Canada now has its own history of the Afghan war — good luck finding a copy | CBC News

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  May 19, 2020 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  COVID-19 MAY WELL BE THE END OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES AS WE HAVE KNOWN THEM…AND OF OUR EFFECTIVE SOVEREIGNTY

  The lesson from this history is simple. Cutting defence spending in times of austerity is a bipartisan affair in Canada. This is owing less to politics than arithmetic. DND's budget –which typically ranges from 1/5 to 1/4 of total federal departmental discretionary spending –is too big to be excluded from any serious spending restraint initiative. This is well understood by Liberals, Conservatives and the Finance Department. The COVID-19 Recession and its Impact No one knows how deep or how long the COVID-19-induced recession will be. But every serious analyst agrees it will produce the sharpest drop in output since the Great Depression. The International Monetary Fund, for example, projects a 6.2 per cent annualized decline in GDP for Canada,1nearly double that of the 2009 recession. And already the government's fiscal response is without precedent and will lead to the largest deficit in postwar Canadian history (at least 10 per cent of GDP, or over $200 billion). This does not mean that Ottawa will snap into austerity mode next year. The economy will likely be too weak for that kind of action and cutting government spending is not in the Trudeau government's DNA to begin with... One big difference between now and the past is that there will be enormous pressure on Ottawa after the recession to boost spending in a wide range of areas which have been exposed in the pandemic. These include public health funding, medical research, pandemic prevention and mitigation, the social safety net, and industries particularly hard hit during the recession. There are also Liberal election campaign commitments from 2019 to honour –almost none of which had been implemented pre-pandemic –of which national defence is conspicuously absent. ...this could produce a perfect storm for Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE). This was always a big risk associated with a defence policy that had its funding ramped up gradually over many years. As the Harper government amply demonstrated, it is relatively easy to reduce or eliminate the rate of planned increases to defence funding –the government took almost no flak for doing so in 2010. Making matters worse, DND has failed to come anywhere near meeting the spending trajectory profiled in SSE, as David Perry has analyzed thoroughly. Which means flattening DND's budget ramp is even more tempting for any government in austerity or even re-prioritization mode. Would a change in government matter here? Unlikely. While the Conservatives are more committed to national defence and the Canadian Armed Forces than the Liberals, they would likely see deficit reduction as their top priority, and it is virtually impossible to have meaningful expenditure restraint that doesn't involve national defence [what the Harper government did from 2010 on]. Conclusion Over the past generation, recessions and the fiscal consolidation that has followed them have had a seriously negative impact on DND's budget. The COVID-19 recession could be the most severe Canada has faced in at least 40 years. It has already resulted in the largest peacetime deficit in Canadian history. And, because of the pandemic, government priorities have changed radically overnight. The future for SSE and its associated funding does not look bright. National Defence probably has a year or two before the crunch hits. Now is therefore the time for strategic thinking and serious priority setting among the political, public service and miitary leadership to ensure that the 2020s don't become another decade of darkness. Eugene Lang is Adjunct Professor, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute. He was chief of staff to two ministers of National Defence in the Chrétien and Martin governments and served as an official in the Department of Finance. The 2020s most certainly will be “another decade of darkness”. It is not improbable that the Canadian military, if the Liberals win the next election, will effectively end up as a constabulary/militia force with domestic response to natural disasters of various sorts as its primary function along with very token commitments to UN peacekeeping missions. Bye bye to serious numbers of new RCAF fighters, to serious numbers of new RCN frigates, and to the needed large funding to renew NORAD's North Warning System [see this post: “So Will the Canadian Government Put Some Big Bucks into Modernizing NORAD's North Warning System?“]. And bye bye to any meaningful military participation in NATO. Canada will then finally be defenceless against help from the US ( the following quote is from the last sentence of this earlier CGAI paper's Executive Summary: “Throughout its 60-year existence, NORAD has been Canada's “defence against help.”). Any American administration will have no hesitation in demanding the use of Canadian territory and waters for its own defence purposes if our efforts fall well below what the US thinks necessary. US Air Force bases at Cold Lake, Yellowknife, Goose Bay and a US Navy one at St. John's anyone? Take a look at this as an example of an increasingly prevalent Canadian progressive view; and Justin Trudeau's “base” is progressive to the max: Spending $19 billion on fighter jets won't fight COVID-19 or climate change Instead of buying a new weapons system, the federal government should disarm and invest in a Green New Deal There it is. Plus earlier from Mr Lang: Is the “business Liberal” extinct? By the way the photo at the top of the post is of the Avro CF-100 Canuck interceptor, the first jet fighter developed in Canada–to defend against Soviet bombers...and US help. Mark Collins

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  June 13, 2019 | Local, Security, Other Defence

  Canada should think again about having the ability to use offensive cyber weapons: Expert

  Howard Solomon Canada's electronic spy agency will soon get new authority to launch cyber attacks if the government approves legislation that is in the final stages of being debated. There's a good chance it will be proclaimed before the October federal election. But a discussion paper issued Wednesday by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute says Canadians need to debate the pros and cons of using this new power. “This direction not only opens up new possibilities for Canadian defence, it could also represent significant new risks,” says the report. “Without good answers to the difficult questions this new direction could raise, the country could be headed down a very precarious path.” Among the possible problems: Cyber retaliation. Another: While Canada might try to target a cyber attack, the impact might be bigger than expected — in fact, it might boomerang and smack us back. Third is the lack of international agreement on the use of cyber weapons (although this is a double-edged sword: Without an agreement there are no formal limits on what any country is forbidden from doing in cyberspace). “To move forward at this point to implement or even formally endorse a strategy of cyber attack would be risky and premature,” concludes the report's author, computer science professor Ken Barker, who also heads the University of Calgary's Institute for Security, Privacy and Information Assurance. “There are challenging technical controls that must be put in place as well as a critical international discussion on how cyber weaponry fits within the rules of war.” Barker's paper is in response to the 2017 strategy setting out Defence Department goals, where the possibility of Canada having a cyber attack capability first raised. It wasn't written with Bill C-59 in mind — now in its final stage before Parliament — which actually gives Canada's electronic spy agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the power to use what's called “active” as well as defensive cyber operations. In an interview Tuesday, Barker said “in the desire to push this thing they need to have more carefully thought about the questions I raise in this paper.” “Maybe it's late, but at least it's available.” He dismisses the argument that by announcing it has an offensive cyber capability Canada will cause other countries to think twice about attacking us with cyber weapons. “They would attempt to find out what Canada is doing to create cyber attack capabilities,” he argued. “One of the risks once we do endorse this,” he added, “is we open ourselves up to other countries to using Canada as a launching pad for cyber attacks to cover up their involvement, and [then] say ‘That was done by Canada.'” Nation states are already active in cyberspace. Ottawa has blamed China for the 2014 hack of the National Research Council, Washington suspects China was behind the massive hack of employee files at the Office of Personnel Management, and there is strong evidence that Russia mounted a sophisticated social media attack against the U.S. during the 2016 federal election. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The U.S. the U.K. and Australia say they have used offensive cyber operations against the Islamic State. The U.S.-based Council on Foreign Relations notes that Germany increased its offensive cyber capability after a 2016 attack on the country's legislature blamed on Russia. Last year the New York Times reported the U.S. Cyber Command has been empowered to be more offensive. Meanwhile in April the CSE warned it's “very likely” there will be some form of foreign cyber interference during the run-up to October's federal election here, The most commonly-cited interference in a country were two cyber attacks that knocked out electrical power in Ukraine — in December 2015 and again in December 2016 — largely believed to have been launched from Russia. All this is why some experts say Canada has to have an offensive cyber capability to at least keep up. In January, Ray Boisvert, former assistant director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), told a parliamentary committee that “the best defence always begins with a good offense ... “When more than five dozen countries are rumoured to be developing active cyber capabilities, in my view that means we must develop capabilities to respond and in some cases that includes outside our borders.” Background In 2017 the Trudeau government announced a new defence strategy that included the promise of “conducting active cyber operations against potential adversaries in the context of government-authorized military missions.” The same year the government introduced Bill C-59, which in part would give the CSE, which is responsible for securing government networks, the ability to take action online to defend Canadian networks and proactively stop cyber threats before they reach systems here. This would be done as part of new legislation governing the CSE called the Communications Security Act. That act would give CSE the ability to conduct defensive and “active” cyber operations. Active operations are defined as anything that could “degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.” Both defensive and active cyber operations can't be used against any portion of the global information infrastructure within this country. And they have to be approved by the Minister of Defence. C-59 has been passed by the House of Commons and slightly amended by the Senate. It was scheduled back in the House last night to debate the Senate amendments. Despite all the cyber incidents blamed on nation states, Barker is reluctant to say we're in an era of low-level cyber war right now. Many incidents can be characterized as cyber espionage and not trying cause harm to another state, he argues. https://www.itworldcanada.com/article/canada-should-think-again-about-having-the-ability-to-use-offensive-cyber-weapons-expert/418912

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  November 9, 2020 | Local, Naval

  Canada spending $650 million on U.S. missiles for new warships

  David Pugliese, Ottawa Citizen, Postmedia News (dpugliese@ottawacitizen.com) Published: Nov 06 at 10:29 a.m. Updated: Nov 06 at 7:20 p.m. The Canadian government is spending around $650 million to buy new missiles and launchers from the U.S. for the Royal Canadian Navy. Canada is buying 100 Standard Missile 2 Block IIIC missiles and 100 MK 13 Vertical Launch Systems. The total estimated cost of the purchase is $500 million U.S., according to the U.S. government, which posted details of the deal on Thursday. The U.S. State Department announced it had approved the pending sale and Congress has also been notified. It is expected to proceed but there were no details about when the weapons would be delivered. The missiles will be installed on the 15 Canadian Surface Combatant ships, according to the U.S. Raytheon Missiles and Defense of Tucson, Ariz., will build the weapons. Last year the Liberal government signed a deal that would lead to the eventual construction of 15 Canadian Surface Combatant warships in the largest single government purchase in Canadian history. A final contract, however, has not yet been signed. Lockheed Martin offered Canada the Type 26 warship designed by BAE in the United Kingdom. Irving is the prime contractor and the vessels will be built at its east coast shipyard. Construction of the first ship isn't expected to begin until the early 2020s. But the Canadian Surface Combatant program has already faced rising costs. In 2008 the then-Conservative government estimated the project would cost roughly $26 billion. The overall project is currently estimated to cost around $60 billion. The $60 billion price tag is now being examined by the Parliamentary Budget Officer. That report was supposed to be delivered to the House of Commons government operations committee on Oct. 22 but has been delayed. No new date has been provided on when the report will be delivered. “Approximately one-half of the CSC build cost is comprised of labour in the (Irving's) Halifax yard and materials,” according to federal government documents obtained by this newspaper through the Access the Information law. But some members of parliament as well as industry representatives have questioned whether the CSC cost is too high. There have been suggestions that Canada could dump the Type 26 design and go for a cheaper alternative since the project is still in early stages and costs to withdraw could be covered by savings from a less inexpensive ship. In 2017 then Parliamentary Budget Officer Jean-Denis Fréchette, estimated the CSC program would cost $61.82 billion. The entry of the BAE Type 26 warship in the Canadian competition was controversial from the start and sparked complaints the procurement process was skewed to favour that vessel. Previously the Liberal government had said only mature existing designs or designs of ships already in service with other navies would be accepted, on the grounds they could be built faster and would be less risky. Unproven designs can face challenges as problems are found once the vessel is in the water and operating. But the criteria was changed and the government and Irving accepted the BAE design, though at the time it existed only on the drawing board. Construction began on the first Type 26 frigate in the summer of 2017 for Britain's Royal Navy. Copyright Postmedia Network Inc., 2020 https://www.thetelegram.com/news/canada/canada-spending-650-million-on-us-missiles-for-new-warships-517604/