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January 22, 2020 | Local, Naval

New Call for Applications: Corrosion Detection in Ships Sandbox /Nouvel appel de candidatures : Environnement protégé relatif à la détection de la corrosion sur les navires

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Envoyé : mercredi 22 janvier 2020 10:46
Objet : New Call for Applications: Corrosion Detection in Ships Sandbox /Nouvel appel de candidatures : Environnement protégé relatif à la détection de la corrosion sur les navires

Corrosion Detection in Ships Sandbox: Rust Never Sleeps

Test your best solutions to find corrosion trouble spots for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). The latest IDEaS sandbox, Corrosion Detection in Ships, is now accepting applications. The Sandbox will take place at the Centre for Ocean Ventures & Entrepreneurship (COVE) facility in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia and will focus on naval vessels.

Participants will get the opportunity to showcase their products in realistic simulations, with successful demonstrations resulting in access to an actual vessel to demonstrate their solution in a real world environment. Apply now to test your technologies at one of the leading collaborative facilities for applied innovation in the ocean sector.

The deadline to apply is February 19, 2020.

Apply now:

Need to get in touch with us? Email us at:

The IDEaS Team


Environnement protégé relatif à la détection de la corrosion sur les navires : La rouille ne dort jamais

Testez vos meilleures solutions pour détecter la corrosion de l'équipement de la Marine royale canadienne (MRC). Nous acceptons présentement les candidatures pour le plus récent environnement protégé relatif à la détection de la corrosion sur les navires. L'environnement protégé aura lieu dans les installations du Centre for Ocean Ventures & Entrepreneurship (COVE) à Darmouth, en Nouvelle-Écosse, et sera axé sur les navires militaires.

Les participants auront l'occasion de démontrer leurs produits dans le cadre de simulations réalistes, et les participants dont les démonstrations seront réussies auront accès à un navire sur lequel ils pourront faire la preuve de leur solution dans un environnement réel. Posez votre candidature dès maintenant pour tester vos technologies dans l'une des principales installations de collaboration pour l'innovation appliquée dans le secteur océanique.

L'échéance pour poser votre candidature est le 19 février 2020.

Posez votre candidature maintenant :

Besoin de communiquer avec nous? Faites-nous parvenir un courriel à l'adresse suivante :

L'équipe IDEeS

On the same subject

  • An In-Service Support Opportunity

    May 5, 2020 | Local, Naval

    An In-Service Support Opportunity

    POLICY PERSPECTIVE by Ian Mack CGAI Fellow May 2020 DOWNLOAD PDF Introduction In the autumn of 2019, the federal government announced on the creation of a discussion group to address in-service support for the Canadian Surface Combatants (CSCs). The objective of Canada's procurement is 15 warships and the project is in the early stages of modifying the design of the U.K.'s global combat ship (GCS), with the first Canadian ship delivery anticipated after 2025. It must be assumed that this discussion group formation is the first stage of industry consultation. The City-class Type 26 frigate design has been in development for over a decade and the first of eight U.K. Type 26 warships is now in production. BAE Systems won the contract for the design and construction work in the U.K. This design has been available for export under the moniker global combat ship, and both Canada and Australia have selected it &ndash; the latter intending to build nine Hunter-class frigates. While neither the Australian nor Canadian designs have been completed, the combat systems will apparently be quite different across the three nations. However, it is unlikely that the major platform design will change dramatically. If this assumption is correct, it could mean that the major equipment of the platforms of some 32 hulls would likely be substantially the same. And from an in-service support point of view, this clearly creates an opportunity for international co-operation wherever it makes sense. TOP OF PAGE Conventional Wisdom &ndash; International Programs There are indications that three-nation government-to-government meetings have taken place to exchange views on creating a user group during the acquisition activity. It would make sense to also explore a related arrangement for in-service support. Clearly, with the potential to support 32 equipment sets across the marine platforms, there are many opportunities for economies of scale which could reduce the costs for all three nations &ndash; for common design modifications, for spares through bulk buys, for depot-level maintenance with many more units, for common training of potentially two to four times individual nations' throughput/requirements and the like. Such synergies could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars in savings over the extended lives of these warships. But international programs are not always easy to establish and implement, for many reasons. Nations are very different. They place different priorities on defence matters so the simple co-ordination required to achieve timely agreements can be difficult. Governments also change and a falling-out between two nations can lead to reversals. Nations lose some of their autonomy in decision-making when they join such programs, which can be a major deterrent. And governments have approaches to contracting which are very different, so negotiations on behalf of multiple governments can become bogged down in disagreements as to what approaches nations will support. In a perfect world, Canadian and Australian officials might have included an option during the design selection competitions so that such international in-service support programs could have been enabled by adopting a number of mandatory attributes. Unfortunately, the variability in schedules driving Canada's and Australia's frigate programs, as well as the built-in challenges of running competitions, conspired against any detailed discussion of &ldquo;what ifs&rdquo;. Work share (or industrial benefits) is important &ndash; to the domestic industries and thus to governments that always care about high-value jobs of the sort one finds in defence-related work. Without doubt, companies in all three countries are already seeing dollar signs and/or may already have won certain rights during the competitions for selection. Hence, Australia and Canada would be unlikely to sign up if all the work is being done, say, in Europe because the bar to agree to collaborate for other reasons could be so high as to be a non-starter. And there could be a number of other challenging commercial issues related to such things as intellectual property that could affect the shape of work-share agreements. There are also many tactical issues. The three time zones are not conducive to ongoing dialogue; one should never underestimate the challenges of working across large distances. As simple as international meeting arrangements should be, one of the partners will not be able to make it at the 11th hour more often than one expects &ndash; much less the travel budget involved and/or the cost of personnel liaison/exchange programs between the countries. Canada's Treasury Board is frequently much more involved in expensive and long-term international contracts, routinely requiring the tedious achievement of annual approvals. Nations and organizations have different laws/regulations and standards respectively which must be synchronized upfront and as changes occur. And so it goes. One can conclude that, aside from international information exchange forums, complex business arrangements involving both governments and industries in international programs detrimentally impact a nation's autonomy in decision-making and often offer fewer economic benefits. They are not for the faint of heart. TOP OF PAGE Conventional Wisdom &ndash; The Opportunity If one were to consider an international three-party in-service support (ISS) program for common platform major equipment/systems which would leverage BAE Systems as the common ISS agent, wouldn't there be potentially significant benefits to Canada? On the face of it, one must assume that the answer is &ldquo;maybe&rdquo; and this is worth exploring. In reviewing this option from a Canadian perspective, it would be appropriate to assess the ISS outcomes against the four sustainment pillars as now mandated for inclusion in the business cases driving Department of National Defence (DND) ISS procurement decisions: performance (operational readiness), value for money (price at or below the market rate), flexibility (adaptable and scalable to accommodate change in operational tempo and available budgets) and economic benefits (jobs and economic growth for Canadian companies). As mentioned earlier, international programs often render economic benefits much more elusive. However, in terms of performance, flexibility and value for money, there is no doubt that the potential exists to see maximum return on investment. In the case under review, BAE Systems is reported to be the second largest Western defence contractor and therefore should be able to wield the clout that comes with it when dealing with major equipment system manufacturers (OEMs). And of course, the supplemental impact must also be understood and catered to &ndash; BAE Systems can choose to be difficult in any business arrangement without significantly affecting its bottom line. With respect to contractual response to major equipment and systems performance (which contributes to technical readiness), a client with a large work share is more likely to get attention for initiatives to maintain and improve performance than will smaller clients. This would be important in this case because the three navies operate in significantly different environments around the world with the concomitant variations in some performance requirements. As well an OEMs' failure to address the concerns of three allied navies could result in being blacklisted by BAE Systems when procuring equipment/systems for new ship designs, while timely and effective contractual response could lead to future opportunities. Low performance achievement could also deliver a much more significant blow to an OEM's reputation if more than one navy is impacted detrimentally &ndash; witness the Boeing scenario with the 737 Max. This can be important, as select foreign OEMs have essentially ignored Canada before when Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) equipment has suffered performance shortfalls. From a performance perspective, an international ISS program with BAE Systems at the centre could be a plus. In terms of providing adaptability and scalability, the presence of a number of clients can allow reductions in the demand for various services by one client (e.g., facing a budget downturn) to be picked up by another on an interim basis. Alternatively, the need for a surge in support by one navy (e.g., facing major unforeseen operations) may be easier to address by diverting some degree of effort from other clients. Only in the case where all clients are experiencing a similar variation in demand will such flexibility be jeopardized; but such a challenge can equally accrue whether in an international support program or not. Therefore, on balance, there can be greater flexibility in traditional circumstances for an international program, but there are limits. Value for money should be a strong argument for an international collaboration, if only because of economies of scale when considering, in this case, a fleet of 32 ship sets instead of eight, nine or 15 &ndash; and that is as-fitted, with spares increasing the overall numbers of common units of equipment. As an ISS client agent with much more maintenance, repair work and spares demand for an OEM, there would be greater interest in keeping multiple navies happy with the prices paid and the requirement over time to see support costs reduced. International programs frequently benefit by pooling spare units and ownership by OEMs, such that the number required (and hence the costs) are lower and risks to availability can be somewhat mitigated. Instead of each nation addressing emerging technical issues separately, sharing the costs should make it cheaper for all. So too are there potential benefits for OEM infrastructure, as top-notch physical plant and software assurance against cyber-attack are much more affordable to all concerned. Hence, the conventional wisdom is that such an international in-service support program should offer a better return on investment in terms of greater performance at lower costs, as well as the possibility for greater scalability to adapt to variations in demand for services. But as mentioned earlier, this comes typically with the potential for fewer economic benefits for Canada &ndash; clearly an important consideration. TOP OF PAGE Unique Considerations of the Case at Hand In exploring a possible international program for the U.K., Australia and Canada to leverage their selection of the same basic platform design and designer (BAE Systems), it is useful to accept the conventional wisdom but explore additional factors that should be weighed in a sustainment business case. What follows is a potpourri of additional considerations worthy of study. It is useful to address what could be included in the term &ldquo;in-service support&rdquo;. Based on common equipments and systems, it could include design agent services, maintenance, spares, training and documentation within an integrated data environment, to name the most important few. Nations could also select from among these options for hybrid arrangements. Near the top of the list for CSC is the fact that it is under the umbrella of the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). The strategy specifically prevents the NSS shipyards from providing a single day of in-service support once they are delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) unless such shipyards win those rights through a competitive procurement process. This is unique &ndash; a departure from past approaches in Canadian government shipbuilding &ndash; and quite frankly considered to be imprudent. In the very early days of a new class of complex ships, the prime contractor (often the build shipyard and/or designer) usually provides as a minimum a number of years of ISS. The shipbuilder typically has the best expert knowledge that exists for the initial years of services, along with the relationships and a degree of leverage with the major equipment/systems' OEMs. Normally, an in-service support bridging contract is awarded concurrent with the ship construction contract. Often, the prime contractor is then awarded a long-term ISS contract. There is a story as to why ship maintenance support for vessels delivered under NSS departed from the norm (there is always a story), and confirmation should be obtained as soon as possible that the earlier decision is reversible, to allow the business case to include all options. Related to the former paragraph, Canada has relatively recently awarded a contract to Thales for support services for the Arctic offshore patrol ships and the joint support ships. Although these ships have yet to be turned over to the RCN, one would expect that even at this early stage many lessons have been learned which should be taken into account when conducting the business case, such as whether the knowledge was/is available to support first-day-under-power with the RCN. BAE Systems is at the heart of the potential international program. From the internet alone, one observes that, among other classes of Royal Navy (RN) ships, BAE Systems manages design, equipment maintenance and ship modifications for the RN's Type 45 destroyers. It therefore would be important to ask the RN how well their approach is working and to explore the details of the existing contract, infrastructure arrangements, innovations introduced and performance to date. This would be a bellwether to the likelihood that the RN would be at least interested in an international support program for their Type 26 frigates in terms of capability and customer-focused cultural flexibility at BAE Systems. And if they have misgivings and/or if Australia is not interested, the international program option may be eliminated from the business case. One would expect that all three nations would support the generation of their own business cases and compare conclusions before making decisions. Earlier, I offered the assumption that the platform systems are likely to employ the same major equipment systems, but that the combat systems are unlikely to be common. But to overstate the obvious, warships are not like layer cakes &ndash; they do not have separate top and bottom halves. The three naval variants being procured are exceptionally integrated and complex super-systems. Therefore, in-service support must address both sets of major equipment/systems &ndash; platform and combat systems. BAE Systems is the overall combat systems integrator for the Type 26 frigates destined for the RN and an obvious choice to deliver in-service support. Lockheed Martin Canada is the equivalent for the CSC. And BAE Systems Australia is partnered with Lockheed Martin Australia and Saab Australia to deliver the combat system integration for the Hunter-class frigates. Therefore, an international &ndash; almost-whole-of-ship &ndash; ISS solution might even offer significant economic benefits to all three nations. This could create challenges based on the proverbial &ldquo;too many eggs in one basket&rdquo;, and certain safeguards would be required. It is worthwhile to note an anomaly in Canada's case regarding the construction of these warships. BAE Systems is responsible for building all of the ships in question in the U.K. and Australia, but Irving Shipbuilding is responsible under NSS to construct the CSCs. One should never underestimate the shipbuilder's knowledge when dealing with a complex seagoing vessel, and a sole platform-related focus on BAE Systems alone would, in the Canadian case, be a deficit in any international program. Irving Shipbuilding's contribution should therefore be considered in the business case for Canada. Should the business case be strong, there is an argument that a directed contract to an Irving-BAE partnership for in-country platform in-service support would make sense and be in the public's interest. As mentioned earlier, although this was prohibited under the original terms of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, it could be waived in this instance for those warships that will be the backbone of Canada's maritime defence for 30 years. It would provide significant economic benefits as well. There is clearly the significant potential of operational value to such an arrangement, in addition to strong performance supporting day-to-day readiness. The three nations are on three different continents, and all three navies pursue global deployments. The availability of full ISS in or within the reach of Canada, the U.K. and Australia provides significant benefits to all three navies over their 30-year lives when breakdowns occur far from home port. The business case should take into account the fact that the U.K. may export the global combat ship design more broadly in the world. If an international consortium delivering in-service support were in place, it could become an important selling feature for potential buyers of the GCS. This undoubtedly could enhance value for money, flexibility and performance for the three plank owner nations. And from a Canadian perspective, as the nation with the largest stake in the game at 15 warships, we should be able to significantly influence the contractual arrangements with current and future parties to the international program. A typical and expensive part of the life cycle of warships is midlife conversions. Combat systems in particular require modernization to employ new technologies designed to address new threats. These are extremely complex endeavours. Once again, the degree of value for money through life could be even greater, depending on the degree of commonality of the equipment upgrade options selected. And the very fact that Canada would see opportunities worth considering as fully developed options would in itself offer potential cost benefits that would otherwise be unlikely to occur. As part of the business case analysis, it would be useful to study the commercial marine industry examples of international in-service support. Large ship operators and OEMs are very experienced in working across national and client boundaries to deliver economical services. Any business case should capture the pros and cons more broadly in the commercial business sector as well. There could be a benefit as part of an international program in terms of the people required. As the proverb goes, many hands make light work. Since the launch of what was then termed the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, Canada's marine HR challenges within government have become more pronounced. An international program could lighten the load while expanding the experience base for involved government and naval personnel in tackling the demands of supporting as complex a platform as the CSC. It would be important to understand the challenges surrounding the governance in the broadest sense. Though not at all unique, governance would likely need to be structured to address three separate functions &ndash; the integrated supplier-client engagement, the clients' government-to-government activity and industry-to-industry supplier co-ordination. While not uncommon when contracting for goods and services for complex systems, the international aspects, length of the arrangement and the ever-increasing volatility in the marketplace are noteworthy. With such complexity and the constantly changing stakeholders involved over 30 years, the mechanisms for a strong and appropriate relationship alignment would be critical to long-term success. When dealing with a high degree of complexity in an international program such as this, the business case needs to assess the likelihood that the collaboration can be created and maintained in terms of the critical enabling relationships. In the factors highlighted here and as with any business case, the importance of comparing the international program solution with what seems to be the more recent and typical Canadian in-service solution resulting from a competitive procurement cannot be underestimated. Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and Joint Support Ships In-Service Support (AJISS) is the latest Canadian example and must be carefully analyzed even at this early stage to determine the prognosis for achieving the desired outcomes. Again, engagement with allies to assess their experience with single-nation support scenarios would be important in establishing the right comparators to enable coherent business case recommendations. It would be prudent to consider the long view as part of the business case &ndash; including such things as the likelihood that nations would retire their warships at different times or even opt out of the international ISS program long before end-of life. While much can change, an early appreciation and understanding of various scenarios and the related risks would be important. As a final point, such complicated business case assessments are never easy. After assembling the assumption set and the criteria analysis, and after negotiating &ldquo;les grandes lignes&rdquo; of a contractual agreement, it would be important to avoid the common pitfall of allowing one or two pros or cons to dominate the decision-making. Too often, the complexity that defies the &ldquo;kiss principle&rdquo; leads to rejection of otherwise optimum solutions. But at the end of the day, one must accept that it will be a judgment call. TOP OF PAGE Concluding Material Under the five-year-old Defence Procurement Strategy, Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) is responsible for leading the industry engagement that launches defence procurement processes. More recently, the ISS procurement strategies have been based on the results of the sustainment initiative business case led by DND. At virtually every opportunity over the past decade, I have emphasized the importance of managing expectations. In every discussion with industry, it behooves those leading the CSC in-service support exploration activity to include the possibility of an international program solution. To eliminate that option without study would be both shortsighted and inexcusable. Also, failing to repeatedly ensure that all stakeholders are aware of the potential for such an outcome would lack transparency and be disingenuous. When the RCN's readiness to deliver operational capability is at stake, along with billions of Canadian taxpayers' dollars for CSC in-service support over 30 years, it matters. And an international in-service support program for the new frigates of Canada, the U.K. and Australia is an important option worth considering. TOP OF PAGE About the Author After a 38 year career with the Royal Canadian Navy, Ian Mack (Rear-Admiral Retired) served for a decade (2007-2017) as the Director-General in the Department of National Defence responsible for the conception, shaping and support of the launch and subsequent implementation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, and for guiding the DND project managers for the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, the Joint Support Ships and the Canadian Surface Combatants. He also had responsibility for four vehicle projects for the Canadian Army until 2015. Since leaving the government, he has offered his shipbuilding and project management perspectives internationally. Ian is a longstanding Fellow of the International Centre for Complex Project Management. He also is allied with Strategic Relationships Solutions Inc. He is married to Alex, and has three grown children. With few accommodations for impaired mobility, he remains active. Upon retirement, he founded a small business, Xi Complexity Consulting Inc. in Ottawa Canada. TOP OF PAGE Canadian Global Affairs Institute The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada's international relations in all its forms including (in partnership with the University of Calgary's School of Public Policy), trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada's population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests. The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada's contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada's role in that process and the connection between globalization and security. In all its activities the Institute is a charitable, non-partisan, non-advocacy organization that provides a platform for a variety of viewpoints. It is supported financially by the contributions of individuals, foundations, and corporations. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Institute publications and programs are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Institute staff, fellows, directors, advisors or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to, or collaborate with, the Institute.

  • 434 Squadron reformed as test and evaluation centre

    July 24, 2018 | Local, Aerospace

    434 Squadron reformed as test and evaluation centre

    Chris Thatcher When your squadron lineage includes bomber, strike, fighter, operational training, and combat support roles, and your predecessors have flown everything from the Handley Page Halifax bomber to the Avro Lancaster, Canadair F-86 Sabre, Lockheed CF-104 Starfighter, Canadair CC-144 Challenger, and CT-133 Silver Star, it's perhaps fitting that you get reborn as an operational test and evaluation squadron. At a ceremony at 8 Wing Trenton, Ont., on May 31, the Royal Canadian Air Force reformed the 434 &ldquo;Bluenose&rdquo; Squadron as 434 Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) Squadron, under command of the RCAF Aerospace Warfare Centre (RAWC). The squadron last served as a combat support squadron in the 1990s, based at 14 Wing Greenwood, N.S. It was disbanded in 2002 and its colours placed in the All Saints Cathedral in Halifax. &ldquo;The fact that [the squadron] has flown so many different aircraft is [appropriate], in that we have now taken on OT&E for every single aircraft within the RCAF,&rdquo; said LCol Graham Edwards, a long-range patrol navigator and the new commanding officer. 434 Squadron is being reformed and re-branded in response to the government's 2017 defence policy. With 13 initiatives specific to the RCAF and many aircraft due to be replaced or modernized, the workload for operational test and evaluation is going to increase. By amalgamating five existing test and evaluation flights (TEFs)&ndash;helicopter, long-range patrol, transport, land aviation, and fighter&ndash;with two new flights for search and rescue and aerospace systems under one command, the Air Force hopes to better manage its limited resources as more platforms and systems require testing and evaluation. &ldquo;It was deemed that the status quo won't work if we are to achieve success with those initiatives,&rdquo; said Edwards. Historically, test and evaluation has been managed within each fleet of aircraft, but it has often drawn people from the operational squadrons and into the testing seats to conduct a trial of a new aircraft or aircraft system. Each community will continue to develop its own testing expertise, but by centralizing decisions about how those people are assigned, 434 Squadron hopes to manage the strain when capabilities are being introduced at the same time that the aircraft are being deployed. Search and rescue aircraft, the CP-140 Aurora or the strategic transport CC-177 Globemaster, for example, rarely have a dip in operational tempo. &ldquo;They can keep the structure of their operational force together,&rdquo; Edwards said of the operational squadrons. &ldquo;As the fleets convert back to operations with the new platform, we'll take the people from the test and evaluation chairs and move them back to the operational chairs. And then I can reallocate those test and evaluation [positions] to the next fleet that is undergoing the next transition.&rdquo; The two new flights are intended to address the arrival of the new CC-295W search and rescue aircraft into service in 2019 and the many ground-based and airborne systems that support all the fleets being introduced in the coming years, such as navigation aids, communication systems, ground-based radars, data link systems, and even simulators. &ldquo;The new Aero TEF is going to provide that body of expertise and create a body that is responsible to deliver that ground capability,&rdquo; said Edwards, noting that a coordinated process will ensure interoperability between all systems during the OT&E phase. &ldquo;There's no sense modifying the fleet with data link systems when we have not done the ground support with it.&rdquo; By including 434 Squadron under the RAWC, which has been transformed in recent years as one of the RCAF's core pillars with 1 Canadian Air Division (operations) and 2 Canadian Air Division (training), lessons acquired during the test and evaluation phase should be more readily incorporated into the development of doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that shape training and operations. Among Edwards' immediate priorities are the amalgamation of the TEFs and establishing a new governance structure, what he called an &ldquo;air test and evaluation master plan.&rdquo; But the process won't be completely new. As an exchange officer with RAF Waddington in 2008, he was part of the transformation of 56 Squadron into an OT&E unit for C4ISR (Command, Control, Computers, Communications and Intelligence, Surveillances and Reconnaissance), conducting trials on unmanned aerial systems, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and Hawker Siddeley Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft. The return of the squadron's colours was a proud moment and the members are keen to carry on its Bluenose traditions. No. 434 Squadron, adopted by the Rotary Club of Halifax, was the RCAF's 13th overseas bomber squadron, formed on June 13, 1943, at RCAF Station Tholthorpe in England. It was reformed as 434 Strike/Attack Squadron in 1963 and as 434 Operational Training Squadron in 1968. It was then re-designated 434 Tactical Fighter Operational Training Squadron in 1970, as 434 Composite Squadron in 1992, and finally as 434 Combat Support Squadron in 1993. In its first two years of operations, the squadron accomplished eight significant battle honours, reflective of what it is trying to do now in a brief period, said Edwards. But he's hoping to break with at least one 434 Squadron tradition. &ldquo;The squadron would stand down every time it switched to a new aircraft. Now that we have all the aircraft of the RCAF under the remit of 434, I hope to see a bit more longevity in the squadron.&rdquo; Helicopter Operational Test & Evaluation Flight at 12 Wing Shearwater, N.S., is responsible for the operationalization of the CH-148 Cyclone Maritime Helicopter. Long Range Patrol Operational Test & Evaluation Flight in 14 Wing Greenwood, N.S., is focused primarily on the CP-140 Aurora. Transport Operational Test and Evaluation Flight, located at 8 Wing Trenton, Ont., deals with all air mobility fleets like the CC-130J Hercules, CC-177 Globemaster, and CC-150 Airbus. Land Aviation Test and Evaluation Flight is in St Hubert, Que., and supports tactical aviation helicopters like the CH-147 Chinooks and CH-146 Griffons. Fighter Operational Test & Evaluation Flight is in 4 Wing Cold Lake, Alta. and deals with fighter aircraft. (new) Search and Rescue Test & Evaluation Flight will be stood-up at 19 Wing Comox, B.C., and will be responsible for the new Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue, CH-149 Cormorant, and the CC-130H Hercules and CH-146 Griffon SAR fleets. (new) The Aerospace Systems Test & Evaluation Flight will be co-located with 434 Squadron headquarters in 8 Wing Trenton and will deal with ground-based aeronautical systems such as radars, navigational aids, meteorological systems and data links.

  • Airbus n'écarte pas la possibilité d'assembler des avions de chasse au Québec

    January 17, 2019 | Local, Aerospace

    Airbus n'écarte pas la possibilité d'assembler des avions de chasse au Québec

    La Presse canadienne Airbus n'écarte pas la possibilité que le Québec puisse accueillir une chaîne de montage d'avions de chasse ainsi qu'un lieu destiné à la construction de satellites si le géant européen parvient à décrocher de nouveaux contrats au Canada. Ces scénarios ont été évoqués lundi par le président des activités canadiennes de la multinationale, Simon Jacques, lors d'un événement organisé par la multinationale à Mirabel, dans les Laurentides, où s'effectue l'assemblage des appareils A220, nés de la C Series de Bombardier. Airbus convoite notamment l'appel d'offres du gouvernement canadien, qui devrait être lancé avant le début de la prochaine campagne électorale, pour l'achat de 88 avions de chasse visant à remplacer ses CF-18 vieillissants. Airbus propose l'Eurofighter Typhoon. « Absolument », a répondu M. Jacques lorsqu'il lui a été demandé si la chaîne de montage pourrait se trouver au Québec. « Nous évaluons nos options. » En plus d'Airbus, les entreprises Boeing, Lockheed Martin et Saab ont été retenues par le gouvernement canadien. « La construction d'une nouvelle ligne d'assemblage, qui entraînerait la création de nombreux emplois, ne serait pas un casse-tête logistique étant donné qu'il y a de l'espace de disponible à Mirabel, dans les Laurentides, où s'effectue l'assemblage de l'avion A220 », a expliqué M. Jacques. Puisque l'appel d'offres devrait imposer du contenu local, le dirigeant d'Airbus au Canada a dit vouloir proposer une « solution canadienne ». Déjà un lien L'actionnaire majoritaire de l'A220 a décroché son premier contrat d'envergure en 2016 avec Ottawa, qui lui a commandé 16 avions de recherche et de sauvetage, une entente de 2,4 milliards de dollars, en plus de 2,3 milliards en entretien et service après-vente pour 20 ans. Le premier de ces appareils doit être livré d'ici la fin de l'année. Les CF-18 mis en service dans les années 1980 devaient être retirés d'ici 2020, mais leur remplacement s'est transformé en une longue saga. Il y a six ans, le gouvernement Harper a abandonné dans la controverse son projet d'acheter des avions de chasse F-35 sans appel d'offres pour remplacer cette flotte vieillissante. Le gouvernement Trudeau, qui avait par la suite décidé d'acheter 18 avions Super Hornet à Boeing également sans appel d'offres, a annulé cet achat en 2017 dans la foulée du conflit commercial entre Boeing et Bombardier à propos de la C Series. D'ici à ce que ce contrat se concrétise, Ottawa s'est tourné vers l'Australie pour acheter des avions de chasse provisoires. D'après M. Jacques, le Canada est « vraiment engagé » à « stimuler la concurrence », ce qui pourrait ouvrir une porte à un autre constructeur que l'américaine Boeing. « Je pense que c'est important pour le Canada d'avoir une flotte différente de ce qu'il y a aux États-Unis [avec Boeing], a-t-il dit. [Cela serait] une bonne chose pour le NORAD [Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord]. » Citant l'exemple du Royaume-Uni, qui est client d'Airbus et de Lockheed Martin pour sa flotte, M. Jacques a soutenu que rien n'empêchait le Canada de faire de même. Des satellites en plus? Parallèlement au dossier des avions de combat, le dirigeant d'Airbus a mentionné que l'entreprise pourrait se tourner vers le Québec pour la construction de satellites si sa proposition est retenue par Télésat Canada, un exploitant de satellites de télécommunication. Cette entreprise avait sollicité des offres à Airbus et à Thales pour le lancement en orbite « d'entre 300 et 500 satellites », selon M. Jacques, dans le cadre d'un projet entourant l'accès à Internet. « Cela viendrait changer la donne au Québec », a-t-il lancé, en évoquant au passage la création de quelque 200 emplois. Airbus dit échanger avec différents ordres de gouvernement, dont Québec et Ottawa, dans le but de s'installer dans la province si la multinationale obtient le contrat.

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