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By: Jill Aitoro The strategy for reading tea leaves of the year to come is naturally anchored in the lasting events of the year just passed. So then let us consider 2019. The year was, in many respects, one of messiness. The already tense relationship between Turkey and NATO allies got worse, leading to the decision by the U.S. to kick the country out of the F-35 program. High-profile program struggles plagued some of the largest defense companies in the world. Political turmoil led to leadership shakeups both in the U.S. and across the pond. Instability in the industrial base made advancements in technology by adversaries all the more troubling. But there were also some signs of progress. Modern warfare capabilities — from hypersonics to artificial intelligence — transitioned from a footnote for only some to the everyday vernacular of most. More experimentation emerged in techiques for system development and acquisition. And around the world, countries from various regions grew more earnest in their desires to expand their influence and investment in global defense. What can we predict, then, based upon this, for 2020? Global relations will continue to shift, no longer defined by existing alliances but rather by individual behavior and more self-serving demands. Elections stand to turn the current state of political affairs on its ear, whether it be for better or for worse. And competition will grow more fierce, driven by a shrinking industrial base and the fact that defense companies will need to look beyond the U.S. to find the most sought-after programs with the biggest potential payout. Obviously, there is a lot we don't know. Will NATO flounder or regain its footing? Will election results drive allies closer together or farther apart? Will defense budgets go up or down? And will the increasing use of hybrid tactics reshape both the forces of today and the systems of tomorrow? We asked leaders from around the world to provide their perspective. See what's on their minds here in Outlook 2020. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/

By: Alessandro Profumo Rapid changes are taking place around the world, both at the geopolitical and technological level, which are having an extremely disruptive impact on the defense industry and its customers, namely governments. For its part, technological innovation has reached a pace never seen before. Growing digitalization, big-data processing, robotics, autonomous systems, biotechnology, hypersonics, directed energy: These are just a few examples of innovations that revolutionize industry and governments' approaches to defense and security issues. In some cases, innovations on the commercial side are driving the technological evolution in the defense sector, with increasingly wider applications from a dual-use perspective. There is a real two-way street. The role of government is crucial in developing a long-term investment strategy and identifying the sovereign technologies necessary to maintain a technological advantage over new peers and emerging actors, in symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. Threats to peace and global stability do not solely originate in traditional domains (air, land, sea), but materialize in space and cyberspace, more difficult to protect, as they both lack precise boundaries. Increasing defense spending is a positive signal, especially when coupled with a strong vision and clear objectives aimed at the development of the right capabilities in an international cooperation framework. The national defense industry, as a strategic asset of its own country, must be able to capture technological innovation where it is produced, finding effective ways of accessing new ideas and solutions. Secondly, it must be able to manage the dynamics between long development and production cycles that characterize this sector, and technological innovation's fast pace. The sense of urgency must regard delivering what is needed, when needed, providing the end user with the maximum benefit and anticipating and adapting to changes, while triggering an ever-growing contamination across industries, governments, startups and academia. A deep interconnection between the defense industry and its customers, working in close synergy, facilitates flexible and adaptable structures capable of responding quickly to new and complex emergencies. In this perspective, the closer one works with the customer — throughout the entire product life cycle — the more this reverberates positively at the industry level. The shared awareness rising from this cooperation will enable industry to make wise and focused investment decisions in order to develop products and solutions that best fit future market requirements. Bearing in mind that technology alone is not enough, true success in creating a resilient defense industry also lies in the ability to attract and retain highly specialized human capital as well as involving the supplier base in innovation processes. A shared road map is, therefore, a priority — industry and governments, working together, side by side, committed to building a safer world. Alessandro Profumo is the CEO of Leonardo. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/ceo-of-leonardo-a-twoway-street-benefits-everyone

By: Jorge Domecq The European Union's strategic autonomy in defense is on everybody's lips since it was put forward as a long-term goal in the EU's 2016 Global Strategy. Yet, it remains unclear what it means in practice and how it would impact NATO and our trans-Atlantic relationship. This has led to a mostly academic debate about the concept's end goal, fueled by doubts and fears stoked from both sides of the pond. However, the risk of too much abstract talk is that we get distracted from the concrete action needed to bring us closer to, what in my view, is a laudable objective. It is time we approach strategic autonomy more positively and look at it as a constructive project — not something directed against NATO, the United States or anybody else. It's about putting EU member states in a position where they can autonomously develop, operate, modify and maintain the full spectrum of defense capabilities they need. It's about giving the EU the option and tools — political, operational, technological, industrial — to take military action whenever needed, either together with partners (notably NATO) wherever possible, or separately if necessary. Instead of undermining trans-Atlantic trust and security, as some fear, a more robust and autonomous European defense will ultimately lead to a stronger NATO. It is in the interest of our trans-Atlantic partners to have a more capable and efficient EU in defense. The U.S. wants Europe to take on its fair share of burden in defense? A stronger and more credible European pillar in NATO will contribute to that. The EU's ambition, as stated in the 2016 Global Strategy, is to reach “an appropriate level of strategic autonomy” in order to “ensure Europe's ability to safeguard security within and beyond its borders.” However, it takes more than ambition and political will to get there. Strategic autonomy presupposes at least two things. First, that our member states' armed forces have at their disposal the full spectrum of military assets that, taken together, could enable the EU to take military action, and on its own if necessary. Second, that the functionality and usability of these assets is not restricted by any technological or political caveats controlled by non-European actors. Today, admittedly, this is not the case yet. Hence the need to invest more, and better, in defense. The good news is that we are moving in the right direction, both in terms of “more” and “better.” But more spending does not automatically guarantee more efficiency or interoperability. To achieve that, we must invest better through cooperation: from joint priority setting to the development, procurement and deployment of cutting-edge defense capabilities. Prioritization is the foundation stone on which all subsequent steps must build. It is already in place: the Capability Development Plan, developed through the European Defence Agency and revised in 2018, lists member states' joint priorities for the years to come. One of them targets cross-domain capabilities that can contribute to strategic autonomy. Using the priorities as a compass will ensure efforts and funding are spent on assets that are really needed and contribute to making the EU more efficient in military terms. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, another new tool to boost joint capability planning and development, will help keep the focus on agreed priorities. To achieve strategic autonomy, the EU must also be able to master cutting-edge technologies and their integration into defense products. That's why it is so crucial that it acquires, maintains and develops the technological knowledge and industrial manufacturing skills required to produce the defense equipment it needs. Those key strategic activities have to be preserved and strengthened if we want to turn the goal of strategic autonomy into reality. EDA, which is the EU hub for defense innovation and collaborative capability development, has for years been involved in this critical work. The agency identifies critical, overarching strategic research areas and other key strategic activities underpinning the EU's strategic autonomy. The aim is to identify, and then support, must-have technologies and industrial capacities, without which strategic autonomy isn't possible. Artificial intelligence, micro- and nanotechnologies, or unmanned and autonomous systems are only a few examples of such critical disruptive technologies that are reshaping defense. It's through concrete action — not political and academic rhetoric — that we can make progress toward strategic autonomy. At the same time, we must ensure coherence and avoid any unnecessary duplication with NATO, which will continue to be the cornerstone of collective defense for its members. EU strategic autonomy isn't necessarily just around the corner, but it is attainable. The closer we get to it and the more additional defense cooperation it triggers, the better. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/head-of-european-defence-agency-eu-strategic-autonomy-is-an-opportunity-not-a-threat

By: Ellen Lord The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment is rapidly transitioning from the former OUSD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to an organization focused on enabling our services to use innovative business practices tailored to their needs. AT&L, the enterprise's former moniker, was a congressionally mandated organizational change for the purpose of streamlining business processes to speed capability delivery to the war fighter and maximize value for the taxpayer. On Sept. 4, 2018, we had our first official day as A&S. Though Department of Defense leadership has changed, our mission to support the war fighter through acquisition innovation remains constant. Over the past year, our team has worked to refine the A&S strategy using the National Defense Strategy as our guidebook. Six goals, each with nested sub-priorities, emerged from our senior leadership planning sessions: enable innovative acquisition approaches that deliver war-fighting capability at the speed of relevance; build a safe, secure and resilient defense-industrial base (commercial and organic); ensure safe and resilient DoD installations; increase weapon system mission capability while reducing operating cost; promote acquisition and sustainment initiatives with key international partners; recruit, develop and retain a diverse acquisition and sustainment workforce. A few initiatives that highlight some of these efforts are outlined below. Cyber Model Maturity Certification, or CMMC, is a strategic solution to make security foundational to DoD acquisition. Currently, the metaphorical “mark” is not being met — most defense supply chain partners are not in compliance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology 800-171. CMMC is a DoD certification process that measures a supply chain partner's ability to protect sensitive information through an independent third-party certification. The process will be managed by an accreditation body, which will certify, train, accredit these third parties and issue certificates. Recently, version V.06 of the model was released for review with a final version ready in January to integrate (in a phased-type approach starting fall 2020), as a mandate into all federal contracts. The Adaptive Acquisition Framework, our most transformational acquisition policy change in decades, is set to deploy at the end of this year. It is new in the sense that it directs using the minimum amount of process to enable program managers to acquire a capability versus previous models, which dictated all those things you might not do from a vast array of process steps. Essentially, this framework cuts superfluous bureaucratic process by empowering program teams to choose a pathway based on the specific product or service being acquired. It emphasizes critical thinking and “creative compliance.” A&S recently appointed an intellectual property leader to help develop DoD guidance and training, as well as to provide assistance across the DoD associated with acquisition, licensing and management of the newly published policy on IP (DoD 5010.44). PMs must proactively address protection of data rights at the inception of each program. Concurrently, we must continue our defense against cybersecurity threats that target U.S. IP by ensuring network security. Lastly, we are proactively strengthening the DoD supply chain against adversaries' creative market disruptions in the global marketplace. As such, we have formed a trusted capital, or TC, ecosystem where innovative companies connect with trusted investors. Though we will not promise business, we are creating an ecosystem in technology areas where we need more trusted sources for hardware, software and services to support our war fighter. Drone Venture Day, held on Nov. 13, 2019, represented the inaugural event in a series of TC opportunities to develop domestic manufacturing capabilities by growing and strengthening our defense-industrial base. These are a few examples of how A&S is reinventing DoD acquisition to simply and cost-effectively reduce the process of equipping our military with cutting-edge capability at the speed of relevance. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/pentagon-acquisition-boss-adapting-to-support-the-war-fighter

By: Sen. Jim Inhofe Since World War II, the American people have believed our military has had the best of everything, but the technological superiority that kept us 20 years ahead of our competitors has rapidly diminished. In some cases, we're already behind. By 2030, unless we pursue “urgent change at significant scale,” as former Defense Secretary Gen. James Mattis put it, it's likely the U.S. will face an enemy with superior weapons, superior equipment and superior capabilities. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in our strategic competition with China. China used to just steal our technology. Now, through heavy investment, they are improving it. The result? China is outpacing the U.S. in key areas like hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies — not to mention conventional capabilities. China isn't the only one. Technological development is accelerating across the globe, expanding to more actors and changing the very nature of war. We can't afford to let our advantage erode further. It is up to the Department of Defense and Congress to make sure that the defense-industrial base becomes, as the National Defense Strategy demands, an “unmatched 21st century National Security Innovation Base.” If we want to “sustain security and solvency,” we need to consider wholesale change to industry culture and its interface with the Department of Defense, shed outdated management processes, and reimagine a resilient supply chain that mitigates 21st century risks. This essay is part of the Defense News 2020 Outlook project. Click here for more. This begins with software, which is foundational to military capability. The DoD and its traditional hardware-dominant industry partners have been behind on software in almost every way — talent, tools, development and delivery processes. Software innovation has failed in countless DoD programs, including the Ford-class carrier, the F-35′s Autonomic Logistics Information System and the GPS next-generation operational control system. Instead of taking the Pentagon for granted as an endless source of cash flow, partners must refocus their attention on delivering secure capability that actually works. Next, the Department of Defense needs to continue to expand capacity — prioritizing speed of delivery and adapting its systems to maximize value and output. For too long we have been slow to expand our stockpiles of fifth-generation weapons required to fight peer adversaries. The second production line for JASSM-ER cruise missiles is a good start toward building the capacity needed to retain advantages that will make any enemy think twice before attacking. We must do the same for other fifth-generation weapons, including air-to-air missiles. Shipbuilding, including aircraft carriers, surface ships, submarines and our logistics fleet, is another area where our capacity is severely limited. The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy, which recently surpassed ours in size, is on track to reach 400 ships in 2025 and is nearly self-sufficient for all components. Size of the fleet isn't a sole consideration. We've focused on ensuring the capability of our fleet remains unmatched and bolstering suppliers of critical components, but we must also improve the construction performance of lead ships in new classes to maintain and build upon our capability advantage. The last thing we want is a fair fight. Innovation is best done at the subsystem level through a rigorous engineering-based process centered on building knowledge through full-scale prototypes, which can then inform ship design. We are eager to work with the Navy to identify and fund more of these prototypes, which will serve as the building blocks of the future fleet. We also must accelerate innovation. Recent defense authorization legislation encourages the DoD to streamline acquisition, take a business-minded approach to contracting, and tap into nontraditional suppliers and public-private partnerships. This must continue. Dilapidated testing infrastructure is holding us back from catching up to our enemies. Just look at hypersonic weapons: Beijing is parading around dozens of its newest weapons, and we have yet to build one. The DoD has looked to Silicon Valley, but we are competing with Chinese influence there as well, and the Pentagon has often proven an impossible customer due to its antiquated bureaucracy. Any technological improvements will be meaningless if vulnerable to being infiltrated or stolen. Recent legislation continues support for the DoD as it assesses and mitigates risks to its supply chains posed by adversaries. Both the government and contractors need to cooperate on and use modern verification tools to identify trusted suppliers and manufacturers, as well as fix vulnerabilities. To make these tools useful, the DoD must first establish a working digital model of its suppliers. Lastly, while we must continue to invest in the domestic, organic industrial base, it's important to remember that we can't take on China and Russia alone — which is why the National Defense Strategy emphasizes our network of allies and partners. We must remove unnecessary barriers to industrial cooperation that degrade our collective competitive edge. We do not have to make a false choice between investing domestically and in our allies — we can do both. Under our National Technology and Industrial Base partnership with Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, we can develop a more diverse, resilient industrial base, secure our supply chains, and become a “five eyes for defense procurement.” It's in our best interest to ensure our allies can leverage our technological advantages and we can leverage theirs. Without a strong national security innovation base, the Pentagon cannot implement the National Defense Strategy. Congress' job is to put the appropriate, tailored policy in place and provide sufficient, predictable resources to help the industrial base meet these challenges. Together, we can harness the power of American innovation to ensure that we are able to win the wars of the future. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/sasc-chairman-we-must-build-the-national-security-innovation-base-our-defense-strategy-requires

By: Jens Stoltenberg On June 6, 2019, we marked the 75th anniversary of the D-Day landings. This was a major turning point in the Second World War, leading to the liberation of Europe. And it was a colossal feat for the tens of thousands of Allied troops, many of whom paid the ultimate price for our freedom. Less than 5 years later, NATO was born. An extraordinary idea, driven by the visionary leadership of our 12 founding nations and by the deep desire of our citizens to live in peace and freedom. NATO leaders will gather Dec. 3-4 in London, the very first home of NATO's headquarters, at a critical time for our trans-Atlantic security. This is an opportunity to reflect on everything we have achieved over seven decades. In that time, allies in Europe and North America have built an unprecedented area of peace and prosperity. Our ironclad commitment to protect and defend one another guarantees freedom and democracy for our almost 1 billion citizens, making NATO the most successful alliance in history. But beyond marking those 70 years, leaders will look to the challenges that still lie ahead. Today we face the greatest security threats in a generation — from a more assertive Russia to instability across the Middle East and North Africa, and from cyber and hybrid attacks to the ever-present terrorist threat. At the same time, the global balance of power is shifting around us. And the rapid development of new technology promises to transform our societies — and security — as radically as the first industrial revolution. So we must be ready to respond to any threat from any direction. And that is exactly what NATO is doing. Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO allies have implemented the largest reinforcement of our collective defense since the Cold War. We have strengthened our presence in the east of our alliance, from the Baltic to the Black Sea regions. And we have increased the size and readiness of our forces. This year we declared two new NATO commands operational: one in Ulm in Germany to improve military mobility in Europe, and one in Norfolk in the United States to ensure trans-Atlantic lines of communication. And we are delivering on our new NATO Readiness Initiative to field 30 air squadrons, 30 combat vessels and 30 land battalions within 30 days. As well as guaranteeing our security today, NATO is preparing for the challenges of tomorrow on land, at sea, in the air, in cyberspace and in space. NATO recently updated the core standards for civilian telecommunications, including 5G, in order to improve the resilience of our networks. And this year allies adopted NATO's first-ever overarching space policy. Finally, all allies are stepping up their investment in our security, not only in cash but also with new capabilities and contributions to NATO missions and operations. European allies and Canada have increased defense spending for five years in a row. By the end of next year they will have added an extra $100 billion to their defense budgets since 2016. More allies are on track to meet their pledge to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2024. But we have to do more because our freedom does not come for free. And in a more unpredictable world, we need to continue to keep our citizens safe. In London, NATO leaders will continue to strengthen our collective defense, modernize our alliance and invest in our shared security. And while NATO's 70th anniversary gives us cause for celebration, this is not the time for complacency. We must never take the trans-Atlantic bond for granted. We must never take freedom and democracy for granted. We must defend them every day. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/nato-secretary-general-alliances-70th-a-time-for-celebration-but-not-for-complacency

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY Bell Boeing Joint Project Office, California, Maryland, has been awarded a maximum $218,749,892 modification (P00006) exercising the first one-year option period of a one-year base contract (SPRPA1-20-F-CD01) with four one-year option periods for performance based logistics and engineering support for the V-22 platform. This is a firm-fixed-price requirements contract. Locations of performance are Texas and Pennsylvania, with a Nov. 30, 2020, performance completion date. Using customers are Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Foreign Military Sales to Japan. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2021 Air Force, U.S. Special Operations Command, Navy and FMS appropriated funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Aviation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. NAVY Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, San Diego, California, is awarded a $74,726,993 cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for design agent engineering services for networks and network user systems on operational landing platform/dock (LPD)-17 class amphibious transport dock ships. Work will be performed in San Diego, California (80%); Norfolk, Virginia (15%); Mayport, Florida (5%) and is expected to be complete by December 2024. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance, (Navy) funding in the amount of $689,680 will be obligated at time of award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304 (c) (1), only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements, as implemented by Part 6.302-1 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. This contract was issued on a sole-source basis to Raytheon Integrated Defense Services. This requirement is for design agent engineering and technical services for the overall management, development, testing, troubleshooting, repair, configuration, maintenance and fleet sustainment of fielded networks and associated network user systems/clients on operational LPD 17-class amphibious transport dock ships. These services are in support of Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia Division, Code 52, which is responsible for the lifecycle in-service engineering agent support of mission critical interior communications data networks. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia Division, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the contracting activity (N64498-20-D-0001). W.R. Systems, Fairfax, Virginia, is awarded a modification to a previously awarded (N65236-19-D-8001) indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee, with provisions for firm-fixed-price task orders, performance based contract. This single award contract (SAC) is currently in its first year with a Feb. 15, 2020, contract expiration date. This modification increases the basic contract estimated ceiling by $61,999,996, and changes the cumulative estimated value of the contract from $49,999,995, to $111,999,992. This SAC is for position, navigation and timing and geospatial information services support to naval ships and shore facilities. Work will be performed in Norfolk, Virginia, and is expected to be completed by February 2020. This SAC was previously procured competitively by full and open competition via the Naval Information Warfare Systems Command e-commerce central website and the Federal Business Opportunities website. This sole-source contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1) and only one responsible source (Federal Acquisition Regulation subpart 6.302-1). The Naval Information Warfare Center, Charleston, South Carolina, is the contracting activity. General Dynamics/Electric Boat, Groton, Connecticut (N66604-20-D-D001); Huntington Ingalls/Newport News Shipbuilding, Newport News, Virginia (N66604-20-D-D002); and Oceaneering International Inc., Chesapeake, Virginia (N66604-20-D-D003) are being awarded a $49,921,536 indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) multiple-award contract to fabricate submarine safety/Level 1 (SUBSAFE/L1) hardware, and provide technical and engineering services. For these base ID/IQ five-year contracts, funding will not be obligated at time of award; the $1,000 minimum guarantee will be executed on each awardee's initial task order. Work will be performed at the contractors' locations and minimally at government locations, and is expected to be completed by November 2024. This multiple-award contract was competitively procured with three acceptable offers received via the Federal Business Opportunities website. This requirement is to provide SUBSAFE/L1 (or related) hardware, systems engineering, technical analyses, mechanical and electrical design, manufacturing, installation, test and evaluation, maintenance and repair services required to support existing and future fleet programs. In accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1), only a limited number of responsible sources and no other supplies or services will satisfy the needs of the agency. This tasking was limited to those activities qualified to perform SUBSAFE work per the Naval Sea Systems Command Notice 5000, fiscal 2019 Navy working capital funds. The Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division Newport, Newport, Rhode Island, is the contracting activity. Washington State Community College District #3, Bremerton, Washington, is awarded a not-to-exceed $18,000,000 five-year indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for educational services in support of the apprenticeship, helper and after-hours program, which pays for tuition, lab fees, math fees, tutoring services and assessment fees in an effort to provide customers with quality, timely and cost efficient maintenance, modernization, and technical and logistics support by maintaining a highly trained and skilled workforce. These services are in support of Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Facility in Bremerton, Washington. This contract does not include options. Work will be performed in Bremerton, Washington, and is expected to be complete by December 2024. No funding will be obligated at the time of award. In accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations Part 15, this was a competitive procurement with one offer received via the Federal Business Opportunities website. Operations and maintenance (Navy) funding will be obligated at the task order level prior to each semester. This is a commercial service contract that was competed in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15. Only one proposal by the incumbent was received. The Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington, is the contracting activity (N4523A20D1300). ARMY General Dynamics Mission Systems, Taunton, Massachusetts, was awarded a $9,164,584 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to procure contractor field service representative support services for the warfighter. One bid was solicited with one bid received. Work will be performed in Taunton, Massachusetts, with an estimated completion date of Nov. 30, 2020. Fiscal 2019 other procurement, Army funds in the amount of $6,363,737 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity (W15P7T-20-F-0004). AIR FORCE Tunista Services LLC, Honolulu, Hawaii, has been awarded a $7,362,228 firm-fixed-priced contract modification (P00006) to previously awarded contract FA4855-18-C-0001 for continuation of operations, maintenance and support services at Melrose Air Force Range. The contract modification provides for the exercise of option year two procured under the basic contract. Work will be performed at Melrose, New Mexico, and work is expected to be completed by Nov. 30, 2020. The total cumulative face value of the contract is $22,676,639. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $7,362,228 are being obligated at the time of award. The 27th Special Operations Contracting Squadron, Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, is the contracting activity. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2029052/source/GovDelivery/

By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — For over a decade, the U.S. Army has used one source — Oshkosh Defense — to build its Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, choosing to sole source to the company beyond its initial five year contract rather than reopen competition. Defense company Navistar is challenging the Army's choice to forgo competition and filed a lawsuit with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in early August. Nov. 26 was to be the day a judge would decide whether the U.S. Army violated the law by continuing to order vehicles from Oshkosh outside of the scope of the contract while avoiding competition. And while a bench trial happened, the judge hearing the case did not make a decision. It is unclear what's next or when a ruling could happen. Navistar decided to sue the Army after it was getting nowhere in its quest to get the Army to produce documents — through a protest filed with the Government Accountability Office — that would show the service's reasoning to continue to order more vehicles from Oshkosh without competition and without proper legal justification. The company contended that the Army did not justify and improperly awarded its most recent sole source FMTV procurement to Oshkosh, and failed to provide proper notice to possible competitors in accordance with federal acquisition regulations and the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), according to an extensive review of court documents by Defense News. In addition, the Army also ignored a stop work order, which automatically went into effect when a GAO protest was filed. Navistar filed two complaints: One that claims the Army violated the law when it continued to buy Oshkosh vehicles outside of the scope of its contract without holding a competition and another that claims the Army illegally continued to work on production of those vehicles despite a required stop work order that must go into affect once a protest is filed with the GAO. Since 2009, the Army has spent over $6 billion on FMTVs from Oshkosh. FMTVs are used for a wide variety of missions to include transporting capabilities that extend from cargo to missile defense radars. Navistar contends the Army had ample time to compete for follow-on FMTV orders, and the pool was deep with companies ready to provide vehicles that met the service's requirement, but the Army never did. A long saga The saga goes much further back than just the 2019 GAO protest and lawsuit. Navistar successfully protested the Army's initial award to Oshkosh back in August 26, 2009. As a result, the Army reviewed its decision, reaffirmed its selection of Oshkosh and awarded it a contract with a performance period of less than five years, set to expire at the end of 2013. The request for proposals ahead of the original contract award estimated 23,341 vehicles to be delivered over a five-year period. Following that, it was Navistar's belief that the Army would reopen the competition to deliver more FMTVs. Through a series of justification and approvals — five of them — the Army continued to extend the contract through August 25, 2019, arguing each time that it did not have the time to conduct a new competition to meet the service's needs. In its latest J&A in September 2016, the Army justified it needed another 1,744 FMTVs at an estimated cost of $575 million for total contract duration of 10 years. The Army argued that it needed to sole source FMTVs to Oshkosh because it didn't have 24 months that it would take to conduct a full competition to meet urgent requirements, while it acknowledged there were other companies to include Navistar that could build FMTVs. The service also justified the sole source award due to its plans to stop procuring the current version of the FMTV as it prepared to take delivery of a new FMTV variant, which was also competitively awarded to Oshkosh in 2018. Navistar chose not to compete for the new variant, according to court documents. The order in 2016 was to fulfill the Army's remaining needs between the end of the current variant and the future variant expected to be delivered in fiscal year 2020. Navistar again protested with the GAO the 2016 sole source award to Oshkosh for more FMTVs and ended up dropping the protest when it settled with the Army to supply some vehicles to Iraq. Without a J&A or any other documents justifying another order of vehicles, the Army, on June 28, 2019, announced what it described as the award of a $320 million contract modification for domestic purposes and for foreign military sales for the countries of Argentina, Djibouti, Iraq, Lebanon and Romania. The order was for an estimated 1,916 vehicles and extended the performance period of the contract out to 2021, 12 years past the original contract award. The announcement, according to Navistar, never disclosed that the Army had actually already ordered roughly 1,000 vehicles in excess of what was justified in the 2016 J&A. Navistar again filed a protest with the GAO over the orders made without a new J&A, but withdrew its protest in favor of filing a lawsuit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims when the GAO refused to require the Army to produce relevant documentation justifying the additional FMTVs. It wasn't until the company filed its complaint in federal court, that it was informed by the Department of Justice that the Army had never stopped work to produce the FMTVs ordered in 2019, Navistar reveals in court documents. Beyond the scope When the Army announced a new sole source procurement for FMTVs to Oshkosh in June, it caught Navistar by surprise because the service hadn't issued a J&A, which had been its practice after the original contract period of performance had ended, and is also required by law, the company argues in the court documents. The June announcement came on the heels of the five J&As that had included an extra 4,875 vehicles and $1.4 billion more to Oshkosh outside of the scope of the original 2009 contract and procured without competition, Navistar notes. Navistar also learned that the Army, months prior to June 28, had already placed tens of millions of dollars in sole source orders for hundreds of FMTVs beyond the scope of the 2016 J&A. Navistar argued a new J&A to cover the 2019 orders was needed because the previous J&As only provided enough authority to solve the Army's claimed immediate needs and were very specific in number and delivery time frame and laid out what trucks were needed by which units and where. The company contended that the original contract and subsequent J&As didn't and shouldn't provide the Army with “a blank check” to continue buying more vehicles without justifying competition. And it argues that the Army, three years beyond 2016, had ample time to prepare to compete for remaining FMTV orders. A contract or a blank check? While the Army's arguments are sealed under a protective order and not available for public review, Oshkosh argued in a response to Navistar's complaint, that the original 2009 contract was a “requirements” contract considered valid through August 25, 2019, for any orders placed. The J&As were essentially just amendments to the original contract. Navistar disagreed and argued that each subsequent J&A should be considered the binding contract and that previous contracts are expired. “CICA does not contain an exception to competition simply because a contract extension involves a requirements contract. To conclude otherwise would gut CICA's requirements," Navistar added. Oshkosh argued that the Army was required to fulfill all of its needs for the FMTV A1P2 through the Oshkosh contract in whatever quantity became necessary until the contract expires. The company also argued that the contract ceiling value had not been exceeded even with the 2019 orders. Oshkosh also argued that Navistar misinterpreted the difference between the ordering period under a contract and the delivery period. The company claims the contract covers the ordering period and not the delivery period, which can extend beyond. Navistar argued that the September 2016 J&A timeline covers the entirety of the contract to include delivery of the vehicles. Oshkosh also contends that the Army alerted all offerors in the original competition that except for monthly and annual limits there is no minimum quantity and no maximum of vehicles that the Army can order. And Oshkosh stated that the number of vehicles laid out in the Army's contract and subsequent J&As were just “estimates” and not a ceiling for orders. Additionally, any maximum ceiling just means a company isn't obligated to honor any orders placed above that level. For Navistar, Oshkosh's interpretation goes against the core of the Competition in Contracting Act. “These J&As do not contain any rationale that would enable the Army to procure an indefinite quantity of Oshkosh vehicles for years into the future - they only provide enough authority to solve the Army's claimed immediate problem of requiring vehicles quickly before a competition can be performed,” Navistar argues. The amendment Deviating from its normal course, the Army retroactively revised or amended the September 2016 J&A in early June instead of issuing a new J&A, scratching out original numbers and costs and replacing them with new numbers and new cost estimates. The amendment was made at the request of the Army's director of policy only after orders earlier in 2019 were discovered to have gone beyond the scope of the 2016 J&A. According to CICA, agencies are not allowed to avoid competition requirements by using the device of a contract modification. The Army did not notify potential offerors of the amendment and claimed, according to Navistar in its response to the court, that the only reason for the amendment was to alert Army leadership of the change. “There is no requirement for the Army to amend a J&A as a method of notifying its own leadership about procurement actions,” Navistar notes. Additionally, Oshkosh argued in its response to Navistar, that the director of policy's request in an email to amend the J&A because orders had fallen out of the scope, was just “the author's view.” Navistar writes, “The Army's attempt to authorize its prior illegal actions along with the Army's official position at the time the amendment was executed (that its sole source actions were “beyond the scope” of its earlier J&As) are damning indicators that the Army failed to justify its 2019 sole source contract action and that it knew its actions were wrong." Army didn't hit pause It's commonly known in defense acquisition that when a GAO protest is filed, work must stop on any contract award at issue until the GAO renders a decision roughly 90 days later. But the Army didn't stop Oshkosh from ordering parts and beginning work to build vehicles wrapped up in the Navistar protest filed July 8. The service doesn't dispute this fact, according to court documents. Navistar was not made aware the Army had continued to execute the disputed sole source orders until it filed its lawsuit at the court. Once alerted by a DOJ attorney that the Army had not stopped working, the company issued a separate complaint addressing the Army's failure to stop working on the contract in accordance with the law. The Navistar complaint states the Army continued to work in secret and did not alert the GAO or Navistar that it was proceeding with the performance of the protested contract. The Army didn't take any action to override the requirement to stop working on roughly 1,365 vehicles covered under the protest. The Army did stop work on 75 vehicles destined for Iraq and Djibouti, but that did not happen for days after the protest was filed with the GAO. The service “inexplicably”, according to Navistar's response to the Army's sealed arguments, believed in “good faith” that the only vehicles in dispute were the 75 vehicles that were bound for Iraq and Djibouti. Navistar states that the administrative record “contains no explanation, documentation or reasoning” as to why the Army failed to stop work. “The Army cannot claim ignorance of its legal obligations (as it appears to be doing) in order to avoid the consequences of its statutory violations,” Navistar argues in its response. The service's argument, according to Navistar's response, focuses on a July 12 phone call it had with Navistar's defense counsel where it claims that the focus of the call was on Iraq and Djibouti requirements, but includes nothing related to it in the administrative record provided to the court. Navistar lays out that the stop work order for the 75 vehicles came at 10:15 a.m. on July 12 before the 10:30 a.m. call with Navistar's counsel. The call was scheduled at the request of the Army's counsel and Navistar's lawyers were advised to come prepared to address the number of FMTV vehicles that it could produce on an expedited basis and the schedule under which it could deliver. According to a declaration submitted to the court, Navistar's lawyers said the Army's counsel offered to try to resolve the protest by giving Navistar contracts to provide vehicles for Iraq and Djibouti. Navistar said it would not agree to a resolution unless the Army agreed to have Navistar provide a more substantial volume of both domestic and foreign military sales vehicles. The Army's lawyers said they couldn't agree with that and indicated they would have to proceed with the protest. And while Iraq and Djibouti were discussed, “the Army could not have reasonably come away from that telephone conference with such a belief,” that the protest only covered those 75 vehicles, according to Navistar's response. To Navistar, it was clear from the beginning that its protest covered all orders in 2019 made beyond the scope of the 2016 J&A. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/11/27/navistars-challenge-against-us-army-over-vehicle-buys-hangs-in-the-balance/

By: Martin Banks BRUSSELS – The Dutch chief of defense says it would be “stupid” if the UK did not continue to be closely involved in EU-funded defense projects even when it is no longer a member of the bloc. But British future involvement in EU-led initiatives such as the European Defence Fund and PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) remains unclear, with EU member states yet to decide on a legal framework for third-party participation. With Brexit, the UK will technically become an outsider to the European Union's push for greater defense autonomy. That means London will no longer take part in EU decision-making or operational entities, and any British contribution to an EU operation will be subject to the rules that apply to third countries. Adm. Rob Bauer, chief of defense in The Netherlands, told Defense News he believes it is “imperative” that the UK remains “very closely” involved in such projects. Speaking at the sidelines of the annual European Defence Agency conference in Brussels on Thursday, Bauer said, “Remember, from a military point of view, the UK, even after Brexit, will still be a member of NATO and part of Europe. It is leaving the EU, not Europe. If the focus in Europe is on security then the UK should be part of that. To do otherwise would be stupid.” The PESCO initiative aims to develop and deploy forces at the EU level. Nearly 50 projects have been unveiled to date with the aim of pushing member states to work more closely together in the area of security and defense. So far, €13 billion has been allocated to the EDF which seeks to promote cross-border collaboration on defense research and technology projects, plus another €6.5 billion in the pipeline to upgrade roads, bridges, rail lines, ports and airports for military mobility, and €16 billion on space programs. Formal rules on third-party access to PESCO projects and the EDF are still being decided. Discussions are continuing at EU member state level, and no final decision is expected until the UK formally exits the EU, officials here said. London's departure has been delayed for the third time until Jan. 31, 2020. Bauer said, “I have spoken to the Brits about this and they have told me how difficult these discussions have been and continue to be. It is clear that agreement on access is certainly not a done deal.” “But we need to be pragmatic about this and continue to work together in the future.” His comments were broadly echoed by Lieutenant General Franz Leitgeb, Austria's Military Representative to the EU and NATO, another attendee at the EDA summit who told Defense News, “After Brexit, the UK will have third-party status, so third-party partnership rules will apply regarding its contribution to and participation in EU-funded projects like PESCO. “We still need to decide what precisely this means in the UK case but, whatever transpires, the UK has to realise this is a two-way street. That means that if the UK and its defense industry is to have access to EU-funded schemes and projects it has to contribute to these.” “Whatever happens we're going to need the current close relations on defense between the two sides to continue.” Further comment came from Benedikt Zimmer, state secretary at the German defense ministry, who took part in a session on PESCO and the EDF and said, “The more open cooperation is after Brexit, the better.” In a keynote address, Michel Barnier, the EU's chief Brexit negotiator, warned that UK involvement in EU defense and security would only become clearer once discussions start, probably at the start of 2020, on a political agreement between the two sides. Barnier told the packed audience, comprising senior military officials and personnel, that reaching agreement will be an “enormous challenge,” adding, “I do not want to interfere in the current UK election campaign but I am sure the Brits will still have an appetite for continued cooperation in the defense field. But, even so, they have to realize it will no longer be business as normal. I hope that UK defense companies, providing the rules are met, will still participate in European defense. We have the tools to make it happen but we still need to find a new framework for future cooperation.” More than 50 non-EU states have participated in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations since its first mission in 2003, including four regional powers – namely Turkey, Russia, Brazil and South Africa. The official British position on security and defense is ambitious about the possible scope of the UK-EU relationship post-Brexit, talking about a “deep and special partnership” that would go “beyond existing third country arrangements.” However, little in the recent past suggests the UK would seek much CSDP involvement once no longer a member: the UK has not been the most enthusiastic supporter of the EU's defense agenda thus far, and it's questionable if this would change after Brexit. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/11/29/britains-defense-ties-to-the-eu-are-still-up-in-the-air-post-brexit/