October 13, 2024 | International, Aerospace
April 28, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
Par Le groupe de réflexions Mars*
Dans le but de permettre à la base industrielle et technologique de défense de contribuer à la sortie de crise et aux plans de relance français et européen, le groupe de réflexions Mars* souhaite partager, dans une série de tribunes, les réflexions qu'il mène notamment autour des sujets de la souveraineté et de l'autonomie, du sens donné à l'Europe de la défense et la place réservée à la défense dans un "plan Marshall" européen, des enjeux macroéconomiques et des enjeux industriels et d'innovation dans la défense. L'objectif du groupe de réflexions Mars est de trouver des solutions pour sécuriser les budgets de défense à court et à moyen terme.
Qui dit crise économique dit plan de relance. La ministre des armées souhaite utiliser à cet effet l'investissement de défense (Titre 5), qui représente 80% de l'investissement de l'État. En réponse, les industriels du secteur proposent de sécuriser, voire d'accélérer la livraison des programmes d'armement prévus dans la loi de programmation militaire en cours. Est-ce pertinent ? L'industrie de défense est une industrie de souveraineté, au sens le plus fort du terme, à savoir que sans elle, il n'y a plus d'indépendance nationale, que la nation dépend de ses alliés pour sa défense. C'est le cœur des compétences régaliennes et la légitimité intrinsèque de l'État. Une protection n'est jamais gratuite. La sécurité a un coût. Autant que le circuit économique créé profite à la croissance de l'activité nationale.
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C'est ainsi que Venise inventa l'arsenal. On peut être un État commerçant ouvert sur le monde et garder jalousement fermée son industrie d'armement. La Chine de Xi Jinping a manifestement retenu les leçons de Marco Polo. Et Venise nous a appris que la prospérité dure tant que l'indépendance est garantie par ses propres armes et ses alliances. Survient une menace irrépressible (Bonaparte) et s'en est fini de l'indépendance et de la prospérité.
L'arsenal vénitien est ainsi la mère de l'industrie d'armement, qui a gardé cette forme (et ce nom !) jusqu'à une date très récente. Pour des raisons d'efficacité économique et "d'ouverture aux marchés", la France a progressivement transformé ses arsenaux en sociétés anonymes. Le processus a pris 30 ans, depuis les poudres et explosifs au début des années 1970 jusqu'à la construction et la réparation navale au début du XXIe siècle. Il n'est d'ailleurs pas achevé : il en reste des traces sous la forme de prises de participation sous diverses formes et à différents niveaux, et surtout, il reste un "arsenal" : la direction des applications militaires du commissariat à l'énergie atomique (CEA/DAM).
Tout cela pour dire que la préoccupation économique en matière de défense, disons l'efficience, est une idée très récente. Elle s'oppose aux notions militaires de "réserve", de "redondance" et de capacité de "remontée de puissance", indispensables à l'efficacité opérationnelle et à ce que l'on appelle aujourd'hui la résilience, c'est-à-dire la faculté de reprendre l'ascendant après avoir encaissé un choc d'une violence inhabituelle, voire imprévisible.
Le principe d'efficience est devenu la composante majeure de l'idéologie managériale qui a connu son apogée en France avec la révision générale des politiques publiques (RGPP) conçue et mise en œuvre entre 2007 et 2012 avec la brutalité et l'absence de discernement que l'on sait en matière de défense. Outre une saignée sans précédent en temps de paix dans les effectifs (54.000 suppressions), il en a résulté une série de fiascos (logiciel LOUVOIS) et de désorganisations (bases de défense, administration de proximité, subordination des soutiens) qui ont durablement affaibli les armées, l'instrument ultime de la résilience de la nation, notamment le service de santé.
C'est la même logique managériale à l'œuvre dans les années suivantes qui a conduit à la liquidation des réserves de masques chirurgicaux et autres consommables permettant de faire face immédiatement à une épidémie sans arrêter brutalement l'activité économique. Autrement dit, le principe d'efficience est une belle théorie dont la mise en œuvre se révèle, dans la violence de ses conséquences, incapable de faire face à un évènement inattendu, même quand les experts en prédisent la survenue probable.
La crise du Covid-19 a révélé le caractère foncièrement anti-économique de cette idéologie et la coupable naïveté des adeptes de l'ouverture aux marchés. Accepter de confier la sécurité d'un pays aux forces brutes des marchés relève de la même croyance candide que le pacifisme désarmera tout agresseur. On a le droit d'y croire, c'est beau, mais pas de gouverner au nom de tels croyances. C'est une question de responsabilité. Cela vaut aussi pour une certaine frange de la gauche.
Une fois admis l'ineptie du principe d'efficience dans les questions régaliennes et stratégiques, faut-il pour autant considérer que l'industrie de défense soit par nature anti-économique. C'est l'idée qu'on avancé certains théoriciens marxistes (dénonçant l'implication de la finance et donc de la classe dirigeante dans cette industrie) et les premiers keynésiens, au titre d'un effet d'éviction sur l'investissement privé. Curieusement, la théorie néolibérale dominante depuis 30 ans tend à reconnaître les effets positifs sur la croissance de l'investissement de défense par la dépense publique.
Cela résulte moins d'études économétrique rigoureuses que des résultats empiriques des Reaganomics, qui ont permis aux États-Unis de surmonter la crise économique du début des années 1980 en s'appuyant sur une course aux armements qui a permis, accessoirement, de gagner la guerre froide. C'est sans doute pourquoi le gouvernement Fillon, pour sortir au plus vite de la crise de 2008, ne voit pas de contradiction, en pleine RGPP, à relancer l'économie notamment par une augmentation (mesurée mais réelle) de l'investissement de défense, au prix d'une augmentation de 50% de la dette publique.
Depuis ce précédent, considéré comme réussi, de nombreuses études ont permis de mieux comprendre les mécanismes microéconomiques et macroéconomiques à l'œuvre. Un certain consensus des économistes spécialisés s'est même dégagé sur la valeur du multiplicateur de croissance de l'investissement de défense : en moyenne 1,27 à court terme et 1,68 à long terme, avec des disparités en fonction du degré d'ouverture à l'étranger. Peut-on en dire autant de toutes les dépenses publiques ? Cela signifie que l'on est dorénavant capable de prévoir qu'un investissement supplémentaire d'un euro dans tel secteur aura tel rendement à telle échéance.
Mais les études vont encore plus loin dans l'analyse et s'intéressent au retour fiscal et social de l'investissement de défense. On sait désormais que ce retour est en moyenne de 50% au bout de deux ans et de 100% après un certain nombre d'années, en fonction des secteurs. Cela signifie que la défense ne peut plus être considérée comme un centre de coût, auquel on ne consent que par nécessité. On sait désormais que c'est un centre de profit, dont le rendement dépend de paramètres liés à l'autonomie stratégique.
Moins un secteur industriel est dépendant d'un approvisionnement (ou d'une main d'œuvre) extérieur, plus ce rendement est élevé. A l'inverse, plus il y a de "fuites" à l'extérieur du circuit économique national, moins l'investissement est rentable économiquement. Reste à identifier ces fuites afin de les résorber gr'ce à une politique industrielle (et une planification) avisée. On sait que la relance par la "monnaie hélicoptère" et les baisses d'impôts n'ont pas un bon rendement, précisément à cause de ces "fuites" : vers les importations de biens de consommation d'un côté, vers l'épargne de l'autre. On sait que renflouer Air France (ou Renault) est nécessaire pour l'emploi, mais qu'en termes économiques, le retour sur investissement est faible, car cela revient, dans le cas d'Air France, à financer, outre Airbus, Boeing, les loueurs et les assureurs, tout en maintenant le pouvoir d'achat d'une catégorie sociale aisée dont le taux d'épargne est important.
Dans le cas de la relance par la défense, le rendement est optimal, même s'il est encore possible de réduite les fuites. La "supply chain" des systémiers-intégrateurs et des grands équipementiers français du secteur de l'armement est essentiellement française. L'emploi se situe à 80% en province, y compris des emplois de haut niveau. Cette industrie à très haut niveau technologique fait appel à des savoir-faire quasi-artisanaux ; d'ailleurs, on ne parle pas d'ouvriers mais de compagnons, pas d'usines, mais d'ateliers. L'investissement dans l'innovation se répercute dans l'industrie civile, ne serait-ce que parce que la majorité de ces sociétés ont une activité duale. La balance commerciale de l'armement français est structurellement excédentaire, ce qui contribue au rendement économique d'un euro investi dans cette industrie, exportatrice par nécessité, du fait de l'insuffisante épaisseur du marché national pour absorber les coûts fixes.
En période de crise, l'effet contra-cyclique de l'investissement de défense permet d'absorber le choc de demande subi par l'activité civile. C'est particulièrement évident aujourd'hui dans le cas de l'aéronautique. Enfin, on sait aujourd'hui que cet investissement rapporte à terme plus que ce qu'il a coûté, y compris en tenant compte du coût du capital (particulièrement faible ces dernières années). Pourquoi s'en priver ?
Oui, pourquoi se priver de tels avantages, au moment où le déficit public et l'endettement ne sont plus bridés par le Pacte de stabilité ? Au demeurant, la défense, pour ce qui concerne du moins les fabrications d'intérêt stratégique, est le seul secteur industriel (le seul !) à bénéficier du privilège exorbitant de n'être soumis ni aux règles de l'OMC, ni au droit commun du marché unique européen. Les biens et service de défense disposent d'une partie spécifique du code de la commande publique. Pourquoi s'en priver, alors qu'on pourrait relancer rapidement l'activité industrielle à droit constant, sans enfreindre aucune règle ?
Pour finir, évoquons rapidement ce qui f'che. Si l'on veut que le rendement économique d'un euro investi dans la défense soit encore meilleur, il faut résorber les fuites résiduelles. Cela suppose d'abord de chercher à substituer des fournisseurs nationaux aux sous-traitants étrangers, tant pour des raisons d'autonomie stratégique ("désItarisation") que dorénavant pour des raisons de patriotisme économique. Cela est aussi valable pour les chantiers ayant pris l'habitude de faire appel, pour diverses raisons dont certaines sont difficilement critiquables (absence de personnel formé), aux travailleurs détachés, alors même que l'on sait à quel point les chantiers navals structurent l'activité dans les zones littorales.
Enfin, il sera injustifiable de continuer à saigner la trésorerie des sociétés pour rémunérer des actionnaires qui se sont révélés défaillants dans leur rôle d'apporteurs de capitaux en période de crise. Le modèle anglo-saxon (cf. Rolls Royce) d'un "flottant" à 100% ne saurait convenir ; l'industrie de défense a besoin d'être détenue par des actionnaires fiables et responsables, y compris par gros temps.
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* Le groupe Mars, constitué d'une trentaine de personnalités françaises issues d'horizons différents, des secteurs public et privé et du monde universitaire, se mobilise pour produire des analyses relatives aux enjeux concernant les intérêts stratégiques relatifs à l'industrie de défense et de sécurité et les choix technologiques et industriels qui sont à la base de la souveraineté de la France.
October 13, 2024 | International, Aerospace
April 20, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval
By: Jen Judson NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — Several major players in the helicopter industry pitched possible solutions at the Navy League's Sea-Air-Space conference for the Navy's next initial-entry, rotary-wing training helicopter as the service signals stronger intentions to replace its aging TH-57 Sea Ranger fleet. The Navy has announced during recent congressional hearings that it plans to buy a new training helicopter in fiscal 2020. For years, the service has put out requests for information asking industry for training helicopter options with the latest coming out in October 2017. That RFI left some requirements open-ended such as whether the aircraft should have one or two engines, but has asked for the helicopter to be Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) certified, an obvious requirement when flying over sea or in reduced visibility environments. It's also assumed the Navy wants a commercial off-the-shelf aircraft. The TH-57 is more than reaching the end of its life, having first been fielded to the Navy's training fleet in the 1970s. So three companies — Airbus, Bell and Leonardo — all brought examples of possible training helicopters to the Navy's biggest trade show. Airbus H135 Airbus is keeping all of its options on the table for a Navy trainer because the service has yet to define all of its requirements, according to John Roth, senior director of business development for Airbus Helicopters Inc. “We have a broad product range that goes from light, single-engine into light, twin-engine to medium and heavy twin-engine platforms,” Roth told Defense News at Sea-Air-Space. “Our approach is we will evaluate those requirements and offer based on those requirements. However, given the nature of training and how the complexity of training has evolved over time, we do have recommendations for the Navy as it relates to having the best possible solution to accomplish all of their missions.” And one recommendation is the H135 light, twin-engine helicopter Airbus had on display at the show. “We believe this is certainly a very capable potential solution that meets all the Navy requirements as a commercial off-the-shelf product,” Roth said. The H135 is similar to the EC-145 helicopter that the Army now uses for its trainer, replacing its TH-67 Creek helicopters with LUH-72A Lakota light utility helicopters already in the service's inventory beginning in 2014. The Army's decision to retire the TH-67s and replace them with Lakotas was met with much debate as to whether it made sense to teach helicopter pilots basic skills in a more complex digital glass cockpit helicopter with twin engines. And the decision was even met with a lawsuit. Leonardo — then known as AgustaWestland — sued the Army over its decision not to compete for a new trainer but to instead sole-source a helicopter already fielded by the service. Leonardo initially won the lawsuit but the decision was overturned in the appellate court. The Army is still filling out its Lakota training fleet, but, Roth said, “from a qualitative perspective, we've got some very positive feedback that talks to capability of the aviators when they complete the training and having them more prepared for the advanced aircraft once they arrive at their advanced training stations.” The fact that both the Lakota and the H135 have advanced digital glass cockpits, four-axis autopilot and twin-engine capability with Full Authority Digital Engine (FADEC) controls “all prepared them for the type of vehicle that they are going to get in when they get into their advanced training,” Roth said. The Army has taken tasks normally taught in the more expensive advanced aircraft and brought those down to basic training, he added. “There has been a lot of advantages realized from that decision that we think the Navy will be able to take advantage of as well,” Roth said. The H135s, if purchased by the Navy, would be built at its Columbus, Mississippi, production line where commercial EC135s and Lakotas are built. The helicopter pitched to the Navy is also used by approximately a dozen countries with nearly 130 aircraft serving as a primary trainer worldwide, Roth said. Bell 407 GXi Bell would be the incumbent in a competition for a new Navy trainer, being the current manufacturer of the TH-57. The company plans to offer up its 407 GXi, according to Steve Mathias, Bell's vice president for Global Military Business Development. Bell has already built and sold 1,500 407s worldwide which have flown over 4.75 million hours, he said, so the helicopter is “very reliable, sustainable, maintainable glass cockpit, just a great overall aircraft,” Mathias said. And from a programmatic perspective, he said, choosing Bell's trainer offers “a lot less risk because it's very similar to the TH-57 that the Navy currently has, so a transition from a Bell product to a Bell product would be a lower risk, I would think, to the customer.” Bell also provides many of the helicopters the Navy and Marine Corps fly today such as the UH-1Y Venom, the AH-1Z Viper and the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor and therefore has a high level of experience working with the services on a day-to-day basis “so we very closely understand what the Navy requirements are,” Mathias argued. The company is hoping the Navy chooses to go with a single-engine aircraft because it would “be less costly to operate” and less complex to train, according to Mathias. He added that he believes the choice would offer the best value to the service. Leonardo TH-119 Italian company Leonardo is making a play for the trainer with plans to submit its TH-119, which puts them, like Bell, into the single-engine camp, according to Andrew Gappy, who is in charge of the company's government sales and programs. The helicopter is a variant of the AW119Kx, a single-engine, full-spectrum training aircraft and can be used for training from the basics like learning how to hover above the ground all the way to advanced tactics. And while Leonardo is a foreign company, all of the 119s worldwide are manufactured in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The 119 is also IFR certified to meet that Navy requirement. The helicopter is known for its significant power, which means the aircraft's training mission sets can grow and change over time without affecting its performance, Gappy said. It's important for the Navy to buy a new trainer now because, Gappy said, he trained on the TH-57 “a long time ago.” The aircraft averages roughly 70,000 flight hours a year and will become more and more costly to operate as it continues to age. “When I went through, the TH-57 had a lot in common with combat aircraft, how the aircraft flew and instrumentation training was really relevant,” he said. “It's so disparate now with glass cockpits and all of them are multi-bladed rotor systems that fly differently than the twin rotor system, so it's really resetting the baseline,” which allows the service to incorporate more advanced training into the basic courses that has migrated away from that training due to the loss in power margin, Gappy said. https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/navy-league/2018/04/11/major-players-pitch-solutions-for-navys-next-training-helicopter/
September 14, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
“We were at the highest level of readiness that we would have been at since the Korean War.” If that seems a perplexing statement from the commander of an Air Force that at one point during the current pandemic had about 70 per cent of its members working from home, LGen Al Meinzinger has a sound explanation. Though Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) headquarters sometimes resembled ghost towns, training schools were paused, operational training units (OTUs) were scaled back to critical force generation activity, and flight operations were at times curtailed, over 83 per cent of personnel were on short notice to activate. “I referred to it tongue and cheek as the team being readied in a martial arts crouch,” he said. “Nobody was away on course, nobody was out of country on temporary duty. Almost 100 per cent of our team was conducting operations, supporting operations or at home ... on a very high alert level to respond as directed.” When the coronavirus flared in communities across Canada in mid-March, the RCAF quickly adopted a posture intended to preserve the force. The health and safety of members and their families became the top priority. At the direction of the Chief of the Defence Staff and military and civilian health authorities, training courses for Reserve cadets, new recruits, technician trades and professional upgrades were halted and over a thousand students returned to barracks or home. Travel for leave was limited. Operational flights were re-routed to avoid COVID hot spots where possible. The operational tempo dipped but did not stop. Transport squadrons continued to support operations in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and elsewhere; fighter squadrons and 22 Wing North Bay, Ont., the Canadian Air Defence Sector, maintained the NORAD mission; and search and rescue units responded around the clock to calls across the country. 8 Wing Trenton, Ont., even became a quarantine site in the early days of the pandemic for Canadian passengers lifted from a cruise ship, the Diamond Princess, docked in Japan. But at Wings and in aircraft, new health and safety measures were introduced to mitigate the risk of infection and transmission. Students were sequestered. Access to workspaces was restricted and traffic flow through some buildings was altered to limit contact. Meetings migrated to Zoom and other video technology. Aircrews conducted virtual handovers. On transport planes, new protocols for mask wearing and passenger screening became the norm. “We have remained focused on the health of our people throughout,” said Meinzinger. “It was impressive how swiftly the team was able to introduce a raft of new protocols.” The payoff has been evident in the number of COVID-19 cases in the RCAF. At no point have they exceeded single digits, he noted. At the time of the interview in early July, no member was sidelined due to the virus. While personnel health was critical, the quick reaction to preserve Air Force capacity was a necessary precaution for what the RCAF suspected could be a busy period ahead. Following the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2002, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) had developed a contingency plan known as Operation Laser to counter a future pandemic. Accordingly, among the CAF's first responses to COVID-19 was the stand-up of six regional task forces to respond to provincial requests for assistance, each with an air detachment of either helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft to provide transport and other services. At the same time, the RCAF was bracing for the urgent calls for air assets under Operation Lentus, the CAF response to natural disasters. Spring flooding and summer forest fires have threatened Canadian communities with increasing frequency in recent years, and assistance with surveillance or evacuation appeared to be in the cards once again. “At the outset, we were looking at dealing with COVID-19 responses and potentially having to support the government with Op Lentus tasks,” said Meinzinger. Since training for Air Combat Systems Officers and Airborne Electronic Sensor Operators was on pause at 402 Squadron in Winnipeg, the RCAF even put the CT-142 Dash-8 “Gonzo” and its aircrews on standby to provide additional airlift. Resuming, at a distance The Air Force is now in the process of working through a business resumption plan that calls for a “controlled, conditions-based” return of activities. In truth, the plan is more about increasing the tempo at Wings, squadrons and headquarters. Mindful of the damage to readiness if core activity ground to a halt, operational squadrons continued to fly and OTUs maintained some flight and technician training for graduates earmarked for possible deployment. Now, it's a matter of ramping up while adapting to the unknowns of the pandemic. Already, about 50 per cent of personnel at 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) and 2 Canadian Air Division are back in their offices and workspaces. “Readiness is everything from your level of flying currency, the recency of that flying, to your knowledge, so we wanted to make sure that we didn't see our readiness shift,” said Meinzinger. “But we are being very diligent in how we are ramping up.” His conditions include the availability of personal protective equipment (PPE), especially face masks, the ability to operate safely, and the ability to move personnel about the country while still meeting the guidelines of provincial health authorities. Already, some courses have resumed, albeit in modified classrooms, and training programs have adapted to shortened weeks in which different cohorts rotate every three days to “reduce the footprint” of both students and instructors. One of the consequences of COVID-19 could be a willingness to embrace distance working. As part of a multi-year retention strategy, the RCAF has been evaluating the merits of working remotely to limit the number of moves a member makes and better accommodate family situations where both spouses serve in the CAF and a move is not conducive for one. Before the pandemic, for example, the RCAF Aerospace Warfare Centre at 8 Wing Trenton, Ont., known as the RAWC, was “leveraging brains rather than bodies” by allowing team members to work remotely from locations such as Comox, B.C., and Gagetown, N.B. “We were already seeing that that model was very effective,” said Meinzinger. “Not only was it delivering operational output ... but more importantly, it was creating better balance in personal lives.” As RCAF headquarters moves to the Carling Campus in Ottawa, he's tasked his deputy commander, MGen Blaise Frawley, to “look at what a Headquarters 2.0 structure looks like, including how many [staff] could work from home for a majority of their work day.” “It's an adaptation and it obviously recognizes the need for a healthy workplace. We may see more shift work happening in the HQ, similar to the three-day model,” he explained. “There is a new reality with COVID-19 and that will probably reshape some of our thinking.” That reality will likely renew discussion around distance learning and the expanded role of simulation and other technologies in training programs. In an ideal world, the RCAF would have a distance learning package for every course “that students could immediately access in a pandemic,” he said. The Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Technology and Engineering at 16 Wing Borden, Ont., is already well down that road with the use of virtual reality (VR) and other tools in the training curriculum of various trades. And CH-148 Cyclone crews are learning hoist mission training on a Bluedrop Training & Simulation VR system at 12 Wing Shearwater, N.S. More recently in June, the RCAF Command Team course for anointed Commanding Officers and unit Chief Warrant Officers was delivered at distance using “modern tools,” he said. “This pandemic has underscored the value of having a greater amount of simulation [and remote learning] within the enterprise.” Return engagement for pilots? As with any crisis, the pandemic response has highlighted capability gaps and opportunities. Assessing the full impact of COVID-19 remains a work in progress – “we're still drawing deductions,” said Meinzinger – but it has confirmed the agility of the Air Force to alter course on the fly. In the first months, units stepped up to develop and deliver PPE for the CAF, including the Aerospace Telecommunications and Engineering Support Squadron at 8 Wing Trenton, which re-rolled to produce medical-grade face shields for Health Services personnel. And when a gap in keeping infected patients isolated from the aircrew was identified, the Directorate of Aerospace Requirements spearheaded the rapid procurement of aeromedical bio containment containers to allow a medical practitioner to care for multiple infected patients in the back of a CC-177 Globemaster or CC-130J Hercules. “That procurement was pivotal and we'll reap the benefit of that work in the coming months” when it is delivered, said Meinzinger. “These systems will complement the superb work related to on-aircraft PPE tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been developed by the 1 CAD team to ensure the safety of our aircrew.” The pandemic might also help with the battle all western air forces have been waging for the past several years, as the commercial airline boom attracted both pilots and maintenance technicians. With civil aviation now in a tailspin and many pilots furloughed or laid off, the RCAF could see the return of former members. The CAF has been working to re-enrol recently retired members for the past few years, hoping to attract experience back to either the Regular or Reserve Force. After the effect of the pandemic on the aerospace sector became apparent, the RCAF launched a campaign on social media to “rejoin the team” and increased the capacity in its Intake and Liaison Team to help interested former members make the transition. To date, about 200 have expressed an interest and 100 are considered serious prospects, spanning a range of Regular and Reserve Force officer and non-commissioned member trades. In the past four months, about 55 have completed applications. Meinzinger expects that to increase. Following the upheaval to civil aviation after 9/11, the Air Force saw a similar trend line. “It takes a bit of time for individuals to contemplate their future,” he said. “There is a family decision [involved] ... but we anticipate in the coming months there will be [greater interest] from those individuals who are affected.” Though the emphasis is on recent military experience, “we'll take any calls,” he added, noting that the ambition of the government's defence policy means “we are going to need a bigger RCAF team.” Trying to predict the trajectory of the pandemic over the next months is almost impossible, but it's a question “I think about each and every day,” Meinzinger acknowledged. He has been drawing on a “fraternity” of air chiefs from allied countries to gather lessons and help shape the RCAF response. The only certainty is “to remain very agile” and adapt to what Gen David Goldfein, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, has called the new non-normal. “The cadence and the rhythm of the pandemic is going to clearly shape the way that we move forward,” said Meinzinger. “We want to be as best prepared as we can be.” https://www.skiesmag.com/features/coping-with-covid-rcaf-adjust-new-world/