Rafael acquires Newcastle based Pearson Engineering as part of its strategic expansion in the United Kingdom

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  February 19, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  Magellan Aerospace Opens New Manufacturing and Assembly Plant in India

  BANGALORE, India, Feb. 19, 2019 /CNW/ - Magellan Aerospace Corporation ("Magellan") announced today, the opening of the company's manufacturing and assembly facility in India. The new 100,000 square foot Magellan Aerospace (India) Pvt. Ltd. facility, constructed on seven acres in Hitech Defence and Aerospace Park (Aerospace SEZ Sector) in Devanahalli, near the Bangalore International Airport, was completed at the end of 2018 and the process of installing and commissioning the high speed machining centres is underway. Magellan's new cellular machining and assembly plant will specialize in high speed milling and turning of aerostructure and aeroengine components produced from both aluminium and hard metal materials. Combined with comprehensive processing and hard metal machining capabilities from Magellan's two longstanding joint ventures in India, API Surface Treatments and Triveni Aeronautics Pvt. Ltd., Magellan is one of the largest suppliers of 'Make in India' manufactured commercial aircraft components today. Magellan established a presence in India's aerospace sector more than a decade ago and has continued to invest and grow their footprint. The plant will create up to 120 high technology and support positions, and will be equipped with a comprehensive range of high speed 4/5-axis machining centres, selected to optimise manufacturing, competitiveness and efficiency. The completion of Magellan Aerospace (India) in 2018 marked the close of phase one of a two-phase construction plan that will see the facility grow to 140,000 square feet in the future. Mr. Haydn Martin, Vice President, Business Development, Marketing and Contracts, Magellan Aerospace said, "Magellan is excited to officially launch this important new venture in India at the Aero India 2019 show". "This new facility, coupled with Magellan's extensive machining operations in Europeand North America offer an exceptional and full range of solutions for our customers in meeting their operational and value requirements." About Magellan Aerospace Corporation Magellan Aerospace Corporation is a global aerospace company that provides complex assemblies and systems solutions to aircraft and engine manufacturers, and defence and space agencies worldwide. Magellan designs and manufactures aeroengine and aerostructure assemblies and components for aerospace markets, advanced proprietary products for military and space markets, and provides engine and component repair and overhaul services worldwide. Magellan is a public company whose shares trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX: MAL), with operating units throughout North America, Europe, and India. Forward Looking Statements Some of the statements in this press release may be forward-looking statements or statements of future expectations based on currently available information. When used herein, words such as "expect", "anticipate", "estimate", "may", "will", "should", "intend", "believe", and similar expressions, are intended to identify forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are based on estimates and assumptions made by the Corporation in light of its experience and its perception of historical trends, current conditions and expected future developments, as well as other factors that the Corporation believes are appropriate in the circumstances. Many factors could cause the Corporation's actual results, performance or achievements to differ materially from those expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements, including those described in the "Risk Factors" section of the Corporation's Annual Information Form (copies of which filings may be obtained at www.sedar.com). These factors should be considered carefully, and readers should not place undue reliance on the Corporation's forward-looking statements. The Corporation has no intention and undertakes no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law. SOURCE Magellan Aerospace Corporation https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/magellan-aerospace-opens-new-manufacturing-and-assembly-plant-in-india-898048682.html

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  April 23, 2020 | International, C4ISR

  FCC and Ligado are undermining GPS – and with it, our economy and national security

  Sen. Jim Inhofe, Sen. Jack Reed, Rep. Adam Smith, Rep. Mac Thornberry Right now, the coronavirus is rightly our country's most immediate concern. But the Federal Communications Commission has used the crisis, under the cover of darkness, to approve a long-stalled application by Ligado Networks — a proposal that threatens to undermine our global positioning system (GPS) capabilities, and with it, our national security. The FCC granted Ligado (formerly known as LightSquared) permission to repurpose spectrum adjacent to GPS frequencies for a terrestrial cellular network — framing this proposal as essential to “winning the race to 5G.” But what Ligado has done is conflate two different and important spectrum issues: the sharing of mid-band 5G spectrum by the Department of Defense and commercial industry, and harmful interference of Ligado's signal with the low-band GPS signals used in nearly every aspect of daily life. The result: some members of Congress, members of the administration, and the public are now confused about the real and immediate impacts of Ligado's proposal. So, we wanted to clarify things: domestic 5G development is critical to our economic competiveness against China and for our national security. The Pentagon is committed working with government and industry to share mid-band spectrum where and when it makes sense to ensure rapid roll-out of 5G. [Editor's note: C4ISRNET first broke the news that the FCC would move forward with Ligado's request on April 10.] The problem here is that Ligado's planned usage is not in the prime mid-band spectrum being considered for 5G — and it will have a significant risk of interference with GPS reception, according to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The signals interference Ligado's plan would create could cost taxpayers and consumers billions of dollars and require the replacement of current GPS equipment just as we are trying to get our economy back on its feet quickly — and the FCC has just allowed this to happen. Think of all the ways Americans use GPS each and every day. GPS satellites provide free precise timing and navigation that powers thousands of functions: making financial transactions at our banks, keeping the lights on in our homes, traveling around the country — the list goes on and on. Studies show GPS satellites contribute at least $1 billion to our economy every single day. GPS also forms the backbone of countless military operations and applications — to get supplies to our war fighters on the battlefield, guide unmanned aircraft and vehicles, target its precision weapons, and much more. It would be practically impossible to identify and repair or replace all of the potentially adversely affected receivers. It would “needlessly imperil [Department of Defense] GPS-dependent national security capabilities,” per Secretary Esper, putting the war fighter, U.S. Space Force, military readiness, and even the defense of our homeland at risk. American families and businesses would lose coverage or be forced to use systems from our strategic competitors, China and Russia, jeopardizing our global leadership in precision timing. We're not the only ones with serious concerns. Nine federal departments and agencies have completed extensive engineering tests and analyses on Ligado's proposal; and the results are clear: Ligado's plan would interfere with millions of GPS receivers across the nation. The Departments of Defense, Commerce, Interior, Justice, Homeland Security, Energy, and Transportation — as well as NASA, the National Science Foundation, the Coast Guard and the Federal Aviation Administration — all strongly object to Ligado's plan. What kind of precedent is the FCC setting by disregarding near unanimous opposition of federal agencies to this proposal? It's not just the government, either — industry leaders representing GPS, satellite communications services, automotive companies, commercial aviation, and weather data have also voiced concerns over Ligado's proposal. We would expect that the FCC listen not just to Ligado's privately funded research, but also broad-based, in-depth research from experts in national security and other fields. This makes it all the more confusing — why is the FCC ignoring all the evidence, especially now, at the height of a global crisis? The Ligado application highlights the need to use a technical, data-driven approach to balance the use of the spectrum between war fighter requirements and commercial needs, rather than strong-arming a proposal through the process like the FCC just did. We can expect this issue to be an ongoing national security challenge. If we want to strike a responsible balance moving forward, the U.S. government must modernize the infrastructure needed to manage and share spectrum efficiently, promote policy and technology innovation, and improve the ability of military systems to operate alongside commercial systems. Considering the risks, it's clear the FCC commissioners made the wrong decision regarding Ligado's plan, which will set a disastrous precedent while impeding ongoing work on spectrum sharing. The vulnerabilities to our national and economic security are not worth the risk, particularly for a band of spectrum that isn't necessary to secure a robust 5G network. We encourage the FCC to withdraw its approval of Ligado's application and take this opportunity to work with the NTIA and other federal agencies, including the Departments of Defense and Transportation, to find a solution that will both support commercial broadband expansion and protect national security assets. Moreover, we expect the FCC to resolve Department of Defense concerns before moving forward, as required by law. If they do not, and unless President Trump intervenes to stop this from moving forward, it will be up to Congress to clean up this mess. Senator Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., is the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., is the ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., is the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, is the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee. https://www.c4isrnet.com/breaking-news/2020/04/22/fcc-and-ligado-are-undermining-gps-and-with-it-our-economy-and-national-security/

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  February 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  The drive to advance missile defense is there, but there must be funding

  By: Richard Matlock Over the past five years, missile threats have evolved far more rapidly than conventional wisdom had predicted. Best known is North Korea's accelerated development and testing of sophisticated, road-mobile ballistic missiles. But the U.S. National Defense Strategy requires renewed focus on greater powers. China has adopted an anti-access strategy consisting of new offensive missiles, operational tactics and fortifications in the South China Sea. Russia, too, has developed highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles specifically designed to defeat today's defenses. Grappling with these sobering realities demands change. The 2019 Missile Defense Review called for a comprehensive approach to countering regional missiles of all kinds and from whatever source, as well as the increasingly complex intercontinental ballistic missiles from rogue states. But programs and budgets have not yet aligned with the policy. The upcoming defense budget submission presents an important opportunity to address these new and complex challenges. The Missile Defense Agency's current top three goals are sustaining the existing force, increasing capacity and capability, and addressing more advanced threats. The first two are necessary but insufficient. The third goal must be elevated to adapt U.S. missile defense efforts to the geopolitical and technological realities of our time. For the last decade, less than 2 percent of MDA's annual funding has been dedicated to developing advanced technology, during which time our adversaries have begun outpacing us. As President Donald Trump said last January, we “cannot simply build more of the same, or make incremental improvements.” Adapting our missile defense architecture will require rebalance, discipline and difficult choices. Realigning resources to develop advanced technologies and operational concepts means investing less in single-purpose systems incapable against the broader threat. It also requires we accept and manage new kinds of risk. Indeed, meeting the advanced threat may, in the short term, require accepting some strategic risk with North Korea. The beginning of this rebalance requires more distributed, elevated and survivable sensors capable of tracking advanced threats. The most important component here is a proliferated, globally persistent space layer in low-Earth orbit consisting of both passive and active sensors. MDA may be the missile defense-centric organization best suited to developing and integrating this capability into the architecture, but there is considerable opportunity for partnering with others to move out smartly, as recently urged by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Hyten. Partnerships with the Space Development Agency and the Air Force can be supplemented by collaborative efforts with commercial space companies. We need not do this all at once. Space assets could be fielded in phases, with numbers, capability (sensors, interceptors, lasers), missions, and orbits evolving over time. MDA demonstrated a similar paradigm with the Delta experiments, Miniature Sensor Technology Integration series and the Near Field Infrared Experiment in the past. Meanwhile, other sensors could alleviate the cost of building new, billion-dollar radar on islands in the Pacific Ocean — efforts which continue to suffer delay. Adding infrared tracking sensors to high-altitude drones, for instance, has already been demonstrated experimentally in the Indo-Pacific theater with modified Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles. These need not be dedicated assets. Sensor pod kits could be stored in theater to be deployed aboard Reapers or other platforms during heightened tensions. We must revisit boost-phase defenses and directed energy. In 2010, the Airborne Laser program demonstrated that lasers could destroy missiles in the boost phase, but deploying toxic chemical lasers aboard large commercial aircraft was fiscally and operationally untenable. Fortunately, considerable operational promise exists with recently developed solid-state lasers (the cost of which is around $2 of electricity per shot). We must move these systems out of the laboratory and build and test operational prototypes. Near-term actions to better manage risk against the rogue-state ballistic missile threat must not overtake the pursuit of these larger goals. Although the Pentagon is currently considering a 10-year, $12 billion program for a next-generation interceptor, nearer-term, cheaper options are available. Replacing each existing kill vehicle on the Ground-Based Interceptors with several smaller kill vehicles would multiply each interceptor's effectiveness dramatically. The U.S. has been developing this technology since 2006, including a “hover” flight test in 2009. Affordable solutions like this must be found. Missile defense cannot do it all. Denying, degrading and destroying enemy missile systems prior to launch must be part of the mix. But left-of-launch activities can be expensive and difficult, and reliance on a cyber magic wand carries risk, too. We need to broaden our approach to attack all parts of our adversary's kill chain. The National Defense Strategy urges that we contend with the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be — or as it previously was. To meet the threats of today and tomorrow, we must radically transform our U.S. missile defenses. It falls to the 2021 budget to do so. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/01/31/the-drive-to-advance-missile-defense-is-there-but-there-must-be-funding/