November 19, 2019 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
By Lee Harding
The Liberal government announced its new cabinet on Nov. 20—the very same day the Canadian Global Affairs Institute hosted its annual event on the topic of military procurement. Given that an overhaul in that area is sorely needed, Canada can learn a lot from Australia, Ian Mack wrote in a recent report for the institute.
Mack is uniquely qualified to make that assessment, having worked with both governments in their process of awarding contracts for military sea vessels. While he believes both countries had an acceptable result, his report, titled “Another Way to Buy Frigates,” suggests the Canadian approach adds work, balloons costs, and delays success.
The re-elected Trudeau government should take note. The Liberals proposed significant changes to Canada's defence procurement system during the election campaign, but it will be a tall order to change this process.
The land down under is isolated in a less secure part of the globe, without a nearby superpower like the United States to watch its back. So if Australia is far more diligent about defence than Canada, it might be due to necessity. The last time Canada had a proper and comprehensive white paper on defence was 1994. Australia has had three in the 21st century.
Australia's effectiveness goes from the top down, something Canada knows nothing of. As Mack explains, “Canada, uniquely among its allies, has multiple government departments and central agencies significantly involved in the minutiae of its major military procurement projects.” These include Defence; Treasury Board; Finance; Public Services and Procurement; Justice; Innovation, Science and Economic Development—and even more.
Meanwhile in Australia, the minister of defence is responsible for all aspects of navy shipbuilding. This includes setting operational and technical requirements, securing funds, developing a plan to benefit domestic industries, and satisfying the legal aspects of procurement.
Each country had a project management office of roughly the same size, but Canada's was, frankly, less competent. Australia's office had many knowledgeable contractors working alongside the Department of Defence, whereas Canada's team had many from the public service and armed forces with “little or no applicable experience or knowledge,” according to Mack.
“In Canada, significant effort was expended on regular reporting to layers of senior governance,” he says in the report. But it was paperwork and process for its own sake, and impractical in its effect. “Despite the onerous reporting demands, only a few key decisions were rendered and rarely in a timely manner. The opposite was the case in Australia.”
In seemingly every aspect of development, Canada made things rigid, complicated, and fragmented, while Australia made them flexible, cohesive, and collaborative. Canada made stand-alone contracts for each sequence of the process. Australia worked with contractors to establish “end-to-end accountability.” Canada's initial request for proposal included hundreds of technical requirements that bidders had to prove. Australia had few mandatory requirements, but worked alongside bidders to explore their respective proposed solutions.
In Canada, the intellectual property, liabilities, and insurance requirements were debated at length and only decided hours before the request for proposal was made. Hundreds of criteria got a numerical score, and the sum of all scores won the bid. Canada was “preoccupied” about a public appearance of fairness and avoiding lawsuits. (Nevertheless, the controversy over former Vice-Admiral Mark Norman and complaints from Irving Shipbuilding over the bid for a navy supply vessel shows it failed at this.)
Shipbuilders bidding in Australia were confident of a fair system without any of those things. The department did not announce its evaluation criteria, nor was the evaluation report the only factor. Instead, the department stated its objectives and worked collaboratively with three potential bidders in their respective approaches. In Mack's words, this left “the competition to be more about assessing apples, oranges, and bananas” than about tallying up numerical scores.
Mack says he could not make the Canadian system work like Australia's because the procurement, request for proposals, and resulting contracts were done outside of the Department of National Defence. At the time, he was “simply unaware of the intricacies of the Australian approach” because he hadn't yet been exposed to it. Regardless, he had already surmised that Canadian bureaucrats “did not want changes to their tried and true ways of doing business” and clung to “adherence to prescriptive and traditional methodologies.”
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December 26, 2019 | Local, Naval
Murray Brewster The Department of National Defence has faced some tough, pointed questions about whether it has chosen the right radar, main gun and close air defence systems for the navy's new frigates, which will soon hit the drawing board. An unsolicited defence industry slide deck presentation, obtained by CBC News, questions each of those key components in the planned $60 billion modernization of the fleet. It was circulated earlier this year and put in front of the senior federal officials in charge of the program. The defence industry briefing presentation points out that the Lockheed Martin-built AN/SPY-7 radar system — an updated, more sophisticated version of an existing U.S. military system — has not been installed and certified on any warship. A land-based version of the system is being produced and fielded for the Japanese government. The briefing calls it "an unproven radar" system that will be "costly to support," and claims it comes at a total price tag of $1 billion for all of the new ships, which the undated presentation describes as "an unnecessary expenditure." Lockheed Martin Canada and British-based BAE Systems Inc. were chosen earlier this year by the Liberal government to design and help build 15 new warships to replace the country's existing patrol frigates — the backbone of the navy. Old guns, inadequate defence systems? The briefing raises concerns about DND's choice of a main gun for the frigates — a 127 millimetre MK 45 described by the briefing as 30-year-old technology that will soon be obsolete and cannot fire precision-guided shells. The briefing also singles out as inadequate the Sea Ceptor close air defence system, which is meant to shoot down incoming, ship-killing missiles. Given the Canadian government's past missteps with military procurement — buying used equipment or opting for developmental systems that take years to get into service — a defence expert said the caution being expressed by the industry now is legitimate, but in some respects it's coming years too late. "There's a risk anytime you try to do something new for the first time," said Dave Perry, an analyst who specializes in procurement at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. The navy struggled for years to get second-hand British submarines up to Canadian standards. The air force also sat on its hands while the manufacturer of the CH-148 Cyclone helicopters worked out all of the developmental bugs. The presentation, Perry said, essentially tries to re-litigate decisions made by federal officials over three years ago, when the government's request for proposals was mapped out. 'The ship has sailed' "This is calling into question whether the government set down [technical] markers in an appropriate spot or not," he said. "There is always the possibility that these issues can be revisited, but I think at this point the ship has sailed because a competition was run, it did produce a preferred bidder." The pressure to get the new frigate design right is enormous, given the enormous expense involved and the changing nature of warfare, Perry added. The briefing presentation apparently was circulated by a rival radar-maker which was not part of the bidding process. Federal officials declined to name the company. Raytheon Canada Ltd. and its U.S. parent are among the biggest electronics and radar manufacturers in the world. A request for comment sent to their international business division went unanswered last week. 'We did our homework' The concerns in the briefing were presented last summer to: Pat Finn, former head of materiel at DND; Andre Fillion, the assistant deputy minister of defence purchasing at Public Services and Procurement Canada; and Rear Admiral Casper Donovan, the navy's director general for "future ship capability." DND confirmed the existence of the briefing presentation but refused to say who received it or which defence contractor was pushing it. "It is not uncommon for companies to present unsolicited material to our department when they are unsuccessful in a competitive process," spokesman Andrew McKelvey said recently. "We do not comment on these unsolicited documents as they are provided outside the scope of our established procurement process." Both the department and the commander of the navy stand behind the decisions that were made and the systems chosen for the new frigate. "We did our homework. We talked to other navies. We engaged our allies," said Vice-Admiral Art McDonald, who added DND was aware of other options on the market. Delivering the warships on schedule and on budget in the mid-2020s is a constant preoccupation in the department, he said. He would not say whether the choice of radar system might mean a delay in delivery. A senior executive at Lockheed Martin Canada said the company's radar system is identical to one selected by the U.S. government and other countries. Much of the system's hardware, and some of its software, have been used on U.S. Aegis-type guided missile destroyers and cruisers. The difference between the radar system chosen for Canada's frigates and conventional systems is in its array: the Lockheed Martin system sweeps around and above the vessel, rather than only horizontally. "The work that remains is to integrate it into the ship and integrate it into the ship's combat system," said Gary Fudge, general manager and vice president of Lockheed Martin Canada. "We worked for two years with BAE during the proposal stage to optimize the ship design with this particular radar." https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/frigate-gun-radar-canadian-navy-1.5405054
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