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Par Frédéric Dubois Dans les airs, sur terre ou sur mer, l'industrie européenne de la Défense vit actuellement de profondes transformations. Français, Italiens, Allemands, Britanniques, Espagnols... tous ces acteurs cherchent de nouvelles alliances dans un secteur de plus en plus concurrentiel. Mariages de raison ou de passion, les rapprochements entre grands groupes industriels sont devenus, depuis quinze ans, un passage obligé pour les entreprises qui veulent survivre sur ce marché hyper concurrentiel. Et les cas sont nombreux. Dans les airs, l'exemple le plus connu est certainement l'Eurofighter Typhoon, avion de combat bi-réacteur mis en service en 2004 par l'entreprise européenne Eurofighter GmbH. Aux manettes, quatre pays : la Grande-Bretagne, l'Allemagne, l'Espagne et l'Italie. Ce projet d'avion européen était sur la table depuis les années 70. Finalement, ces quatre pays ont uni leurs savoir-faire, laissant les Français sur la touche, car ces derniers préféraient faire cavalier seul avec le Rafale de Dassault. Entre les deux camps, les résultats commerciaux sont sans appel. En quinze ans, Eurofighter GmbH a vendu 538 exemplaires de son chasseur ; en quelques années de plus, Dassault a écoulé – seulement – 176 avions, en dépit d'une carrière opérationnelle nettement plus prestigieuse. Cette situation a poussé les Européens à revoir leur copie. En 2014, Français et Britanniques se mettent à plancher sur un projet – baptisé FCAS pour Future Combat Air System – afin de produire un avion de 6e génération. Trois ans plus tard, ils sont rejoints par les Allemands. Finalement, en 2018, Dassault annonce officiellement son partenariat avec Airbus Defence and Space dans le cadre du projet FCAS : l'Europe va ainsi se doter d'un nouveau système de défense aérienne avec l'héritier du Rafale, de l'Eurofighter Typhoon européen et de l'Hornet espagnol. Son nom (provisoire) : New Generation Fighter. Dans les airs, les Européens ont enfin compris qu'il valait mieux parler une seule et même langue face au Sukhoi Su-57 russe, et autres F-35 américain ou J-20 chinois. Des concurrents aux dents longues Quel que soit le secteur en Europe, les industries nationales jouent aujourd'hui leur survie face à des concurrents aux moyens nettement plus importants qu'auparavant, gr'ce à des marchés domestiques en forte dynamique et au soutien politique et financier d'états puissants. Après les airs, prenons la direction des océans. Le secteur de l'industrie navale a pris quelques longueurs de retard. En 2017, le quotidien français Le Mondetitrait : « Naval : le serpent de mer de la consolidation européenne ». Dans ce secteur comme dans les autres, le principe de « consolidation » est sur toutes les lèvres, la concurrence étant très sévère entre pays exportateurs. Deux géants se dressent face aux Européens : les Russes et surtout les Chinois, devenus la première puissance mondiale en la matière. En seulement dix ans. « Les groupes européens se sont trop souvent livré une guerre fratricide sur les appels d'offres internationaux, remarque Bertrand Gueynard, directeur du pôle Défense et sécurité du cabinet de conseil en stratégie CEIS dans les colonnes du Monde. Ils sont confrontés à la montée en puissance des arsenaux chinois, russes et même aujourd'hui japonais. Pour rester dans la classe mondiale, les rapprochements sont indispensables. Dans cette industrie, la taille est déterminante car elle permet d'offrir une large gamme de produits et de financer les investissements en recherche et développement nécessaires pour maintenir une avance technologique. Il faut toujours avoir un coup d'avance. » Motivées par le risque de disparition de certaines industries (les exemples sont nombreux hors défense), certaines entreprises européennes de l'industrie navale ont décidé de réagir avant qu'il ne soit trop tard. Des fleurons high-tech en Europe C'est le cas du Français Naval Group et de l'Italien Fincantieri. En 2017, Fincantieri a décidé de se lier à la France à travers deux projets : le rachat des Chantiers de l'Atlantique de Saint-Nazaire (les Sud-Coréens ayant jeté l'éponge) et l'alliance avec son homologue Naval Group. Ces deux entreprises étaient à la fois concurrentes lors d'appels d'offre internationaux et partenaires sur différents projets depuis trente ans, comme avec les frégates Horizon, un projet impulsé en 1991 par Hervé Guillou... devenu PDG de l'entreprise française en 2014. Lors de l'annonce de son alliance avec le PDG de Fincantieri Giuseppe Bono, Guillou a expliqué leur vision commune : « C'est une double ambition – à la fois d'offrir à nos deux pays les meilleures technologies au meilleur prix avec les meilleurs programmes pour garantir la supériorité de nos marines, mais aussi d'être capables d'avoir une présence mondiale suffisante pour assurer notre compétitivité et notre présence sur le marché – qui justifie notre rapprochement. » Cette volonté de la France et de l'Italie part d'un constat sans ambiguïté : l'Europe, et ses divers budgets de défense nationaux, n'a plus les moyens de faire vivre ni de maintenir toutes les compétences de l'ensemble des industriels de la construction navale. Les marchés commencent à opérer une sélection naturelle douloureuse, certains acteurs historiques commençant à connaitre de graves difficultés, notamment en Allemagne, aux Pays-Bas ou encore en Espagne. C'est une course pour la survie qui s'engage désormais. Les Européens ont donc tout intérêt à faire vite, d'autant qu'ils jouissent d'un savoir-faire et de technologies que le reste de la planète leur envie, avec des fleurons high-tech comme Leonardo, Thalès ou Safran. Car si la concurrence est aujourd'hui féroce, les atouts des Européens sont évidents et constituent de réelles opportunités pour les acteurs du Vieux continent. Encore faut-il qu'ils arrêtent de se mettre – trop souvent – des b'tons dans les roues. https://www.econostrum.info/Concentration-industrielle-en-Europe-une-necessite-autant-qu-une-opportunite-pour-la-Defense_a25636.html

NAVY Raytheon Co., Fullerton, California, is awarded a $234,640,402 fixed-price-incentive, firm-target contract for the low-rate initial production of 23 Joint Precision Approach and Landing Systems. In addition, this contract procures three production and installation engineering development model unit upgrade kits, engineering change proposals, and associated data. Work will be performed in Fullerton, California (68 percent); Cedar Rapids, Iowa (22 percent); and Indianapolis, Indiana (10 percent), and is expected to be completed in August 2023. Fiscal 2019 other procurement (Navy); and fiscal 2019 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funds in the amount of $49,134,484 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity (N00019-19-C-0020). Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona, is awarded a $151,468,431 firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for integrated logistics support and repairs for the sustainment of the AIM-9X Block II and Block II+ missiles. These services are in support of the Navy, Air Force, and the governments of Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Oman, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Turkey under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona (90.7 percent); Cheshire, Connecticut (7 percent); Andover, Massachusetts (0.7 percent); Burlington, Massachusetts (0.6 percent); Heilbronn, Germany (0.5 percent); and various locations within the continental U.S. (0.5 percent), and is expected to be completed in May 2022. No funds will be obligated at time of award; funds will be obligated on individual task orders as issued. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity (N00019-19-D-0023). Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is awarded $11,336,274 for modification P00003 to a previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee contract (N00019-19-C-0004). This modification exercises an option for deployment and operation of test aircraft in support of the F-35 Lightning II development, production, and sustainment for the Air Force, Navy, and non-U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) participants. Work will be performed in Lakehurst, New Jersey (70 percent); and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida (30 percent), and is expected to be completed in March 2020. Fiscal 2019 research, development, test and evaluation (Air Force and Navy); and non-U.S. DoD participant funds in the amount of $11,336,274 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the fiscal year. This option combines purchases for the Air Force ($8,791,728; 78 percent); Navy ($224,464; 2 percent) and non-U.S. DoD participants ($2,320,082; 20 percent). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Raytheon Co., Fullerton, California, is awarded $8,997,334 for modification P00030 to a previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee contract (N00019-16-C-0052) to design, prototype, and test a replacement Joint Precision Approach and Landing System Ship Global Positioning System Sensor Unit (SGSU). This resolves obsolescence driven by part shortages in the Digital Integrated Global Positioning System Anti-Jam Receiver, a major subassembly of the SGSU. Work will be performed in Cedar Rapids, Iowa (59.4 percent); Fullerton, California (40.4 percent); and Indianapolis, Indiana (0.2 percent), and is expected to be completed in July 2021. Fiscal 2019 research, development, test and evaluation (Navy) funds in the amount of $8,997,334 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Computer Systems Center Inc.,* Springfield, Virginia, is awarded a $7,474,901 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract to perform up to 51,180 hours of concept and requirements development and system engineering services for the F-35 Lightning II Offboard Mission Support Integrated Product Team. Work will be performed in Springfield, Virginia (60 percent); China Lake, California (20 percent); Arlington, Virginia (10 percent); and Fort Worth, Texas (10 percent), and is expected to be completed in May 2024. Fiscal 2019 working capital funds (Navy) in the amount of $205,572 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the fiscal year. This contract combines purchases for the Navy ($4,858,686; 65 percent); and the Foreign Military Sales customers ($2,616,215; 35 percent). This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1. The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, California, is the contracting activity (N68936-19-D-0035). AIR FORCE Sierra Nevada Corp., Sparks, Nevada, has been awarded a $74,902,132 definitive C-type contract for installation of a Degraded Visual Environment System (DVES), which improves situational awareness to pilots and aircrew operating in DVE conditions by adding new functional capabilities to the HH-60G. This contract provides for the procurement, installation, and integration of the DVES solution on 85 HH-60G helicopter aircraft. Work will be performed in Sparks, Nevada, and is expected to be complete by May 21, 2024. This award is a result of a competitive acquisition resulting in three offers received. Fiscal 2019 other procurement funds in the amount of $19,155,984 are being obligated at the time of award. Air Force Material Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, is the contracting activity (FA8552-19-C-0002). The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri, has been awarded a $40,974,754 firm-fixed-price modification (P00026) to previously awarded contract FA8621-16-C-6397 for F-15C and F-15E Mission Training Center Services contractor-furnished, high-fidelity simulation equipment to provide simulation capability to train pilots and weapons system operators. This modification provides four additional pilot/weapon systems officer crew stations devices and their associated equipment in support of aircrew training requirements. Work will be performed at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and is expected to be complete by Feb. 15, 2021. This modification brings the total cumulative face value of the contract to $229,428,492. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance funds in the full amount are being obligated at the time of award. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity. BAE Systems Technology Solutions & Services Inc., Rockville, Maryland, has been awarded a $7,758,301 delivery order (FA2521-19-F0139) against previously awarded contract FA2521-16-D-0010 for serviceable components and subsystems for Instrumentation Tracking Systems (ITS). This delivery order provides for a 5.5 KVDC transmitter power upgrade for AN/FPS-8a5 Phased Array Radar. Work will be performed at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and is expected to be complete by March 17, 2021. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance funds in the full amount are being obligated at the time of award. The 45th Contracting Squadron, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, is the contracting activity. (Awarded May 16, 2019) ARMY Caelum Research Corp.,* Rockville, Maryland, was awarded a $22,639,066 hybrid (cost-no-fee and firm-fixed-price) contract for data and information management support services. Twenty five bids were solicited with three bids received. Work will be performed in Huntsville, Alabama, with an estimated completion date of Nov. 30, 2024. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance, Army funds in the amount of $3,694,966 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W31P4Q-19-F-0324). Sentar Inc.,* Huntsville, Alabama, was awarded a $10,426,896 hybrid (cost-no-fee and firm-fixed-price) contract for cyber security and information management support services. Twenty five bids were solicited with six bids received. Work will be performed in Huntsville, Alabama, with an estimated completion date of Nov. 30, 2024. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance, Army and Army working capital funds in the amount of $1,683,982 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W31P4Q-19-F-0323). CAT Island Conservancy LLC,* Baton Rouge, Louisiana, was awarded an $8,121,750 firm-fixed-price contract to purchase Bottomland Hardwood Impacts mitigation bank credits/acres from approved mitigation bank(s) in the Lake Pontchartrain and/or Mississippi River basins. Bids were solicited via the internet with four received. Work will be performed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with an estimated completion date of June 3, 2019. Fiscal 2019 Army Corps of Engineers civil construction funds in the amount of $8,121,750 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans, Louisiana, is the contracting activity (W912P8-19-C-0037). DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY Galois Inc., Portland, Oregon, was awarded a $16,479,920 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for a research project under the Safe Documents (SafeDocs) program. The SafeDocs program aims to develop novel verified programming methodologies for building high assurance parsers for extant electronic data formats, and novel methodologies for comprehending, simplifying, and reducing these formats to their safe, unambiguous, verification-friendly subsets (safe sub-setting). SafeDocs will address the ambiguity and complexity obstacles to the application of verified programming posed by extant electronic data formats. Work will be performed in Portland, Oregon, with an expected completion date of May 2023. Fiscal 2019 research, development, test and evaluation funding in the amount of $2,326,000 are being obligated at time of award. This contract was a competitive acquisition under an open broad agency announcement and 23 offers were received. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia, is the contracting activity (HR001119C0073). *Small business https://dod.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1855659/source/GovDelivery/

Defence Secretary Penny Mordaunt has announced £22 million in funding for Army cyber operations centres Speaking this evening at the NATO Cyber Defence Pledge Conference in London, Defence Secretary Penny Mordaunt will address the need for the UK and NATO members to recognise offensive cyber as central to modern warfare. As the UK has already demonstrated against Daesh in the Middle East, it can be a vital tool to keep people in the UK and overseas safe from virtual and physical threats. The military continues to develop its cyber capabilities as part of the £1.9 billion investment into the National Cyber Security Strategy, focused on boosting the UK's cyber security. Recent UK innovations have included the creation of the National Cyber Security Centre which brings together government, intelligence agencies and the private sector into one organisation. The state-of-the-art Defence Cyber School, which marked its first anniversary in March this year, is also training the next generation of cyber experts. The Defence Secretary will today expand that commitment, announcing £22 million in funding to stand up new Army cyber operations centres across the UK. Defence Secretary Penny Mordaunt will say: We know all about the dangers. Whether the attacks come from Russia, China or North Korea. Whether they come from hacktivists, criminals or extremists. Whether its malware or fake news. Cyber can bring down our national infrastructure and undermine our democracy. It's time to pay more than lip service to cyber. We must convince our adversaries their advances simply aren't worth the cost. Cyber enemies think they can act with impunity. We must show them they can't. That we are ready to respond at a time and place of our choosing in any domain, not just the virtual world. We need coherent cyber offense as well as defence. So today I can announce we will be investing £22m to create new cyber operations centres. Putting the Army at the forefront of information warfare, the centres will draw together cyber capability from a range of sources – including both national intelligence and open source data – to give the Army the competitive edge across all environments. The cyber centres will provide the Army with 24/7 information and analysis, dispel misinformation and give the UK Armed Forces and our allies the upper hand on emerging digital threats. The centres are likely to be used to support overseas operations, humanitarian missions, and efforts to protect UK digital communications on home soil. The centres will work with existing Army capabilities, such as 77 Brigade – a modern and information-focused British Army unit – but will also have regular contact with joint and other national security organisations. Major General Tom Copinger-Symes, General Officer Commanding Force Troops Command: These new cyber centres will allow the Army and Defence to transform the way we use data, at speed, so that we can compete with our adversaries in a way fit for the 21st Century. Combining artificial intelligence with our military analysts will help us better understand threats and exploit opportunities, in turn enabling us to get the truth out much more rapidly, quashing the noise of disinformation from our enemies. While details on locations are yet to be confirmed, building in support of the centres is due to begin next year, with operations expected to commence in the early 2020s. The MOD is embracing transformation at an ever-faster rate and investments in truly high-tech innovation, such as in the provision of cutting-edge cyber centres, that will develop the Armed Forces of the future. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cyber-innovation-at-the-forefront-of-uks-approach-to-modern-warfare

(B2) L'Union européenne doit reconsidérer sa relation avec les Etats-Unis et l'OTAN pour faire émerger une stratégie de défense européenne. C'est ce qu'a défendu Jolyon Howorth, professeur émérite à la Harvard Kennedy School, durant les seconds entretiens européens de la défense à Paris jeudi (16 mai) Face à la création d'une armée européenne, trois obstacles... Les Américains s'inquiètent des conséquences d'une défense européenne pour leur leadership. Les Britanniques jouent l'ambivalence pour ne pas froisser les États-Unis. Les Européens peinent à se mettre d'accord sur la marche à suivre. Trois obstacles qui ont fait « échouer » les deux premières tentatives de forger une armée européenne, la Communauté Européenne de Défense (CED) dans les années 1950 et la première version de la politique de défense (la PESD ou politique européenne de sécurité et de défense) à la fin des années 1990 début 2000, et qui continuent à freiner les nouvelles initiatives. Les Américains, d'accord sur le principe d'une défense européenne Les Américains, souvent critiqués pour le retard que prennent les initiatives européennes en matière de défense, n'étaient pas toujours défavorables à l'idée et ne s'y « opposent pas par principe, au contraire ». Mais une question les taraude, celle des « conséquences pour le leadership de l'Alliance, voire pour son avenir » si une défense européenne crédible devait se former. D'où l'ambivalence des États-Unis sur cette idée que Eisenhower regardait pourtant en 1951 comme un des objectifs de l'Alliance, idée légitimée par les multiples injonctions américaines à augmenter les budgets européens de défense. Cette position confuse s'inscrit dans le débat existentiel qu'est la définition de la prochaine « grand strategyaméricaine », explique Jolyon Howorth. ... mais des inquiétudes subsistent sur leur leadership au sein de l'Alliance Après « quarante ans de leadership incontesté des alliés européens », le courant « liberal hegemon » qui définit la politique des Etats-Unis depuis longtemps se voit contester par les partisans de « l'offshore balancing ». Lesquels prônent un repli américain sur « un nombre fort limité de bases stratégiques » et un « transfert aux Européens de la responsabilité principale de leur propre sécurité ». La question reste ouverte alors que Donald Trump « semble s'y associer », sans toutefois « comprendre un instant le sens profond de ce débat stratégique ». Les Britanniques, réfractaires à toute intégration européenne Les Britanniques ont été, eux, « beaucoup plus réfractaires que les Américains au projet dès le début ». Et ils continueront de « freiner l'avancée des Européens vers une autonomie stratégique », rendant l'axe Paris-Berlin « d'autant plus urgent ». La vision britannique est celle d'une sécurité européenne b'tie sur une « clé de voûte » : l'OTAN. Les Européens étant simplement relégués à un rôle « complémentaire ». C'est pourquoi « Londres a bloqué toute avancée » qui aurait pu mener à une armée européenne tout en réclamant pourtant « à cor et à cri » un « engagement inconditionnel » à la sécurité européenne, selon le professeur, lui-même British. Pourtant fermement soutenue par Winston Churchill dès le début, la défense européenne a vite inquiété outre-Manche, le Royaume-Uni anxieux de « préserver le partenariat avec les États-Unis ». Le pays avait par exemple refusé la CED dès 1953, craignant que « le succès de l'armée européenne n'entraîne le désengagement américain ». Les Européens indécis et divisés Mais au final, les Européens sont leurs propres ennemis. Les divisions nationales sur la manière de construire l'Europe persistent et se retrouvent, « de façon profonde, au sein des familles politiques ». Mais avec le nouveau contexte géostratégique, de plus en plus complexe et multidimensionnel, « l'Union européenne ne peut plus se permettre le luxe de ses divisions internes ». Il faut repenser notre stratégie pour « passer de l'Europe de la défense, à la défense de l'Europe ». Ces divisions cristallisent l'opposition entre « l'intégrationnisme » prôné par Monnet et « l'intergouvernementalisme », selon le modèle gaullien. La politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) a, depuis Saint-Malo, et la déclaration franco-britannique de 1998, été développée dans le cadre de ce dernier, un modèle « de plus en plus mis en question ». Les dernières évolutions en matière de défense nous placent à nouveau « face à la confrontation de ces deux méthodologies contradictoires ». Trois défis majeurs aujourd'hui Définir une stratégie européenne propre Il faut développer une « grand strategy » à l'européenne martèle Jolyon Howorth. L'un des problèmes fondamentaux de la première version de la PSDC fut son « manque d'ambition » par « crainte de froisser » les Américains. Pourtant, « la seule ambition qui vaille pour l'Union européenne est d'assumer sa propre défense collective ». Et donc d'arrêter de penser qu'il est impossible pour l'Europe de se défendre sans le soutien américain. Et il faut « pouvoir s'adapter à la nouvelle donne planétaire ». « Après Trump, il n'y aura pas de retour à la case départ ». À quel prix « L'armée européenne ne s'achètera pas parmi les soldes de chez Tati ». Les États membres de l'OTAN ont dépensé « 264 milliards de dollars » sur les questions de défense en 2018. Si tous les pays avaient atteint l'objectif fixé par l'OTAN de 2% du PIB, cela aurait majoré la somme de « près de 102 milliards de dollars ». Mais une armée européenne autonome pourrait représenter jusqu'à « 467 milliards de dollars supplémentaires » rappelle l'universitaire, se basant sur une étude récente du International Institute for Security Studies (IISS) qui fait l'hypothèse d'un retrait américain d'Europe. Un engagement conséquent donc. Et avec qui ? Si beaucoup pensent que l'armée européenne sera forgée « à l'extérieur de l'OTAN, sans les Américains, voire contre », Jolyon Howorth n'en est pas persuadé. Une armée européenne ne doit pas être construite contre les Américains, mais « en bonne intelligence avec eux ». Car l'Alliance ne va pas se dissoudre de sitôt. Et elle peut avoir un rôle moteur alors qu'il existe actuellement « quatre-vingt projets de coopération » entre l'OTAN et l'UE, et que les Américains « n'arrêtent pas de nous demander des efforts accrus, de nous encourager à assumer le leadership stratégique dans notre voisinage ». Il faudrait plutôt revenir au scénario initial : une alliance « rééquilibrée » dans laquelle les Européens « prennent graduellement la part du lion » et les Américains jouent « le rôle de facilitateurs ». Pour former une alliance qui ne soit pas « structurée par la dépendance, encore moins par la servitude ». (Coline Traverson st.) https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2019/05/23/entretiens-europeens-de-la-defense-2019-une-grand-strategy-pour-leurope-j-howorth/

DARPA's Defense Sciences Office (DSO) will host Discover DSO Day (D3) on June 18, 2019, to facilitate discussion of technical research thrusts outlined in a new office-wide Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) solicitation expected in mid-June. Additionally, D3 will familiarize participants with DSO's mission and streamlined business practices designed to simplify the proposal process and accelerate the timeline from idea approval to research start date. The event will take place in the DARPA Conference Center, Arlington, Virginia, from 8:45 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. EDT, and the audio also will be webcast. Registration is required to attend in person or via webcast. One of six technical offices at DARPA, DSO identifies and pursues high-risk, high-payoff research initiatives across a broad spectrum of science and engineering disciplines and transforms them into game-changing technologies for U.S. national security. “D3 is an opportunity for the broader science and technology community to engage with DSO as we highlight key technical areas we're focusing on in the coming year,” said Valerie Browning, director of DSO. “We encourage potential proposers from small companies, universities, research centers and large companies to join us. We especially encourage those who've never done business with DARPA to come and learn about DSO and let us hear your novel ideas in the areas we're interested in.” Panels of DSO program managers will discuss concepts and ideas they are pursuing in each of the four technical areas listed below. Participants will have the opportunity to ask questions following each panel presentation: Frontiers in Math, Computation & Design: The increasingly complex, technologically sophisticated, fast-paced and dynamic military operational environment imposes fundamental challenges in how we design and plan for future military needs. The DoD implications of these trends drive a need for new math, computation, and design tools that enable trusted decision making at increased speed and with known confidence levels. Topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) mathematical, computational, and design frameworks and tools that provide robust solutions to challenging DoD problems such as planning, optimization, and platform design; (2) fundamental scientific underpinnings and limits of machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI); and (3) alternative computing models, architectures, and substrates for faster, more robust decision making. Limits of Sensing & Sensors: Sensing and measurement of signals ranging from “DC to daylight” are ubiquitous to military systems and missions. Surveillance, navigation, warfighter health monitoring, and target ID/tracking are just a few examples of missions and/or applications that rely on various sensing modalities. Topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) new sensing modalities, (2) fundamental sensing limits, (3) engineered materials that enable novel optics and imaging capabilities, (4) fundamental and practical limits of quantum enabled sensing and metrology, and (5) practical and deployable sensing and sensor designs. Complex Social Systems: Understanding social behavior and the dynamics of complex social networks is critically important for many military operations including stability, deterrence, compellence, counter-terrorism, shaping the environment, training, and mission planning. Additionally, increasingly robust machine capabilities in the form of automation, platforms, and artificial intelligence (AI) will fundamentally change how human teams frame problems, plan, and operate at tempo and manage complexity. Topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) accurate and scientifically validated models of the social dynamics underlying different kinds of conflict; (2) capabilities to improve understanding of causality in complex social systems; (3) artificial intelligence and other tools that enable improved human-machine symbiotic decision-making; and (4) new concepts in war-gaming and simulations to identify and understand options for deterrence and stability operations. Anticipating Surprise: Ultimately, the goal of DSO R&D investments is to ensure that U.S. warfighters have access to the most advanced technologies. Research funded under this thrust area supports scientific and technological discovery that leads to “leap ahead” capabilities for enhanced military readiness across multiple operational domains. Example topics of interest under this domain include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) novel functional and structural materials and manufacturing processes; (2) materials for harsh environments; (3) defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Weapons of Mass Terror (WMD/WMT) threats; (4) energetic materials; (5) new propulsion concepts; and (6) novel approaches to energy storage and power generation. For D3 agenda and registration instructions, please visit: https://www.fbo.gov/spg/ODA/DARPA/CMO/DARPA-SN-19-52/listing.html https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-05-20a

By THERESA HITCHENS BOSTON: BAE Systems, the third-largest defense contractor in the world, is funding innovative small startups to get innovative technology quickly to its Defense Department customers. Through an initiative called FAST Labs, BAE is both providing seed capital directly to startups and funding a number of accelerators to widen the potential market. The standard tactics include simply buying a smaller company to gain its technology or investing in a startup in order to control the direction of its research. Instead, BAE's FAST Labs is attempting to serve as a middle man connecting startups with DoD customers and BAE's various units. “By giving [the startups] the feasibility money, we can expose them to those harsh requirements that exist in the aerospace and defense world, but we can also in turn do social engineering inside our company,” Jerry Wohletz, the vice president and general management of BAE FAST Labs, told me. The idea is to introduce the startups' designs to BAE's factory and engineering work force, he said, “because we need to get it out of R&D land and get it into those products and services” that BAE knows its defense customers are looking for. FAST Labs is focused on research related to next-generation electronics, intelligent autonomous systems, cyber, electronic warfare, and sensors and processing. Wohletz explained that BAE does in-house research on capabilities that are solely of interest to DoD and the Intelligence Community, but it is reaching out to startups in order to partner on products and services based on commercial market needs. “A lot of aerospace and defense companies have venture capital funds,” Wohletz said. “That's not what we are trying to do. This is not an equity play to drive bottom line performance. We talk here about innovation velocity. We want speed to market.” Therefore, BAE is also putting its money — but more importantly its time — into a number of technology accelerators, such as Techstars in Boston, Capitol Factory in Austin, Texas, and MASSChallenge with hubs in both cities. FAST Labs has a team of scouts whose job is to attend pitches all across the country. “This is not based on ownership. We leave them their freedom,” Francesca Scire-Scappuzzo, who heads the scout team, told me. “We want innovation not just to support our market, we want to support their own innovation” for the commercial market. “Other defense contractors are trying to get involved with venture capital, but they for the most part don't really get it. BAE was in early, and they had the benefit of being linked with us,” Lt. Col. Dave Harden, chief operating officer of AFWERX, the Air Force's innovation hub, told me during the Techstars Air Force Accelerator Demo Day here last Thursday. Indeed, BAE cosponsored the event, and put upfront investment in at least three of 10 start-up companies participating. Neither Wohletz or Scire-Scappuzzo would tell me the size of BAE's budget for startup investment, but Wohletz said “it's getting bigger every year.” Further, the company is using accelerators not just to help itself innovate, Wohletz said, but also to find foreign companies to partner with in bids where the buying country requires offsets, such as India. “It's a completely different way of looking at this than we have done in the past,” he summed up. https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/bae-makes-big-bet-on-small-companies-fast-labs/

We fund innovation through two main mechanisms, the Open Call for Innovation and Themed Competitions. Open Call for Innovation The Open Call exists to offer suppliers the opportunity to submit their ideas to defence and security stakeholders. The Open Call welcomes innovations that address defence and/or security challenges. Please see some examples of work we have funded here. The Open Call is open for proposals all year round, with assessment dates scheduled across the year. More information on assessment dates can be found here. Themed Competitions Themed Competitions exist to offer suppliers the opportunity to submit proposals around specific government areas of interest. Themed competitions may only run for a short time and have set closing dates. DASA has had various themed competitions covering a range of topics. For details on past competitions, please see here. To see examples of projects that have been funded through themed competitions, please see here. Competitions currently open for application Closing Date Competition Title 28 May 2019 Countering drones - finding and neutralising small UAS threats 11 June 2019 Developing the Royal Navy's autonomous underwater capability 18 June 2019 Semi-autonomous reconnaissance vehicles for the Army 26 June 2019 Space to innovate 1 July 2019 Future screening for aviation and borders 9 July 2019 Open Call for Innovation - Cycle 2 Various Help us scope future competitions We also host a number of events; please see here for a list of our upcoming events. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/apply-for-funding

By PAUL MCLEARY Europe has bristled at a letter sent to the EU from the Pentagon and State Department, which says proposed EU defense programs are unfair to the US defense industry. WASHINGTON: Pentagon and State Department officials have told the European Union they're “deeply concerned” over plans to potentially exclude US defense firms from competing for billions worth of new arms deals, suggesting the US could slap restrictions on buying European defense equipment in retaliation. At issue is the proposed $14 billion European Defence Fund, and a host of procurement programs under the the Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, the European economic alliance is undertaking. While the May 1 letter from Ellen Lord, Pentagon procurement chief, and Andrea Thompson, State's undersecretary for arms control and international security, expressed general support for the EU initiatives, it made clear the US would like to see significant changes in the draft language before the 28-country bloc votes on them as early as next month. The language in both documents, the US argues, feature intellectual property and export control restrictions that would act as “poison pills” to “effectively preclude participation by any company that uses U.S.-origin technology.” Overall, Lord and Thompson write, the conditions outlined in the EDF and PESCO documents “represent a dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defense sector.” If the restrictions are kept in place, the US officials warn, “it is clear that similar reciprocally imposed U.S. restrictions would not be welcomed by our European partners and Allies, and we would not relish having to consider them in the future.” But EU officials defended their efforts this week. Asked about the US letter, an EU spokesperson replied in an email that the EDF and PESCO will “complement and strengthen NATO,” at a time in which the Trump administration has made that a key policy goal, and “enable Europe to shoulder its fair share of the burden and responsibility for global security.” But it's clear the letter has rankled the Europeans. “The EU has an open and competitive defense procurement framework, in fact more so than the US procurement market,” the spokesperson wrote. “In the EU, there is no ‘Buy European Act.' 81 percent of the total value of international defense contracts in Europe go to US firms. The US defense market is three to four times larger than that of the EU, and yet imports from the EU are marginal for the US, while EU imports from the US are significant.” The official said that American companies with subsidiaries in the EU will remain eligible for funding under the EDF subject to security conditions “which are similar – in fact less restrictive – to the ones that EU companies face in the US.” The EU's High Representative Federica Mogherini told reporters Tuesday that PESCO projects aren't meant to be a vehicle to increase transAtlantic ties, and the EU will gladly continue doing business with non-EU defense companies. The program “is not defined to be an instrument for partnership,” she said. “It does not substitute other partnerships, including in the defense industry and research that we have already in place and that are essential for us,” she added. For years, non-NATO countries like Sweden and Finland have drawn closer to NATO and have increased ties with US defense firms while also building their own domestic defense capabilities, though the relationship hasn't always been smooth. While the US government is concerned over US companies being excluded, the PESCO effort has been developed explicitly to bolster the ability of European countries to produce their own weapons systems, cyber capabilities, and surveillance technologies. So-called “third states” — non EU members — may ask to participate in PESCO projects, but all of the member states must vote to allow them in. Lord and Thompson argue that walling-off EU projects from NATO efforts would lead to duplication and waste, while decreasing interoperability between the EU and NATO. It could also “potentially tum the clock back to the sometimes divisive discussions about EU defense initiatives that dominated our exchanges 15 years ago.” In the end, the US letter is just the latest turn in what has been a complex, up and down relationship between the US and Europe under the Trump administration. The president has loudly condemned Washington's closest allies in Europe for not spending enough on their own defense, while threatening to pull out of NATO. At the same time, the US has increased troop levels in Europe and pumped over $11 billion into the European Deterrence Initiative over the past two years, in an effort to upgrade US and allied basing, increase joint exercises, and modernize equipment on the continent to counter the Russian threat. https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/state-dod-letter-warns-european-union-to-open-defense-contracts-or-else/

Nicolas Gros-Verheyde (B2) Mois après mois, les résultats tombent. Quand ils ont le choix, certains Européens préfèrent acheter américain plutôt qu'européen. Pourquoi ? Un achat de défense n'est pas uniquement un achat En matière de défense, un pays n'achète pas seulement un matériel, il répond à une histoire — tradition maritime, terrestre, etc. —, une géopolitique intérieure — neutralité, non aligné, aligné, autonome —, une affirmation de soi — volonté de prouver au peuple, à ses voisins sa puissance —, un contexte géopolitique — proximité ou non d'adversaires ressentis ou réelle —. La volonté d'avoir une autonomie d'équipements, ou non, découle de tous ces facteurs. La meilleure défense face à un adversaire ... Face à la Russie, nombre de pays européens estiment que la meilleure défense reste les États-Unis. Il ne s'agit donc pas de desserrer les liens qui existent avec les USA, mais de les resserrer. Et le meilleur moyen reste alors les achats d'équipement, qui solidifient de façon claire ce lien euro-atlantique. La duplicité de l'appel à dépenser plus C'est toute la duplicité de l'appel à dépenser davantage pour la défense. Appel largement soutenu par les Américains. Au-delà de l'objectif, justifié, de partage du fardeau entre Européens et Américains, la pression a un objectif purement économique : favoriser l'industrie américaine qui est la seule à répondre à la fois aux objectifs industriel (les matériels), opérationnel (l'interopérabilité), économique (le moins disant) et politique. La panoplie complète des Américains La fourniture des équipements militaires s'accompagne de la logistique, des armements et de la formation. Un ‘package' ordinaire pour ce type d'armements. Mais les Américains ont une panoplie beaucoup plus complète, qui va de l'outil de financement à crédit au soutien logistique dans les opérations extérieures, en passant par la présence de troupes ou de matériels dans les pays concernés, destinés à les rassurer face à des voisins inquiétants, un forcing permanent de leurs politiques, sans oublier l'accueil de jeunes ou moins jeunes officiers ou sous-officiers stagiaires dans leurs écoles. Un effort notable américain de formation Rien que pour la Roumanie, par exemple, pays qui préside actuellement aux destinées de l'Union européenne, ce sont 700 officiers qui franchissent le seuil d'une des écoles militaires US, des écoles de guerre réputées aux simples écoles de gardes nationaux. Cela forge des réflexes, une culture commune, des camaraderies, une solidarité... et l'habitude d'utiliser certains matériels. Peu étonnant ensuite que chacun soit convaincu dans l'armée roumaine qu'il faille acheter ces équipements. Une réflexion à engager Si les Européens veulent un tant soit peu défendre leurs équipements, il va falloir réfléchir sérieusement à se doter de ces cinq outils : les échanges et l'accueil dans les écoles européennes — l'Erasmus militaire prôné dans la fin des années 2000 est un peu tombé dans l'oubli (1) —, le financement croisé, la présence dans les pays (qui ne soit pas dispersée). (Nicolas Gros-Verheyde) https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2019/05/17/pourquoi-les-europeens-narrivent-pas-a-convaincre-lors-de-lachat-dequipements-militaires/