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The service's new AimPoint plan builds very different forces for Europe and the Pacific – but new high-level artillery HQs are central to both. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR WASHINGTON: Call it the once and future king of battle. The Army's artillery branch, neglected over 20 years of hunting guerrillas, is being revived as the long-range striking arm for multi-domain warfare against Russia and China. That will affect everything from what missiles the service buys, to which officers get promoted, to how the service organizes itself for battle – a force structure outlined in a new Army Futures Command study called AimPoint. The biggest change? Having already created two experimental Multi-Domain Task Forces built around artillery brigades, the Army now plans to build new high-level headquarters called Theater Fires Commands to coordinate long-range missile warfare on a continent-wide scale. “That is a direct output of AimPoint,” said Lt. Gen. Eric Wesley, whose Futures & Concepts Center developed the force structure plan. While the Theater Fires Commands do not exist yet, he said, the service has already begun setting aside manpower in its Total Army Analysis process to staff them. In AimPoint's vision of the future, “the brigades largely look very similar to what you might see right now... except for your [increased] ability to connect to national assets” in space and cyberspace, Lt. Gen. Wesley told reporters last week in a wide-ranging discussion. (Read more here). The big changes, he said, will come at higher levels – division, corps, and theater command – that have largely played a supporting role in highly localized counterinsurgency operations, but which must take the lead in coordinating large-scale campaigns against well-armed nation-states. “If you look at echelons above brigade, what we're having to do is build out our capacity to fight large-scale, campaign-quality combat,” he said. “Those echelons we have mortgaged a bit in the last 20 or 30 years because our BCTs [Brigade Combat Teams] were so powerful relative to our opponent. [Today], because we are being contested in all domains and our two peer competitors are investing in their militaries, we have to build back some of that campaign quality at echelon, with the distinction being you've got to have information warfare, you've got to have cyber, you've got to have space access.” Once the shooting starts, however – and even before, when you're trying to deter the other side from shooting at all – you still need old-fashioned firepower, with a 21st century twist. Artillery has been a US Army strength since World War II, when its ability to quickly coordinate far-flung howitzer batteries to pour overwhelming fire on a chosen target was one of the few things the German Wehrmacht feared. But back then, and even throughout the Cold War, the limits of radio networks, artillery range and precision targeting meant artillery could only be decisive on the tactical level, supporting the face-to-face battle of infantry and tanks. Today, however, the precision-guided missiles that the US, Russia, and China are developing have such long ranges – hundreds or thousands of miles – that you need satellites to spot suitable targets and send back targeting data, plus superior cyber warriors to protect that communications network from hostile hackers. Bringing all those technologies together in the right organization with well-trained personnel, and artillery can make a decisive impact on theater-wide operations or even the strategic level. Dead Branch Resurrecting? But there's a problem. Over the three decades between the end of the Cold War and the reawakening to Russian and Chinese threats, the Army neglected its artillery branch. In 2002, the Army actually disbanded the artillery brigades in its divisions and dispersed their component battalions across its armor and infantry brigades. Then, in Afghanistan and Iraq, US firepower was so overwhelmingly superior, and air support was so readily available for even small patrols, that artillery troops rarely got to fire their guns, even in training, and were routinely retasked for other duties. By 2008, three artillery colonels co-wrote a paper that called their arm of service a “dead branch walking.” Meanwhile, Russian and Chinese howitzers, rocket launchers and surface-to-surface missiles came to not only outnumber but also outperform their aging US counterparts. That led Lt. Gen. Wesley's predecessor as the Army's chief futurist, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, to tell Congress in 2016 that “we are outranged and outgunned.” The next year, in October 2017, the Army officially made Long-Range Precision Fires its No. 1 modernization priority. Now the Army is urgently developed new artillery systems, from rocket-boosted, precision-guided howitzer shells with a range of 40 miles, to 300-plus-mile tactical missiles, to hypersonic weapons that can fly thousands of miles at more than Mach 10. But technology alone is not enough. After two decades of its soldiers rarely getting to use artillery, the Army now needs experienced gunners to run its new high-level Fires Commands and make the most of its new long-range missiles. Sure, infantry and tank brigade commanders can call in strikes on the targets they see in front of them in a tactical fight. But it takes senior artillery officers and experienced, specialist staff to choose the most critical targets for an entire theater of war and to coordinate long-range strikes over hundreds of miles. While the Army recreated division-level artillery headquarters in 2014, it is now studying long-range fires commands at the corps and theater levels. What's more, the different theaters will require a different mix, not only of artillery systems, but of all the supporting players being developed as part of the Army's “Big Six”: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Networks, , Air & Missile Defense (also an artillery branch mission), and Soldier Lethality gear. For Indo-Pacific Command, focused on the Chinese threat, the vast expanse of ocean means the Army must support the Navy. That means long-range artillery batteries – very long range, given the distances involved – based on friendly islands to control the surrounding sea lanes, forming unsinkable anvils for the Navy's highly mobile hammer. But, Wesley said, that also requires advanced air and missile defense systems to blunt the enemy's own long-range salvos, long-range high-speed aircraft to move ground forces from island to island and a sophisticated, secure network to coordinate it all. In Europe, by contrast, the distances are shorter – requiring a different mix of missiles – and ground combat is the central front, with small and largely landlocked seas on either flank. That makes armored ground vehicles and soldier gear, from new rifles to targeting goggles, much more important than in the Pacific. Those profound differences mean the Army cannot create a single universal unit with one set of equipment that can adapt to every situation, as the cancelled Future Combat Systems program once attempted. Even if a one-size-fits-all Army somehow made sense tactically, Wesley said, it wouldn't work out technologically. With rapid advances in computing affecting everything from targeting to logistics, there's no way to develop a new piece of equipment, mass-produce it and issue it to every brigade across the Army before something new and better comes along. Instead of “pure fleets” where every brigade has the same software, trucks, missiles, etc., organized in the same way, the Army must tailor its forces to the theater. For more from Lt. Gen. Wesley in his own words (edited for brevity and clarity), read on: Q: Historically, the Army has always wanted to standardize equipment, training, and organization as much as possible – after all, “G.I.” stands for “General Issue.” But Europe and the Pacific are very different. Do you need more of a mix of forces across the Army? A: The world and technology are moving too fast to believe I'm going to get Technology One in every single brigade [before Technology Two makes it obsolete]. We have to be more agile than that. Pure fleeting and even pure structuring is probably not an acceptable approach. Second, the reality is there are two pacing threats that we're looking at, and they're distinctly different, the geography is different, and so we have to consider different ways to approach those problems. You can expect that the force package we build for INDOPACOM will be distinct from the force package we build in Europe. Where there's commonality is in Multi-Domain Operations. MDO is a way of fighting, and I think you're going to see that way of fighting be consistent in both theaters, but the application of it will be different. What are those distinctions? In INDOPACOM, fires to help the Navy control sea lanes are indispensable. In Europe, the essence of the problem is the ability to conduct a very advanced ground maneuver effort. Those [Big Six] priorities that we identified are pretty consistent with what most of the data and analytics and the rigor of the experimentation we look at – those priorities are priorities for a reason. But if you look at the theaters, those priorities might look a little different. So in INDOPACOM, fires, air and missile defense, and the network are some of the really critical pieces, and Future Vertical Lift, I would argue. If you look to Europe, it's going to be long range fires, the network, next generation combat vehicles, and soldier lethality. Q: How are you designing that future force? A: Gen. Milley [the 39th Army Chief of Staff, from 2015 to 2019], asked us, in a perfect world, what that force looks like. [He] asked us to build a resource-unconstrained design that reflects the precepts and principles of multi-domain operations. That was affectionately called the White Board Force. CSA 40 [the new Chief of Staff, Gen. James McConville] and Gen. Murray, the AFC commander, asked us to do a resource-informed design. That's what is called the AimPoint. It tightens the shot group and it allows us to define our experimentation, analysis, and programming better. When you're resource-unconstrained, you can go out and buy a Maserati. When you're resource-informed, you might buy a Corvette. We just had to throttle back on some of the ambitious desires we were looking for. We're on a [trajectory] to 492,000 [active duty soldiers]: How would you organize that in order to achieve MDO? AimPoint is not a locked down design that everybody has to invest in and build towards now. It's really an architect's design, and now we have to get into the detailed engineering and blueprint of it. We need an enhanced posture forward in both INDOPACOM and in Europe – nothing like the 1980s, but larger than what we have now. That's obviously going to be informed by resource decisions, but already the Army [is reactivating] an additional corps headquarters with an operational command post forward [in Europe]. Q: How will the AimPoint Army be organized differently to fight? A: The brigades largely look very similar to what you might see right now, because you still have to shoot, move, and communicate. BCT [Brigade Combat Team] and below, what you see won't change a lot — except for your ability to connect to national assets. Why is that? Well, we're fighting multi-domain, which means access to cyber, access to space assets, in certain instances at the tactical level. You have to have the plugs to get connect to national assets. If you look at echelons above brigade, what we're having to do is build out our capacity to fight large-scale, campaign-quality combat. Those echelons we have mortgaged a bit in the last 20 or 30 years because our BCTs were so powerful relative to our opponent. [Today], because we are being contested in all domains and our two peer competitors are investing in their militaries, we have to build back some of that campaign quality at echelon, with the distinction being you've got to have information warfare, you've got to have cyber, you've got to have space access. So in each echelon you would have that capacity to fight all domains and integrate them. Each echelon has distinct problems that has to be solved in order to enable the force to get to a position of advantage. Sometimes that requires each echelon to have distinct capabilities. Competition [short of war] is the first joint problem that has to be solved. Frankly, a brigade commander cannot provide the resources, the solutions, and the decisions made, to compete with a peer competitor. That's got to be retained at the three- and four- star level. In the event of conflict, it requires long range fire to strike the Russian combined arms army or Chinese equivalent. Again, that BCT commander would not necessarily have either the assets or the authority to strike the targets we're talking about with long range fire. So you have to do that at a different echelon. There are problems that the BCT commander does not solve for the theater, and some of that needs to be done at echelon. Q: What kinds of higher-echelon capabilities from the Cold War era are being recreated, like corps level artillery formations? A: Building out the ability to integrate fires at echelon is really important to being able to fight at scale. When we went to modularity, with the BCT being the coin of the realm, we moved the artillery fires battalion [out of the division-level artillery brigade] into the BCT. Now what you're going to see is the need to return to some aspects of centralization of fires, with the ability to decentralize [as needed], which makes the problem even harder. So, how have we done that? Well, for example, you saw a couple of years ago that we went back into the [division-level] fires brigade. That might be further reinforced as we go forward. Then the theater fires command, as an example, that is a direct output of AimPoint. In the last TAA [Total Army Analysis] cycle, we started to [set aside] a wedge of structure that we can design against. So that does not exist [yet]. Q: What are you able to do in the near term? You already have one experimental Multi-Domain Task Force in the Pacific and another being stood up in Europe. A: We've got AimPoint, we've got this orientation to the future, but General McConville said, ‘hey, I want to get stuff out there now, because the customer needs it, and that is the capacity to penetrate with long range fires, with the ability to integrate all domains.' That is what a MDTF is, and we're building them right now, and we want to get them into each theater. As we deploy those, we're going to learn lessons on how they best connect with the joint force. You may see, for example, an MDTF subordinate to a theater fires command or subordinate to a corps fires element. Right now, they're individual [units] that are being built; we will experiment with them and learn how they plug in, but ultimately you're going to see that capability migrate to the [higher] echelons. Topics: army, Army AimPoint, army future, Army Futures Command, Army strategic fires, artillery, Big Six, China, europe, Gen. Eric Wesley, INDOPACOM, Long-Range Precision Fires, LRPF, Missiles, Pacific, Russia, strategy, Theater Fires Command https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/army-rebuilds-artillery-arm-for-large-scale-war/

By THERESA HITCHENSon April 27, 2020 at 5:02 PM WASHINGTON: With the federal deficit expected to balloon to over $4 trillion in fiscal 2020 due to spending to pump the economy in the face of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, downward pressure on the US defense budget is inevitable, several experts believe. “I think the budget comes down sooner rather than later,” Mackenzie Eaglen, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said bluntly in a webinar today. The best-case scenario is for flat defense budgets for the foreseeable future, but if history is a guide, the smart money is on defense budget cuts, explained Todd Harrison, DoD budget guru at the Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS). “What has historically happened is, when Congress's fiscal conservatives come out and get serious about reducing the debt, reducing spending defense is almost always part of what they come up with for a solution,” he said. “So, we could be looking at a deficit-driven defense drawdown coming. ... At least history would suggest that that is a real possibility.” Indeed, even as Congress is pulling out all the stops trying to assist DoD and the defense industrial base to weather the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, DoD already is being eyed as the future deficit bill-payer, Eaglen told the webinar. “DoD is at the top of the list,” she said. Eaglen added that, at a more macro-level, the budget crunch could force DoD to re-look the goals of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) with an eye to downsizing. “There's going to be an impact across the board,” she said. “There probably will be a total relook — at even the NDS fundamentals, and what mission is going to have to go — in response to this.” Harrison noted that already DoD has been looking at flat budgets through 2021, which has caused it to have to take some risks as it tries to juggle divesting in high-maintenance legacy systems with investing in future programs while maintaining readiness to handle a possible peer conflict with Russia and/or China. “Just to divest legacy systems and invest in new ones and try to maintain, or slightly grow, force structure, DoD was already saying that it would need three to five percent real growth each year in the defense budget, going forward, just to fully execute that,” he said. This means that DoD leadership is going to face even more difficult decisions in the future, Harrison explained. “Now we're looking at an environment where the budget might be flat at the best case or trending down over time. Something's gonna have to give. And so, if DoD really wants to protect these key modernization programs, not only is it going to have to divest legacy systems, it's going to have to divest them faster, and it's going to have to make some reductions in force structure that's going to incur risk.” More immediately, Harrison said, as Congress moves over the next few months to pass a fourth, or even a fifth, economic stimulus package DoD already is signaling that it hopes to see a number of its “unfunded requirements” stuffed into those bills. “DoD is saying: ‘hey, if you want to fund more things for DoD to help stimulate the economy, and help the defense industry, well, here's a list you already have that you can pick from.” DoD's unfunded priorities list — the annual wish list of programs it would like to fund if only there was more money in the top-line — for 2021 includes a total of $35.9 billion for programs across the military services and the combatant commands. The Pentagon might also petition Congress for greater authority to use operations and maintenance funds appropriated but not spent due to work slowdowns to short up programs facing cost overruns because DoD paid contractors for work supposed to be done, but not actually done, while employees are home-bound due to the pandemic, Harrison said. “DoD has implemented the CARES Act implementation, saying that they would pay for paid leave for employees of defense industry firms that are unable to report to work. And so that cost is covered,” Andrew Hunter, who works on defense industrial base issues at CSIS, explained. “Those folks aren't necessarily going to be laid off; they will be kept on the payroll and paid. And again, that will create some costs down the road to then pay those folks to do the actual work that they're originally scheduled to do.” Most of the nearly $10.5 billion in the CARES Act, signed by President Donald Trump on March 27 to help DoD protect itself from the impacts of the pandemic goes into O&M accounts, according to CSIS. That said, some $1 billion goes to procurement funding, with an eye on health-related equipment. Further, it includes some $1.5 billion in the Defense Working Capital Fund, which allows DoD to make investments in things like depot maintenance, transportation and supply management in the near term and recoup the costs through future year pricing deals. However, the bill grants DoD a good deal of flexibility to move money around — with the exception of banning any funding for Trump's southern border wall construction. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/dod-budget-cuts-likely-as-4-trillion-deficit-looms/

By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — Boeing's termination of a $4.2 billion deal for a majority stake in Embraer's commercial aviation business could have widespread implications on the Brazilian firm's flagship military aircraft. Boeing on Saturday announced that it would walk away from a joint venture that would give it an 80 percent stake in Embraer's commercial business, as well as a 49 percent stake in the company's C-390 Millennium cargo plane. Although Boeing said that the company would maintain previous teaming agreements to support Embraer with marketing the C-390 internationally, analysts told Defense News that the vitriol between the two companies could portend a wider collapse of their collaboration in the military sphere. “The future of the KC-390 without Boeing — or without a U.S. defense prime helping — isn't all that great,” said Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst with the Teal Group. “It just seems like cooler heads should probably prevail.” At Dubai Air Show last November, the companies announced the formation of a new entity known as Boeing-Embraer Defense set up specifically to proactively market the C-390 around the world — a step up from previous agreements that had Boeing in more of a hands-off role. The agreement gave Boeing a new plane that could compete head-to-head against Lockheed Martin's C-130, and gave Embraer the resources to match. The big question now is whether Embraer seeks out partnerships elsewhere for either the KC-390 or its commercial business, said Byron Callan, an analyst with Capital Alpha Partners. “I just wonder, is there something else or someone else that emerges in 2021 or 2022 that ties up with Embraer. Could that be Chinese? Indian? Another country, company or entity outside of the United States?” he said. “That would be a more interesting broader change for aerospace, that has military implications as well, too.” It's even possible that Airbus could try to usurp Boeing's role as Embraer's partner on the C-390, said Callan, who noted that Airbus — like Boeing — does not offer a medium cargo transport aircraft that directly competes against the C-130. A good relationship gone bad On Monday morning, Embraer announced that it had filed arbitration proceedings against Boeing, capping off an angry back-and-forth between both companies that spanned the weekend. When Boeing announced it was walking away from the deal on Saturday, the company claimed it had “worked diligently over more than two years” to finalize the transaction, but that Embraer left some conditions of the master transaction agreement, or MTA, unresolved. "It is deeply disappointing,” said Marc Allen, Boeing's president of Embraer Partnership & Group Operations. “But we have reached a point where continued negotiation within the framework of the MTA is not going to resolve the outstanding issues." Embraer, however, issued a scathing statement of its own, asserting that it had fulfilled all contractual obligations and blaming the failure of the deal on Boeing's continued financial problems and the fallout from two fatal 737 MAX crashes. “Embraer believes strongly that Boeing has wrongfully terminated the MTA, that it has manufactured false claims as a pretext to seek to avoid its commitments to close the transaction and pay Embraer the US$4.2 billion purchase price,” the company said. “We believe Boeing has engaged in a systematic pattern of delay and repeated violations of the MTA, because of its unwillingness to complete the transaction in light of its own financial condition and 737 MAX and other business and reputational problems.” Boeing's decision to break its agreement with Embraer makes sense from a financial standpoint, Cai Von Rumohr, a defense analyst with Cowen, wrote in an email to investors. Because of COVID-19's impact on the aerospace industry, $4.2 billion seems an inflated price for Boeing to pay to acquire a controlling stake in Embraer's commercial business, and terminating the deal may help to free up cash that Boeing needs in the near-term. But while Von Rumohr said he believes Boeing and Embraer will continue to collaborate on the C-390, it will depend on whether the relationship can be salvaged. “This issue is, how pissed off is Embraer now, and is this something they're likely to get over to continue with what was a teaming agreement that made a whole lot of sense for both parties?” Von Rumohr told Defense News. Another major question is how the COVID-19 crisis effects worldwide defense spending, with implications for nations' domestic industries as well the international defense industrial base. Callan noted that some countries who have ordered the aircraft such as Brazil or Portugal “are probably looking at different defense budget projections. Aboulafia added that the dissolution of the partnership increases the likelihood that Embraer will need stimulus funds from the government of the Brazil to help fortify its commercial sector during the COVID-19 pandemic. “That money could easily come out of defense spending, which would impact Embraer defense programs, particularly Gripen or C-390,” he said. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/04/27/collapse-of-boeing-embraer-deal-could-have-major-impact-on-c-390-millenniums-future

Gareth Jennings, London - Jane's International Defence Review 26 April 2020 The US Army is looking to acquire tethered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to laser-designate ground targets from stand-off distances. A solicitation posted on 24 April by the Department of the Army calls for information on a tethered-UAV that can be used by Air National Guard (ANG) Special Tactics Operators (STOs) to observe and engage hostile ground forces using laser-guided weapons from greater stand-off distances. "The required product will allow STOs to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for observing and engaging hostile forces with low-collateral, long stand-off, laser-guided weapons fired or released from weapons systems that are unable to self-designate and expedite targeting for systems that can self-designate but have not yet identified a target's location," the request for information (RFI) noted. Performance standards for the tethered UAV set out in the RFI comprise the ability to reach 200 ft above ground level (AGL); 24-hour flight on a 2 kw or smaller generator; a 5 lb (2.3 kg) payload capacity; AES 256 encryption of the UAV control and video data; ability for open architecture use of the UAV's onboard computer; gimballed camera with co-witness laser designator capability of 30 mj or better, laser spot tracker, and laser rangefinder (which would reduce the 5 lb payload); the ability to generate target co-ordinates; an untethered communications link range of 8 km or better; remote handoff capability desired; an untethered flight duration of at least 45 min with 3 lb payload; autonomous delivery capability of 4 lb; multiple hot-swappable payloads and batteries (ability to change payload and batteries without powering down); the ability to operate in high winds of more than 40 mph (64 kph); the ability to operate in precipitation- industry standard IP54 or better; a temperature capability of -10°F to + 120°F (-23°C to 49°C); a hover capability and forward flight speed of 35 mph or better; target recognition artificial intelligence (AI) capable for people and vehicles; an Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) integrated plugin; and the ability to operate and navigate in GPS and radar-denied environments. https://www.janes.com/article/95779/us-army-seeks-tethered-uav-for-laser-designating

Lee Hudson The U.S. Navy has expedited its component workshare agreement with an Air Force aviation depot because of coronavirus-related workforce shortages. Fleet Readiness Center East (FRCE) located in North Carolina was initially scheduled to begin working on a Boeing F-18 cabin safety valve later this year while the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex's test chamber was closed for scheduled maintenance. But the time line was accelerated when Tinker AFB in Oklahoma had a significant number of workers unavailable due to COVID-19 risk mitigation efforts. The cabin safety valve is an integral part of the aircraft's environmental control system, Mary Linton, an aerospace engineer on the Gas Turbine Compressor-Pneumatics Fleet Support Team at FRCE, said in an April 27 statement. The valve is a component on both legacy F/A-18 Hornets and newer Super Hornets that acts as a backup to maintain cabin pressure above 23,000 ft. The part also serves as a supplement to the cabin air pressure regulator when the aircraft is in a rapid dive. “The original intent of bringing this workload to FRCE was to support Tinker Air Force Base through a major support equipment rework effort,” Linton said. “All of the great effort that went into establishing this capability proved even more critical to maintaining the readiness of the F-18 fleet as we navigate through the COVID-19 crisis.” The FRCE team was prepared to begin repairing, checking and testing the cabin safety valves in May, beginning with 20 per month before getting to a monthly rate of 40 by July, said John Miller, a planner and estimator with the Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul Logistics department at FRCE. To date, FRCE has completed 18 of the 40 units inducted so far, with plans to funnel 10 more into the pipeline. Once those first units are completed, the team must wait for additional valves to maintain the workflow. “The availability of components is still in flux due to COVID-19 and other factors, but the transition should move smoothly,” Miller said. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/covid-19-forces-usn-expedite-usaf-workshare-agreement

Les industriels de la défense, qui sont venus défendre l'idée d'un plan de relance devant les parlementaires le 23 avril dernier, évoquent plusieurs pistes possibles : maintien de la loi de programmation militaire a minima, nouvelles commandes, plan pour l'innovation et implication de la Commission européenne. « Pour la LPM (loi de programmation militaire), nous souhaitons son maintien et que des idées soient données pour ajuster ces programmes dans le but d'alimenter notre industrie de défense, souligne Eric Trappier, président du GIFAS. Il faut être capable de relancer notre économie sinon il y a un risque pour l'emploi et l'activité. Je suis très attaché à l'emploi dans les territoires. Avant de parler de relocalisation, il faut rappeler que l'industrie de défense se situe déjà en France ». La Tribune du 27 avril 2020

Par Le groupe de réflexions Mars* Dans le but de permettre à la base industrielle et technologique de défense de contribuer à la sortie de crise et aux plans de relance français et européen, le groupe de réflexions Mars* souhaite partager, dans une série de tribunes, les réflexions qu'il mène notamment autour des sujets de la souveraineté et de l'autonomie, du sens donné à l'Europe de la défense et la place réservée à la défense dans un "plan Marshall" européen, des enjeux macroéconomiques et des enjeux industriels et d'innovation dans la défense. L'objectif du groupe de réflexions Mars est de trouver des solutions pour sécuriser les budgets de défense à court et à moyen terme. Qui dit crise économique dit plan de relance. La ministre des armées souhaite utiliser à cet effet l'investissement de défense (Titre 5), qui représente 80% de l'investissement de l'État. En réponse, les industriels du secteur proposent de sécuriser, voire d'accélérer la livraison des programmes d'armement prévus dans la loi de programmation militaire en cours. Est-ce pertinent ? L'industrie de défense est une industrie de souveraineté, au sens le plus fort du terme, à savoir que sans elle, il n'y a plus d'indépendance nationale, que la nation dépend de ses alliés pour sa défense. C'est le cœur des compétences régaliennes et la légitimité intrinsèque de l'État. Une protection n'est jamais gratuite. La sécurité a un coût. Autant que le circuit économique créé profite à la croissance de l'activité nationale. close volume_off Prospérité rime avec indépendance C'est ainsi que Venise inventa l'arsenal. On peut être un État commerçant ouvert sur le monde et garder jalousement fermée son industrie d'armement. La Chine de Xi Jinping a manifestement retenu les leçons de Marco Polo. Et Venise nous a appris que la prospérité dure tant que l'indépendance est garantie par ses propres armes et ses alliances. Survient une menace irrépressible (Bonaparte) et s'en est fini de l'indépendance et de la prospérité. L'arsenal vénitien est ainsi la mère de l'industrie d'armement, qui a gardé cette forme (et ce nom !) jusqu'à une date très récente. Pour des raisons d'efficacité économique et "d'ouverture aux marchés", la France a progressivement transformé ses arsenaux en sociétés anonymes. Le processus a pris 30 ans, depuis les poudres et explosifs au début des années 1970 jusqu'à la construction et la réparation navale au début du XXIe siècle. Il n'est d'ailleurs pas achevé : il en reste des traces sous la forme de prises de participation sous diverses formes et à différents niveaux, et surtout, il reste un "arsenal" : la direction des applications militaires du commissariat à l'énergie atomique (CEA/DAM). Tout cela pour dire que la préoccupation économique en matière de défense, disons l'efficience, est une idée très récente. Elle s'oppose aux notions militaires de "réserve", de "redondance" et de capacité de "remontée de puissance", indispensables à l'efficacité opérationnelle et à ce que l'on appelle aujourd'hui la résilience, c'est-à-dire la faculté de reprendre l'ascendant après avoir encaissé un choc d'une violence inhabituelle, voire imprévisible. Le dogme du principe d'efficience Le principe d'efficience est devenu la composante majeure de l'idéologie managériale qui a connu son apogée en France avec la révision générale des politiques publiques (RGPP) conçue et mise en œuvre entre 2007 et 2012 avec la brutalité et l'absence de discernement que l'on sait en matière de défense. Outre une saignée sans précédent en temps de paix dans les effectifs (54.000 suppressions), il en a résulté une série de fiascos (logiciel LOUVOIS) et de désorganisations (bases de défense, administration de proximité, subordination des soutiens) qui ont durablement affaibli les armées, l'instrument ultime de la résilience de la nation, notamment le service de santé. C'est la même logique managériale à l'œuvre dans les années suivantes qui a conduit à la liquidation des réserves de masques chirurgicaux et autres consommables permettant de faire face immédiatement à une épidémie sans arrêter brutalement l'activité économique. Autrement dit, le principe d'efficience est une belle théorie dont la mise en œuvre se révèle, dans la violence de ses conséquences, incapable de faire face à un évènement inattendu, même quand les experts en prédisent la survenue probable. La crise du Covid-19 a révélé le caractère foncièrement anti-économique de cette idéologie et la coupable naïveté des adeptes de l'ouverture aux marchés. Accepter de confier la sécurité d'un pays aux forces brutes des marchés relève de la même croyance candide que le pacifisme désarmera tout agresseur. On a le droit d'y croire, c'est beau, mais pas de gouverner au nom de tels croyances. C'est une question de responsabilité. Cela vaut aussi pour une certaine frange de la gauche. Dépense de défense, un effet multiplicateur de croissance Une fois admis l'ineptie du principe d'efficience dans les questions régaliennes et stratégiques, faut-il pour autant considérer que l'industrie de défense soit par nature anti-économique. C'est l'idée qu'on avancé certains théoriciens marxistes (dénonçant l'implication de la finance et donc de la classe dirigeante dans cette industrie) et les premiers keynésiens, au titre d'un effet d'éviction sur l'investissement privé. Curieusement, la théorie néolibérale dominante depuis 30 ans tend à reconnaître les effets positifs sur la croissance de l'investissement de défense par la dépense publique. Cela résulte moins d'études économétrique rigoureuses que des résultats empiriques des Reaganomics, qui ont permis aux États-Unis de surmonter la crise économique du début des années 1980 en s'appuyant sur une course aux armements qui a permis, accessoirement, de gagner la guerre froide. C'est sans doute pourquoi le gouvernement Fillon, pour sortir au plus vite de la crise de 2008, ne voit pas de contradiction, en pleine RGPP, à relancer l'économie notamment par une augmentation (mesurée mais réelle) de l'investissement de défense, au prix d'une augmentation de 50% de la dette publique. Depuis ce précédent, considéré comme réussi, de nombreuses études ont permis de mieux comprendre les mécanismes microéconomiques et macroéconomiques à l'œuvre. Un certain consensus des économistes spécialisés s'est même dégagé sur la valeur du multiplicateur de croissance de l'investissement de défense : en moyenne 1,27 à court terme et 1,68 à long terme, avec des disparités en fonction du degré d'ouverture à l'étranger. Peut-on en dire autant de toutes les dépenses publiques ? Cela signifie que l'on est dorénavant capable de prévoir qu'un investissement supplémentaire d'un euro dans tel secteur aura tel rendement à telle échéance. Mais les études vont encore plus loin dans l'analyse et s'intéressent au retour fiscal et social de l'investissement de défense. On sait désormais que ce retour est en moyenne de 50% au bout de deux ans et de 100% après un certain nombre d'années, en fonction des secteurs. Cela signifie que la défense ne peut plus être considérée comme un centre de coût, auquel on ne consent que par nécessité. On sait désormais que c'est un centre de profit, dont le rendement dépend de paramètres liés à l'autonomie stratégique. Relance par la défense : rendement optimal Moins un secteur industriel est dépendant d'un approvisionnement (ou d'une main d'œuvre) extérieur, plus ce rendement est élevé. A l'inverse, plus il y a de "fuites" à l'extérieur du circuit économique national, moins l'investissement est rentable économiquement. Reste à identifier ces fuites afin de les résorber gr'ce à une politique industrielle (et une planification) avisée. On sait que la relance par la "monnaie hélicoptère" et les baisses d'impôts n'ont pas un bon rendement, précisément à cause de ces "fuites" : vers les importations de biens de consommation d'un côté, vers l'épargne de l'autre. On sait que renflouer Air France (ou Renault) est nécessaire pour l'emploi, mais qu'en termes économiques, le retour sur investissement est faible, car cela revient, dans le cas d'Air France, à financer, outre Airbus, Boeing, les loueurs et les assureurs, tout en maintenant le pouvoir d'achat d'une catégorie sociale aisée dont le taux d'épargne est important. Dans le cas de la relance par la défense, le rendement est optimal, même s'il est encore possible de réduite les fuites. La "supply chain" des systémiers-intégrateurs et des grands équipementiers français du secteur de l'armement est essentiellement française. L'emploi se situe à 80% en province, y compris des emplois de haut niveau. Cette industrie à très haut niveau technologique fait appel à des savoir-faire quasi-artisanaux ; d'ailleurs, on ne parle pas d'ouvriers mais de compagnons, pas d'usines, mais d'ateliers. L'investissement dans l'innovation se répercute dans l'industrie civile, ne serait-ce que parce que la majorité de ces sociétés ont une activité duale. La balance commerciale de l'armement français est structurellement excédentaire, ce qui contribue au rendement économique d'un euro investi dans cette industrie, exportatrice par nécessité, du fait de l'insuffisante épaisseur du marché national pour absorber les coûts fixes. Un investissement qui rapporte En période de crise, l'effet contra-cyclique de l'investissement de défense permet d'absorber le choc de demande subi par l'activité civile. C'est particulièrement évident aujourd'hui dans le cas de l'aéronautique. Enfin, on sait aujourd'hui que cet investissement rapporte à terme plus que ce qu'il a coûté, y compris en tenant compte du coût du capital (particulièrement faible ces dernières années). Pourquoi s'en priver ? Oui, pourquoi se priver de tels avantages, au moment où le déficit public et l'endettement ne sont plus bridés par le Pacte de stabilité ? Au demeurant, la défense, pour ce qui concerne du moins les fabrications d'intérêt stratégique, est le seul secteur industriel (le seul !) à bénéficier du privilège exorbitant de n'être soumis ni aux règles de l'OMC, ni au droit commun du marché unique européen. Les biens et service de défense disposent d'une partie spécifique du code de la commande publique. Pourquoi s'en priver, alors qu'on pourrait relancer rapidement l'activité industrielle à droit constant, sans enfreindre aucune règle ? Aller vers une autonomie stratégique Pour finir, évoquons rapidement ce qui f'che. Si l'on veut que le rendement économique d'un euro investi dans la défense soit encore meilleur, il faut résorber les fuites résiduelles. Cela suppose d'abord de chercher à substituer des fournisseurs nationaux aux sous-traitants étrangers, tant pour des raisons d'autonomie stratégique ("désItarisation") que dorénavant pour des raisons de patriotisme économique. Cela est aussi valable pour les chantiers ayant pris l'habitude de faire appel, pour diverses raisons dont certaines sont difficilement critiquables (absence de personnel formé), aux travailleurs détachés, alors même que l'on sait à quel point les chantiers navals structurent l'activité dans les zones littorales. Enfin, il sera injustifiable de continuer à saigner la trésorerie des sociétés pour rémunérer des actionnaires qui se sont révélés défaillants dans leur rôle d'apporteurs de capitaux en période de crise. Le modèle anglo-saxon (cf. Rolls Royce) d'un "flottant" à 100% ne saurait convenir ; l'industrie de défense a besoin d'être détenue par des actionnaires fiables et responsables, y compris par gros temps. ------------------------------------------------- * Le groupe Mars, constitué d'une trentaine de personnalités françaises issues d'horizons différents, des secteurs public et privé et du monde universitaire, se mobilise pour produire des analyses relatives aux enjeux concernant les intérêts stratégiques relatifs à l'industrie de défense et de sécurité et les choix technologiques et industriels qui sont à la base de la souveraineté de la France. https://www.latribune.fr/opinions/tribunes/l-investissement-dans-la-defense-rapporte-plus-que-ce-qu-il-coute-846190.html

Saab has successfully completed the first air trials with its new fighter X-band Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, which will be offered as a new addition to Saab's PS-05/A radar family. Saab continues to develop core AESA technology and has now successfully completed the first air trials with the new X-band AESA radar. The trials were flown successfully, collecting data while detecting and tracking objects. The radar is designed for fighter aircraft and can be adapted to a variety of platforms. As Saab previously announced, a version of the new AESA antenna has been sold to a U.S. Government customer. “This is an important step in the development of our new fighter AESA radar. We see great possibilities for the radar, and its modular, adaptable and scalable design means it can also be used for a range of other applications,” said Anders Carp, SVP and head of Saab's business area surveillance. The host aircraft during the air trial was a Gripen D aircraft, which is currently offered with Saab's latest Mk4 radar. The new version of the radar can be offered to Gripen C/D operators, as an upgrade. The new AESA radar features GaN, a material that gives lower power consumption and improved heat resistance. This enables wider bandwidth and greater reliability, availability and efficiency. The new fighter X-band AESA radar will, for example, have better performance against small targets, enhanced Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM) capability as well as improved ability to support more advanced weaponry. https://www.skiesmag.com/press-releases/saabs-new-fighter-radar-in-the-air

By: Aaron Mehta , Valerie Insinna , and David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The F-35 Joint Program Office has put in place stopgap fixes for five key technical flaws plaguing America's top-end fighter jet, but the problems have not been completely eliminated. Last June, Defense News reported exclusive details about 13 major technical issues, known as category 1 deficiencies, impacting the F-35. The JPO has since quietly downgraded five of those issues to the lesser category 2. A category 1 deficiency is defined as a shortfall that could cause death, severe injury or illness; could cause loss or damage to the aircraft or its equipment; critically restricts the operator's ability to be ready for combat; prevents the jet from performing well enough to accomplish primary or secondary missions; results in a work stoppage at the production line; or blocks mission-critical test points. In comparison, a category 2 deficiency is of lesser concern — something that requires monitoring, but not something that should impact operations. But downgrading the category doesn't mean the problems are solved, said Dan Grazier, who tracks military issues for the Project on Government Oversight. CAT 2 programs are still "definitely cause for concern. They are going to have an impact on how the aircraft performs,” Grazier said. "It really depends on what the issue is, but every design flaw has a potential issue on the mission. ... You want to not have flaws, you want these things can be fixed so pilots can get out and do what they need to do.” Aside from a few basic statements on which projects were downgraded to CAT 2, a JPO spokesperson said the office “cannot disclose any information about how these deficiencies were resolved or downgraded due to their security classification.” The ALIS sovereign data transfer solution does not meet information assurance requirements. The Autonomic Logistics Information System, or ALIS, provides the backbone of the F-35, used by the aircraft's operators in virtually all stages of flying and sustaining the Joint Strike Fighter. The system is used to plan and debrief missions, order spare parts, walk maintainers through repairs, and view technical data and work orders. (A potential replacement, named ODIN, is in the works.) But some international partners on the F-35 program have expressed concerns that data flowing through ALIS to the United States government — and to Lockheed Martin — could give both the U.S. military and the American defense contractor a window into that country's flight operations, including when and where its F-35s are flying. Those concerns were so high that two countries threatened to leave the program entirely if a fix was not quickly applied, according to the original documents viewed by Defense News. That fix is now in, according to the JPO, which said that on April 29, 2019, an update to ALIS included an initial version of a new Sovereign Data Management tool. “The SDM tool permits F-35 operators more control over the types of Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) data that are transferred to the F-35 Operations Center,” the JPO said. Incorrect inventory data for complex assemblies continues to result in grounding conditions. This particular deficiency involves supplies or components that, upon installation, are not actually listed and tracked in ALIS as designed. Those require specific, almost daily requests to software engineers to have data corrected in the system. While those requests can catch some problems, the issue is not always detected by the user. These “holes,” as the JPO calls them, do not collect data on how parts are used after installation, which means a part might be breaking down from heavy use. Yet, that part won't be flagged by ALIS as an at-risk piece. As a result, it's less likely that issues developing from wear and tear or a lack of replacement parts will be discovered until such an issue has become an acute problem, possibly leading to a grounding of the aircraft. The issue was downgraded to a CAT 2 deficiency on Jan. 13, 2020, “due to ALIS data quality improvements that have been made in the two years since this DR [deficiency report] was written,” according to the JPO. “The quality improvements have reduced the frequency and magnitude of issues that have impacted operational units' abilities to quickly release aircraft for flight following maintenance.” The F-35B and F-35C experienced incongruous lateral and longitudinal control response above a 20-degree angle of attack. One of the most eye-opening issues identified in the initial report was that the F-35B and F-35C models used by the Marine Corps and Navy become difficult to control when operating above a 20-degree angle of attack — which would be seen in the extreme maneuvers a pilot might use in a dogfight or while avoiding a missile. Pilots reported the aircraft experiencing unpredictable changes in pitch, as well as erratic yaw and rolling motions when coming in at that angle of attack.. “It has random oscillations, pitch and yaw issues above [its] 20-[degree angle of attack]," a longtime naval aviator told Defense News last year. "[So] if I had to perform the aircraft — if I had to maneuver to defeat a missile, maneuver to fight another aircraft, the plane could have issues moving. And if I turn around aggressively and get away from these guys and use the afterburner, [the horizontal tail and tail boom] start to melt or have issues.” The issue was important enough that it accounted for two CAT 1 issues, one each for the two variants impacted by the design issue. However, the JPO downgraded this issue to a CAT 2 on May 28, 2019, for the F-35C and on July 8, 2019, for the F-35B. The solution involves “improvements in flying qualities that were implemented in software. The improvements provide pilots with an intuitive reference indication for AOA [angle of attack], which allows pilots to more quickly optimize lateral maneuvering during air-to-air maneuvering. These software improvements have been released to all F-35 operators.” There were unanticipated thrust limits in jetborne flight on hot days. This particular issue only occurred once, but was so significant that it was identified in the original document as the “No. 1 priority” for the Marine Corps. The issue was identified aboard the amphibious assault ship Essex, where a Marine pilot performed what is known as a “mode four” operation. That is where the jet enters hover mode near a landing spot, slides over to a target area and then vertically lands onto the ship. It's a key capability for the "B" model, which was designed for its short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing abilities. The engine — working hard on a day that temperatures cracked 90 degrees Fahrenheit while trying to lift a plane that was heavier than most returning to base — wouldn't generate the needed thrust for a safe, ideal landing. The pilot managed to land, but the issue set off alarm bells in the Marine aviation community. The JPO initially expected a fix for this issue to be out sometime in 2019, but it wasn't until March 2020 that a mix of nondescript “software updates and procedural adjustments” brought the “propulsion system performance back to original specified performance levels.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/hidden-troubles-f35/2020/04/24/five-f-35-issues-have-been-downgraded-but-they-remain-unsolved/