August 3, 2022 | Local, Aerospace
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January 2, 2019 | Local, Naval
China’s advances in Arctic may pose security threat to Canada
Calgary academic believes Beijing will conduct naval operations in the Arctic soon and that China's next-generation nuclear subs will have 'under-ice' capabilities
China's growing focus on the Arctic Ocean has drawn the eye of circumpolar nations, including Canada, which lays claim to the waters of the Northwest Passage.
The Canadian government tends to downplay the military threat posed by Beijing, but at the same time has voiced concern about its disrespect for international rules in dealing with territorial disputes in the China seas, and the possibility that it could replicate its intimidatory tactics in the High North.
The Chinese rolled out their Arctic policy last January. The Asian giant considers itself a “near-Arctic” state, and wants a stake in the region's development as ice melting is creating new business opportunities – a concept reiterated by Gao Feng, China's special representative for Arctic Affairs, at the Arctic Circle Conference in Seoul on December 8.
Beijing aims to set up the polar leg of its Belt and Road Initiative for better connectivity across Eurasia and beyond. The Chinese are keen to utilize new Arctic sea routes to narrow the distance and cut transport time with Europe for their cargo ships, besides exploiting the region's natural resources and investing in infrastructure projects.
Canada's Department of National Defense spokesperson Jessica Lamirande told Asia Times that her country was committed to cooperation with other states in the Arctic, provided they abide by international law, including environmental, navigation and other standards. Against this backdrop, “Canada welcomes continued discussions with China on Arctic issues,” she said.
Arctic militarization
Militarization of the Arctic is becoming reality. Russia is busy reinforcing military positions in its polar territory and will require foreign warships that want to sail through its Arctic waters to give prior notification to the Defense Ministry starting from next year.
The USS Harry S Truman sailed beyond the Arctic Circle in October, the first time a US aircraft carrier has operated in these latitudes since the early 1990s. The warship then joined the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization in Norway for its largest military exercises after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Still, it is worth noting that the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force also includes circumpolar states such as Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, which are all concerned with Russia's military build-up in the High North.
But Lamirande said the Canadian armed forces had not seen an increase in Chinese military presence in the country's Arctic region. “While there is no immediate military threat in Canada's Arctic, our military carefully monitors the changing security environment in the polar areas and is focused on exercising surveillance and control there,” she insisted. “All of the waterways that are commonly referred to as the Northwest Passage are internal waters of Canada and we have an unfettered right to regulate them.”
Underestimating China's challenge
Not everyone shares Canada's optimistic view of the Chinese commitment to the Arctic. Robert Huebert, a senior fellow at the University of Calgary's Center for Military and Strategic Studies, thinks it is naive on the Canadian government's part to believe that China will not conduct naval operations in the Arctic in the future.
“The Chinese have expanded their overall naval capability from 1994 on to the point of becoming the real world's second-largest navy,” he said. “Not to mention that China's naval shipbuilding currently surpasses that of any other country, including the United States.”
Huebert noted that Beijing had shown its interest in having Arctic and near-Arctic operations in 2016 when it sent a five-vessel taskforce to the Bering Sea, and later deployed naval units to visit some Nordic countries and hold drills with the Russian navy in the Baltic Sea.
“All of this points to a Chinese desire to have vessels that will be able to operate globally,” the Canadian scholar said. “Given the activities of both American and Russian submarines in the Arctic, and given the Chinese intention to become a challenger to both of these navies, it is inevitable that China will soon have an Arctic capability for its naval forces.”
Cooperation with the US
Canada is trying to beef up its military potential in the High North, but it may not be up to the task of coping with a serious external threat in the region.
The Royal Canadian Navy will have six new Arctic and offshore patrol ships down the line. Lamirande explained that jetty infrastructure was being upgraded at Esquimalt and Halifax dockyards to berth these vessels.
She said that a new jetty was under construction at Halifax, Canada's naval base on the Atlantic coast, and would be ready for use in the spring of 2019. Similar work is also underway for two new jetties at the naval facility in Esquimalt, which hosts the country's Pacific fleet, with this project expected to be completed in the late 2020s.
“Work to establish a docking, replenishing and refueling facility in Nanisivik [in Canada's northern Nunavut territory] is well advanced and expected to be operational in 2019,” she added.
According to Huebert, the new Arctic and offshore patrol ships are not designed to respond to an expanding Chinese (and Russian) submarine threat in the Arctic. “The vessels are important in providing Canada's navy with the opportunity to learn how to operate in the Arctic region,” he pointed out.
However, to be able to counter the Chinese and the Russians in the Arctic waters, he said Canada would have to work closely with the United States to improve the underwater mission of NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command).
“It was agreed in 2005 that NORAD would have a maritime detection mission, but there have been limited efforts to actually operationalize this requirement,” Huebert admitted, adding that prospects of any improvement in the immediate future were not that great, given the strained relations between US President Donald Trump's administration and the Canadian government.
To complicate the issue, Washington asserts that the Northwest Passage is an international strait, and not Canadian territorial waters.
“Nevertheless there will be a requirement to improve underwater detection systems, and those that can in fact operate at a distance from the northern section of North America,” Huebert said. “Given the range of new weapon systems that are now coming online, this will be an increasingly complicated challenge for the two North American countries.”
Submarine deployment
China launched its first home-built polar icebreaking vessel in September and is said to be working on a nuclear-powered icebreaking cargo vessel. A Chinese icebreaker made its way into the Canadian Arctic in August 2017. Professor Huebert noted that the Chinese navy actually has more icebreakers operational today than either the American or Canadian naval forces.
More importantly, it has been reported that the Chinese are studying submarine technology for deployment in the Arctic waters. For Huebert, an increase in China's submarine activities in the polar region is a plausible scenario, and Ottawa should not underestimate it.
“As the emerging naval challenger to the United States, China will inevitably develop a submarine capability to enter the Arctic,” he warned.
In his view, China's new Type 094 and next-generation Type 096 nuclear-powered missile submarines will likely have “under-ice” capacities, posing a great threat to both Canada and the US.
http://www.atimes.com/article/chinas-advances-in-arctic-may-pose-security-threat-to-canada/amp/
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November 19, 2019 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
Military Procurement: What the New Cabinet Can Learn From Australia
By Lee Harding The Liberal government announced its new cabinet on Nov. 20—the very same day the Canadian Global Affairs Institute hosted its annual event on the topic of military procurement. Given that an overhaul in that area is sorely needed, Canada can learn a lot from Australia, Ian Mack wrote in a recent report for the institute. Mack is uniquely qualified to make that assessment, having worked with both governments in their process of awarding contracts for military sea vessels. While he believes both countries had an acceptable result, his report, titled “Another Way to Buy Frigates,” suggests the Canadian approach adds work, balloons costs, and delays success. The re-elected Trudeau government should take note. The Liberals proposed significant changes to Canada's defence procurement system during the election campaign, but it will be a tall order to change this process. The land down under is isolated in a less secure part of the globe, without a nearby superpower like the United States to watch its back. So if Australia is far more diligent about defence than Canada, it might be due to necessity. The last time Canada had a proper and comprehensive white paper on defence was 1994. Australia has had three in the 21st century. Australia's effectiveness goes from the top down, something Canada knows nothing of. As Mack explains, “Canada, uniquely among its allies, has multiple government departments and central agencies significantly involved in the minutiae of its major military procurement projects.” These include Defence; Treasury Board; Finance; Public Services and Procurement; Justice; Innovation, Science and Economic Development—and even more. Meanwhile in Australia, the minister of defence is responsible for all aspects of navy shipbuilding. This includes setting operational and technical requirements, securing funds, developing a plan to benefit domestic industries, and satisfying the legal aspects of procurement. Each country had a project management office of roughly the same size, but Canada's was, frankly, less competent. Australia's office had many knowledgeable contractors working alongside the Department of Defence, whereas Canada's team had many from the public service and armed forces with “little or no applicable experience or knowledge,” according to Mack. “In Canada, significant effort was expended on regular reporting to layers of senior governance,” he says in the report. But it was paperwork and process for its own sake, and impractical in its effect. “Despite the onerous reporting demands, only a few key decisions were rendered and rarely in a timely manner. The opposite was the case in Australia.” In seemingly every aspect of development, Canada made things rigid, complicated, and fragmented, while Australia made them flexible, cohesive, and collaborative. Canada made stand-alone contracts for each sequence of the process. Australia worked with contractors to establish “end-to-end accountability.” Canada's initial request for proposal included hundreds of technical requirements that bidders had to prove. Australia had few mandatory requirements, but worked alongside bidders to explore their respective proposed solutions. In Canada, the intellectual property, liabilities, and insurance requirements were debated at length and only decided hours before the request for proposal was made. Hundreds of criteria got a numerical score, and the sum of all scores won the bid. Canada was “preoccupied” about a public appearance of fairness and avoiding lawsuits. (Nevertheless, the controversy over former Vice-Admiral Mark Norman and complaints from Irving Shipbuilding over the bid for a navy supply vessel shows it failed at this.) Shipbuilders bidding in Australia were confident of a fair system without any of those things. The department did not announce its evaluation criteria, nor was the evaluation report the only factor. Instead, the department stated its objectives and worked collaboratively with three potential bidders in their respective approaches. In Mack's words, this left “the competition to be more about assessing apples, oranges, and bananas” than about tallying up numerical scores. Mack says he could not make the Canadian system work like Australia's because the procurement, request for proposals, and resulting contracts were done outside of the Department of National Defence. At the time, he was “simply unaware of the intricacies of the Australian approach” because he hadn't yet been exposed to it. Regardless, he had already surmised that Canadian bureaucrats “did not want changes to their tried and true ways of doing business” and clung to “adherence to prescriptive and traditional methodologies.” https://www.theepochtimes.com/military-procurement-what-the-new-cabinet-can-learn-from-australia_3150065.html
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June 3, 2019 | Local, Naval
No icebreakers in federal government’s $15.7B plan for new coast-guard ships
By Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press OTTAWA — The Canadian Coast Guard's recent struggles resupplying northern communities and rescuing ice-jammed ferries appear set to continue despite Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's promise to spend $15.7 billion on "a complete fleet renewal." That's because none of the 18 vessels the government announced last week that it plans to buy will be an icebreaker, meaning the coast guard will be forced to continue relying on its existing icebreaker fleet for the foreseeable future. Many of those are nearing — or have already exceeded — their expected lifespans, which has resulted in breakdowns and other problems that have affected coast-guard operations, such as resupply runs and assisting ferries in winter. Federal procurement minister Carla Qualtrough acknowledged on the sidelines of the annual Cansec arms-trade show this week "there's definitely a capability gap on icebreakers," but wouldn't say when it would be addressed. Qualtrough instead indicated that any announcement on more ships for the coast guard would likely come after the government adds a third shipyard to the two that are already partners in the federal shipbuilding plan. "There's definitely more ships coming," she said on Thursday. "It will really be dependent on how long it takes the third yard to get itself ready to build the kind of ships we need." The search is expected to start in the coming weeks, but while many observers expect Davie Shipbuilding in Quebec City to emerge victorious, a senior government official maintained a decision is unlikely before October's election. The government's planned $15.7-billion investment unveiled last week includes two Arctic patrol ships to be built by Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax and 16 so-called multipurpose vessels from Seaspan Shipbuilding in Vancouver. But those vessels are what officials describe as "ice-capable," rather than icebreakers, meaning the coast guard will need to continue to rely on its existing fleet for many of its operations. The icebreaker fleet did receive a boost on Thursday, when the Canadian Coast Guard officially welcomed the CCGS Molly Kool to its ranks after several months of conversion work at Davie. The CCGS Molly Kool is the first of three second-hand icebreakers that Davie has sold to the government, which the coast guard has said it plans to use for the next 15 to 20 years to fill any gaps until replacements are built. But while the government is spending millions to refit its current icebreakers, which are on average 35 years old, and keep them running as long as possible, the question remains when those replacements will arrive. The only new icebreaker currently in the government's multibillion-dollar shipbuilding plan is the polar-class CCGS John G. Diefenbaker, which was expected in 2017 before various delays pushed it back to the next decade. "We haven't built a coast guard-designed icebreaker since 1983. That was the last time," said Rob Huebert, an expert on the coast guard at the University of Calgary. "And anything we have bought is usually second-hand from industry." The coast guard doesn't have clout in Ottawa, Huebert said, which has translated into a lack of long-term planning or investment by successive governments — except when there are political points to be scored. And while the addition of a third yard to the federal shipbuilding plan should mean icebreakers will follow soon after, Huebert said it is all ad hoc and will simply lead to the same problems down the road. "I get incensed by the fact that we do not have any form of a long-term coast-guard renewal for icebreakers." Documents obtained by The Canadian Press warned more than a third of the coast guard's 26 large vessels, including its icebreakers, had exceeded their expected lifespans — and that many wouldn't survive until replacements arrived. The fleet's advanced age was also already affecting the coast guard's ability to do its job, including reduced search-and-rescue coverage, ferry-service disruptions and cancelled resupply runs to Arctic and coastal communities. —Follow @leeberthiaume on Twitter Lee Berthiaume, The Canadian Press https://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2019/05/31/no-icebreakers-in-federal-governments-15-6b-plan-for-new-coast-guard-ships/#.XPFqzBZKiUl