December 2, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
By: Sen. Jim Inhofe
Since World War II, the American people have believed our military has had the best of everything, but the technological superiority that kept us 20 years ahead of our competitors has rapidly diminished. In some cases, we're already behind. By 2030, unless we pursue “urgent change at significant scale,” as former Defense Secretary Gen. James Mattis put it, it's likely the U.S. will face an enemy with superior weapons, superior equipment and superior capabilities.
Nowhere is this better illustrated than in our strategic competition with China. China used to just steal our technology. Now, through heavy investment, they are improving it. The result? China is outpacing the U.S. in key areas like hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies — not to mention conventional capabilities.
China isn't the only one. Technological development is accelerating across the globe, expanding to more actors and changing the very nature of war.
We can't afford to let our advantage erode further. It is up to the Department of Defense and Congress to make sure that the defense-industrial base becomes, as the National Defense Strategy demands, an “unmatched 21st century National Security Innovation Base.” If we want to “sustain security and solvency,” we need to consider wholesale change to industry culture and its interface with the Department of Defense, shed outdated management processes, and reimagine a resilient supply chain that mitigates 21st century risks.
This essay is part of the Defense News 2020 Outlook project. Click here for more.
This begins with software, which is foundational to military capability. The DoD and its traditional hardware-dominant industry partners have been behind on software in almost every way — talent, tools, development and delivery processes. Software innovation has failed in countless DoD programs, including the Ford-class carrier, the F-35′s Autonomic Logistics Information System and the GPS next-generation operational control system. Instead of taking the Pentagon for granted as an endless source of cash flow, partners must refocus their attention on delivering secure capability that actually works.
Next, the Department of Defense needs to continue to expand capacity — prioritizing speed of delivery and adapting its systems to maximize value and output. For too long we have been slow to expand our stockpiles of fifth-generation weapons required to fight peer adversaries. The second production line for JASSM-ER cruise missiles is a good start toward building the capacity needed to retain advantages that will make any enemy think twice before attacking. We must do the same for other fifth-generation weapons, including air-to-air missiles.
Shipbuilding, including aircraft carriers, surface ships, submarines and our logistics fleet, is another area where our capacity is severely limited. The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy, which recently surpassed ours in size, is on track to reach 400 ships in 2025 and is nearly self-sufficient for all components.
Size of the fleet isn't a sole consideration. We've focused on ensuring the capability of our fleet remains unmatched and bolstering suppliers of critical components, but we must also improve the construction performance of lead ships in new classes to maintain and build upon our capability advantage. The last thing we want is a fair fight. Innovation is best done at the subsystem level through a rigorous engineering-based process centered on building knowledge through full-scale prototypes, which can then inform ship design. We are eager to work with the Navy to identify and fund more of these prototypes, which will serve as the building blocks of the future fleet.
We also must accelerate innovation. Recent defense authorization legislation encourages the DoD to streamline acquisition, take a business-minded approach to contracting, and tap into nontraditional suppliers and public-private partnerships. This must continue. Dilapidated testing infrastructure is holding us back from catching up to our enemies. Just look at hypersonic weapons: Beijing is parading around dozens of its newest weapons, and we have yet to build one. The DoD has looked to Silicon Valley, but we are competing with Chinese influence there as well, and the Pentagon has often proven an impossible customer due to its antiquated bureaucracy.
Any technological improvements will be meaningless if vulnerable to being infiltrated or stolen. Recent legislation continues support for the DoD as it assesses and mitigates risks to its supply chains posed by adversaries. Both the government and contractors need to cooperate on and use modern verification tools to identify trusted suppliers and manufacturers, as well as fix vulnerabilities. To make these tools useful, the DoD must first establish a working digital model of its suppliers.
Lastly, while we must continue to invest in the domestic, organic industrial base, it's important to remember that we can't take on China and Russia alone — which is why the National Defense Strategy emphasizes our network of allies and partners. We must remove unnecessary barriers to industrial cooperation that degrade our collective competitive edge.
We do not have to make a false choice between investing domestically and in our allies — we can do both. Under our National Technology and Industrial Base partnership with Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, we can develop a more diverse, resilient industrial base, secure our supply chains, and become a “five eyes for defense procurement.” It's in our best interest to ensure our allies can leverage our technological advantages and we can leverage theirs.
Without a strong national security innovation base, the Pentagon cannot implement the National Defense Strategy. Congress' job is to put the appropriate, tailored policy in place and provide sufficient, predictable resources to help the industrial base meet these challenges. Together, we can harness the power of American innovation to ensure that we are able to win the wars of the future.
September 17, 2023 | International, Land
As Russia's Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met this week to discuss what analysts believe will be a deal for an exchange of weapons, the West's leading companies were descending on Europe's biggest arms show in London.
September 1, 2024 | International, Aerospace
This event marks a significant milestone in the Polish Air Force's history and strengthens the alliance between the United States and Poland, a key NATO ally.
July 22, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval
By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy's top officer has ordered his staff to develop a comprehensive strategy to field unmanned systems in the air, on the water and under the sea over the coming years. Dubbed “unmanned campaign plan,” it looks to tie together all the disparate programs into a coherent way forward, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday told Defense News in a July 16 interview. “We've got ... a family of unmanned systems we're working on,” Gilday said. “Undersea we've got extra-large, large and medium [unmanned underwater vehicles]; on the surface we have small, medium and large [unmanned surface vessels]; and in the air we have a number of programs. “What I've asked the N9 to do is come to me with a campaign plan that ties all those together with objectives at the end. I've got a bunch of horses in the race, but at some point I have to put my money down on the thoroughbred that's going to take me across the finish line so I can make an investment in a platform I have high confidence in and that I can scale.” Gilday's drive toward an unmanned campaign plan comes after two consecutive years of congressional criticism that the Navy is forging ahead too quickly on unmanned systems without first having designed or developed critical new technologies and mechanical systems. The criticisms have resulted in marks in legislation that deliberately slows down the development of the systems that both the Navy and the Office of Secretary of Defense have said are necessary to offset a rising China without breaking the bank. In the interview, Gilday acknowledged the Navy hadn't adequately mapped out its unmanned future in a way that would inspire confidence. “What I've found is that we didn't necessarily have the rigor that's required across a number of programs that would bring those together in a way that's driven toward objectives with milestones,” Gilday said. “If you took a look at [all the programs], where are there similarities and where are there differences? Where am I making progress in meeting conditions and meeting milestones that we can leverage in other experiments? At what point do I reach a decision point where I drop a program and double down on a program that I can accelerate?” In the most recent National Defense Authorization Act, currently working its way through Congress, lawmakers appear poised to restrict funding for procurement of any large unmanned surface vessels, or LUSV, until the Navy can certify it has worked out an appropriate hull as well as mechanical and electrical system, and that the design can autonomously operate for 30 consecutive days. Furthermore, the Navy must demonstrate a reliable operating system and ensure any systems integrated into the platform — sonars, radars, etc. — are likewise functioning and reliable, according the text of the subcommittee's markup of the fiscal 2021 NDAA, Congress's annual defense policy bill, which was obtained by Defense News. In short, the language would mean the Navy could not spend procurement dollars on a large unmanned surface vessel until it has a working model, and it may not try to develop those technologies on the fly. In a June interview with Defense News, Rep. Joe Courtney, D-Conn., head of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, said the panel supports unmanned system development but doesn't want the Navy repeat mistakes. “The message I want people to understand is that we fully support the move toward unmanned, whether that's on the surface or undersea,” Courtney said. “But we want to make sure that some of the real nuts and bolts issues ... are worked out before we start building large unmanned platforms. “We want to make sure that, again, we don't end up with situations like LCS [the littoral combat ship] where we're trying to figure out what the mission is at the same time we're building them.” Conceptualize and control That's a criticism the CNO hears and is working to address. Gilday is pushing on two major efforts to get better answers on what the Navy is trying to accomplish with unmanned systems: a concept of operations, and a network to control them with. “The concept of operations that the fleet is working on right now will be delivered in the fall, and that talks conceptually about how we intend to employ unmanned in distributed maritime operations,” Gilday said, referencing a Navy plan to physically expand its maneuvers to complicate enemy targeting rather than aggregate around an aircraft carrier. But beyond how unmanned tech will fit into a distributed fleet, the Navy is looking at where those systems should be located and how they will be supported. That's leading the Navy to consider stationing the systems and support elements overseas. “What would a day-to-day laydown look like of unmanned forward?” Gilday asked. “The Navy has got to be forward: For obvious reasons we don't want the fight back here; the Navy exists to operate forward. That's where we need to be in numbers. And with unmanned, if you are not there at the right time, you are irrelevant. “There also has to be a number of unmanned [systems] forward. I can't just decide to rally unmanned out of San Diego or in the Pacific northwest at a time when they'll be too late to need.” The other big piece of the puzzle is something Gilday has previously referred to as akin to a new “Manhattan Project,” a rapid, well-funded project to field a network that can control all the various unmanned and networked systems, sensors and weapons. And to do that, he's linking in with the Air Force's Joint All Domain Command and Control, or JADC2, effort. “The other piece of this is the Navy Tactical Grid,” Gilday explained. “Coming into the job, the projections for the Navy Tactical Grid was for delivery in about 2035. I knew that was way, way too late. “So, on a handshake with [Air Force Chief of Staff] Gen. [David] Goldfein, I said: ‘Look, I am all in, and my vision is that the Navy Tactical Grid would be the naval plug into JADC2.' So the Navy Tactical Grid ends up being a very critical element of the unmanned campaign plan because it becomes the main artery to operate those platforms. “Without it, I have a bunch of unmanned that I shouldn't be building because I can't control it very well.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/21/the-us-navy-is-trying-to-get-its-act-together-on-unmanned-systems/