10 mai 2019 | Local, Aérospatial
OTTAWA, ON (May 6, 2019): In a hard-hitting new Macdonald-Laurier Institute report, MLI Senior Fellow Richard Shimooka takes a critical look at the government's approach to replacing Canada's aging fleet of CF-18 fighters. In the report, titled The Catastrophe: Assessing the Damage from Canada's Fighter Replacement Fiasco, he argues that Ottawa's performance on this file mirrors the SNC-Lavalin Scandal and the Mark Norman Affair.
“At their heart, these two incidents represent attempts by the Liberal government to circumvent established processes to meet their partisan interests,” Shimooka explains. “This description is just as apt for the fighter program.”
Canada is a participant in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program that has been developing the F-35s. These fighter jets were slotted to replace the RCAF's aging CF-18s, but after the program was mired in political scandal under the previous government, the Liberal government changed plans.
“During the 2015 election campaign, the Liberal Party promised not to buy the F-35 jets, but instead to use a competition to identify and subsequently purchase a lower-cost competitor... this decision proved to be impossible, unethical, and potentially illegal,” writes Shimooka.
From billions of dollars being wasted on a procurement process to fix a contrived capability gap to potentially threatening Canada's defence relationship with the US, the report finds that political interests have consistently been put above Canada's defence needs.
Shimooka argues that “the decisions made [regarding fighter jet replacement] were purely for reasons of political interest: not a single one could be claimed as being in the country's national interest.”
The “fiasco,” as Shimooka describes it, has caught the attention of both Canada's Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and senior US officials. According to documents never before seen by the public, the OAG had specifically cautioned the government against its chosen course of purchasing Australian Hornets as an interim measure in a draft report – and the final OAG report was heavily revised to obscure that recommendation.
Worse still, letters from US officials reveal that “resentment and distrust towards the government of Canada had grown, particularly within the US Air Force.” These letters, which again have not been made public until now, outline the significant strategic and economic benefits that have already been accrued from being part of the JSF Program. Yet they also contain an implicit (but clear) threat that Canada could be kicked out of the Program – if Ottawa continues with its current policy of trying to obtain guaranteed industrial benefits that, by their very nature, are not allowed under the JSF Program.
“There was a complete lack of logic of Canada's policy, which seemed to ignore basic facts about membership in the JSF program, including clear advantages in cost and capability that the F-35 provided.”
Despite these persistent, high-level issues with the government's chosen approach on the fighter jet replacement, the file has avoided serious public scrutiny. Shimooka finds that this happened in large part due to the successful gag orders levelled by the government.
“The government has also suppressed negative viewpoints within and outside the Department of National Defence, allegedly up to and including the deletion of portions of Memos to Cabinet that highlighted why certain decisions should not be taken.”
Moving forward on the file may prove to be difficult; defence procurement woes have plagued Canada since Confederation, and the issues with the fighter jet replacement are deeper than just purchasing the right aircraft. Worse still, Shimooka says that the brunt of the burden of consistently poor decision-making in Ottawa will be borne by the RCAF itself.
“While the negative consequences are clear for Canada as a whole," Shimooka explains, "no community has felt the impact more than the RCAF. As a result of this government's policies, its ability to conduct its most basic function, the defence of Canadian sovereignty and that of our allies, is diminishing rapidly.”
“It is a sad state of affairs.”
To read the commentary in full, click here.
https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/assessing-damage-canadas-fighter-replacement-fiasco-new-mli-report/
9 mai 2024 | Local, Naval
Ukraine, a nation with virtually no navy, humiliated Russia's mighty Black Sea Fleet using cheap, fast, disposable drones. Combined with artificial intelligence, drones are set to change the nature of naval warfare. But are the world's militaries prepared for the risks?
25 février 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre
This week, approximately 350 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel will deploy to Resolute Bay and Rankin Inlet, Nunavut as part of Operation Nanook-Nunalivut 2020 (Op Na-Nu 20). From Feb. 24 to March 27, 2020, CAF personnel and international partners will work together to enhance and test their specialized Arctic skill-sets, and reaffirm their ability to operate in the High Arctic. Ranging from ground and underwater activities to complex logistical support, Op Na-Nu 20 will demonstrate the presence and capabilities of the CAF in the Arctic, and will improve our readiness to operate in the region: a key component of Canada's Defence Policy – Strong, Secure, Engaged. Operations like Op Na-Nu 20 also enhance Canada's ability to work effectively with northern partners and allies. “Each year, Operation Nanook-Nunalivut provides us with a renewed focus on our operational capabilities and effectiveness in the High Arctic. The North is a vast, harsh and unique place to operate, and because of this, careful preparations and close collaboration with our northern partners is key. Sharing knowledge with our partners and allies will allow us to be better able to adapt to new demands and challenges in the North, and address common northern defence, security and safety concerns in the High Arctic,” said BGen Patrick Carpentier, commander, Joint Task Force (North). https://www.skiesmag.com/press-releases/the-canadian-armed-forces-international-partners-nunavut
23 novembre 2018 | Local, Aérospatial
By Levon Sevunts, Radio Canada International As the federal government embarks on a much delayed and criticized quest to find a replacement for its ageing fleet of CF-18 Hornet fighter jets, Norway's saga with the acquisition of F-35 stealth fighters offers Canada a valuable lesson. The search for a replacement for CF-18 got a new urgency Tuesday after a blistering report by Canada's auditor general, who lambasted the Liberal government's handling of the file that could have serious implications for Ottawa's ability to fulfill its NATO and NORAD obligations. Just like Ottawa, Oslo was one of the first NATO countries to show interest in the new stealth multirole fighters developed by U.S. defence giant Lockheed Martin. In June 2009, the Norwegian Parliament decided that the F-35A Lightning II would replace its current fleet of F-16 fighter jets. Unlike Ottawa, despite strong internal opposition, Oslo saw things through. By 2025, Norway hopes to have a fleet of 52 F-35s. No-show at Trident Juncture demonstration Norwegian authorities were hoping to showcase their newest and most expensive defence acquisition in the country's history at a massive display of NATO's military might during the official launch of Trident Juncture 2018 exercise on Oct. 30. But much to the chagrin of dozens of journalists, NATO officials and dignitaries that had assembled on the shores of the Trondheim Fjord in central Norway to watch the display of land, sea and air power, the Norwegian F-35s never showed up. Lt.-Col. Stale Nymoen, commander of the 332 Squadron of the Royal Norwegian Air Force and one of the first Norwegian pilots to learn to fly the F-35s, said strong crosswinds at the Ørland Air Base forced officials to cancel the planned overflight. The cancellation of the overflight on an otherwise perfect autumn day had nothing to do with the jet's capabilities, Nymoen said. “Seen from my perspective, it's one of the best fighter aircraft out there,” Nymoen told a roomful of journalists during a briefing at the Ørland Air Base in central Norway earlier this month. But it has taken even experienced pilots like him years to learn to fly the new fighter jets and, just as importantly, unlearn old habits, Nymoen said. Learning to crawl before walking Norway received its first four F-35s in January of 2017. But all of them were stationed at the Luke Air Force Base in Phoenix, Arizona, where Norwegian, U.S. and Italian pilots trained on the new aircraft. It wasn't until November of 2017 that the stealth fighter jets actually arrived for service in Norway, at the Ørland Air Base, which is going through a massive infrastructure upgrade to house the new planes. Operating and flying them in Norway with its harsh North Atlantic and Arctic climate is a whole new experience, Nymoen said. “What is different from Luke when we train to operate the aircraft here is temperatures, winter, icy and slippery runways, winds,” Nymoen said. “Those are conditions that we don't necessarily get to train for when we're training in the United States.” And the Norwegian air force is taking a very cautious approach to avoid any accidents, he said. “We have to learn to crawl before we can walk, and we have to learn to walk before we can run,” Nymoen said. The first squadron of F-35s is expected to reach initial operational capability in 2019 and full operational capability only in 2025, eight years after the aircraft were delivered to Norway. This timeline would also apply to Canada, if Lockheed Martin were to emerge as the winner of the competition to buy 98 advanced aircraft for the Royal Canadian Air Force announced by the Liberal government last December. The list of eligible suppliers identified by the federal government also includes France's Dassault Aviation, Sweden's SAAB, the U.K.'s Airbus Defense and Space, and the U.S. defence and aerospace giant Boeing. If the federal government manages to stick to its timetable, a contract award is anticipated in 2022 and the first replacement aircraft delivered in 2025. This means that the current fleet of Canadian CF-18s and the 18 additional second-hand Australian F-18s the federal government is buying as a stopgap measure will have to operate until at least 2030, experts say. http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2018/11/21/norway-f-35-fighter-jets-offers-lesson-for-canada