced -- the sprawling BAE Systems manufacturing complex at York, Pennsylvania. BAE Systems is a contributor to my think tank and a consulting client, so I have a fairly detailed understanding of what goes on there. At the moment, York is in the midst of a renaissance, having recently won orders for a new Army troop carrier and a new Marine amphibious vehicle. It is also upgrading the Army's Bradley fighting vehicle and Paladin self-propelled howitzer. The company is investing heavily in new machining systems and other capital equipment to sustain an expected surge in output, and is hiring hundreds of workers who must be trained to a high level of proficiency in specialized skills such as the welding of aluminum armor. This is all good news for the local economy, but to a large degree what BAE Systems is doing at York involves building back capacity that was lost during the Obama years. BAE Systems has been highly successful at booking new business in the armored-vehicle segment of the military market as Army and Marine leaders have become increasingly worried about their reliance on Cold War combat vehicles. An industrial-base study released by the White House in September stated that over 80% of new armored-vehicle production for the two services will occur at York. The study speculated that all the new work might stress the production capabilities of the site. However, that issue was thoroughly analyzed by the Army before it awarded recent contracts for Paladin howitzer upgrades and a new Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle to replace Vietnam-era troop carriers in its armored brigades. The Army found no significant capacity constraints so long as BAE makes suitable investments and hires skilled workers. The findings of the Army's industrial-base analysis are not reflected in the White House report. Here are a few reasons why capacity concerns are overblown. First, although York is the final assembly point for diverse armored vehicles, it is only one part of a nationwide manufacturing network on which BAE Systems relies to produce combat vehicles. The company operates other manufacturing facilities in Alabama, Oklahoma and South Carolina, including one of the nation's largest integrated forges for producing track components. It also works closely with Army depots (as does the tank plant), and has a supplier network containing over a thousand industrial partners. Second, preparation of the White House report predated release of some details concerning how BAE Systems plans to invest in robotic welding, advanced machining technology and other cutting-edge capital equipment. The combination of these investments and programs with schools near manufacturing sites to train the necessary workforce will provide BAE Systems with more production capacity than it requires to address projected levels of demand. Third, the current level of production capacity at York is the inevitable result of uneven demand from U.S. military customers over the last decade. The White House report identifies lack of stable funding as a key factor explaining the fragility of the military supplier base, but fails to explicitly make the connection in explaining why York is facilitized to its current capacity level. BAE Systems is now investing heavily to meet future demand, but it is understandably wary about building capacity much beyond what it expects to need. The latter factor is critical in understanding why there are only two sites left in America capable of integrating heavy armored vehicles. There were many more in the past when high levels of demand were sustained for decades, but industry can't carry capacity indefinitely if no customer is prepared to fund the resulting costs. The reason the workforce assembling Abrams tanks at the Ohio plant dwindled to less than 100 personnel during the Obama years was that nobody was buying tanks. This is not a hard connection to grasp. York has some advantages over the tank plant because it produces a diverse array of vehicles for multiple customers, and the industrial skills required are fungible across its portfolio. But if the Army or Marine Corps were to trim their production objectives for ground vehicles as they have repeatedly over the last decade, it is inevitable that production capacity will adjust to match the reduced level of funding. That's how an efficient industrial base works: supply matches demand. At the moment, the York plant is generating products that satisfy all customer technical standards. There are no outstanding issues -- which is a good thing, because BAE Systems and its legacy enterprises have been the sole providers of Marine amphibious vehicles since World War Two and today manufacture a majority of the combat vehicles in the Army's armored brigades. Company executives do not anticipate problems as they gradually ramp up to two shifts per day at the site. But the point they stressed to me is that York is the central node of an industrial network scattered across the nation, and there is adequate capacity going forward not only to meet expected demand, but also to cope with potential surges. The company estimates that combined demand from the Army and the Marine Corps will be the equivalent of one-and-a-half armored brigades worth of equipment per year, and that should be easily manageable within the limits imposed by planned capacity. They are confident the company can deliver what warfighters need, when they need it. https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/11/13/bae-systems-leverages-industrial-network-as-ramp-up-of-armored-vehicle-production-approaches