Biden's proposed $2-trillion stimulus will spill over into Canada '€” but it could also hurt our competitiveness

On the same subject

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  January 21, 2024 | International, Land

  UK to upgrade warship defence missile system used in Red Sea

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  April 28, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  What the Pentagon should (and should not) get in the next stimulus bill

  By: Mackenzie Eaglen As Washington begins to draft another stimulus spending bill to combat coronavirus, the Pentagon needs a new plan to articulate its needs to lawmakers. Simply submitting unfunded lists whole cloth comes across as tone deaf and opportunistic. A better plan would be to focus on the health, safety and continuity of all the Pentagon's workforce: uniformed, civilian and contractor. Capitol Hill is (virtually) busy as ever these days, completing another injection of funds into the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act last week. Congress and the White House will now begin formulating a phase 4 bill. President Donald Trump and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi have indicated they would both like to see domestic infrastructure spending inside. Negotiations are just beginning, but this bill will open the spending aperture compared to the CARES Act. For national defense, this legislation must focus on taking care of people and protecting jobs. Even as the U.S. military mobilizes to support the fight against COVID-19, the disease is hitting the Defense Department and its workforce much the same as the rest of America. The first order of business is for the Pentagon to ensure health and wellness for service members, their families, civilians and contractors by encouraging safe and flexible work policies. The Pentagon will need additional funding to pay for COVID-19 support deployments, mitigate the effects of stop-movement orders, increase the availability of personal protective equipment and sanitation, and expand its IT infrastructure for telework. Second, Congress and the Pentagon should provide financial assistance to the thousands of small businesses, subcontractors and suppliers to defense contractors building weapons, conducting maintenance or developing classified software. The defense-industrial base is built for maximum efficiency, not resiliency. Even seemingly minor production pauses of weeks are combining with broader quarantine restrictions to wreak havoc on program schedules. While the Pentagon has many tools at its disposal — accelerating awards and progress payments as well as lifting contracting restrictions — the acquisition team simply cannot respond to this crisis without more resources available. Absent additional liquidity, contractors face the impossible choice between letting workers go or facing the reality that they will have no jobs to return to. Small businesses and subcontractors are particularly vulnerable, as they have far less slack to respond to crises. Many live contract to contract, as indicated by a 2018 Department of Defense report on industrial base fragility. These small firms providing needed materials, labor and technology to companies designated as “essential” are struggling with COVID like everyone else. Their employees are either afraid to come to work out of fear of contraction and contagion, or they're sick with the virus. The vicious cycle — where people want to work but can't — means schedules slip. If there is no work, there is no revenue, which means layoffs. Already around the country, a major defense contractor had to shut down two plants; a shipbuilder is struggling to get employees to show up; another defense firm has laid off employees; and still others can't get to work because classified spaces are off limits. To ensure workforces remain intact, lawmakers need to move quickly to pay contractors who cannot work because of COVID-19 effects, as delays are now averaging three months. Fixing this is as simple as measuring the impact of COVID-19 on contracts and ensuring a reasonable payment for that delay, which will be billions of dollars, according to acquisition czar Ellen Lord. It's no different than legal remedies for “acts of God.” Also, the DoD can consider a subset of its unfunded priorities list to get projects on contract that are executable very quickly and inject liquidity into the defense contractor workforce. These unfunded priorities run the gamut, from weapons production to software development. Similarly, there are always “incremental” projects that can be accelerated, like facilities sustainment and depot maintenance. Using unfunded priorities to inject liquidity into the defense-industrial base isn't the ideal tool, but all options must be brought to bear to deal with this crisis. The majority of defense dollars allocated to the big prime contractors go back out the door to their suppliers and vendors — many of which are small businesses. While many of the easiest financial levers to pull involve getting contracts to primes, Congress and the Pentagon need to emphasize that this money — whether it be new contracts, accelerated contracts or increased progress payments — must be passed on to major suppliers and subcontractors. If the behemoths of defense industry don't share the wealth and take care of their supply chain, there won't be more money, contracts or authority for additional progress payments from Congress. Contractor leadership must take care of workers — including those of its vendors. Lastly, Congress can provide Defense Production Act Title III funding to directly target injections of cash to the emergent needs of small businesses and subcontractors, including many up-and-coming innovative firms and single-source suppliers. So far, DPA funding has been focused on contracting for additional personal protective equipment, but the DPA was equally built to protect the defense-industrial base. The industrial base was already hurt by the Budget Control Act, and it's been busy rebuilding under Trump, only to get whacked again by COVID-19. Employees need to know the work is there, their safety is a priority and their jobs are safe. If the Pentagon and primes don't take care of their suppliers and subcontractors, the defense-industrial base will contract again, losing crucial skills and talents permanently — and possibly seeing those companies bought up by China. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/27/what-the-pentagon-should-and-should-not-get-in-the-next-stimulus-bill/

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  November 13, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land

  A new future in global arms sales?

  By: Jill Aitoro The last few years have seen a subtle transition in how the U.S., as the world's dominant arms exporter, markets to the world. Consider what we already know. In Europe, there's an expectation to filter more to local firms, whether through co-development or direct buys. There's also demand for greater access into U.S. programs, and for that access to be on a level playing field. And then there's South Korea, now calling for foreign contractors to engage with domestic small and medium-sized enterprises. Financial support for its companies is important, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, but so is guidance that helps identify technologies that will make those domestic companies more marketable. Call it a mentorship of sorts. Look to Middle Eastern countries and we've historically seen more financial offsets: expectations to create jobs at home to improve the economy, grow skilled labor and expand infrastructure. That's the same in northern Africa. But with oil no longer a reliable source of revenue for the region, the expectations are shifting. The Middle East wants to build a new industry, and with billions of dollars in arms sales at stake for the U.S. and Western allies, the region also knows full well that it holds some powerful cards to play. It's that question that drove the shift in Europe: “We're buying from you, so why can't you buy more from us? And by the way, politically speaking, we're pretty important.” All this to say that the emerging visions in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have some teeth. And it can, therefore, shape how the Pentagon, American defense giants and global allies for that matter handle arms sales. Consider a couple of the more recent developments. The UAE launched a government-owned company with a combined annual revenue of $5 billion known as Edge, established with a core mandate “to disrupt an antiquated military industry generally stifled by red tape,” according to its CEO. Falling under Edge are now 25 companies that before were quite small in revenue and global market share, but together hold significant buying power: NIMR, AMMROC and Abu Dhabi Ship Building to name a few. Not only do these companies become more formidable players on the global stage, but Edge suddenly carries with it significant negotiation power. Sales to the UAE could bring newfound expectations for partnerships, for stakes in programs. Then consider Saudi Arabia, which established the Saudi Arabian Military Industries, or SAMI, for essentially the same reason. It also modeled the structure off of other countries with established defense industries — Turkey, South Korea, South Africa and some Western countries, among others. SAMI's stated goal is to become one of the largest 25 defense companies in the world by 2030 and to have export account for 30 percent of its business. So what might this mean for how the U.S. works with the Middle East? Major primes have cheered the formation of these holding companies. But make no mistake: Those primes recognize that the holding companies also pose a threat to the status quo. A simple model of just selling systems into the region likely won't fly, nor will teaming on a particular competition necessarily be enough. Boeing formed a joint venture with SAMI, for example, recognizing the need to commit long term. Also consider what SAMI CEO Andreas Schwer stated to be his asks of the U.S. and allies when I interviewed him last year: “If there was a wish, we would love to get more access to top-class technologies from all the U.S. partners. There are obviously limitations, which we are suffering from. That's the one element. So be a little bit more open. And second, export in arms and weapons was driven by FMS [Foreign Military Sales] programs. In our new setup in Saudi Arabia, we will do more and more in direct commercial sales.” Let's be realistic — that could change things. https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2019/11/11/a-new-future-in-global-arms-sales/