minister blair concludes productive visit to brussels for ukraine defense contact group meeting and nato defence ministers meeting

On the same subject

• 

  November 25, 2019 | Local, Other Defence

  Defence Procurement’s Effectiveness Dissected at Ottawa Conference

  By James Careless How well is Canada's defence procurement actually working, and are industry-boosters like ITBs paying off? These and other questions were tackled at the ‘Defence in the 43rd Parliament' one-day conference on November 20, 2019. It was staged by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) at the Chateau Laurier hotel, before a full house in the Adam Room. During the opening session, ‘Canadian Defence Procurement – The State of the Union', DND Associate Deputy Minister Claude Rochette was cautiously upbeat about the state of Canadian defence procurements. In the last year, DND has signed about 12,000 contracts and spent about $6 billion on procurements, he said. Most of these contracts were on time and on budget. 2019's defence procurement spending is up from $4.9 billion spent by DND in 2016, Rochette noted. In addition, this year DND will “close out its budget” by spending its allocated funds, he said. Despite some criticisms that Canadian defence procurements are not moving fast enough, “we are doing pretty well,” said Claude Rochette. But the process isn't perfect, he admitted. “We have more work to do.” Rochette's positive assessment was echoed by PSPC Associate Deputy Minister Michael Vandergrift. 2019 “has been a very busy time” in Canadian defence procurement, he said, During the past year, the federal government issued an RfP for the Future Fighter Capability project; sole-sourced Light Armoured Vehicles from General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada; and selected Lockheed Martin to built 15 Canadian Surface Combatant ships. Asked which defence procurements are going well and which are posing challenges, Rochette replied that smaller projects that fall within DND's $5 million spending authority are easy to manage. Where issues crop up is in large multi-million dollar projects with long time lines: Trying to cost them accurately and manage them effectively is akin to asking, “I want to have a car and buy it next year, so tell me how much I'll pay for it (right now),” he said. In a later morning session entitled, ‘Offsets – Is the ITB Policy Delivering?', the panel considered the impact of procurement bidders ‘overcommitting' to ITBs (promising financial benefits worth more than the contracts they are bidding for) on the Canadian defence industry. Such ITB overcommittments, which can be worth 300% or more than the contract being sought, are “introducing unnecessary risk” in the Canadian defence industry, said Rich Foster, Vice President of L3 Harris Technologies - Canada. The result of overcommitting is that contractors are “now focussed more on quantity than quality” in making their procurement decisions, he said. The real victims of ITB overcommittments are SMEs, which lack the resources available to large companies to pay for these big ITBs. The choice facing these SMEs is to directly/indirectly seek such contracts – which can run 20-40 years – “or you go out of business,” said Brian Botting, Director of Strategic Offsets at General Dynamics Missions Systems. “It is a terrible dilemma for them to be in.” The CGAI procurement conference ended with the panel discussion, ‘Defence Procurement Canada'. This is the name of the integrated procurement agency the Liberals proposed during the October 2019 election, to replace the multiple ministries currently sharing this responsibility. The common sense reason for having a single defence procurement agency comes down to human nature: “If you ask two of your kids to take out the garbage, it won't get done,” quipped Alan Williams, President of The Williams Group. “If you ask one of your kids, maybe it will get taken out.” He explained that sharing procurement among ministries causes requires agreement between multiple ministers and deputy ministers – which wastes time -- and that Canada's military allies manage their procurements through single agencies. Creating a separate Defence Procurement Canada (DPC) agency would not be easy, said Jim Mitchell, Research Associate with the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. Speaking from his own government experience, Mitchell observed that such changes are “disruptive, costly, difficult, hard on people, and hurt efficiency and effectiveness for a few years.” Mitchell added that creating DPC would not prevent Treasury Board and other ministries from having a role in defence procurement afterwards. CGAI Fellow Gavin Liddy was just as pessimistic about the value of creating DPC when so many defence procurements are underway. If the government wants “to do one single thing to delay the procurement agenda in the next five to seven years,” then they should instruct defence bureaucrats to create the DPC, Liddy concluded. “Nothing would divert their attention more than doing that.” http://www.canadiandefencereview.com/news?news/2765

• 

  October 21, 2022 | Local, Naval

  Canada's multibillion-dollar combat ship plan nears key decision

  Officials in Ottawa have taken their time in reviewing the Canadian Surface Combatant design because the one ship class must do it all.

• 

  July 20, 2020 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Why it is time for smart protectionism

  Put simply, Canadian governments have a responsibility to practise smart protectionism where the risks to Canadians' personal security and national security are high. Free trade is good economics. Protectionism is bad. Global supply chains are efficient. Favouring domestic goods, services and industries is inefficient. Canada has long adhered to these orthodoxies. And most of the time it makes sense to do so. However, through the COVID-19 pandemic, both the public and private sectors have seen weaknesses associated with heavy or total reliance on foreign sources and global supply chains for essential goods, notably personal protective equipment (PPE). As of June 2, for example, the Government of Canada had ordered close to 122 million N95 masks from international suppliers, yet 12 million had been received and 9.8 million of those failed Canadian standards. We are learning the hard way that foreign sources cannot necessarily supply the products we need in the time, quantity or quality required during a national or global emergency. China, as the dominant global producer of many of these PPE supplies, has become the focal point for an emerging debate around domestic control over certain goods, technologies, and services. A recent report from the Henry Jackson Society in the U.K., for example, has argued the “Five Eyes”—the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand—are far too reliant on Chinese sources for all kinds of strategically important goods, and that this is a threat to the national security of those countries. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, too, has warned that Canadian companies that produce certain critical technologies are vulnerable to foreign takeovers by entities with agendas hostile to Canada's interests. This is not just an issue with China, though. In Canada, we like to believe that in national or global crises we can rely on the U.S. or other allies for help. Canada, in other words, would be at or near the front of the line with allies. The COVID-19 pandemic, and the behavior of the U.S. and European countries, suggests this is naive. Italy, a founding EU member, requested and was denied face masks from the EU's stockpile at the peak of their COVID-19 outbreak. In April, a presidential executive order gave the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency the power to “allocate to domestic use” several types of PPE that would otherwise be exported. U.S. produced masks bound for Germany, a close American ally, were reportedly diverted back while in transit. Ultimately, Canada was exempt from the U.S. order, but this episode should tell us that global emergencies can lead to “home front comes first” attitudes, even among our closest allies. Fundamentally, the issue comes down to one of efficiency versus necessity. Sometimes, in some areas of the economy, security of supply is more important than efficiency. While this thinking is new to most companies and governments in Canada, it is not new to Canadian companies working in defence and national security. The Canadian defence industry has long highlighted the need for focused sovereign production and control in key national security capabilities—in part to ensure security of supply—as our allies in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere have been doing for generations. The argument has fallen largely on deaf ears. There seems to be a greater aversion in Canada to any kind of protectionism than among our more pragmatic allies. There is also a belief that Canada can always rely on obtaining critical supplies from the U.S., owing to both our close trading relationship and bi-lateral defence agreements dating from the 1950s that purport to establish an integrated North American defence industrial base. Canada puts too much faith in these beliefs, to our peril. While we can still hold free trade and integrated global supply chains as the goal, we also need to recognize that this view of the economy does not always serve our national interests. Put simply, Canadian governments have a responsibility to practise smart protectionism where the risks to Canadians' personal security and national security are high. Christyn Cianfarani is president and CEO of the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI). The Hill Times https://www.hilltimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/072020_ht.pdf