Chantier Davie won’t take ‘no’ for an answer

On the same subject

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  October 11, 2018 | Local, Aerospace

  Purchase of three spy planes from the U.S. could cost Canada $140 million more than planned

  DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN Canadian companies had wanted to provide the aircraft, but the Canadian military decided it needed the planes quicker than they believed Canadian firms could deliver The cost of three small surveillance aircraft Canada is buying from the U.S. could be $140 million more than the Canadian military had originally estimated. The three Beechcraft King Air planes, to be based at CFB Trenton in Ontario, will be outfitted with sensors and equipment to intercept cell phone and other electronic transmissions. Canadian special forces and, potentially, other government departments will use them for missions overseas and in Canada. On Oct. 1 the Canadian Forces told Postmedia the three outfitted planes and initial in-service support would cost between $100 million and $249 million, as outlined in the Liberal government's defence policy documents. However, on Oct. 4 the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency revealed the final tally, informing Congress that the deal was underway with an estimated cost of US $300 million — around $389 million. Canadian companies had wanted to provide the aircraft and on-board equipment, and several have formed alliances with U.S. firms who supply the Pentagon with the same or similar aircraft. But the Canadian military decided it needed the planes more quickly than they believed Canadian companies could deliver, and that U.S. security regulations governing the on-board sensor equipment might cause delays. As a result, it determined the U.S. government was the only supplier capable of providing the planes. The Canadian Forces says it hopes to get a better deal. The cost the U.S. government agency presented to Congress is not the final tally and the “final cost is anticipated to be much lower,” the Canadian Forces claimed in an email. “Over the coming months, we will work to more clearly define our interests and requirements for the purchase, and negotiate an acceptable price with the U.S.,” the email said. Department of National Defence spokeswoman Ashley Lemire said in an email to Postmedia that the delivery of the first plane would take place sometime between 2020 and 2021. The final delivery of the three aircraft would be wrapped up by 2022. The main contractor is Beechcraft in Wichita, Kan. The Canadian government will run a separate program to allow companies to compete to provide in-service support for the planes. The government expects to ask for bids for that 20-year contract sometime in the spring of 2019, said Lemire. DND declined to provide an estimate of what that long-term support would cost taxpayers. Industry representatives have complained over the years that the Canadian Forces cut domestic firms out of the project and reduced the role they could play. Lemire rejected that claim, saying Canadian firms would have a role in servicing the planes. https://calgaryherald.com/news/purchase-of-three-spy-planes-from-the-u-s-will-cost-canada-140-million-more-than-planned

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  October 29, 2020 | Local, Land

  Fight the Information War Without Sacrificing Canadian Values

  David Scanlon Defence Watch Guest Writer Recent news reports have shown the Canadian Armed Forces are struggling to define ethical boundaries as they expand their capability to meet the rising threats of the information age. A global information war is now being fought in a “grey zone” where malign state and non-state actors are trying to sow confusion and division across the international community. American professor of strategy and author Sean McFate writes that future military victories “will be won and lost in the information space, not on the physical battlefield.” But he warns that “some democracies may be tempted to sacrifice their values in the name of victory.” Recent mishaps by Canada's military underscore this temptation. In April, the Ottawa Citizen published this headline: “Canadian Forces ‘information operations' pandemic campaign quashed after details revealed to top general.” The article reported that the “IO” campaign was targeted at Canadians and “called for ‘shaping' and ‘exploiting' information” with the aim of maintaining civil order and ensuring “public compliance with suppression measures” during the coronavirus pandemic. A parallel effort involved the “data mining” of personal social media accounts in Ontario by a team assigned to military intelligence. The military shared data with the province, including findings that some of its citizens were unhappy about its response to the pandemic. Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan ordered a review of the information operations campaign and an investigation into the legality of the data-mining activities. Given the Canadian Armed Forces were tasked with helping the provinces of Quebec and Ontario deal with the cruel impact of the coronavirus in long-term care homes, it is disquieting that such a campaign would be contemplated, let alone put in writing. Chief of the defence staff General Jon Vance reportedly avowed that, “as long as he was in charge information operations tactics wouldn't be used in a domestic situation, except in the case where an enemy had invaded the country.” Despite the defence chief's promise, only six months later the armed forces were caught conducting a disinformation campaign on Canada's Atlantic coast. Under the headline, “Canadian Soldiers Cry Wolf, Alarming Residents,” the New York Times reported that a military psychological training exercise had “gone wrong,” and that a “fake disinformation exercise had become a real one.” For reasons as yet unexplained, military personnel circulated a forged letter from the province of Nova Scotia warning certain residents to be wary of a wandering wolfpack, backed by loudspeakers blaring the sounds of growling wolves. It took some time for the armed forces to accept responsibility and apologize. Meanwhile, baffled local officials assured affected residents the province had not issued the letter and there were no wolves in the area. The defence minister rightly supports training the military “on how best to respond to foreign actors who use influence activities.” But to avoid further mistakes he ordered such training paused until an investigation into the wayward wolfpacks was concluded. Emma Briant, a US-based British academic and author who specializes in propaganda and political communication, told the New York Times she finds the recent incidents “appalling,” a “failure of governance,” a “failure to ensure restraint,” and a “failure to ensure ethics are built into training and planning operations.” “They seem to have introduced a policy of weaponization of influence, domestically,” Briant observes. Instead, she advises, Canada's military needs to be building “a relationship of trust with the public.” The military's pattern of ethical breaches appears to reveal an embedded operational mindset fixed on tactics, as opposed to a strategic one focussed on building public trust. British military historian Hew Strachan wrote that armed forces are attracted to the operational level of war, as opposed to the strategic. It allows them to “appropriate what they see as the acme of their professional competence,” enabling them to operate in “a politics free zone.” This may in part explain General Vance's decision in 2015 to “operationalize” the military's public affairs branch, which is responsible for public communication. The branch was seen as not delivering tangible “effects” in support of so-called “operations in the information environment.” By operationalizing a strategic function like public affairs, the military was in effect reducing it to an operational or tactical capability, like special operations forces or precision-guided missiles. Ostensibly, these can deliver precise, tangible “effects” under direct military control. Some of the perils of this new approach were exposed when a senior public affairs officer, Brig.-Gen Jay Janzen (then a colonel), began using his Twitter account to target journalists, commentators, and politicians. In April 2018, for instance, he sparked a heated Twitter exchange with opposition defence critic James Bezan. The defence committee had been debating a military deployment to Mali to help defeat cancerous African offshoots of ISIS and al-Qaeda. Janzen tweeted that questions about the mission from opposition Members of Parliament were “nonsensical.” He even proposed “better” questions for opposition parties to ask. For a serving senior officer to publicly criticize elected officials was unprecedented. Government ministers must have been perplexed to see a high-ranking service member tweeting better debate questions to opposition MPs. Janzen's tweets, which appear to have at least the tacit approval of his superiors, set an example for other service members. Another perplexing public information moment occurred last April when the Canadian military reported that a Canadian frigate patrolling off the Greek coast had “lost contact” with its Cyclone maritime helicopter. It was later revealed the helicopter was moments from landing on the ship when, as the CBC reported, “it went down in full view of horrified shipmates.” Tragically, all six aboard the Cyclone were killed in the crash. The military was widely criticized for misrepresenting the facts—contact was in fact never “lost” and officials failed to explain the miscommunication. Some practitioners of public affairs and information operations have been telling their military bosses that with scientific techniques like “target audience analysis” they can change people's perceptions and behaviours with astounding precision. Canada's defence department recently paid over a million dollars to Emic Consulting Limited (whose founder worked at the UK's controversial and now defunct Strategic Communication Laboratories) to teach public affairs officers and others how to conduct “actor and audience analysis” and otherwise weaponize behavioural science. But is this training being misapplied? One aim of information operations is to change the perceptions and behaviours of target audiences using a range of influence techniques, including “psychological” and “deception” operations. As the defence chief alluded, such techniques should not be approved for use in Canada, other than in exceptional circumstances against clearly defined foes, such as terrorists. Military public affairs, by contrast, is about ensuring Canada's armed forces follow federal communications policy, which calls for maintaining “public trust,” and directs that federal communications “must be objective, factual, non-partisan, clear, and written in plain language.” In a free and democratic society, public trust is a priceless strategic “effect.” As malign actors seek to create confusion and division, Canadians need trusted sources of information. Surveys consistently show that Canadians trust their military. Military leaders and their public affairs advisors must preserve this trust. As called for in defence policy, Canada's armed forces do need the tools to wage information and cyber warfare. They are already facing such threats on missions overseas. But the armed forces also need the tools to communicate with Canadians and other friendly audiences in a timely, truthful, and accurate fashion. Transparency is a potent democratic deterrent against disinformation. Informed by the investigations into recent mishaps, the defence minister and chief of the defence staff should consider the following: o To ensure that information operations have proper approvals and oversight, and are conducted ethically, robust policy, doctrine, and governance are essential. o To ensure broad awareness of ethical considerations when conducting influence activities, related training and education needs to be incorporated at all rank levels. o To explain their actions and help build public trust, the armed forces need to field uniformed spokespersons more often. (The military's “chief spokesman” cited by the New York Times in the “wolves” story was a civilian.) o To ensure coherent doctrine and effective implementation of information-related capabilities, a professional total force cadre of practitioners should be created. o Military public affairs must be reinvigorated as a strategic capability that promotes transparency, provides unhindered advice to commanders at all levels, and ensures close coordination with the civilian communication arms of government. o Policy and doctrine, along with leaders, operators, and information practitioners, must clearly differentiate between activities intended to inform Canadians, such as public affairs, and information operations designed to influence or deceive adversaries. Fighting disinformation is a serious whole-of-nation challenge. It requires an informed public, ethical and transparent government, an engaged private sector, a vigorous and valued free press, and armed forces that respect and reflect Canadian values. https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/canada/fight-the-information-war-without-sacrificing-canadian-values-513691/

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  January 5, 2021 | Local, Aerospace

  Canada’s New Drone Can Better Surveil Its Challenging Arctic Environment

  BY KEVIN M. BAERSON After years of experimentation and analysis, the government of Canada has procured a new Hermes 900 StarLiner from Israeli UAV manufacturer Elbit Systems that can withstand and patrol its massive, inhospitable Arctic territory. Extreme weather with high winds and low temperatures, limited and unreliable satellite communication and navigation, and continuous darkness during the winter months make controlling UAVs in the Arctic especially challenging. Combined with a lack of ground infrastructure, both line of sight and satellite control of a UAV can become nearly impossible. The hope is that the Starliner can conquer these harsh Arctic conditions. This version of Elbit's Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) military UAV is fully certified to operate in civilian airspace and will take off from and land on civilian airfields. It will perform myriad operations to reduce harmful environmental impacts, including detection of oil pollution and wildlife surveying, as well as ice patrol and reconnaissance. It will also support search and rescue, humanitarian efforts and illegal fishing enforcement, and will aid the development and regulation of Canada's drone industry. The $36.16 million contract includes communication links, ground control stations, sensor packages, training and the optional purchase of spare parts. The Starliner is expected to be delivered by December 2022, but procurement has been years in the making. Arctic Takeoff In 2017, Canadian officials began research and development test flights using a Sea Hunter drone produced by Alabama-based Griffon Aerospace. The data collected, including BVLOS results, contributed to developing requirements for the eventual Hermes purchase. Timothy Choi, a maritime strategy expert and Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, has said the Canadian government had limited options in its search for a proven maritime drone with Arctic capabilities. “Large maritime surveillance drones—that is, ones equipped with downward-looking radar and AIS [automatic identification system] receivers to detect shipping—have not been as prevalent in the global drone market as their land-centric counterparts,” Choi told the website Eye On The Arctic. “Of these, there are even fewer that have been tested in Arctic conditions.” The model Canada is acquiring has been undergoing operational trials in Iceland via the European Maritime Safety Agency since summer 2019. At 1.6 tons, the StarLiner includes detect and avoid (DAA) systems, redundant datalinks and an advanced terrain avoidance warning system. Its ability to automatically take off and land in near-zero visibility, and to sustain deicing procedures and direct lightning strikes, makes it ideal for the Arctic's extreme weather challenges. According to Canadian officials, the new UAV can operate at up to 72 degrees north latitude and has a range of more than 1,400 nautical miles. It comes equipped with back-up command and control and navigation systems, electrical optical infrared camera, synthetic aperture radar and a mapping camera system. For now, the majority of Canada's Arctic surveillance data will continue to come from RADARSAT, the country's remote sensing earth observation satellite program. But while the satellites can detect emergencies such as an oil spill, their brief visits over the Arctic make it difficult to identify causes and consequences. The same is true for identifying nefarious activities such as illegal dumping and unpermitted fishing. “The ability of a drone to loiter for long periods of time with higher resolution sensors will help fill this gap,” Choi explained. “Operationally, the new drone will greatly help ‘connect the dots' when it comes to surveilling Arctic waters and enforcing Canadian regulations.” Drone Diplomacy While this Hermes version will be used in civilian missions, its acquisition is just one part of Canada's Arctic Unmanned Aircraft System Initiative, and it will join the country's National Aerial Surveillance Program's manned aircraft fleet. With 75% of Canada's coastline and 55% of its landmass located in the Arctic, Canada and its main regional rival, Russia, potentially contest for resources and the new shipping routes being created by global warming. Russia is deploying a fleet of dual-use extreme-weather UAVs featuring a GIRSAM alternative navigation system. China, which is talking about a “Polar Silk Road,” also is developing dual-use UAVs optimized for Arctic conditions. “Canada is committed to protecting our endangered species and our marine environment,” Canadian Transport Minister Marc Garneau said in a statement. “Integrating remotely piloted aircraft into Transport Canada's fleet will make federal surveillance operations more robust than ever.” https://insideunmannedsystems.com/canadas-new-drone-can-better-surveil-its-challenging-arctic-environment/