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Murray Brewster · Reports of human rights violations are pushing trading countries like Canada into a corner In both war and diplomacy, language matters. And if one thing was evident from the flood of words coming out of the Halifax International Security Forum last weekend, it's that Western democracies, despite their vows to uphold human rights, have no common language to define their view of — and relationship with — China. The world is rapidly approaching a crossroads with Beijing, a point where nations will have to decide whether to treat the burgeoning superpower as a trading partner, a rival — or an active threat. Secret Chinese documents were released to media outlets recently which show how the Muslim minority Uighur population is being locked up in mass detention camps and subjected to "systematic brainwashing." Beijing's violent response to pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong revived grim memories of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. So is China a competitor or an adversary? 'Naive' about China's motives The answer to that question seems to depend on which country's leaders are answering it — how heavily Beijing has invested in their nations' markets, how badly their businesses want access to that vast Chinese market. "For many years, folks were naive about Chinese motivations," U.S. National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien told journalists during an on-the-record briefing in Halifax over the weekend. "In the past, the relationship with China was driven solely by trade, driven solely by economics." O'Brien describes China, rather antiseptically, as a "near-peer competitor," not as an adversary. Still, there were points during the briefing when O'Brien's language became decidedly adversarial — even dystopian — as he described the high-tech incarceration and forced re-education of as many as one million Uighurs. In the context of the dispute over allowing Chinese telecom giant Huawei into Western 5G wireless systems, O'Brien asked whether Western Europe would have allowed the Soviet Union into their countries to build railroads at the height of the Cold War. A new Cold War? On the record, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan also was not prepared to describe China as an adversary — but he was decidedly mushy when asked how we should describe it. The confusion on display in Halifax over the question of whether the West has arrived at the threshold of a new Cold War was widespread. U.S. Admiral Phillip Davidson, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, would not describe the current moment as "a new Cold War" but warned that the West needs to be prepared to continually "call out" China when it crosses internationally accepted lines. Many say some of those lines have been crossed already — through the arbitrary detention of the Uighurs (which China attempts to justify with the claim that it's fighting Islamic extremism) and through its program of constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea, which has been condemned by an international tribunal at the Hague. So, again ... rival or adversary? 'Feeding ... a monster' Lady Pauline Neville-Jones, a former top British diplomat and adviser to ex-U.K. prime minister David Cameron, said China has signalled it intends to become an "unequalled" high-tech nation. Beijing has said it's prepared to pour real money into achieving that goal — with Western nations supplying the world-class post secondary institutions that are training the next generation of Chinese engineers. "We are feeding something that could be a monster," she told the Halifax forum. "So what do we do about it? As long as we pursue our relations with China, largely separately on the basis of short-term national interest, I think we are giving away the game." It took Western allies several years to come with up a comprehensive Cold War strategy following the Second World War, she pointed out. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-u-s-sajjan-uighur-halifax-international-security-forum-1.5372856

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Alexandria, VA) established the DOD Biotechnologies for Health and Human Performance Council (BHPC) study group to continually assess research and development in biotechnology. The BHPC group assesses scientific advances for improved health and performance with potential military application; identifies corresponding risks and opportunities and ethical, legal, and social implications; and provides senior leadership with recommendations for mitigating adversarial threats and maximizing opportunities for future U.S. forces. At the direction of the BHPC Executive Committee, the BHPC study group conducted a year-long assessment entitled “Cyborg Soldier 2050: Human/Machine Fusion and the Impact for the Future of the DOD”. The primary objective of this effort was to forecast and evaluate the military implications of machines that are physically integrated with the human body to augment and enhance human performance over the next 30 years. This report summarizes this assessment and findings; identifies four potential military-use cases for new technologies in this area; and assesses their impact upon the DOD organizational structure, warfighter doctrine and tactics, and interoperability with U.S. allies and civil society. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/m/articles-of-interest/300458

By: Jill Aitoro The strategy for reading tea leaves of the year to come is naturally anchored in the lasting events of the year just passed. So then let us consider 2019. The year was, in many respects, one of messiness. The already tense relationship between Turkey and NATO allies got worse, leading to the decision by the U.S. to kick the country out of the F-35 program. High-profile program struggles plagued some of the largest defense companies in the world. Political turmoil led to leadership shakeups both in the U.S. and across the pond. Instability in the industrial base made advancements in technology by adversaries all the more troubling. But there were also some signs of progress. Modern warfare capabilities — from hypersonics to artificial intelligence — transitioned from a footnote for only some to the everyday vernacular of most. More experimentation emerged in techiques for system development and acquisition. And around the world, countries from various regions grew more earnest in their desires to expand their influence and investment in global defense. What can we predict, then, based upon this, for 2020? Global relations will continue to shift, no longer defined by existing alliances but rather by individual behavior and more self-serving demands. Elections stand to turn the current state of political affairs on its ear, whether it be for better or for worse. And competition will grow more fierce, driven by a shrinking industrial base and the fact that defense companies will need to look beyond the U.S. to find the most sought-after programs with the biggest potential payout. Obviously, there is a lot we don't know. Will NATO flounder or regain its footing? Will election results drive allies closer together or farther apart? Will defense budgets go up or down? And will the increasing use of hybrid tactics reshape both the forces of today and the systems of tomorrow? We asked leaders from around the world to provide their perspective. See what's on their minds here in Outlook 2020. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/

By: Dirk Hoke The year 2020 will become one of truth for Europe's defense industry — especially in the sector of military aviation. For years, European nations are discussing efforts to jointly develop defense assets that should ensure better security into the 21st century. Progress has been made — mainly on the development of a European drone and the Future Combat Air System. Next year will show how serious the nations take the projects, as for the first time big contractual and financing milestones will have to be achieved. Security never comes for free. Everybody acknowledges that fact, but practical decisions need to underpin this. Same applies to the promise to meet the NATO target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. We can only show a credible line of defence if enemies of the alliance are afraid of feeling the strong military power NATO is able to provide in the worst case. Procrastination and post-Cold War recession in several countries need to come to an end. I acknowledge that, for example, Germany is moving in the right direction. But is it fast enough while security is evermore volatile in certain parts of the world? The defense industry, especially that in Europe with its decades of experience in working in collaborative programs, can help. We are on standby, but political decisions need to be taken first. Modern threats sometimes require modern answers. But we shouldn't forget that these answers are often two- or threefold and inherit also a large pack of traditional approaches — and sometimes the old ways are still the best. Nations and industry must not wait for the next big thing, but they also need to consider constantly refining their existing equipment. A perfect example for this is the military aircraft fleet of Airbus. Be it our transport, mission or combat segment: By adding more sensors and connectivity into the existing fleets, we will see in 2020 good things becoming better and enable them to play a vital role in the Future Combat Air Systems scenarios. Special attention will also need to be devoted to the novel situation in space as a serious area of engagement for defense. As Europe's largest space company, we know what we are talking about here. Let's be frank: Without our assets in space — all communications nods and observation assets — what the Western world calls “normal” life is no longer possible. And with this goes the well-being of our societies. So it is only fair that nations are starting now to make up their minds on space defense, and NATO recently decided to declare space the fifth dimension of defense next to land, sea, air and cyber. This adds another layer to an already extremely complex scenario. How does that translate into the defense industry? The importance of the few large companies will rise. With their huge integration, capabilities and portfolio that is spread over all five threat dimensions, they will have to play a key role in mastering technologies, integrating smaller, specialized companies, and ensuring that government and military users can focus their decision-making on the bits and pieces that really matter. This is a challenge we will passionately continue working on in 2020 and the years beyond. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/ceo-of-airbus-defence-and-space-on-what-will-be-vital-in-2020/

By: Alessandro Profumo Rapid changes are taking place around the world, both at the geopolitical and technological level, which are having an extremely disruptive impact on the defense industry and its customers, namely governments. For its part, technological innovation has reached a pace never seen before. Growing digitalization, big-data processing, robotics, autonomous systems, biotechnology, hypersonics, directed energy: These are just a few examples of innovations that revolutionize industry and governments' approaches to defense and security issues. In some cases, innovations on the commercial side are driving the technological evolution in the defense sector, with increasingly wider applications from a dual-use perspective. There is a real two-way street. The role of government is crucial in developing a long-term investment strategy and identifying the sovereign technologies necessary to maintain a technological advantage over new peers and emerging actors, in symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. Threats to peace and global stability do not solely originate in traditional domains (air, land, sea), but materialize in space and cyberspace, more difficult to protect, as they both lack precise boundaries. Increasing defense spending is a positive signal, especially when coupled with a strong vision and clear objectives aimed at the development of the right capabilities in an international cooperation framework. The national defense industry, as a strategic asset of its own country, must be able to capture technological innovation where it is produced, finding effective ways of accessing new ideas and solutions. Secondly, it must be able to manage the dynamics between long development and production cycles that characterize this sector, and technological innovation's fast pace. The sense of urgency must regard delivering what is needed, when needed, providing the end user with the maximum benefit and anticipating and adapting to changes, while triggering an ever-growing contamination across industries, governments, startups and academia. A deep interconnection between the defense industry and its customers, working in close synergy, facilitates flexible and adaptable structures capable of responding quickly to new and complex emergencies. In this perspective, the closer one works with the customer — throughout the entire product life cycle — the more this reverberates positively at the industry level. The shared awareness rising from this cooperation will enable industry to make wise and focused investment decisions in order to develop products and solutions that best fit future market requirements. Bearing in mind that technology alone is not enough, true success in creating a resilient defense industry also lies in the ability to attract and retain highly specialized human capital as well as involving the supplier base in innovation processes. A shared road map is, therefore, a priority — industry and governments, working together, side by side, committed to building a safer world. Alessandro Profumo is the CEO of Leonardo. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/ceo-of-leonardo-a-twoway-street-benefits-everyone

By: Jorge Domecq The European Union's strategic autonomy in defense is on everybody's lips since it was put forward as a long-term goal in the EU's 2016 Global Strategy. Yet, it remains unclear what it means in practice and how it would impact NATO and our trans-Atlantic relationship. This has led to a mostly academic debate about the concept's end goal, fueled by doubts and fears stoked from both sides of the pond. However, the risk of too much abstract talk is that we get distracted from the concrete action needed to bring us closer to, what in my view, is a laudable objective. It is time we approach strategic autonomy more positively and look at it as a constructive project — not something directed against NATO, the United States or anybody else. It's about putting EU member states in a position where they can autonomously develop, operate, modify and maintain the full spectrum of defense capabilities they need. It's about giving the EU the option and tools — political, operational, technological, industrial — to take military action whenever needed, either together with partners (notably NATO) wherever possible, or separately if necessary. Instead of undermining trans-Atlantic trust and security, as some fear, a more robust and autonomous European defense will ultimately lead to a stronger NATO. It is in the interest of our trans-Atlantic partners to have a more capable and efficient EU in defense. The U.S. wants Europe to take on its fair share of burden in defense? A stronger and more credible European pillar in NATO will contribute to that. The EU's ambition, as stated in the 2016 Global Strategy, is to reach “an appropriate level of strategic autonomy” in order to “ensure Europe's ability to safeguard security within and beyond its borders.” However, it takes more than ambition and political will to get there. Strategic autonomy presupposes at least two things. First, that our member states' armed forces have at their disposal the full spectrum of military assets that, taken together, could enable the EU to take military action, and on its own if necessary. Second, that the functionality and usability of these assets is not restricted by any technological or political caveats controlled by non-European actors. Today, admittedly, this is not the case yet. Hence the need to invest more, and better, in defense. The good news is that we are moving in the right direction, both in terms of “more” and “better.” But more spending does not automatically guarantee more efficiency or interoperability. To achieve that, we must invest better through cooperation: from joint priority setting to the development, procurement and deployment of cutting-edge defense capabilities. Prioritization is the foundation stone on which all subsequent steps must build. It is already in place: the Capability Development Plan, developed through the European Defence Agency and revised in 2018, lists member states' joint priorities for the years to come. One of them targets cross-domain capabilities that can contribute to strategic autonomy. Using the priorities as a compass will ensure efforts and funding are spent on assets that are really needed and contribute to making the EU more efficient in military terms. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, another new tool to boost joint capability planning and development, will help keep the focus on agreed priorities. To achieve strategic autonomy, the EU must also be able to master cutting-edge technologies and their integration into defense products. That's why it is so crucial that it acquires, maintains and develops the technological knowledge and industrial manufacturing skills required to produce the defense equipment it needs. Those key strategic activities have to be preserved and strengthened if we want to turn the goal of strategic autonomy into reality. EDA, which is the EU hub for defense innovation and collaborative capability development, has for years been involved in this critical work. The agency identifies critical, overarching strategic research areas and other key strategic activities underpinning the EU's strategic autonomy. The aim is to identify, and then support, must-have technologies and industrial capacities, without which strategic autonomy isn't possible. Artificial intelligence, micro- and nanotechnologies, or unmanned and autonomous systems are only a few examples of such critical disruptive technologies that are reshaping defense. It's through concrete action — not political and academic rhetoric — that we can make progress toward strategic autonomy. At the same time, we must ensure coherence and avoid any unnecessary duplication with NATO, which will continue to be the cornerstone of collective defense for its members. EU strategic autonomy isn't necessarily just around the corner, but it is attainable. The closer we get to it and the more additional defense cooperation it triggers, the better. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/head-of-european-defence-agency-eu-strategic-autonomy-is-an-opportunity-not-a-threat

By: Ellen Lord The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment is rapidly transitioning from the former OUSD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to an organization focused on enabling our services to use innovative business practices tailored to their needs. AT&L, the enterprise's former moniker, was a congressionally mandated organizational change for the purpose of streamlining business processes to speed capability delivery to the war fighter and maximize value for the taxpayer. On Sept. 4, 2018, we had our first official day as A&S. Though Department of Defense leadership has changed, our mission to support the war fighter through acquisition innovation remains constant. Over the past year, our team has worked to refine the A&S strategy using the National Defense Strategy as our guidebook. Six goals, each with nested sub-priorities, emerged from our senior leadership planning sessions: enable innovative acquisition approaches that deliver war-fighting capability at the speed of relevance; build a safe, secure and resilient defense-industrial base (commercial and organic); ensure safe and resilient DoD installations; increase weapon system mission capability while reducing operating cost; promote acquisition and sustainment initiatives with key international partners; recruit, develop and retain a diverse acquisition and sustainment workforce. A few initiatives that highlight some of these efforts are outlined below. Cyber Model Maturity Certification, or CMMC, is a strategic solution to make security foundational to DoD acquisition. Currently, the metaphorical “mark” is not being met — most defense supply chain partners are not in compliance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology 800-171. CMMC is a DoD certification process that measures a supply chain partner's ability to protect sensitive information through an independent third-party certification. The process will be managed by an accreditation body, which will certify, train, accredit these third parties and issue certificates. Recently, version V.06 of the model was released for review with a final version ready in January to integrate (in a phased-type approach starting fall 2020), as a mandate into all federal contracts. The Adaptive Acquisition Framework, our most transformational acquisition policy change in decades, is set to deploy at the end of this year. It is new in the sense that it directs using the minimum amount of process to enable program managers to acquire a capability versus previous models, which dictated all those things you might not do from a vast array of process steps. Essentially, this framework cuts superfluous bureaucratic process by empowering program teams to choose a pathway based on the specific product or service being acquired. It emphasizes critical thinking and “creative compliance.” A&S recently appointed an intellectual property leader to help develop DoD guidance and training, as well as to provide assistance across the DoD associated with acquisition, licensing and management of the newly published policy on IP (DoD 5010.44). PMs must proactively address protection of data rights at the inception of each program. Concurrently, we must continue our defense against cybersecurity threats that target U.S. IP by ensuring network security. Lastly, we are proactively strengthening the DoD supply chain against adversaries' creative market disruptions in the global marketplace. As such, we have formed a trusted capital, or TC, ecosystem where innovative companies connect with trusted investors. Though we will not promise business, we are creating an ecosystem in technology areas where we need more trusted sources for hardware, software and services to support our war fighter. Drone Venture Day, held on Nov. 13, 2019, represented the inaugural event in a series of TC opportunities to develop domestic manufacturing capabilities by growing and strengthening our defense-industrial base. These are a few examples of how A&S is reinventing DoD acquisition to simply and cost-effectively reduce the process of equipping our military with cutting-edge capability at the speed of relevance. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/pentagon-acquisition-boss-adapting-to-support-the-war-fighter

By: Sen. Jim Inhofe Since World War II, the American people have believed our military has had the best of everything, but the technological superiority that kept us 20 years ahead of our competitors has rapidly diminished. In some cases, we're already behind. By 2030, unless we pursue “urgent change at significant scale,” as former Defense Secretary Gen. James Mattis put it, it's likely the U.S. will face an enemy with superior weapons, superior equipment and superior capabilities. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in our strategic competition with China. China used to just steal our technology. Now, through heavy investment, they are improving it. The result? China is outpacing the U.S. in key areas like hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence and biotechnologies — not to mention conventional capabilities. China isn't the only one. Technological development is accelerating across the globe, expanding to more actors and changing the very nature of war. We can't afford to let our advantage erode further. It is up to the Department of Defense and Congress to make sure that the defense-industrial base becomes, as the National Defense Strategy demands, an “unmatched 21st century National Security Innovation Base.” If we want to “sustain security and solvency,” we need to consider wholesale change to industry culture and its interface with the Department of Defense, shed outdated management processes, and reimagine a resilient supply chain that mitigates 21st century risks. This essay is part of the Defense News 2020 Outlook project. Click here for more. This begins with software, which is foundational to military capability. The DoD and its traditional hardware-dominant industry partners have been behind on software in almost every way — talent, tools, development and delivery processes. Software innovation has failed in countless DoD programs, including the Ford-class carrier, the F-35′s Autonomic Logistics Information System and the GPS next-generation operational control system. Instead of taking the Pentagon for granted as an endless source of cash flow, partners must refocus their attention on delivering secure capability that actually works. Next, the Department of Defense needs to continue to expand capacity — prioritizing speed of delivery and adapting its systems to maximize value and output. For too long we have been slow to expand our stockpiles of fifth-generation weapons required to fight peer adversaries. The second production line for JASSM-ER cruise missiles is a good start toward building the capacity needed to retain advantages that will make any enemy think twice before attacking. We must do the same for other fifth-generation weapons, including air-to-air missiles. Shipbuilding, including aircraft carriers, surface ships, submarines and our logistics fleet, is another area where our capacity is severely limited. The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy, which recently surpassed ours in size, is on track to reach 400 ships in 2025 and is nearly self-sufficient for all components. Size of the fleet isn't a sole consideration. We've focused on ensuring the capability of our fleet remains unmatched and bolstering suppliers of critical components, but we must also improve the construction performance of lead ships in new classes to maintain and build upon our capability advantage. The last thing we want is a fair fight. Innovation is best done at the subsystem level through a rigorous engineering-based process centered on building knowledge through full-scale prototypes, which can then inform ship design. We are eager to work with the Navy to identify and fund more of these prototypes, which will serve as the building blocks of the future fleet. We also must accelerate innovation. Recent defense authorization legislation encourages the DoD to streamline acquisition, take a business-minded approach to contracting, and tap into nontraditional suppliers and public-private partnerships. This must continue. Dilapidated testing infrastructure is holding us back from catching up to our enemies. Just look at hypersonic weapons: Beijing is parading around dozens of its newest weapons, and we have yet to build one. The DoD has looked to Silicon Valley, but we are competing with Chinese influence there as well, and the Pentagon has often proven an impossible customer due to its antiquated bureaucracy. Any technological improvements will be meaningless if vulnerable to being infiltrated or stolen. Recent legislation continues support for the DoD as it assesses and mitigates risks to its supply chains posed by adversaries. Both the government and contractors need to cooperate on and use modern verification tools to identify trusted suppliers and manufacturers, as well as fix vulnerabilities. To make these tools useful, the DoD must first establish a working digital model of its suppliers. Lastly, while we must continue to invest in the domestic, organic industrial base, it's important to remember that we can't take on China and Russia alone — which is why the National Defense Strategy emphasizes our network of allies and partners. We must remove unnecessary barriers to industrial cooperation that degrade our collective competitive edge. We do not have to make a false choice between investing domestically and in our allies — we can do both. Under our National Technology and Industrial Base partnership with Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, we can develop a more diverse, resilient industrial base, secure our supply chains, and become a “five eyes for defense procurement.” It's in our best interest to ensure our allies can leverage our technological advantages and we can leverage theirs. Without a strong national security innovation base, the Pentagon cannot implement the National Defense Strategy. Congress' job is to put the appropriate, tailored policy in place and provide sufficient, predictable resources to help the industrial base meet these challenges. Together, we can harness the power of American innovation to ensure that we are able to win the wars of the future. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/sasc-chairman-we-must-build-the-national-security-innovation-base-our-defense-strategy-requires

By: Jens Stoltenberg On June 6, 2019, we marked the 75th anniversary of the D-Day landings. This was a major turning point in the Second World War, leading to the liberation of Europe. And it was a colossal feat for the tens of thousands of Allied troops, many of whom paid the ultimate price for our freedom. Less than 5 years later, NATO was born. An extraordinary idea, driven by the visionary leadership of our 12 founding nations and by the deep desire of our citizens to live in peace and freedom. NATO leaders will gather Dec. 3-4 in London, the very first home of NATO's headquarters, at a critical time for our trans-Atlantic security. This is an opportunity to reflect on everything we have achieved over seven decades. In that time, allies in Europe and North America have built an unprecedented area of peace and prosperity. Our ironclad commitment to protect and defend one another guarantees freedom and democracy for our almost 1 billion citizens, making NATO the most successful alliance in history. But beyond marking those 70 years, leaders will look to the challenges that still lie ahead. Today we face the greatest security threats in a generation — from a more assertive Russia to instability across the Middle East and North Africa, and from cyber and hybrid attacks to the ever-present terrorist threat. At the same time, the global balance of power is shifting around us. And the rapid development of new technology promises to transform our societies — and security — as radically as the first industrial revolution. So we must be ready to respond to any threat from any direction. And that is exactly what NATO is doing. Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO allies have implemented the largest reinforcement of our collective defense since the Cold War. We have strengthened our presence in the east of our alliance, from the Baltic to the Black Sea regions. And we have increased the size and readiness of our forces. This year we declared two new NATO commands operational: one in Ulm in Germany to improve military mobility in Europe, and one in Norfolk in the United States to ensure trans-Atlantic lines of communication. And we are delivering on our new NATO Readiness Initiative to field 30 air squadrons, 30 combat vessels and 30 land battalions within 30 days. As well as guaranteeing our security today, NATO is preparing for the challenges of tomorrow on land, at sea, in the air, in cyberspace and in space. NATO recently updated the core standards for civilian telecommunications, including 5G, in order to improve the resilience of our networks. And this year allies adopted NATO's first-ever overarching space policy. Finally, all allies are stepping up their investment in our security, not only in cash but also with new capabilities and contributions to NATO missions and operations. European allies and Canada have increased defense spending for five years in a row. By the end of next year they will have added an extra $100 billion to their defense budgets since 2016. More allies are on track to meet their pledge to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2024. But we have to do more because our freedom does not come for free. And in a more unpredictable world, we need to continue to keep our citizens safe. In London, NATO leaders will continue to strengthen our collective defense, modernize our alliance and invest in our shared security. And while NATO's 70th anniversary gives us cause for celebration, this is not the time for complacency. We must never take the trans-Atlantic bond for granted. We must never take freedom and democracy for granted. We must defend them every day. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/nato-secretary-general-alliances-70th-a-time-for-celebration-but-not-for-complacency