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  August 7, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Libya is turning into a battle lab for air warfare

  By: Tom Kington ROME — During Libya's proxy war this year, the skies over the North African country have filled with Turkish and Chinese drones, Russian MiG 29s and Sukhoi 24s and Emirati Mirage 2000s — reportedly — with Turkish F-16s and Egyptian Rafales waiting in the wings. Russian air defense systems have taken down drones while fighters, civilians and air bases have been bombed by jets as C-130s and Turkish A400M aircraft keep up deliveries of new weaponry and fighters into the country. In short, Libya has been transformed this year into something of an air warfare laboratory, begging the question, what exactly is going on, who is winning and what has this conflict taught generals about modern air combat? “On one level, Libya yet again simply underscores the value of air power – you do not want to get in a fight without it,” said Douglas Barrie, Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. The conflict in lawless Libya began to escalate in April 2019 as local strongman General Khalifa Haftar launched his campaign to take the capital Tripoli. Backed by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and France, he felt confident going up against the UN-recognized government in Tripoli backed by Turkey, Italy and Qatar. In April last year, Chinese Wing Loon II drones operated by the UAE bombed civilian targets in the city, reflecting the recent, and rapid, procurement of Chinese drones around the Middle East. “The Chinese have been adept at selling drones in the Middle East, including to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Iraq. With the US previously constrained in selling systems, the Chinese saw a gap in the market,” said Barrie. Turkey has proved the exception. Around May 2019, it introduced its own TB2 drone into the fray, attacking Haftar's forces, knocking out Russian Pantsir air defense systems supporting him and helping end his ambitions to take Tripoli. “Turkey has majored in UAV design and manufacture and likely used Libya in part as a test and adjust battle lab, and its systems are now ‘combat proven'. Its industry, like Roketsan, has also developed small, precision-guided munitions for UAVs,” Barrie said. A second analyst said Turkey's use of its TB2 in Libya had been a game changer. “Turkey decided it was okay to lose them from time to time, that they were semi-disposable, and that novel approach caught their enemy off guard,” said Jalel Harchaoui at the Clingendael Institute in Holland. The reason? Cost. “They used to cost the Turks $1-1.5 million apiece to build, but thanks to economies of scale as production volumes rose, the cost has dropped to below $500,000, excluding the control station,” said Harchaoui. He added that software and other technical changes had boosted the TB2′s efficiency and reconnaissance capabilities, which allowed them to find the right altitude to avoid the Russian Pantsir systems. “The performance of the Wing Loon II's in the hands of the UAE has meanwhile been largely static. They didn't evolve, so they have been much less impressive,” he said. Barrie said Libya was another example of the normalization of drone use in modern warfare. “UAVs are a capability now pursued by state and non-state actors alike. Obviously states can afford more capable, larger systems, while non-state actors may have to make do with home-built systems akin to being made with Radio Shack-like components, or acquiring systems from state sponsors.” He added, “In Libya UAVs have suited this kind of ugly, attritional warfare against small, lightly armed units.” The use of manned fighters in Libya has meanwhile been characterized by major powers sending them in on the quiet, with no announcement. Last July, a missile strike on a migrant center near Tripoli which killed 53 was likely the work of the UAE, the BBC has reported, quoting a confidential UN investigation. Analyst Harchaoui alleged that UAE Mirage 2000-9 aircraft flying out of an Egyptian base had been supporting Haftar periodically since June 2019. “Misrata airbase, which has hosted Turkish TB2 drones, was bombed multiple times last year by Emirati drones and jets until the Turks brought in Korkut and MIM-23 Hawk air defense systems. The raids over Misrata stopped in 2020 – probably because the UAE did not want to see a captured pilot show up tortured on Facebook,” he said. On July 4, fighter jets attacked Al-Watiya air base, just after Turkey had brought in its MIM-23 Hawk air defense missiles there. “Sonic booms heard over Sebha, in southwest Libya, suggest the aircraft took off from Egypt then flew to Libya via the Sahara to avoid being spotted by Turkish frigates off the Libyan coast,” said Harchaoui. “Could it have been Egyptian Rafales? They are good but don't have enough experience for an ultra-precise mission like this. French pilots flying Egyptian Rafales is unlikely in case one was captured, leaving the UAE Mirages as most likely,” he said. “Of all the Gulf states, the UAE is the most capable of this kind of mission – they have the combat experience and could do this,” added Barrie. Meanwhile, the U.S. military command in Africa reported in late May that satellite imagery showed Russian aircraft arriving in Libya to support Haftar. USAFRICOM said, “At least 14 MiG-29s and several Su-24s were flown from Russia to Syria, where their Russian markings were painted over to camouflage their Russian origin.” The aircraft are reportedly being used to support the Wagner Group, a Russian-sponsored mercenary operation on the ground in Libya which Moscow denies links to. The American command warned the aircraft might be flown by “inexperienced” mercenaries who “will not adhere to international law.” According to Harchaoui, eye witnesses in Libya reported a number of misses notched up during bombing raids by the aircraft. “That suggests they were not Russian air force pilots,” he said. This summer the conflict has slowed, as Haftar's forces retreat from Tripoli and take up position to fight for the coastal city of Sirte, which is key to controlling Libya's oil trade. With Al-Watiya airbase now repaired and back in business after the July air raid, Turkey may be considering basing its F-16s there, finally giving it a beach head for fighters in Libya. Bringing in American-built aircraft could however rely on the say-so of the U.S. “Is the U.S. so concerned about Russia's intervention in Libya it would support the deployment of Turkish F-16s to stop it?” said Harchaoui. “Or will it come down on the side of Egypt, which is a US ally? The ball is in its court.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-air-power/2020/08/06/libya-is-turning-into-a-battle-lab-for-air-warfare/

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  August 21, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval

  The Navy's Fighter Shortage Is Finally, Slowly Improving

  By Kyle Mizokami The U.S. Navy's horrible fighter availability rate is gradually improving thanks to increased funding for fighter maintenance. At one point in 2017, just one in three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters was available, a number that's increased to nearly half of all fighters. The problem is in large part due to past budget shortfalls and delayed introduction of the F-35 fighter jet. The U.S. Navy has 546 F/A-18E and F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters, larger, beefier, slightly stealthier versions of the original F/A-18 Hornet. Aircraft readiness rates, or the percentage of aircraft ready for deployment, should typically be north of seventy five percent, depending on type of aircraft, the complexity of the aircraft systems, and the age of the fleet. In 2017, the Navy's Super Hornet fleet hovered around 30 percent readiness, a shockingly low number the service blamed on minimal maintenance budgets and non-stop operations. The Navy struggled to place flight-capable aircraft with squadrons deploying on aircraft carriers. On the outside things looked fairly normal, as carriers went to sea with flight decks filled with Super Hornets. Behind the scenes however non-deployed squadrons suffered, acting as spare parts donors for deployment-bound ships. This cascading effect had negative implications for stateside squadrons and pilot training. According to DefenseNews, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer cited increased maintenance budgets over the past two years as a major part of the turnaround, allowing the service to fund repairs and spare parts. The service also streamlined maintenance processes, avoiding duplication and increasing efficiency. The maintenance crisis was caused by several problems. The high demand for strike fighters, particularly for combat operations against the Islamic State, increased the amount of wear and tear on the Super Hornet fleet. Super Hornets also act as aerial refueling tankers, increasing flight hours and wear and tear on the platform. Meanwhile the Navy struggled to operate within the budget mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act that trimmed federal spending. Making matters worse, so-called "continuing resolutions" passed during times of budget bickering to keep government going were an inefficient means of spending money and played havoc with the Pentagon's budget. Another problem that indirectly cause the crisis: a delay in the introduction of the U.S. Navy's version of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C. The F-35C, meant to replace older F/A-18C Hornet fighters, is now at least three years behind schedule. As the chart above illustrates, the Navy originally expected the F-35C to be initial operations capable—when the first Navy squadron is at least partially combat-capable—in late 2015. That date has gradually slipped to late 2018 or early 2019. On the outside things looked fairly normal, as carriers went to sea with flight decks filled with Super Hornets. Behind the scenes however non-deployed squadrons suffered, acting as spare parts donors for deployment-bound ships. This cascading effect had negative implications for stateside squadrons and pilot training. According to DefenseNews, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer cited increased maintenance budgets over the past two years as a major part of the turnaround, allowing the service to fund repairs and spare parts. The service also streamlined maintenance processes, avoiding duplication and increasing efficiency. The maintenance crisis was caused by several problems. The high demand for strike fighters, particularly for combat operations against the Islamic State, increased the amount of wear and tear on the Super Hornet fleet. Super Hornets also act as aerial refueling tankers, increasing flight hours and wear and tear on the platform. Meanwhile the Navy struggled to operate within the budget mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act that trimmed federal spending. Making matters worse, so-called "continuing resolutions" passed during times of budget bickering to keep government going were an inefficient means of spending money and played havoc with the Pentagon's budget. Another problem that indirectly cause the crisis: a delay in the introduction of the U.S. Navy's version of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C. The F-35C, meant to replace older F/A-18C Hornet fighters, is now at least three years behind schedule. As the chart above illustrates, the Navy originally expected the F-35C to be initial operations capable—when the first Navy squadron is at least partially combat-capable—in late 2015. That date has gradually slipped to late 2018 or early 2019. As a result of this delay, the Navy was forced to extend the lives of five squadrons of older -C model Hornets while it waited for the F-35C. That work added to the burden of Navy maintenance units already working to keep Super Hornets flying. In addition to the Navy's maintenance work, Boeing is set to take 40 to 50 Super Hornets a year and upgrade them to the new Block III configuration. DefenseNews says this will also bring the jets in the worst shape back to flying condition. In the long term F-35C production should ease the burden on the Super Hornet community, as the fifth generation fighter will eventually equip half of the strike fighter squadrons deployed on U.S. Navy carriers. The executive branch's 2019 defense budget also plans for an additional 110 Super Hornets over five years. Finally, the Navy plans to acquire a small fleet of MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial refueling aircraft to take over tanking duties from the overworked strike fighters. Full article: https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a22778556/us-navy-fighter-shortage-progress

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  August 15, 2023 | International, Land

  US Army set to test combined cyber, jamming, signal intelligence tool

  TLS-BCT is designed to provide smaller Army formations a means to understand their surroundings and disrupt networks and advanced electronics.