August 3, 2022 | Local, Aerospace
Snowbirds won't take flight as military investigators look into cause of crash
There is no timeline for how long the aircraft will be on the sidelines, according to the Department of National Defence
May 10, 2019 | Local, Aerospace
ASSESSING THE DAMAGE FROM CANADA’S FIGHTER REPLACEMENT FIASCO: NEW MLI REPORT
OTTAWA, ON (May 6, 2019): In a hard-hitting new Macdonald-Laurier Institute report, MLI Senior Fellow Richard Shimooka takes a critical look at the government's approach to replacing Canada's aging fleet of CF-18 fighters. In the report, titled The Catastrophe: Assessing the Damage from Canada's Fighter Replacement Fiasco, he argues that Ottawa's performance on this file mirrors the SNC-Lavalin Scandal and the Mark Norman Affair.
“At their heart, these two incidents represent attempts by the Liberal government to circumvent established processes to meet their partisan interests,” Shimooka explains. “This description is just as apt for the fighter program.”
Canada is a participant in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program that has been developing the F-35s. These fighter jets were slotted to replace the RCAF's aging CF-18s, but after the program was mired in political scandal under the previous government, the Liberal government changed plans.
“During the 2015 election campaign, the Liberal Party promised not to buy the F-35 jets, but instead to use a competition to identify and subsequently purchase a lower-cost competitor... this decision proved to be impossible, unethical, and potentially illegal,” writes Shimooka.
From billions of dollars being wasted on a procurement process to fix a contrived capability gap to potentially threatening Canada's defence relationship with the US, the report finds that political interests have consistently been put above Canada's defence needs.
Shimooka argues that “the decisions made [regarding fighter jet replacement] were purely for reasons of political interest: not a single one could be claimed as being in the country's national interest.”
The “fiasco,” as Shimooka describes it, has caught the attention of both Canada's Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and senior US officials. According to documents never before seen by the public, the OAG had specifically cautioned the government against its chosen course of purchasing Australian Hornets as an interim measure in a draft report – and the final OAG report was heavily revised to obscure that recommendation.
Worse still, letters from US officials reveal that “resentment and distrust towards the government of Canada had grown, particularly within the US Air Force.” These letters, which again have not been made public until now, outline the significant strategic and economic benefits that have already been accrued from being part of the JSF Program. Yet they also contain an implicit (but clear) threat that Canada could be kicked out of the Program – if Ottawa continues with its current policy of trying to obtain guaranteed industrial benefits that, by their very nature, are not allowed under the JSF Program.
“There was a complete lack of logic of Canada's policy, which seemed to ignore basic facts about membership in the JSF program, including clear advantages in cost and capability that the F-35 provided.”
Despite these persistent, high-level issues with the government's chosen approach on the fighter jet replacement, the file has avoided serious public scrutiny. Shimooka finds that this happened in large part due to the successful gag orders levelled by the government.
“The government has also suppressed negative viewpoints within and outside the Department of National Defence, allegedly up to and including the deletion of portions of Memos to Cabinet that highlighted why certain decisions should not be taken.”
Moving forward on the file may prove to be difficult; defence procurement woes have plagued Canada since Confederation, and the issues with the fighter jet replacement are deeper than just purchasing the right aircraft. Worse still, Shimooka says that the brunt of the burden of consistently poor decision-making in Ottawa will be borne by the RCAF itself.
“While the negative consequences are clear for Canada as a whole," Shimooka explains, "no community has felt the impact more than the RCAF. As a result of this government's policies, its ability to conduct its most basic function, the defence of Canadian sovereignty and that of our allies, is diminishing rapidly.”
“It is a sad state of affairs.”
To read the commentary in full, click here.
https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/assessing-damage-canadas-fighter-replacement-fiasco-new-mli-report/
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November 5, 2020 | Local, Naval
The Future Canadian Surface Combatant
By Captain Christopher Nucci, Royal Canadian Navy November 2020 Proceedings Vol. 146/11/1,413 Canada is pursuing a single class of 15 surface combatants for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), unlike some of its allies who are building multiple classes of more specialized ships. A single variant Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) is better than the project's original vision of two variants based on a common hull (the first a task group command/air-defense version, the other a more general-purpose/antisubmarine warfare version). While all naval force structure is essentially driven by national strategic defense and security interests, a single-class solution is based on three principal factors. First, it fits best for Canada's unique naval requirements shaped by its geography, modest fleet size, and the RCN's operational needs. Second, it optimizes effectiveness now and into the future, while responsibly seeking maximum cost efficiencies. Finally, it is an innovative approach that has only recently become both practical and advantageous because of recent technological developments, such as convergence and digitization. The General Purpose Warship Moment Naval force planning decisions must coexist in harmony with decisions regarding a navy's overall fleet mix of capital ships, “high-end” surface combatants, “low-end” combatants, and submarines—and the roles of each type.1 In particular, surface combatants have historically fulfilled one or two warfare roles, such as antiair and antisubmarine warfare. Until recently, fielding an affordable “general purpose warship” was too difficult to achieve. The technological limitations of the latter half of the 20th century and into the first decade of the 21st imposed inescapable constraints stemming from the necessary physical size and power requirements of electronics and equipment, along with the expensive and challenging integration of the various single-purpose weapons, sensors, communications, and command-and-control arrangements (as well as the operations and maintenance personnel) required for each role. These limitations could only be surmounted by increasing space, weight, crew size, and the commensurate complexity. As a result, many navies introduced multiple classes of surface combatants to handle the different warfare roles, as well as low-end ships (at less cost) to have sufficient numbers of ships available to respond to contingencies. For the RCN, with a small force of submarines and no capital ships, the approach until now followed this pattern, with the Iroquois-class destroyers focused until their divestment on task group command and area air defense and the more numerous Halifax-class frigates acting as more general-purpose/antisubmarine warfare platforms. Canada's allies have had to confront similar considerations. For example, in the United Kingdom, the number of hulls and capabilities of the Type 26 (the CSC's parent design, known as the Global Combat Ship) are directly connected to the planned acquisition of less-capable Type 31 frigates, the existence of Type 45 antiair-warfare destroyers, a larger submarine fleet, and the importance of capital ships, such as Royal Navy aircraft carriers. For Australia (which is also acquiring the Type 26/GCS-derived Hunter-class), the requirement to protect amphibious ships, more submarines in the fleet, and a separate class of air-warfare destroyers are key factors. Different requirements ultimately lead to different priorities and trade-off decisions, and Canada's circumstances are unlike any others. Canada's Geography, Fleet Size, and Operational Requirements Aside from the overall fleet mix, the other considerations for any state's naval force structure are the geographic factors, overall fleet size, and operational requirements. In Canada's case, unique geography includes the bicoastal nature of the RCN's homeports in Victoria, British Columbia, and Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the tricoastal areas of responsibility in the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic. Each area is very distant from the others, and therefore any timely maritime response generally must come from the closest base. In other words, when you need a ship from the opposite coast for any unexpected reason, it is a long way to go. So, it is best if all ships are equally capable and allocated more or less evenly among homeports. Similarly, the RCN must consider the long-range nature of its ship deployments—even domestic ones—because of the significant distances to anticipated theaters of operation. A single combatant class that can perform a wide range of tasks while remaining deployed best meets this challenge and provides more options to government when far away from homeport. For example, a CSC operating in the Asia-Pacific region as an air-defense platform for an allied amphibious task group can quickly respond to a requirement to hunt an adversary's submarine, if needed. Similarly, assembling a national naval task group of several multirole CSCs in response to a crisis is much more achievable when the RCN can draw from the whole surface combatant fleet to assign ships at the necessary readiness levels. The alternative may not guarantee a sufficient number of specialized variants needed for the task when the call comes. In other words, if any one ship becomes unavailable to perform a task for any reason, there is more depth available in the fleet to fill the gap and complete the mission. Consequently, having more ships of similar capabilities ensures a higher rate of operational availability, which is especially important with the RCN's relatively modest fleet size. For small fleets, a “high/low” mix of warships or multiple classes of more specialized combatants actually constrains operational availability. Cost-Saving Value While increasing complexity would ordinarily imply increasing cost, a single class of ships can actually present opportunities to increase cost efficiency. First, a single class of ships eliminates duplication of fixed program costs such as design and engineering and, during ship construction, further eliminates additional costs derived from retooling and pausing work in the shipyard between the construction of different classes, while achieving better learning curves and lowering overall costs per unit compared with two shorter construction runs. As each ship enters service, a single ship class in sufficient numbers has dedicated supply chains and more efficiency and equipment availability from the provision of common parts (especially given that two allies are procuring additional ships based on the common Type 26/GCS design.) Higher cost efficiencies in maintenance from labor specialization also can be expected, as well as the ability for more efficient repair training and use of required ship repair facilities and equipment. Furthermore, training costs associated with a single class are reduced through the ability to deliver common training modules to a larger student cohort, while simultaneously allowing for deeper knowledge and specialist personnel development among a larger pool of available crew with common qualifications. This latter point cannot be overstated—crew availability is a key requirement for operational availability, and the efficiencies made possible with a single set of common qualifications and training enables a larger pool of available personnel to deploy and more flexibility for sustained operations at the unit level. It includes Royal Canadian Air Force maritime helicopter crews and embarked unmanned systems specialists, as well as Army, special operations forces, and even Royal Canadian Mounted Police personnel in a law enforcement mission who would require no additional conversion training between classes once familiar with the CSC's modular mission bay arrangement or boat launching procedures. An Opportunity Enabled by Modern Technology Compared with a few decades ago, several recent technological developments are making multirole ships much more practical. Information-age innovation is, in essence, enabling all the potential advantages a single class of surface combatants while minimizing the traditional disadvantages. For example, any operations room or bridge display can now easily show video or data feeds from any sensor, weapon, or software support system—convergence. Likewise, instead of several stand-alone unmanned systems controllers, consoles that can control any of the ship's unmanned air, surface, or subsurface system are becoming available. Widespread digitization has reduced space requirements, while increasing system capability, flexibility, and power and cooling efficiency. This miniaturization allows for smaller components that can fit into smaller spaces. Multifunctionality can now be found in all kinds of components. For example, a single digital beam-forming radar can replace multiple traditional radars, software-defined radios can support different communications requirements on the fly, programmable multipurpose weapons can engage more than one kind of target but be fired from a common vertical launcher, and decoy launchers can now deploy a variety of defensive munitions. Multifunctionality even extends beyond individual systems to encompass features like the CSC's modular mission bay—a reconfigurable space able to accommodate and integrate any containerized payload imaginable. With an air-transportable, container-based set of payloads, embarking additional specialized equipment or capabilities into a deployed ship during an overseas port visit can be done in just a few days. These developments enable a single ship to rapidly transition to and execute many naval roles while defending itself against a myriad of threats. Although a ship's overall capacity (e.g., the desired number of crew accommodated, missiles embarked, unmanned systems carried, endurance and seakeeping performance, etc.) will still be constrained by its size, a single ship class can have a full range of capabilities. The CSC balances multirole capabilities with a modest amount of capacity. For example, it has one main gun and 32 vertical-launch cells, one helicopter, one mission bay, one multifunction radar, and the ability to embark approximately 204 personnel for crew and mission personnel. Further technological development and additional advantages will accrue from operating a single ship class, such as those from software development and data analytics. For example, the analysis of detailed technical data, such as system-error codes, from across the entire class in near-real time enables the efficient updating of control software to improve cyber security. Or, consider the ability to perform virtual research and development work on a digital twin of a physical system, such as a gas turbine, to examine performance limitations without risking the equipment itself. Data analytics performed on the same system when a part fails can help determine which sensors are critical and what patterns are early indicators of impending failure. This will allow the crew to perform preventive maintenance before the system fails catastrophically and should prevent failures in the other ships of the class. In a connected world, it is even possible to rapidly and remotely inject operational capability enhancements to deployed ships. Ultimately, the relative ease with which the software elements of a combat system can be changed will allow ships of the same class a greater capability to act and react with agility, the most efficient way to maximize potential for a relatively small fleet. Acknowledging the unique Canadian geographical and operational requirements, the imposed limitations on naval force structure, and the need to maximize the RCN's effectiveness while seeking cost efficiencies calls for a single class of surface combatant—the current CSC project. Canada will benefit from this innovative solution for decades. The RCN is well-positioned to make the most of this new platform and the inherent flexibility and multirole capabilities it will bring. The Canadian government's decision to move forward with the CSC program as a single surface combatant class is not only eminently feasible, but also the most sensible for the situation we face. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/november/future-canadian-surface-combatant
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December 7, 2018 | Local, Aerospace
Le défi de rapiécer nos vieux CF-18 jusqu’en 2028 coûtera 3 milliards et probablement beaucoup plus
Par Stéphane Parent | francais@rcinet.ca Le gouvernement canadien de Justin Trudeau prévoit investir 3 milliards au cours de la prochaine décennie pour maintenir en service ses avions de chasse CF-18 jusqu'à l'achat de nouveaux chasseurs. La facture ne tient pas compte cependant de la mise à niveau des systèmes électroniques de ces avions qui n'ont pas été modernisés depuis 2008. Nos CF-18 auront 50 ans en 2032, l'année où le gouvernement prévoit les retirer. Leur technologie de combat accusera alors un retard de 15 ans si elle n'est pas modernisée. Croyant qu'elle allait pouvoir les remplacer en 2020, la Défense nationale canadienne n'a pas préparé de plan pour mettre à jour leur capacité de combat. Le vérificateur général du Canada, Michael Ferguson, a critiqué le gouvernement libéral, le mois dernier, en soulignant que les montants prévus pour le maintien opérationnel de la flotte ne comprenaient en fait aucune mise à niveau réelle des systèmes de combat des avions, qui n'ont pas été revus depuis 2008. Des avions capables de voler, mais pourront-ils réellement nous défendre? Des représentants de la Défense ont affirmé à un comité de la Chambre des communes, lundi après-midi, qu'ils s'attendaient à avoir une idée d'ici le mois de mai du type de mises à niveau nécessaires. Des améliorations qui, selon des analystes, coûteront des centaines de millions, voire des milliards de dollars. Selon les données de la défense nationale du printemps dernier, 22 % des postes de techniciens dans les escadrons de CF-18 à Bagotville au Québec et à Cold Lake en Alberta étaient vacants ou occupés par des techniciens peu qualifiés. Un autre défi qui attend l'armée canadienne sera de trouver une façon de remédier à la pénurie de techniciens expérimentés pour réparer et entretenir les vieux avions. Elle cherche à sous-traiter certaines t'ches de maintenance des avions de combat vieillissants CF-18. Des responsables de la Défense estiment qu'ils sauront le printemps prochain quels capteurs, armes et autres mises à niveau seront nécessaires pour que les avions de combat CF-18 vieillissants du pays puissent encore effectuer des missions de combat jusqu'à leur remplacement. De moins en moins d'avions et de plus en plus d'argent Pas moins de 19 chasseurs F-18 se sont écrasés depuis l'acquisition de cette flotte de 138 appareils par l'Aviation royale canadienne au tout début des années 1980 au prix de 5 milliards de dollars. Dix pilotes ont perdu la vie dans ces écrasements. Seuls 76 des 138 CF-18 achetés dans les années 80 sont toujours en service. Craignant de ne plus être en mesure de maintenir le nombre de chasseurs qui doivent être prêts à décoller en tout temps comme l'exige son alliance militaire avec les États-Unis au sein du NORAD, le Canada a décidé l'an dernier d'acheter 18 avions de chasse usagés CF-18 de l'aviation militaire australienne. En septembre, les États-Unis ont finalement donné le feu vert à l'achat par le Canada des CF-18 australiens usagés. L'approbation des Américains était nécessaire parce que ces avions ont été construits aux États-Unis avec la technologie américaine. Si toutes les négociations et approbations se déroulent comme prévu, les avions commenceraient à arriver au Canada en 2019. De nouveaux avions attendus depuis près de 10 ans d'ici 7 ans et plus Les CF-18 mis en service dans les années 1980 devaient être retirés d'ici 2020, mais leur remplacement s'est transformé en une longue saga. Il y a six ans, le gouvernement conservateur de Stephen Harper a abandonné dans la controverse son projet d'acheter des avions de chasse américains F-35 sans appel d'offres pour remplacer cette flotte vieillissante. Le gouvernement Trudeau, qui avait par la suite décidé d'acheter 18 avions Super Hornet à Boeing également sans appel d'offres, a annulé cet achat en 2017 dans la foulée du conflit commercial entre Boeing et Bombardier. Il a donc fini par se tourner vers l'Australie pour acheter des avions de chasse provisoires et a lancé un appel d'offres pour acheter 88 avions de chasse permanents. On s'attend maintenant à ce qu'il faille de cinq à sept ans pour réunir un nombre suffisant de pilotes et de techniciens à temps pour commencer à faire la transition des CF-18 vers de nouveaux avions ultramodernes. La livraison du premier avion est prévue en 2025, et celle du dernier en 2031. http://www.rcinet.ca/fr/2018/12/04/modernisation-vieux-cf-18-canada-verificateurs-avion-chasse-australien/