October 27, 2022 | International, C4ISR
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March 13, 2018 | International, Aerospace
Air Force orders freeze on public outreach
By: Valerie Insinna , David B. Larter , and Aaron Mehta
WASHINGTON — The Air Force is slashing access to media embeds, base visits and interviews as it seeks to put the entire public affairs apparatus through retraining — a move it says is necessary for operational security, but one which could lead to a broader freeze in how the service interacts with the public.
According to March 1 guidance obtained by Defense News, public affairs officials and commanders down to the wing level must go through new training on how to avoid divulging sensitive information before being allowed to interact with the press.
The effort, which represents the third major Defense Department entity to push out guidance restricting public communication over the past 18 months, creates a massive information bureaucracy in which even the most benign human-interest stories must be cleared at the four-star command level.
Before settling on retraining its public affairs corps and commanders, the service considered an even more drastic step: shutting down all engagement with the press for a 120-day period, a source with knowledge of the discussions said.
Instead, the service settled on the retraining plan, a temporary move which Brig. Gen. Ed Thomas, director of public affairs, said could be completed “in the coming weeks.”
“In today's challenging information environment marked by great power competition, we will continue to be as transparent with the American public as possible while protecting sensitive information on our operations and capabilities,” Thomas told Defense News. “We owe both to the public, and it is vitally important for the public to understand what we are doing on their behalf and with their tax dollars.”
But two former Air Force secretaries and an influential congressman all raise the same concern: that intentionally or not, this will send a message that engaging with the public simply isn't worth the risk.
Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., told Defense News the memo fits into a trend of recent moves inside the Defense Department towards less transparency, which could ultimately undermine DoD's efforts to address long-standing problems. Gallagher serves on the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, which oversees several key Air Force programs like the B-21 bomber.
“I fully support the National Defense Strategy's focus on great power competition,” Gallagher told Defense News, “but I think the department has it backwards; It is precisely because of the scale of the challenges before us that transparency is more important than ever. I worry that by failing to discuss problems, we will only ensure there is no public pressure to fix them.”
Shrinking Air Force access
The renewed focus on operational security stems from the Trump administration's recently released national defense strategy, according to the Air Force guidance. That document, which was marked as “for official use only,” was distributed to public affairs officials following a February 2018 memo on operational security signed by Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson and Chief of Staff Gen. Dave Goldfein.
“As we engage the public, we must avoid giving insights to our adversaries which could erode military advantage,” the March 2018 guidance read. “We must now adapt to the reemergence of great power competition and the reality that our adversaries are learning from what we say in public.”
Until wing-level spokesmen have been certified by their corresponding major command, responses to reporter queries that potentially could include details about “operations, training or exercises, readiness or other issues which may reveal operational information to potential adversaries” are subject to approval by the Air Force's public affairs headquarters at the Pentagon, known as Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs or SAF/PA. Exceptions can be made for human interest stories, community engagement pieces or other lighter, fluffier news, which can be approved by major command public officials.
What this means is that if public affairs officials at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas haven't received their training, a local story about military working dogs would need the approval of Air Education and Training Command before being allowed to proceed with an interview or any engagement.
Beyond limiting the Air Force's interactions with journalists, the new guidelines pose new restrictions on public appearances such as air show demonstrations, trade shows, industry conferences and think tank events, which can move forward if authorized by SAF/PA's engagement division.
And although Air Force band performances will be permitted to continue, all band members who interact with the media must receive training from public affairs.
Exactly what constitutes sensitive information is unclear. The Air Force's guidance lays out “potential engagement areas” alongside topics that could possibly pose “operational security risks.” Classified information and vulnerabilities are included in the latter area, but so are details about flag exercises, the number and location of operational assets, or information related to current readiness — some of which are routinely shared with the public.
The guidance notes that “neither list is all inclusive,” and that public affairs professionals “use sound discretion and exercise discretion when evaluating all engagement opportunities.”
Pausing a turnaround
The guidance comes as the Air Force was finally repairing a damaged public affairs reputation. The service infamously clamped down on talking after the 2008 firing of both its chief of staff and service secretary, which had a chilling effect across the service.
The situation culminated in a 2016 informal poll by Foreign Policy magazine, which found reporters ranking the Air Force as the worst service to deal with. That result resonated heavily within Air Force leadership, triggering promises of more open lines of communication.
Deborah Lee James, Wilson's predecessor as Air Force secretary, told Defense News it was her belief the service needs to be more open, not less.
“I have not seen the memo. However, I am sorry to hear about this development. If true, it certainly runs against the grain for what I tried to do as secretary of the Air Force,” James said. “Sometimes there's positive news to talk about, and our airmen can be the best communicators. Sometimes there's negative news to talk about. But much better that we be the ones to describe that news and frame it for the American people.”
Whit Peters, who from 1997-2001 served as both Air Force secretary and undersecretary, acknowledged there are times when the military needs to keep information back for security reasons. He said the memo restrictions remind him of the way the service handled information during the conflict in Bosnia. But he also warned the memo may have a chilling effect far beyond its printed text.
“The penumbra of this memo is worse than the memo itself. If you're already an Air Force officer, who is disinclined to talk to the press, this just gives you one more reason to think it is not career enhancing to talk to the press,” Peters said. “And that is unfortunate because the Air Force at all levels needs to be talking to the American public about what a valuable service it provides.”
“I still think the Air Force does not do enough publicly to explain its mission and to explain why it needs to rejuvenate its whole fleet, both in air and space,” Peters continued. “So I would hope this doesn't get in the way of the Air Force telling its story on why it's important, and why it needs to be funded by the taxpayers.”
The Navy: A Case Study
A test case for the potential impact of the memo can be seen in the recent status of the Navy.
In March 2017, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson issued a memo that directed admirals to continue to engage with the media. But it also implored Navy officials not to give “too much” information — even unclassified information — in a public setting.
“When it comes to specific operational capabilities however, very often less is more,” he said in the memo. “Sharing information about future operations and capabilities, even at the unclassified level, makes it easier for potential adversaries to gain an advantage.”
The memo, which was broad and lacked specific guidance, created a persistent atmosphere of uncertainty throughout the Navy where leaders and program managers have been unsure about what they can talk about and what they can't.
And last October, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis released a memo calling for employees to be “vigilant” in preventing leaks.
“It is a violation of our oath to divulge, in any fashion, non-public DoD information, classified or unclassified, to anyone without the required security clearance as well as a specific need to know in the performance of their duties,” he said.
The information chill both inside the Navy and DoDwide has been noticed by lawmakers, who have called on the military to err on the side of transparency.
Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., discusses the budget and transparency at the Surface Navy Association's annual symposium on Jan. 10, 2018.
At a Navy conference in January, Gallagher dismissed Richardson's concerns about giving away secrets in the press, arguing that if the Navy doesn't talk about what it's doing, members of Congress can't convince their fellow members not on defense committees, let alone their constituents, that more resources are necessary.
“Despite the old adage that ‘loose lips sink ships,' non-existent strategic communications can sink entire navies,” he continued. “If the bias is towards silence to prevent adversaries from finding out about unique capabilities or potential weaknesses: guess what, there will never be a public constituency for acquiring or mitigating them.
“And, oh by the way, our adversaries probably have a decent idea of what we're up to anyways.”
The powerful chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), spoke out in January as well, saying that while secrecy is important, so is transparency, saying it makes a difference in DoD's bottom line.
“As we've talked before, some of the folks in DoD are reluctant to talk too openly about our shortfalls because you're broadcasting that to your potential adversaries,” Thornberry said. “And I admit, it's a fine balance. But if we're going to convince my colleagues who are not on this committee, as well as the American people, to fix these things, I think we do have to at least talk somewhat openly about what our problems are.”
https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2018/03/13/air-force-orders-freeze-on-public-outreach/
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September 4, 2018 | International, Land, C4ISR
New military drone roadmap ambivalent on killer robots
By: Kelsey Atherton Drones are everywhere in the Pentagon today. While unpeopled vehicles are most closely associated with the Air Force and targeted killing campaigns, remotely controlled robots are in every branch of the military and used across all combatant commands. The fiscal year 2018 defense authorization contained the largest budget for drones and robots across the services ever, a sign of just how much of modern warfare involves these machines. Which is perhaps why, when the Department of Defense released its latest roadmap for unmanned systems, the map came in at a punchy 60 pages, far shy of the 160-page tome released in 2013. This is a document less about a military imagining a future of flying robots and more about managing a present that includes them. The normalization of battlefield robots Promised since at least spring 2017, the new roadmap focuses on interoperability, autonomy, network security and human-machine collaboration. The future of drones, and of unpeopled ground vehicles or water vehicles, is as tools that anyone can use, that can do most of what is asked of them on their own, that communicate without giving away the information they are sharing, and that will work to make the humans using the machines function as more-than-human. This is about a normalization of battlefield robots, the same way that mechanized warfare moved from a theoretical approach to the standard style of fighting by nations a few generations ago. Network security isn't as flashy a highlight as “unprecedented battlefield surveillance by flying robot,” but it's part of making sure that those flying cameras don't, say, transmit easily intercepted data over an open channel. “Future warfare will hinge on critical and efficient interactions between war-fighting systems,” states the roadmap. “This interoperable foundation will transmit timely information between information gatherers, decision makers, planners and war fighters.” A network is nothing without its nodes, and the nodes that need to be interoperable here are a vast web of sensors and weapons, distributed among people and machines, that will have to work in concert in order to be worth the networking at all. The very nature of war trends toward pulling apart networks, toward isolation. Those nodes each become a point at which a network can be broken, unless they are redundant or autonomous. Where will the lethal decision lie? Nestled in the section on autonomy, the other signpost feature of the Pentagon's roadmap, is a small chart about the way forward. In that chart is a little box labeled “weaponization,” and in that box it says the near-term goals are DoD strategy assessment and lethal autonomous weapon systems assessment. Lethal autonomous weapon systems are of such international concern that there is a meeting of state dignitaries and humanitarian officials in Geneva happening at the exact moment this roadmap was released. That intergovernmental body is hoping to decide whether or not militaries will develop robots that can kill of their own volition, according to however they've been programmed. The Pentagon, at least in the roadmap, seems content to wait for its own assessment and the verdict of the international community before developing thinking weapons. Hedging on this, the same chart lists “Armed Wingman/Teammate (Human decision to engage)” as the goal for somewhere between 2029 and 2042. “Unmanned systems with integrated AI, acting as a wingman or teammate with lethal armament could perform the vast majority of the actions associated with target identification,tracking, threat prioritization, and post-attack assessment," reads the report. "This level of automation will alleviate the human operator of task-level activities associated with the engagement of a target, allowing the operator to focus on the identified threat and the decision to engage.” The roadmap sketches out a vision of future war that hands off many decisions to autonomous machines, everything from detection to targeting, then loops the lethal decision back to a human responsible for making the call on whether or not the robot should use its weapons on the targets it selected. Humans as battlefield bot-shepards, guiding autonomous machines into combat and signing off on the exact attacks, is a possible future for robots in war, one that likely skirts within the boundaries of still-unsettled international law. Like its predecessor, this drone roadmap is plotting a rough path through newly charted territory. While it leans heavily on the lessons of the present, the roadmap doesn't attempt to answer on its own the biggest questions of what robots will be doing on the battlefields of tomorrow. That is, fundamentally, a political question, and one that much of the American public itself doesn't yet have strong feelings about. https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2018/08/31/new-military-drone-roadmap-ambivalent-on-killer-robots
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June 26, 2018 | International, Aerospace
B-21 Bomber Critical Design Review by End of Year
JOHN A. TIRPAK The secret B-21 bomber will progress to a major milestone—critical design review—by the end of this year, Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office director Randall Walden said Monday. Walden also revealed that the B-21 is merely one of 28 programs being managed by the RCO, which he noted is funded at about $30 billion over the five-year future year defense plan. Walden, speaking at an AFA Mitchell Institute event in Arlington, Va., said the B-21 has already passed its preliminary design review, and noted that the release of drawings for the bomber is progressing well. As for critical design review, "we haven't done it, but we're on our way," and he predicted it would happen by the end of December. Major design work on the bomber is taking place at Northrop Grumman's Melbourne, Fla., facility. He acknowledged that subscale models of the aircraft have been tested in wind tunnels, but said no full-size version has yet been fabricated. "Component testing" is moving along at an "appropriate" speed, he said. "We're looking forward to ... an 'on-time' start of production," Walden said. Walden has spoken publicly about the RCO in a number of venues, but was more forthcoming than usual about the organization and its products at the Mitchell event. Of the 28 projects in the RCO's portfolio, 13 are "ACAT 1," he noted, meaning they are major defense acquisition programs, which usually means a major platform, like an aircraft, missile, or command and control system. While Walden would only identify the B-21 and X-37 orbital vehicle among those that the RCO is working on, he said the majority of the rest could best be characterized as "family of systems" projects. Interestingly, Walden said the RCO has not been called on to undertake any hypersonics programs. The Air Force is pursuing hypersonics projects with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the other services are conducting independent research in the field. Walden said the RCO has about 220 people, who are headquartered at JB Anacostia-Bolling, in Washington, D.C. Among them are experts from the line Air Force who are "embedded" with programs to offer operator advice on design and development. Four bomber pilots are attached to the RCO to advise on the B-21's development, he noted. The B-21 program manager—who Walden did not name—has had experience with management of the F-22 and F-35 programs, he said. The B-21 program has long been scheduled to produce a "usable asset" in the 2024 timeframe, according to comments offered by Air Force officials for the last three years. Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va.), chair of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces panel, revealed in March that problems had arisen with airflow to the B-21's engines, and Walden said Monday that these had been resolved. "Complex weapon systems, especially engine integrations, ... you've got to get throat sizes done right, prior to anything being built" he said, referring to the serpentine tunnels by which air reaches the B-21's engines, which are buried in the fuselage. The RCO obtained "insight from actual lab testing" and found the optimal solution, he said. The RCO has been asked to help with the set-up of a dedicated "Space RCO" at the Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles AFB, Calif., and Walden said he has recommended veterans of his own shop to run it, especially those who have worked on space systems, and they have been hired, he said. Walden resisted allowing his own people to be hired away for the new organization, he said. Walden was asked whether the RCO is working on a successor platform to the X-37, and although he did not reply directly, he did say that it is "no different from any other system, ... it starts to get old," and there begin to emerge problems with vanishing vendors and parts obsolescence. However, he forecast no "big change" in that program in the near future. The X-37 tends to fly two-year missions, and various agencies that use the data collected from it are very happy with its activities, he said. Walden told Air Force Magazine he is not experiencing trouble obtaining the workforce he requires, but he said he's aware that major vendors are experiencing difficulties hiring all the engineering and especially software talent needed to execute the Air Force's array of high-tech projects. He also reported that the RCO's experience with protests—wherein a contractor not selected for a program complains that the judging was not fair—is no worse, and probably somewhat better, than that experienced by the Air Force in its "white world," or non-secret programs. Commenting on the "culture" of the RCO, Walden said it is largely based on the Lockheed "Skunk Works" model of small teams with tightly defined objectives and a vastly shortened reporting chain. Where the RCO saves time and money is usually in the area of "deciding to do" something and not going into endless coordination efforts. The RCO can save two to three years on a project simply by having the authority to make decisions, Walden said, avoiding "the tyranny of consensus." It reports to an executive committee comprised of the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the service's acquisition executive, and the Pentagon's acquisition chief. It's not possible to rush the development of, say, an aircraft, he said, noting that basic design must be gotten right or problems are inevitable later on. It takes about three years at a minimum to develop a design, he said. Asked whether the RCO can provide a model to the overall acquisition system, Walden said it can be applied to a degree, but there is the risk that the organization could get too big. "There is a knee in the curve. I can't tell you" what it is, he said, but at a certain size, an RCO-like acquisition agency would no longer be able to do things rapidly. The value of something of constrained size, like the RCO, is to "make a decision, get on contract," Walden said. The mainstream acquisition system takes "an inordinate amount of time" on those two steps. An analysis of alternatives can take up to three years and "sometimes no one makes a decision," Walden said. Walden insisted the RCO is fully observant of the 5000-series of acquisition regulations, but makes a careful review of them on all its efforts and works to "avoid" the ones that don't really affect its programs. He also said the organization turns away many people who want to be involved in overseeing or getting briefed on RCO activities unless they are required under regulations. Even so, he said the RCO has a good relationship with Congress because it tries to be transparent with members, and even when it runs into problems, people on Capitol Hill "want to help." He added that the Pentagon's "risk-averse" acquisition process took many years to get that way and reversing that mindset to one of risk-taking and experimentation will not happen quickly. http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2018/June%202018/B-21-Bomber-Critical-Design-Review-by-End-of-Year.aspx