September 24, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
By Dominik Kimla and Hamilton Cook Posted September 19, 2019 In White Papers
One of the more dissonant aspects of NATO field exercises is, three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the continued presence of Warsaw Pact weapons and equipment: Soviet-made T-series tanks, MiG fighters, Mi-17 helicopters, BM-21 rocket artillery, and more.
Like their western counterparts on the continent, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) states have repeatedly delayed needed recapitalization as defense needs gave way to domestic imperatives. But times – and threat assessments – are changing.
By our analysis, cumulative CEE defense spending will be nearly $200 billion over the next five years, growing by nearly five percent per year. More than a quarter of that total, some $53 billion, will be spent on defense hardware procurement.
This represents a rare opportunity for Western defense firms – European and American – to seize a first-mover advantage. However, US companies must find new ways to credibly differentiate themselves from European competitors that may offer more financial and industrial incentives (and fewer regulatory hassles) in the long run.
Currently, US companies are well positioned for success as more aggressive US government advocacy has led to recent CEE customer wins for Black Hawk helicopters (Latvia, Poland, Slovakia), F-16 fighters (Bulgaria, Slovakia), HIMARS (Poland, Romania), JLTV (Lithuania), and Patriot AMD systems (Poland, Romania).
The US effort to steer CEE weapons-buying decisions picked up further momentum last year with the State Department-led European Recapitalization Incentive Program (ERIP), which provided $190 million in financing assistance to five Balkan countries (along with Slovakia) to replace ex-Soviet and Yugoslav-made equipment.
Even as ERIP expands, American companies will still have plenty of obstacles ahead. Historically, the limited new weapons procurement in most CEE countries included minimal offset or local industrialization requirements.
Going forward, reporting suggests that CEE countries, even as small as Croatia or Slovenia, will demand some form of local industrial participation and technology cooperation to develop their indigenous capabilities. This puts American firms at a disadvantage given the US government's still-stringent technology transfer regime.
Western European companies will differentiate themselves by proposing generous technology and work-sharing transfers, integrating local defense companies into their supply chains, and setting up a pan-European Defense Industrial Base.
The European Defense Fund (EDF) will fuel this by providing up to €13 billion over the next eight years to cultivate and secure these local ties. By financing collaborative R&D projects, prototype development, and disruptive, higher-risk defense innovation, the EDF will entrench Western European companies in CEE defense establishments over the medium to long term.
Yet, from the perspective of vulnerable members on NATO's eastern flank, only the US has the political power and defense capabilities to counter Russian meddling and aggression.
Given the ambivalence of Western European powers about confronting Russia, and the appearance of oft-fluctuating US commitment to NATO, CEE nations may see buying American not only as a means to get best-in-class (but more costly) weapons, but also as a binding mechanism to enhance US political and military commitment.
This dynamic was most vividly illustrated with Poland as it announced its intention to pursue the F-35, a platform historically out of Poland's “price range.” The purchase was also one of three major cornerstones for ensuring US investment in Polish security. The others were Poland's procurement of Patriot AMD systems and its agreement to – and its offer to fund – enduring US basing in-country.
However, Poland will still expect significant local industrial benefit as part of any arms transaction, as defense acquisitions continue to be as much a political and (parochial) economic exercise as a military one.
European firms have not stood idly by while the US competitors have targeted the region though, and they have gained their own CEE foothold. They have found success by targeting countries like Hungary, who recently purchased helicopters from Airbus along with tanks and howitzers from KMW.
While this is smaller than recent US sales, Western European contractors have an advantage: time. Every programmatic delay buys more time for the EDF to mature, extend its tendrils into every Western European foothold in the region, and bring the promise of increased industrial participation.
Thus, absent a dramatic softening of the US tech transfer regime, American contractors will need to push for more creative ways to provide credible differentiation from Western European competitors.
First, they can take advantage of the upcoming eastern shift of US operations in the region and establish logistics and maintenance centers that are able to serve both a country's new equipment and US forces in region, in a model similar to the F-35's maintenance depots in Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom. This expands NATO's operational support footprint into the region and grants CEE countries access to a much larger sustainment enterprise.
Second, American firms should push for more aggressive releases of Excess Defense Articles. While older, this equipment still represents a substantial increase in military capability that many CEE countries otherwise could not afford.
This has been seen in Croatia, where 16 retired OH-58 Kiowa Warriors are providing the country with new capabilities it could not afford (and now cannot afford to replace) and a pair of UH-60Ms donated to the Croatia Special Forces have introduced the platform to the Croatian military ahead of an eventual Mi-8/17 replacement program. These introductions induct CEE customers to US-style CONOPS and equipping standards that increase switching-costs to European competitors.
Finally, American contractors should extol the wider advantages of buying into the US defense enterprise. The opportunity to tap into the extensive US training enterprise during and after the acquisition process would be a boon to CEE nations overhauling their militaries.
While this has most recently been highlighted by international F-35 customers conducting their initial training at Luke Air Force Base amid the expansive Western US training range infrastructure, it is an opportunity that can be granted to non-Air Force customers, particularly given the establishment of a new Combat Training Center in Drawsko Pomorskie, Poland.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Military Sales process grants international contractors access to DoD buying power, not only for the acquisition itself, but also for the all-critical procurement of spare parts and weapons reloads decades down the line.
As they pursue long-overdue military modernization CEE countries will have to balance competing economic, political, and security imperatives. While going with US defense prime contractors provides top-tier capability and stronger ties with the only NATO member that can credibly deter Russian military adventurism, Western European firms will offer the lure of technology sharing and a more lucrative package for local industry. How CEE nations strike that balance will shape the military-political alignment of Europe's eastern flank for the next generation.
https://www.avascent.com/news-insights/white-papers/defense-firms-angle-for-eastern-europe/
September 23, 2024 | International, C4ISR, Security
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August 19, 2020 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR
Nathan Strout WASHINGTON — The U.S. Space Force hopes its prototype low-Earth orbit weather satellites will entice commercial businesses and allied nations to partner up on the project, reducing the cost of delivering critical weather data to the war fighter. The U.S. Air Force has been trying to replace the aging Defense Meteorological Satellite Program for years, ever since Congress opted to can it in 2015. Two capabilities in particular have proven a challenge for replacement: cloud characterization and theater weather imagery. But now the Space Force thinks it has the answer. By leveraging the increasingly popular low-Earth orbit architecture demonstrated by SpaceX's Starlink constellation and other experiments, the military believes it can lower the cost of individual satellites, increase the resiliency of the systems and attract new partnerships. In a recent interview with SpaceNews, Space and Missile Systems Center Portfolio Architect Col. Russell Teehan explained the thinking behind the new approach. The Air Force previously struggled to attract partners due to the sheer cost of the systems, he said. After all, when a single satellite costs more than $700 million, it's difficult to find someone to share the load. That price point forced the Air Force to build exquisite systems, comprised of just a handful of satellites operating in higher orbits. As the Pentagon has come to understand with its other exquisite systems, in wartime this leaves the military's space-based capabilities dependent on just a few satellites that are difficult to defend. A proliferation low-Earth orbit, or P-LEO, constellation may solve both of those problems. Smaller LEO satellites can deliver the same capabilities at a fraction of the cost per satellite, while the sheer number of targets in the constellation means that the loss of a single satellite isn't crippling. “The goal is in doing that, that ideally the commercial and allied sector would increase their desire to partner on those activities,” Treehan said. “[T]he activities in the past were generally $700 million-plus individual systems, which forced us into architectures that were [made up of less than five satellites] that were significantly vulnerable if we were in a time of conflict.” The Space Force is targeting satellites in the $30-50 million range, Treehan added. The Space Force has issued a trio of prototype contracts this summer for new space-based sensors that can collect cloud characterization and theater weather imagery from low Earth orbit. Raytheon Technologies, General Atomics and Astra are leading separate prototyping efforts after receiving contracts from the Space Enterprise Consortium. The Space Force is asking for $131 million to continue these efforts in fiscal 2021. The decision to settle on LEO for this critical weather data follows years of disarray as the Pentagon has worked to find a replacement for the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, or DMSP. For decades, the military has relied almost entirely on that program for weather data. The first satellite was launched in the 1960s, with the constellation being replenished with updated generations of weather satellites over the years. Today, there are just four DMSP satellites in operation. But no satellite is built to last forever, and there are no new DMSP satellites coming. As those satellites reach the end of their service life, they leave the two vital gaps of cloud characterization and theater weather imagery. Foreseeing this problem, Congress in 2015 directed the Air Force to launch a new weather satellite program to replace DMSP. The Air Force began working on a new constellation to launch in 2024, but there was a problem: a four-year gap between the projected end of DMSP's service life in 2020 and the launch of the new satellites. To fill that gap, the Air Force collaborated with NASA on ORS-8, a satellite to be launched just before DMSP expired. While a contract was awarded to Sierra Nevada Corp. to build that gap-filling satellite, it was protested, rescinded and ultimately canceled by the Air Force after the service determined DMSP's end-of-life date would extend beyond 2024. In 2019, the Air Force proposed a new solution: a free-flying space vehicle that would operate in low Earth orbit. The Pentagon asked for $101 million to begin the effort in fiscal 2020, with plans to launch it in 2024. But that plan didn't last the year. In September, the Air Force told Congress it wanted to scrap the free-flying space vehicle in favor of a new approach. Based on a space-based environmental monitoring capability assessment and strategy review completed in April 2019, the Air Force found it best to switch to an LEO architecture for scalability and increased resilience. Though skeptical, Congress ultimately swapped the funding for the free-flyer space vehicle to the new program. “Across the board in our weather strategies ... we're looking at multilayers of an architecture, how to most cost-effectively move forward in capability. They can be incrementally delivered over time. So that becomes a mix of large satellites that do missions and smaller satellites that we can launch in order to grow capability over time,” Col. Dennis Bythewood, program executive officer for space development at the Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center, said in September 2019. “We're finding much more capable sensors being delivered in small packages that we think we can grow mission sets over time. Those are the types of things that we are looking at within our strategy.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/08/17/trio-of-prototyping-contracts-brings-new-approach-for-collecting-military-weather-data/
July 3, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR
By Julie Hirschfeld Davis WASHINGTON — President Trump has written sharply worded letters to the leaders of several NATO allies — including Germany, Belgium, Norway and Canada — taking them to task for spending too little on their own defense and warning that the United States is losing patience with what he said was their failure to meet security obligations shared by the alliance. The letters, sent in June, are the latest sign of acrimony between Mr. Trump and American allies as he heads to a NATO summit meeting next week in Brussels that will be a closely watched test of the president's commitment to the alliance. Mr. Trump has repeatedly questioned its value and has claimed that its members are taking advantage of the United States. Mr. Trump's criticism raised the prospect of another confrontation involving the president and American allies after a blowup by Mr. Trump at the Group of 7 gathering last month in Quebec, and increased concerns that far from projecting solidarity in the face of threats from Russia, the meeting will highlight divisions within the alliance. Such a result could play into the hands of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who is to meet with Mr. Trump in Helsinki, Finland, after the NATO meeting, and whose primary goal is sowing divisions within the alliance. In his letters, the president hinted that after more than a year of public and private complaints that allies have not done enough to share the burden of collective defense, he may be considering a response, including adjusting the United States' military presence around the world. “As we discussed during your visit in April, there is growing frustration in the United States that some allies have not stepped up as promised,” Mr. Trump wrote to Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany in a particularly pointed letter, according to someone who saw it and shared excerpts with The New York Times. “The United States continues to devote more resources to the defense of Europe when the Continent's economy, including Germany's, are doing well and security challenges abound. This is no longer sustainable for us.” “Growing frustration,” Mr. Trump wrote, “is not confined to our executive branch. The United States Congress is concerned, as well.” The president's complaint is that many NATO allies are not living up to the commitment they made at their Wales summit meeting in 2014 to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product on national defense. American presidents have long complained about the lack of burden-sharing by NATO member countries, but Mr. Trump has taken that criticism much further, claiming that some of the United States' closest allies are essentially deadbeats who have failed to pay debts to the organization, a fundamental misunderstanding of how it functions. The Trump administration has already reportedly been analyzing a large-scale withdrawal of American forces from Germany, after Mr. Trump expressed surprise that 35,000 active-duty troops are stationed there and complained that NATO countries were not contributing enough to the alliance. In the letter, Mr. Trump told Ms. Merkel that Germany also deserves blame for the failure of other NATO countries to spend enough: “Continued German underspending on defense undermines the security of the alliance and provides validation for other allies that also do not plan to meet their military spending commitments, because others see you as a role model.” In language that is echoed in his letters to the leaders of other countries — including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada, Prime Minister Erna Solberg of Norway and Prime Minister Charles Michel of Belgium — Mr. Trump said he understands the “domestic political pressure” brought to bear by opponents of boosting military expenditures, noting that he has expended “considerable political capital to increase our own military spending.” “It will, however, become increasingly difficult to justify to American citizens why some countries do not share NATO's collective security burden while American soldiers continue to sacrifice their lives overseas or come home gravely wounded,” Mr. Trump wrote to Ms. Merkel. Mr. Michel reacted tartly last week to the letter, telling reporters at a European Union summit meeting in Brussels that he was “not very impressed” by it, according to a report by Deutsche Welle. Mr. Trump has long complained about the alliance and routinely grouses that the United States is treated shabbily by multilateral organizations of which it is a member, be it the World Trade Organization or the North Atlantic alliance. But in Europe, the letters to NATO allies have been greeted with some degree of alarm because of their suggestion that Mr. Trump is prepared to impose consequences on the allies — as he has done in an escalating tariff fight with European trading partners — if they do not do what he is asking. “Trump still seems to think that NATO is like a club that you owe dues to, or some sort of protection racket where the U.S. is doing all the work protecting all these deadbeat Europeans while they're sitting around on vacation, and now he is suggesting there are consequences,” said Derek Chollet, a former Defense Department official who is the executive vice president for security and defense policy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “Europeans have been watching Donald Trump begin to implement his rhetoric on trade in ways that are very combative,” he said, “and they're starting to contemplate whether he would do this regarding security issues, as well.” Mr. Trump's letter to Mr. Trudeau was reported last month by iPolitics in Canada, and the existence of others was reported last week by Foreign Policy. It was not clear precisely how many Mr. Trump wrote, and the White House would not comment on presidential correspondence. But two diplomatic sources said they believed at least a dozen were sent, including to Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. A White House official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the official was not authorized to discuss the matter, said that Mr. Trump is committed to the NATO alliance and expects allies to shoulder “their fair share of our common defense burden, and to do more in areas that most affect them.” John R. Bolton, Mr. Trump's national security adviser, said Sunday that it was NATO members who refused to spend more on defense — not the president — who were responsible for undercutting the alliance. “The president wants a strong NATO,” Mr. Bolton said in an interview on CBS's “Face the Nation.” “If you think Russia's a threat, ask yourself this question: Why is Germany spending less than 1.2 percent of its G.N.P.? When people talk about undermining the NATO alliance, you should look at those who are carrying out steps that make NATO less effective militarily.” But for diplomats hoping fervently to avoid another high-profile summit meeting collapse with Mr. Trump as the instigator, the letters were concerning. “Europeans, like many folks in our Defense Department, think that there are many good things that could come out of this summit if only they can keep it from going off the rails,” Mr. Chollet said. “They are hoping to survive without irreparable damage, and so the fact that you have all these storm clouds surrounding NATO and Trump is really worrisome.” Mr. Trump's disparagement of Europe and the alliance has become almost routine, leaving some veteran diplomats aghast. Last week, Jim Melville, the United States ambassador to Estonia, told friends and colleagues that he would resign at the end of this month after more than 30 years in the Foreign Service, in part because of the president's language. “For the President to say the E.U. was ‘set up to take advantage of the United States, to attack our piggy bank,' or that ‘NATO is as bad as NAFTA' is not only factually wrong, but proves to me that it's time to go,” Mr. Melville wrote in a Facebook post. He was referring to remarks about Europe that the president made during a rally last week in Fargo, N.D., and comments about NATO that he is reported to have made privately during the Group of 7 gathering. Still, the president is not alone in demanding more robust military spending by NATO allies. Jim Mattis, the secretary of defense, wrote to Gavin Williamson, the British defense minister, last month saying he was “concerned” that the United Kingdom's military strength was “at risk of erosion” if it did not increase spending, and warned that France could eclipse Britain as the United States' “partner of choice” if it did not invest more. A United States official confirmed the contents of Mr. Mattis's letter, first reported by The Sun. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/europe/trump-nato.html