Nouvelles

Par Vauban* | 13/07/2020, 8:00 | 3730 mots L'industrie d'armement française, telle qu'elle est actuellement, est en péril : aussi bien dans son organisation nationale, que dans la volonté politique de lancer des coopérations européennes tous azimuts (programmes, alliances industrielles) en passant par les nombreuses entraves dans le domaine des exportations. (*) Par Vauban, un groupe d'une vingtaine de spécialistes des questions de défense. L'industrie d'armement n'échappe pas aux confusions conceptuelles dont les deux premières tribunes se sont déjà faites l'écho : cette dernière tribune souhaite rétablir des faits minorés ou ignorés, souvent de mauvaise foi, sur la place fondamentale de l'industrie d'armement pour la France. Il s'agit moins de rappeler son poids industriel et technologique comme le retour sur investissement qu'il crée dans l'économie, que de lui redonner sa vraie place politique en France, en Europe et dans le monde. En France, l'édification d'arsenaux et de manufactures sous l'Ancien Régime visait déjà à doter l'armée française de ses propres armes afin, d'une part d'éviter la dépendance étrangère et, de l'autre, de disposer des équipements spécifiques dont elle avait besoin : fusil du modèle 1777, pistolet de celui de 1763/66, frégate de 74, systèmes d'artillerie Gribeauval et Vallée. Le besoin actuel demeure identique et est même exacerbé par une armée expéditionnaire, conséquence des choix diplomatiques. Cet axiome de bon sens est cependant souvent perdu de vue : on ne fait bien la guerre qu'avec des équipements qu'on a soit même spécifiés. Le Rafale avec ses équipements et armements est là pour le démontrer. Cette vérité, souvent oubliée dans la folie des coopérations européennes (on y reviendra) ou la frénésie des achats américains, est cruciale, surtout en des temps où les chevaux de Troie modernes peuvent paralyser un système de défense. Indépendance militaire ? Cette vérité est aussi fondatrice : elle a engendré un modèle d'armée indépendant, polyvalent et performant qui est le choix encore assumé de la France ; pour le b'tir, un triptyque bien connu, aux équilibres délicats, a été mis en place depuis 1961 : des armées, qui connaissent leurs besoins, une DGA (direction générale de l'armement), qui traduit ce besoin et l'exprime à une industrie nationale, qui y répond, organisée en champions nationaux : systémiers de la dissuasion (Naval Group et Dassault Aviation) du terrestre (Nexter), des systèmes de missiles (MBDA). Schéma de bon sens, mais qui n'est actuellement suivi, hors club des grandes puissances, que par les nations qui veulent leur indépendance militaire : Israël, la Corée du Sud et la Turquie principalement, les autres nations se contentant d'acheter sur étagères - même avec une part de production locale sous licence - ce que d'autres pays ont conçu. Ce système est actuellement triplement en péril. Structurellement d'abord, parce que la DGA, loin d'être renforcée dans son rôle de conduite des programmes et d'expert technologique - voire de programmes civils tant les ministères civils sont dans l'impéritie totale -, est actuellement croquée pas à pas : on lui a retiré le secrétariat des CIEEMG, puis l'innovation et désormais la stratégie : or, sans ce corps technique compétent d'État, l'armement national a vécu. L'avenir le démontrera. Capitalistiquement ensuite, car l'on voit bien les incohérences d'un État qui multiplie les interférences et les conflits d'intérêt dans la vie de l'industrie d''armement alors qu'aux Etats-Unis, il gouverne par la loi et les commandes publiques et non le capital, ce qui est beaucoup plus efficace. Instituer une concurrence entre Thales, missilier résiduel et MBDA, missilier érigé en champion national sur le domaine sol-air est aussi néfaste que de ne pas trancher enfin le nœud gordien de la participation de Thales dans Naval group, où l'actionnaire est en même temps (toujours ce "en même temps" !) équipementier de son systémier et son concurrent par le truchement de sa filiale néerlandaise...L'État entretient ainsi les rivalités du village gaulois. Conjoncturellement enfin, car la crise actuelle nécessite un plan de relance spécifique à la défense. Puisque la crise est jugée plus sévère que celle de 2008 (qui n'était que financière et non globale), comment expliquer que le plan de relance actuel (833 millions d'euros) est très inférieur à celui de 2009 (2,4 milliards d'euros) ? Plan essentiellement "Airbus", l'ébauche annoncée n'est pas dimensionné aux enjeux : l'amortisseur d'activités que constituent les commandes de défense doit pourtant jouer à plein afin que les sociétés duales touchés par la crise du civil compensent un tant soit peu par la défense les parts de marché perdues, et que les sociétés purement défense trouvent aussi dans la commande d'Etat une activité que l'export atone leur a fait perdre. C'est l'idée du plan de 2009 ; c'est aussi celui du ministère allemand de la défense, qu'on ne peut décemment pas prendre pourtant comme un exemple dans la planification de défense... Il faut donc un plan de relance ambitieux dont les idées-forces politiques sont : l'avancée des hausses budgétaires prévues entre 2023 et 2025 dès la rentrée de septembre et jusqu'en 2022 au moins ; la traduction rapide dans les sociétés : la recapitalisation peu coûteuse des moyens de l'Outre-mer, qui s'offre comme un domaine privilégié et nécessaire compte tenu des menaces qui pèse sur notre souveraineté ultra-marine : allongement de la série de patrouilleurs Outre-mer (6 patrouilleurs ne coûtent que 223,9 millions d'euros) avec production sous licence dans les chantiers nationaux (CMN, Piriou, etc), Falcon Albatros, etc... ; le réarmement en munitions complexes dont les stocks sont notoirement insuffisants. Une coopération européenne élargie ou un cadre bilatéral clair ? L'Europe, ensuite. Pas à pas, l'industrie nationale est entrée dans le "système Goulard", c'est-à-dire une dépendance mutuelle qui aboutit "à privilégier des consortiums dans lesquels les Français ne sont pas toujours leaders" (déclaration de l'éphémère ministre de la défense le 8 juin 2017). Cette doctrine fédéraliste acte la fin du leadership français en Europe sur la seule industrie, qui ne soit pas encore démantelée par l'impéritie de l'État. La feuille de route du 13 juillet 2017 comme l'alliance navale italienne en sont les fruits : à des acteurs mineurs européens dans la Défense sur les plans technologiques et industriels, on donne les clés de secteurs entiers sans qu'une quelconque convergence de doctrine diplomatique et opérationnelle n'ait été réalisée avec les pays en question et sans que la méthode de conduite des programmes n'ait été enfin gommée des défauts structurels de tout programme européen et, sans enfin et surtout, que la parité exigée par nos partenaires soit méritée autrement que par l'habilité des négociateurs politiques. La taille des ensembles industriels sert de mantra aux promoteurs de ce grand bradage ; le problème est que nulle part ailleurs en Europe, on trouve trace de ce raisonnement : Damen, Saab, BAE Systems, Lürssen, GNY-K, Rheinmetall, etc... jouent leurs propres cartes ou la carte de la consolidation nationale ou des partenariats par programme, jamais celle de la fusion européenne. La taille, en outre, ne résout pas les problèmes essentiels de toute industrie : l'innovation technologique, l'agilité du mode de production, la gamme de produits, la compétitivité et l'exportation soutenue par l'Etat. Le nombre d'acteurs, aussi agité comme obligation majeure des consolidations européennes, est un faux argument : les industriels européens croient en la commande publique et en l'exportation et non à un raisonnement malthusien qui voudrait que moins d'acteurs amènent moins de concurrence et donc la survie de la production ; ce raisonnement qui est congénitalement contraire aux lois du marché, même ceux spéciales de la Défense. Tout l'avenir des sociétés réside uniquement dans le soutien de l'Etat par la R&D, la commande publique et le soutien à l'exportation : la Turquie et la Corée du sud en donnent une éclatante démonstration. La faille de ce raisonnement est enfin d'éluder que la coopération européenne n'a jamais fait la démonstration de son utilité et de sa performance. Ce n'est pas l'idée de coopération qui est remise en cause ici, mais la méthode de coopération : pas de contrat de réduction des risques, pas de maître d'œuvre expérimenté, pas de sélection des équipementiers par le systémier, mais un juste retour destructeur qui conduit à des sous-performances, des retards et des surcoûts. Ce qui valait hier pour l'A400M, vaut aujourd'hui pour le futur avion de patrouille maritime... Même Airbus, pourtant promoteur et exemple hier de cette consolidation, vitupère aujourd'hui contre la décision du gouvernement espagnol de sélectionner Indra sistemas, simple équipementier de second rang, comme maître de file des industriels espagnols du SCAF aux dépens d'Airbus, qui, même espagnol, est trop franco-allemand au goût de Madrid... La même politique appliquée au spatial conduit à des dispersions de compétences et des gaspillages industriels et financiers : OHB qui ne savait rien faire, est d'ores et déjà devenu un concurrent d'Airbus et de Thales, parce que Berlin a choisi de le protéger bec et ongles. Il n'y a au fond qu'en France que l'altruisme sert de boussole à la politique industrielle : partout ailleurs, c'est bel et bien le nationalisme industriel qui est lui à l'œuvre : la Suède veut développer seule son avion de combat futur (2020) après avoir fait de même sur les sous-marins (2014) ; l'Italie réfléchit à une alternative nationale ou bilatérale au MGCS, etc ; s'agissant de défense nationale, il n'y a là rien de surprenant ; s'agissant d'industrie, rien de choquant à voir un gouvernement préférer son industrie à celle des autres, mais il est surprenant que les beaux esprits parisiens ne le sachent pas ou feignent, pour le besoin de leurs discours, de l'ignorer. La consolidation européenne est jugée nécessaire enfin face à la concurrence extra-européenne ; là aussi, le raisonnement ignore ou feint d'ignorer que cette concurrence russe, chinoise, turque, sud-coréenne, sud-africaine ou israélienne use d'autres armes que celle de la taille industrielle ou du prix. Cette concurrence organisée bénéficie d'abord du plein soutien de son État en ordre de bataille : déplacements, renseignements et financements sont coordonnés par une volonté ferme de l'Etat. Elle utilise ensuite des armes que la France refuse d'utiliser : désinformation (voir la campagne en Australie contre le contrat français de sous-marin, qui vaut celles, très violentes, contre le Rafale en Inde où le parti du Congrès a été instrumentalisé par un avionneur concurrent) et corruption (qui ose croire que certains contrats récents de concurrents européens aient pu se faire sans cette douceur-là ?). Elle casse enfin les prix car les contrats domestiques sont rentables et réguliers. Face à cette concurrence-là, quelles armes la naïve consolidation européenne lui opposera-t-elle ? Celle du prix ? Aucun programme européen n'est déjà compétitif pour les armées nationales clientes... Aucun des trois arguments des promoteurs du démantèlement de l'industrie nationale au profit d'ensembles européens fédérés et intégrés ne saurait amener les gouvernements à privilégier une quelconque "préférence européenne" à leur souveraineté de choix. La préférence européenne ne se décrète pas : elle se mérite. Or, on l'a vu, les ratés de la coopération européenne n'ont jamais servi de leçon à leurs initiateurs. Pourtant, des expériences négatives du passé, au moins trois s'en dégagent : une convergence des besoins et des spécifications (ce qui sous-entend que les Etats partagent la même vision de la politique de défense), un cadre bilatéral - opérationnel et industriel - favorisant la coopération du maître d'œuvre et de son éco-système, (évitant ainsi la dispersion et les digressions de tiers imposant leurs vues ou leurs industriels) et un financement pluriannuel, lui aussi bilatéral. Aux grands programmes, toujours décevants, les nations sages préfèrent un cadre bilatéral clair, de la conception à la commercialisation. C'est le cas des programmes de missiles franco-britanniques, des programmes navals germano-norvégiens, belgo-néerlandais ; c'est le tort des programmes bilatéraux que de vouloir s'élargir à tout prix au plus vite : SCAF avec l'Espagne, MGCS avec les nations Leopard. C'est enfin le défaut majeur de tous ces projets européens que de ne jamais prévoir un financement garanti donc pluriannuel. Est-il admissible pour la France que le futur de son aviation d'armes soit dans les mains d'une poignée de députés de la commission du budget du Bundestag ? La défense de la France ne se fait pas plus au Bundestag que la politique de la France à la corbeille de la bourse. Exportation, l'un des grands défis pour la souveraineté française close volume_off L'exportation, enfin. Troisième pilier de l'industrie, après la R&D et la commande publique, elle doit être replacée dans son contexte politique puisque l'acte d'exporter depuis 1939 est un acte souverain. Sur le plan doctrinal, l'exportation est l'incarnation de la liberté souveraine que la France entend exercer en commerçant ou non avec tel ou tel pays. Elle envoie ainsi un message politique clair tant au pays à qui elle vend qu'à celui auquel elle ne vend pas ; ce faisant, elle contribue à organiser le marché par divers instruments - traités d'interdiction de tel ou tel système, traité de non-prolifération, embargo - ou bloquer toute régulation contraire à ses intérêts (ou de s'en affranchir). A cet égard, la liberté de commerce de la France dans le domaine des ventes d'armes ne saurait être entravée par l'imposition de règles étrangères : l'imposition des règles américaines - que l'Administration sait contourner et faire contourner à ses industriels, comme la règlementation anti-corruption, les normes technologiques, les embargos - est ainsi un des grands défis posés à la souveraineté de la France, l'une des rares nations occidentales à être le vrai concurrent des Etats-Unis : la rivalité sans merci dans le domaine des avions d'armes et des missiles en est l'illustration complète. Œuvre de pharisiens préoccupés d'affirmer leur vertu tout en cherchant surtout à écraser leurs concurrents, cette normalisation du marché des armes appelle au contraire à un regain de souveraineté. Cette liberté est également à défendre bec et ongles dans le domaine des coopérations que la France entend mener. Il lui faut donc négocier ces coopérations avec des partenaires qui respectent sa souveraineté, en lui laissant une totale liberté d'emploi pour ses propres opérations, et en se laissant la liberté d'exporter les matériels co-développés. En ce sens, la coopération européenne n'est pas la prolongation d'un modèle national d'indépendance mais bel et bien - et c'est là le but recherché par ses auteurs allemands et bruxellois - une dépendance mutuelle qui est à rebours de la conception nationale défendue ici. Cette liberté se niche aussi dans la conception morale du commerce des armes : du moment que les décisions nationales sont prises selon ses règles d'éthique, qui sont celles d'ailleurs que chacun proclame de son côté, il n'y a pas lieu de laisser contester ces décisions au motif qu'elles contreviendraient à l'interprétation publique de circonstance de ces mêmes règles par ses concurrents. Sur le plan opérationnel, cette liberté d'exporter permet ensuite de graduer l'intensité des relations que la France décide d'entretenir avec tel ou tel pays. La géopolitique française - c'est-à-dire sa capacité à profiter de sa géographie, de son Histoire et de ses atouts pour assurer son influence - s'exprime par le type de matériel qu'elle est prête à vendre à un tel pays. La vente d'avions d'armes, de sous-marins conventionnels, de satellites d'observation, de systèmes de radars ou de missiles ou de services sensibles (R&D) inscrit en effet la relation bilatérale dans une longue durée : elle détermine ainsi un ancrage qui vaut au moins pour la durée de vie d'un système (en moyenne 30 ans pour un avion d'armes ; 35 ans pour un sous-marin ; 15 ans pour un système de missile). Cet ancrage durable permet le partage : de doctrine, de formation, de renseignements, d'équipements pour des exercices ou des opérations. La France a ainsi équipé presque intégralement jusqu'à une époque récente des pays-clés pour sa diplomatie comme les Emirats Arabes Unis (EAU) et le Qatar ; elle a été, ou est encore selon, la double source en Arabie Saoudite (pour la défense sol-air, la Marine, la Garde Nationale), à Oman (pour la Garde Royale), en Inde, aux EAU, au Qatar, en Egypte, au Brésil, en Malaisie, etc. La coopération navale avec la Grèce pave la voie à des contrats d'acquisition ou de modernisation face au danger turc. Elle continue à faire partie des rares pays appelés pour des appels d'offres sur des systèmes majeurs (sous-marins en Pologne, Pays-Bas, Indonésie ; avions d'armes et défense sol-air en Suisse, etc), preuve qu'elle pèse encore de manière significative tant sur les plans diplomatique qu'industriel. Sur le plan industriel, l'exportation d'armement est une valeur ajoutée, qui démultiplie la souveraineté. D'abord en France où les flux financiers tirés de l'exportation permettent non seulement à l'Etat de consolider sa planification de défense, d'en retirer des revenus (formation), mais aussi aux industriels de conforter des investissements sur fonds propres pour développer des versions utiles ultérieurement aux armées françaises. Les conséquences sur l'emploi qualifié et non délocalisable sont connues (entre 40 et 50.000 emplois vivant directement de l'exportation, soit 25% environ des emplois du secteur). Elle projette ensuite sur le pays partenaire un modèle français de souveraineté où l'indépendance nationale du pays acheteur est non seulement respectée mais consolidée par un pays vendeur - la France - qui n'émet pas de restrictions d'utilisation dans la mesure où la relation est cadrée par un accord d'Etat à Etat fondé sur le respect de la souveraineté. Le pays n'est plus un client, mais un partenaire qui entre dans la sphère d'influence française lié par un contrat intergouvernemental produisant et permettant des échanges féconds de renseignements et d'expériences. La vente d'avions d'armes en Inde comme celle de sous-marins au Brésil, à l'Inde et à la Malaisie l'illustre. De cette vente d'armes découle bien souvent une relation politique, qui débouche sur de nouvelles opportunités souvent éloignées du secteur de la défense : en ce sens, la fiabilité de la France comme fournisseur de systèmes d'armes trace la voie à d'autres ventes et dans d'autres secteurs stratégiques (énergie, nucléaire, etc). Ce modèle souverain dans la conception, la production et l'exportation d'armement a fait ses preuves. La Turquie et la Corée du Sud et dans une moindre mesure l'Indonésie et l'Inde, suivent en cela l'exemple français : fort taux de R&D, développement de champions nationaux en monopole, structuration de l'offre, promotion organisée sur les marchés de l'armement et accompagnement diplomatique complet des offres de d'armement. L'exportation n'échappe cependant pas à l'ordre naturel des choses : tout bouge et se transforme sans cesse. La position de la France est ainsi forte mais s'érode. Il y a les explications diplomatiques : un alignement des positions nationales sur les positions de ses concurrents (américains), un moralisme aussi inutile que destructeur, absence de déplacements (qui égale les voyages de Jean-Yves Le Drian ?) pour faire du client un partenaire ; il y a les raisons financières : myopie de Bercy, peur des encours trop nombreux sur des pays fragiles (Brésil, Égypte), frilosité des banques sur des pays (Arabie, Indonésie) ou des domaines (drones armés) sensibles ; il y a enfin - et actuellement surtout -, des explications juridiques sous couvert d'une morale douteuse : alors que la France, à la différence de nombreux pays occidentaux, a un système rigoureux de contrôle des exportations, elle se voit accusée de vendre n'importe quoi à n'importe qui et, surtout, de le faire au moyen de la corruption. Le grand combat perdu de l'industrie d'armement (et de l'industrie tout court) aura été celui de la lutte contre la corruption. Face à Transparency International, elle a perdu en effet le combat principal en 2000 avec l'imposition de la convention OCDE qui bannit les "frais commerciaux extérieurs", les criminalise rétroactivement et la pénalise alors que les principaux corrupteurs avaient déjà trouvé la parade (Etats-Unis avec le FCPA de 1977) ou refusaient de signer un texte aussi suicidaire (Afrique du Sud, Israël, Chine, Russie, etc). Depuis 2000, l'industrie subit de plein fouet les effets pervers de procédures stériles, qui sont la ruine de son commerce et la fortune des avocats et consultants spécialisés. Elle subit les procédures inquisitoriales sur ses contacts, consultants, contrats. Elle subit le détournement de ses échanges électroniques vers des serveurs situés à l'étranger. A force d'être pure, elle est épurée ; à force d'être morale, elle perd le moral ; à force de laver plus blanc que ses concurrents, elle sort lessivée. Et ce n'est pas tout : jugée coupable au tribunal de la morale à géométrie variable d'ONG manipulées ou naïves, elle est régulièrement traînée dans la boue dans les media et désormais devant les tribunaux avec l'État. Si l'on doit à la ministre une belle défense des exportations nationales d'armement, on sent que le ver est partout dans le système et détruit des réseaux commerciaux entiers et donc des ventes futures. Alors que l'État parle d'abord de redistribuer une richesse inexistante, l'industrie d'armement démontre qu'il faut d'abord savoir la créer. Donc exporter. Montesquieu ne disait pas autre chose dans l'Esprit des Lois que "Le commerce est la chose du monde la plus utile à l'État". L'armement ne fait pas exception : il faut oser le dire. https://www.latribune.fr/opinions/les-veritables-menaces-qui-pesent-sur-l-industrie-d-armement-francaise-3-3-852610.html

Aero Montreal said it fully supports the arguments presented by the Canadian aerospace industry to the federal government and shares its concerns about the lack of support for the sector in Finance Minister Bill Morneau's recent economic update. This new snapshot makes no reference whatsoever to measures that would allow the industry to emerge from the crisis. That is why Aero Montreal is reiterating the importance of implementing a Canada-wide aerospace strategy, with specific measures dedicated to our sector, as soon as possible. By putting the aerospace industry at the heart of economic policies for more than 80 years, both in Quebec and in Canada, governments have succeeded in making aerospace an industry that contributes more than $25 billion to the country's GDP. Amidst the COVID-19 crisis, when other jurisdictions around the world are redoubling their efforts to support their aerospace industry, Quebec is supporting its “champion.” But the Canadian government is still waiting and Canada continues to fall behind on international markets. Aero Montreal is sounding the alarm on behalf of the Québec aerospace industry, which represents 49 per cent of the Canadian aerospace sector's workforce and 57 per cent of its sales. In Canada, research and development is at the heart of the aerospace industry, with an investment of $1.4 billion per year, more than 70 per cent of which is carried out in Quebec. In times of economic recovery, innovation is critical. For example, France is banking on an innovative recovery with a carbon-neutral aircraft. The United States has repeatedly demonstrated its support for the defence sector, allowing for the development of leading edge technologies that can be transferred to commercial aircraft. Canada must, without further delay, continue to invest in this strategic sector to position itself in this race for innovation. In order to succeed, our industry must be able to retain its highly-skilled workforce and prevent the ecosystem from being eroded. “The unprecedented mobilization of all players in the aerospace industry illustrates the intensity of the crisis we are experiencing. Through a collective approach, we are advocating the urgent need for a specific strategy dedicated to our sector that will accelerate the recovery, while emphasizing that this cannot be achieved without the help of the federal government,” said Suzanne M. Benoît, president of Aero Montreal. https://www.skiesmag.com/press-releases/aero-montreal-supports-appeal-to-the-federal-government/

By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — As the last portions of the altered Defender 2020 exercise kick into gear, the U.S. Army is beginning to plan its 2021 edition, a top general said Thursday. Speaking at a Defense News virtual panel on trans-Atlantic alliances Brig. Gen. Sean Bernabe, deputy commander of U.S. Army Europe, expressed confidence that Defender 2021 will be able to happen despite the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. “We've been continuing to look forward now that we've gained some confidence that we can train large-scale, collective [military exercises] in this environment,” Bernabe said. “We've been looking further and further forward. As we speak, we're planning exercise Defender Europe 2021, to take place in the late spring, early summer of 2021, focused in the Black Sea and Balkans.” Planning “is underway, again informed by our experiences between March and June. Having validated that we can do it, we're confident that we'll figure it out in partnership with our allies,” he added. “I feel confident that we will [be able to] maintain readiness and interoperability across Europe, despite COVID, regardless of how long it may be a part of our operating environment.” Bernabe predicted the 2021 exercise will likely be smaller than 2020′s planned version, which should be no surprise. Defender 2020 was billed as the third-largest military exercise in Europe since the end of the Cold War, a major test of the United States' ability to move stateside forces to locations across Europe, including Poland, the Baltics, some Nordic nations and Germany. A total of 20,000 soldiers were expected to participate. However, the COVID-19 outbreak forced the Army to hit pause on the exercise in March just as it was starting. Several smaller, related drills were canceled outright, and U.S. forces were sent back home. A smaller associated exercise picked up again in June. Bernabe's comments came just hours before the Army announced that a combined arms battalion would deploy to Europe between July 14 and Aug. 22 as part of the “final phase” of the modified Defender 2020 exercise. The deployment will involve 550 soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division out of Fort Hood, Texas, with the 1st Cavalry Division Headquarters in Poznan, Poland, serving as mission command. Approximately 55 Abrams tanks and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles will take part. The tanks will be equipped with the Trophy active protection system so the Army can “assess and experience the dynamics of moving and installing the system in a field environment.” At the end of June, the European Union put citizens of the United States on a list of countries barred from traveling to EU member states due to the continued spread of COVID-19. However, military movements are exempt from that rule, and Bernabe believes the Army has a good plan in place for the intake of forces into Europe. “To be good neighbors, we are using some very, I'd say, aggressive approaches to make sure that we are screening and testing for COVID as personnel arrive,” he said. “Make sure that we're putting in the mandatory 14 days' [quarantine], making sure that we continue screening, we wear masks, we practice physical distancing to make sure that we're not bringing infection into Europe while we focus on maintaining the military readiness. “So thankfully we've worked with our host nations to continue to flow personnel into and out of Europe.” https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-army/2020/07/10/as-defender-2020-winds-down-army-planning-for-2021-underway/

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY The Boeing Co., Huntsville, Alabama, was awarded a $150,000,000 undefinitized contract modification (P00057) to previously awarded HQ0147-12-C-0004/-19-C0004 on the Ground-based Midcourse Defense development and sustainment contract (DSC). The scope of work under the current DSC includes development, fielding, test, systems engineering, integration and configuration management, equipment manufacturing and refurbishment, training and operations and sustainment for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense weapon system and associated support facilities. Under this undefinitized modification, the Missile Defense Agency executes the procurement of four additional Configuration 2 Ground Based Interceptor boost vehicles to maintain the fleet and flight test programs. The value of this contract, including options, is increased from $11,337,396,890 to $11,487,396,890. The work will be performed in Chandler, Arizona, and the period of performance is from July 10, 2020, to July 30, 2023. This acquisition was executed on a sole-source basis. Fiscal 2020 procurement funds in the amount of in the amount of $72,000,000 have been obligated at the time of award. The Missile Defense Agency, Huntsville, Alabama, is the contracting activity. NAVY ASMD LLC, Honolulu, Hawaii, is awarded a $100,000,000 maximum amount, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, architect-engineer contract for design and engineering services for various projects funded by the government of Japan (GOJ) direct cash contributions (or otherwise referred to as the Mamizu funds) and U.S. funds for the development of infrastructure and facilities covered by the Defense Policy Review Initiative under the cognizance of Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Pacific. Work will be performed at various Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and other government facilities within the NAVFAC Pacific area of responsibility, including but not limited to, Hawaii and Guam, and may include work in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands. The work to be performed provides for design and engineering services for the execution and delivery of plans and specifications, including design-build request for proposal contract documents and design-bid-build contract documents; technical surveys and reports including engineering investigation, site investigation, topographical survey, geotechnical investigation and munitions of explosive concern investigation; functional analysis concept development/design charrettes; construction cost estimates; and post construction award services. Work is expected to be completed by July 2025. Contract funds in the amount of $20,000 are obligated on this award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Contract funds are GOJ direct cash contributions. Future task orders will be primarily funded by GOJ direct cash contributions. This contract was competitively procured via the Navy Electronic Commerce Online website with two proposals received. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, is the contracting activity (N62742-20-D-0001). Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas, is awarded an $87,498,287 cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. This contract provides non-recurring engineering for the development and maturation of the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) in support of data migration and transition to the newly developed F-35 Operational Integrated Data Network (ODIN). ALIS and ODIN provide maintenance capabilities to support worldwide F-35 operations. Additionally, this contract provides software and hardware engineering in support of F-35 ODIN development, delivery and associated data management activities for the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and non-Department of Defense participants. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida (75%); and Fort Worth, Texas (25%), and is expected to be completed by June 2022. No funds will be obligated at the time of award. Funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity (N00019-20-D-0007). Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., McLean, Virginia, is awarded a $70,337,682 firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. This contract provides for the development and delivery of the PC-based Open-architecture for Reconfigurable Training Systems (PORTS). Work will be performed in Middletown, Rhode Island (60%); Orlando, Florida (13%); San Diego, California (7%); Newport, Rhode Island (5%); Point Loma, California (5%); Norfolk, Virginia (1%); Dam Neck, Virginia (1%); Virginia Beach, Virginia (1%); Mayport, Florida (1%); Everett, Washington (1%); Point Mugu, California (1%); Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (1%); Fort Worth, Texas (1%); Fallon, Nevada (1%); and Yokosuka, Japan (1%). Additionally, this contract provides PORTS life cycle support to include training system modifications, trainer hardware purchases, configuration, installation and disposal, distance simulation software deficiency analysis, engineering distance simulation software, on-site simulation software troubleshooting, Training Equipment Change Request (TECR) corrections, TECR installation and test, spare parts and simulation software product delivery for PORTS-related trainers around the world. Work is expected to be completed by July 2025. No funds will be obligated at the time of award. Funds will be obligated on individual orders as they are issued. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1). The Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division, Orlando, Florida, is the contracting activity (N61340-20-D-0016). Raytheon Co., Tucson, Arizona, is awarded a $17,229,374 cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price order (N00019-20-F-0493) against previously issued basic ordering agreement N00019-15-G-0003. This order provides non-recurring engineering in support of upgrading the existing Tactical Tomahawk Guidance Test Set (TTGTS) product baseline to eliminate obsolescence and production issues. Additionally, this order provides for the development, test and delivery of six new TTGTSs. Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona (77%); Clearwater, Florida (4%); Glenrothes Fife, United Kingdom (3%); Midland, Ontario (3%); Huntsville, Alabama (2%); Scottsdale, Arizona (2%); North Salt Lake, Utah (1%); various locations within the continental U.S. (7.5%); and various location outside the continental U.S. (0.5%). Work is expected to be completed by December 2022. Fiscal 2020 weapons procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $17,229,374 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, Tewksbury, Massachusetts, was awarded a $9,686,463 cost-plus-fixed fee and firm-fixed-price order under basic ordering agreement N00024-18-G-5501 for engineering design and component replacement parts to support the Dual Band Radar systems. Work will be performed in Andover, Massachusetts (25%); Marlborough, Massachusetts (25%); Tewksbury, Massachusetts (25%); and Portsmouth, Rhode Island (25%), and is expected to be completed by November 2022. Fiscal 2018 other procurement (Navy); fiscal 2019 other procurement (Navy); fiscal 2020 other procurement (Navy); and fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance (Navy) funding in the amount of $9,686,463 will be obligated at time of award and funding in the amount of $2,975,360 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This order was procured under the statutory authority of 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1); one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-20-F-5505). (Awarded July 8, 2020) Lockheed Martin, Rotary and Mission Systems, Moorestown, New Jersey, is awarded a $7,344,470 cost-plus-incentive-fee modification to previously awarded contract N00024-16-C-5102 to exercise an option for AEGIS Platform Systems Engineering Agent efforts for the integration and delivery of AEGIS Baseline 9 capabilities. Work will be performed in Moorestown, New Jersey. The contract provides for the completion of the development and fielding of the AEGIS Baseline 9 AEGIS Weapon System and integrated AEGIS Combat System on the remaining AEGIS Technical Insertion (TI) 12 configured destroyers as well as TI 12 and TI 08 configured cruisers. Work is expected to be completed by July 2021. Fiscal 2013 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy); fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance (Navy); fiscal 2020 other procurement (Navy); and fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funding in the amount of $7,344,470 will be obligated at time of award and funding in the amount of $1,380,964 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. AIR FORCE TAC Industries, Springfield, Ohio, has been awarded a $69,422,312 requirements contract for the production of cargo nets for the support equipment and vehicles division at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. The base contract year has a value of $13,469,074; Option One has a value of $13,565,182; Option Two has a value of $13,842,626; Option Three has a value of $14,127,218; and Option Four has a value of $14,418,212. The contract provides for the production of 40,600 low profile side nets and 17,000 top nets under the basic period, and best estimated quantities of 40,600 low profile side nets and 17,000 top nets during each option period thereafter. Work will be performed in Springfield, Ohio, and is expected to be completed by July 10, 2025. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. Fiscal 2020 other procurement funds in the amount of $13,469,074 are be obligated at the time of first delivery order award. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, is the contracting activity (FA8534-20-D-0005). Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory LLC, Laurel, Maryland, has been awarded a $29,702,388 cost-plus-fixed-fee modification (P00013) to contract FA9453-18-D-0018, task order FA9453-18-F-0007, to provide technical and programmatic support of Tactical Space and Small Satellite Portfolio's core competencies and mission lifecycle. This includes support of the mission phases from concept through design, implementation, operations and transition of space assets. Work will be performed in Laurel, Maryland, and is expected to be completed Sept. 29, 2023. This modification brings the total cumulative face value of the contract to $53,550,559. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $1,329,250 are being obligated at time of award. Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, is the contracting activity. Howell Instruments Inc., Fort Worth, Texas, has been awarded an $8,034,280 firm-fixed-price, requirements-type contract, for the production of environmental control test sets. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas, and is expected to be completed July 9, 2025. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. No funds are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Support Equipment Directorate, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, is the contracting activity (FA8533-20-D-0006). ARMY Phylway Construction LLC,* Thibodaux, Louisiana, was awarded a $51,702,210 firm-fixed-price contract for construction of hurricane protection features in Plaquemines Parrish, Louisiana. Bids were solicited via the internet with six received. Work will be performed in New Orleans, Louisiana, with an estimated completion date of Aug. 31, 2026. Fiscal 2020 civil construction funds in the amount of $51,702,210 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg, Mississippi, is the contracting activity (W912P8-20-C-0032). Pine Bluff Sand and Gravel Co., Pine Bluff, Arizona, was awarded a $48,002,240 firm-fixed-price contract for flood control on the Mississippi River and tributaries. Bids were solicited via the internet with two received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of July 10, 2022. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans, Louisiana, is the contracting activity (W912P8-20-D-0011). Speegle Construction Inc.,* Niceville, Florida, was awarded a $10,373,085 firm-fixed-price contract to construct two new facilities at Eglin Air Force Base. Bids were solicited via the internet with 10 received. Work will be performed at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, with an estimated completion date of Aug. 30, 2022. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation (Air Force) funds in the amount of $10,373,085 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W91278-20-C-0020). Mike Hooks LLC, Westlake, Louisiana, was awarded a $10,207,400 firm-fixed-price contract for pipeline dredging of the Matagorda Ship Channel. Bids were solicited via the internet with three received. Work will be performed in Bay City, Texas, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 31, 2021. Fiscal 2019 and 2020 civil construction funds in the amount of $10,207,400 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Galveston, Texas, is the contracting activity (W912HY-20-C-0023). USA Environmental Management,* Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was awarded a $9,473,200 firm-fixed-price contract for hot cargo hydrant system replacement at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. Bids were solicited via the internet with five received. Work will be performed at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 30, 2022. Fiscal 2020 military construction, defense-wide funds in the amount of $9,473,200 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New York, New York, is the contracting activity (W912DS-20-C-0017). Ashford Leebcor Enterprises III,* Williamsburg, Virginia, was awarded an $8,134,009 firm-fixed-price contract to renovate Building 11 at the Defense Logistics Agency. Bids were solicited via the internet with 11 received. Work will be performed in Richmond, Virginia, with an estimated completion date of Sept. 22, 2021. Fiscal 2016 facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization funds in the amount of $8,134,009 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Norfolk, Virginia, is the contracting activity (W91236-20-C-2021). CORRECTION: The contract announced on July 8, 2020, to BFBC LLC, Bozeman, Montana (W912PL-20-C-0002), for a $138,335,455 modification (P00005) to modify existing electrical attributes (closed-circuit TV, linear ground detection system and shelters) on the Barry M. Goldwater Range, Yuma 10/27 design-build border infrastructure project, was actually awarded on July 9, 2020. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY American Water Operations and Maintenance LLC, Camden, New Jersey, has been awarded a $26,919,360 modification (P00163) to a 50-year contract (SP0600-08-C-8257), with no option periods for the ownership, operation and maintenance of water and wastewater utility systems at Fort Polk, Louisiana. This is a fixed‐price with prospective-price redetermination contract. Locations of performance are Louisiana and New Jersey, with a Jan. 31, 2059, performance completion date. Using military service is Army. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2059 (Army) operations and maintenance funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Energy, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Baltimore, Maryland, has been awarded a $19,660,934 cost-plus-fixed fee contract for the base period of a research project for hypersonic boost glide systems. Work will be performed in Baltimore, Maryland, with an estimated completion date of March 2023. Fiscal 2019 research and development funds in the amount of $549,419; and fiscal 2020 research and development funds in the amount of $17,449,429 are being obligated at time of award. This contract is a sole-source award. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia, is the contracting activity (HR0011-20-C0-0054). *Small Business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2270757/source/GovDelivery/

The J-20B has overcome agility problems to finally be considered a fully fledged fifth-generation fighter, military source says Aircraft still will be fitted with Russian engine but ‘Chinese version could be ready in a year or two' A modified version of China's first stealth fighter jet, the J-20, has formally entered mass production, with upgrades earning it a place as a fifth-generation fighter jet, according to a military source close to the project. The moment was marked at a ceremonial unveiling of the modified J-20B stealth fighter jet on Wednesday attended by many senior military leaders including Central Military Commission (CMC) vice-chairman General Zhang Youxia, the source said. Zhang is the second-ranked vice-chairman of the CMC and is in charge of weapons development for the People's Liberation Army. “Mass production of the J-20B started on Wednesday. It has finally become a complete stealth fighter jet, with its agility meeting the original criteria,” the source said. “The most significant change to the fighter jet is that it is now equipped with thrust vector control.” Thrust vector control (TVC) allows pilots to better control the aircraft by redirecting engine thrust. In 2018, China debuted its J-10C multirole fighter – fitted with a WS-10 Taihang engine – at the China air show in Zhuhai, putting the aircraft through its paces in a performance that indicated that China had succeeded in thrust technology. While the TVC technology had been applied to the stealth fighter, the J-20B would still use Russian Saturn AL-31 engines because more work needed to be done on China's WS-15 engine, the source said. Chinese engineers have been developing high-thrust turbofan WS-15 engines for the J-20, but that work has fallen behind schedule. “The Chinese engine designed for the J-20s still failed to meet requirements, but its development is going quite smoothly, and it may be ready in the next one or two years,” the source said. “The ultimate goal is to equip the J-20B fighter jets with domestic engines.” China was thought to have built about 50 J-20s by the end of 2019, but problems with the jets' engines delayed further production plans. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth assembly plant in Texas delivered 134 F-35 stealth fighters in 2019, three more than its target and 47 per cent more than its output in 2018, according to the company. China's first batch of J-20s entered service in 2017 when the US decided to deploy more than 100 F-35s to Japan and South Korea that year. The J-20 was meant to be a fifth-generation fighter jet on a par with Lockheed's F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning multirole strike fighters. Fifth-generation fighters are defined by their stealth technology, supersonic cruising speed, super manoeuvrability, and highly integrated avionics. But the earlier version of the J-20 was described by Western media as a “dedicated interceptor aircraft” because of its lack of agility. “The launch of the J-20B means this aircraft now is a formal fifth-generation fighter jet,” the military source said, adding that Chengdu Aerospace Corporation (CAC), which manufactures the J-20s, had received “heavy orders” from the PLA. CAC set up its fourth production line in 2019, each one with a capacity to make about one J-20 a month. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3092839/chinas-stealth-fighter-goes-mass-production-after-thrust

India is a top buyer of foreign weapons on the international market and Russia has been its main supplier since the Soviet era The June 15 clash between China and India in the contested Galwan Valley lends an urgency to New Delhi's arms programme Russia and the United States are racing to sell weapons to India as New Delhi seeks to boost arms supplies for its ongoing military tension with Beijing. The Indian government last week rushed to approve a proposal to acquire 33 new Russian warplanes for US$2.4 billion and upgrade 59 more, in addition to an earlier US$5.43 billion deal for S-400 air defence missile systems, after the deadly skirmish with Chinese troops last month on their disputed border. However, Russia's close relationship with China raised questions over Moscow's reliability by some in India, while the US, which has been stepping up ties with New Delhi through the Indo-Pacific strategy, has been pushing for arms sale to India. “Many believe that India must not put all its eggs in one basket, rather continue to follow the middle path by pushing for engagement with both Russia as well as the United States,” said Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a distinguished fellow and head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. India is a top buyer in the international arms market, with billions of dollars of imports every year. In the past 10 years, it has spent more money on foreign weapons than any other country in the world, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Russia has been the main supplier to India since the Soviet era. Since 2000, it has sold about US$35 billion worth of weapons, accounting for more than two-thirds of India's arms procurement of US$51 billion. Most of India's strategic weapons – from its only active aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya with its ship-borne MiG-29 and Ka-31 aircraft, to its only nuclear attack submarine in service, the Chakra II, to its T-90 and T-72 main battle tanks – are from Russia. Additionally, Russia licensed Indian firm HAL to build the Su-30 MKI, the main fighter for the Indian Air Force, and contributed to India's only nuclear-capable supersonic cruise missile – the BrahMos. In comparison, arms deals with the US have totalled just US$3.9 billion over the past 20 years but America has been rapidly catching up since 2010 to rise to number two vendor to India, surpassing Israel and France. India has equipped its military with Boeing C-17 and C-130J airlifters. Earlier this year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi pledged to US President Donald Trump to buy US$3 billion worth of US equipment, including helicopters, as the two converged on a course to counter China in the Indo-Pacific region, and gradually formed much closer military ties with a series of strategic military pacts Then the tension between India and China suddenly escalated, culminating in a clash on June 15, in which at least 20 Indian soldiers were killed in the contested Galwan Valley between Indian-administered Ladakh and Chinese administered Aksai Chin. The continued stand-off added urgency to India's arms shopping. “Russians profit from a Sino-India clash. I don't think the Americans would be so happy to see that,” said Zhou Chenming, a Beijing-based military analyst. “The Trump administration has been trying very hard to grab a bigger share in this market of billions every year, which they wouldn't want to miss.” The US has leverage. The 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) punishes whoever engages in “significant transactions” over US$15 million with the Russian state-owned defence industry. And Washington has remained non-committal despite the constant request for an exemption from the Indian side. “I don't think the US will actually implement the sanction at the end of the day. That was part of the effort to pressure India to choose American arms over Russian,” said Song Zhongping, a military commentator in Hong Kong. “And Russia will not sit by. They will also take action to keep India on.” Other efforts include discussions earlier this year in which the US offered to develop for India a “super F-16”, and even transfer the production line to India as preferred by the Modi government, as well as other air defence missile alternatives to the S-400. The US has delivered Apache and Chinook helicopters now deployed in Ladakh. Song said India's buying spree could increase its strength against the Chinese army but only to a limited extent. “India could buy some advanced weapons but cannot buy real combat capability. A modern military is an organic system,” he said. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3092710/russia-and-us-jostle-arms-sales-india-after-tensions-china

Joe Anselmo Michael Bruno July 10, 2020 When he was United Technologies Corp. chairman and CEO, Greg Hayes took a lot of heat for merging his company with Raytheon to create aerospace powerhouse Raytheon Technologies. But the critics have been silenced as defense has cushioned the company from the battering the commercial downturn has inflicted on its Collins Aerospace and Pratt & Whitney operations. Hayes spoke via videoconference with AW&ST Editor-in-Chief Joe Anselmo and Senior Business Editor Michael Bruno. AW&ST: How long will it take the commercial aviation industry to recover from the COVID-19 crisis? Initially, we thought this was going to be like the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2002-03. We thought it was going to be relatively short-lived, where air traffic would go down for a little while but then gradually recover. I don't think any of us envisioned the morbidity or the scope of this pandemic and its impact on travel. I would say we're looking now at getting back to 2019 in 2023, maybe 2024. It is going to be a slow recovery. Raytheon chief looks ahead Commercial aviation recovery will take years Investing in hypersonics Game-changing technologies for a next-generation narrowbody The good news is we've got plenty of liquidity. We'll see our way through this, but it is going to be a tough road. We are hunkering down for a protracted recession on the commercial aero side. Our aftermarket orders are down 50%-plus at both Collins Aerospace and Pratt & Whitney. That's where a lot of the profits come from. The reason we can spend $2.5 billion a year on R&D for the commercial businesses is because we have this spares business that generates strong cash. When that goes away, it's tough. And as a result, we're going to cut R&D this year by $500 million on the commercial side. Unfortunately, the airlines are not in a position to weather this storm for probably more than another 12 months without government assistance. That's really going to be the key. Do governments in the U.S., Europe, South America and across Asia step up to support what is a critical industry in aerospace? Is the industry underplaying the severity of the COVID-19 downturn? A vaccine is the key, and it has to be widely available. The World Health Organization is working on that, but we're going to have hotspots with this pandemic for the next year or two. So even if the U.S. and Europe are completely vaccinated, what does that mean for travel to Africa, Asia, to the fast-growing markets? I'd almost bifurcate the aerospace industry between a narrowbody recovery and widebody recovery. The narrowbody is primarily domestic, whether it's Europe, the U.S. or even China. That will recover more quickly as people become confident-—there's either a vaccine or they've found new treatment options. But on the international side, we can't fly today into Europe, and we don't want the Europeans to fly to the U.S. We can't go to South America or China. Those routes are going to take much, much longer to recover. The fact is there are so many excess aircraft out there right now that we believe you're going to see more parting out of existing fleets before we see a resurgence. And that's why even when passenger traffic starts to come back, there's probably a full 6-12 months before we're going to see a return to normalcy in our aftermarket organization. Pratt supplies the PW1000G engine option for the Airbus A320neo. How much downside risk is there for -deliveries? We're planning for about a 40% reduction in A320 deliveries this year and next year compared with February 2020 production rates. Airbus would love to build more, but it's not clear to us that customers are going to be around to take more than that. The good news is our market share went from about 42% [of A320neo engines] to north of 50% in the last year. Customers are starting to believe in the geared turbofan because of the fuel efficiency. Do you see the market share between Airbus and Boeing shifting? The order book for the A320 is much stronger today, with all the cancellations that we've seen on the 737 MAX because of delays. We still think the 737 will get back in the air this year, and we continue to work with Boeing on software updates. We firmly believe it's a great aircraft. Keep in mind we have about $2.5 million of content per shipset on the 737. It's going to be a tough couple of years, but we ultimately have faith in the airframe and the certification process. Where are you focusing your future efforts with Boeing and Airbus? We were optimistically cautious about the [proposed Boeing] new mid-market airplane (NMA), but there is a lot of excess capacity now, and it's not clear another evolutionary design is going to be the answer. So our focus right now is the next-generation single--aisle. And we think that's probably been pushed out a couple of years, to maybe 2033 or 2035. They're talking about a 30% efficiency gain from the current single-aisle. Two-thirds of that gain has to come from engine design. At the Paris Air Show last year, we talked about a hybrid electric design [Project 804]. We're going to continue on that path. We're trying to figure out how you can have enough power at takeoff while having a much lower fuel consumption at cruise. And that's where hybrid electric comes in. It's going to take us at least a decade to prove that out. I don't know if hybrid electric is the answer. There are other things that we're working on. But obviously it's got to be something completely different than what we've been building in the past. Governments around the world are taking on huge debt to alleviate the coronavirus crisis. Are you worried that will put pressure on military spending over the long term? You would have to have your head in the sand to not understand what's going to happen to defense budgets over time. When [Raytheon CEO] Tom Kennedy and I first talked about this merger, it was, “What can we do together that we can't do separately?” And it really was bringing the technologies of the two companies together to solve customer problems in new and innovative ways. Defense budgets will go down, but I think the real question is where Defense Department spending is going. I remember talking two years ago with [then-Defense Secretary] Gen. [James] Mattis, and he said, “Bring us innovative solutions, not to fight the last war but to fight the next war.” And the next war, he said, is going to be fought in cyberspace and outer space. The capabilities of the legacy Raytheon business are second to none in space and are outstanding on the cyber side. You marry that up with the manufacturing and material science that Pratt & Whitney brings, with the communication systems that Rockwell Collins brings, and this is going to be a great play. The U.S. Air Force wants more software-driven capabilities, delivered in weeks or even days. How does that square with your businesses, which often involve long-term hardware evolutions? It's making sure that we're continuing to evolve our products. The missiles we're delivering today, such as the SM-3 [interceptor] or the SM-6 [anti-air/anti-surface/-ballistic missile defense] are state of the art, and we continue to find new uses for them. A lot of things will change over time in terms of how the weapons are deployed. Think about the Storm-Breaker missile that we just demonstrated, which has the tri-mode seeker. It can do things the last generation of missiles could never do in terms of going through smoke, fog, dust and sand. The LRSO [Long-Range Standoff nuclear cruise missile] is another example. And the Tomahawk is an established product that we will evolve as the needs of the battlefield change to meet new requirements. That's really what we want to focus on: How do we continue software-driven solutions but also find ways to redeploy and reinvigorate the product line and bring new capabilities to the warfighter? Are you making long-term investments in hypersonics? Hypersonics are a destabilizing technology. There's only so much we can talk about, but we know we're behind the Chinese and probably behind the Russians. I think in 3-5 years we'll be on a level playing field. Our focus has been on defensive systems, using space-based assets to track hypersonics. It's nothing that a ground radar could ever do because they move too fast. And then countermeasures that we could use to defend against hypersonics is the bigger market. We're obviously investing. We've got a program, the HAWC [Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept], which is an air-breathing hypersonic missile that we're working on. I think we'll flight-test that later this year. Also think about the materials science that Pratt brings. The key to hypersonics is how to keep the electronics from getting fried when you're operating at something like 5,000F. We're investing in cooling materials—that will be one of the big bets that we're going to have to make. Tom Kennedy saw the need to make these investments, and we're going to do that. The other piece is on the space side. There's not a lot that we can say, other than that we think space will be the frontier that will differentiate us—that is, the defense of space assets, as well as using space assets to detect, track and target hypersonic weapons. When the merger of United Technologies and Raytheon was announced, there was a lot of criticism from investors. Now they're happy about how well-positioned the combined company is to weather the COVID-19 storm. There was a lot of pushback from investors, especially from the hedge fund guys. They saw us taking a lower-margin business, and they didn't like the fact that the technology takes 5-10 years to pay off. I was roundly criticized. All I can say is I was an idiot a year ago and now I'm a genius, through no fault of my own. We did this for the long term, and it was completely fortuitous that the merger happened when it did. The commercial businesses won't make any money this year, and they are going to struggle for the next couple of years, but now we've got a rock-solid balance sheet and a lot of cash. And that defense business is going to grow 5-8% this year. We've got a good backlog. I'd like to say it was genius, but it really was just doing what's right for the long term. My goal is to leave this company better than I found it. You have reshaped this company, starting with selling Sikorsky to Lockheed Martin in 2015. Then you acquired Rockwell Collins and moved to break up the UTC conglomerate, and it looked like UTC was going to be a commercial aerospace company. Now comes Raytheon. Are you done, or is there more to come? I'm never done until I'm gone, but we don't need to do anything else big. The driving force [behind the Raytheon merger] was putting two big technology companies together with cyclical balance [between commercial and defense]. Tom Kennedy always felt he was at a disadvantage against the Lockheeds of the world because of the scale of Lockheed versus Raytheon. This gives us the scale to invest and compete head on with the Lockheed Martins and Northrop Grummans, as well as being the largest supplier to both Boeing and Airbus. We have some clout in the marketplace. We've got 700,000 different things that we deliver to customers: missiles, APUs, engines, communications gear. Some we really love; others don't have the returns that we want or require too much investment for a limited market. We hope to have a portfolio review done by the end of the year. And you'll probably see some divestitures, but not big pieces. We also continue to look for technology bolt-ons as we think about what's next in defense and the space and cyber spectrums. Longer term, the big question in my mind is what happens to Rolls-Royce, a great technology company that is facing challenging financial circumstances. We loved the partnership Pratt had with Rolls on International Aero Engines. Could we recreate that someday? Perhaps, but not now. Ian Davis, who's the chairman over there, is a good guy. We always say, “Look, we need to find ways to collaborate so we can take on GE Aviation.” Despite the fact that GE may be on its heels today, they've got over 30,000 engines out there. Their aftermarket will recover, they will get better, and they will be the formidable competitor for both Rolls and Raytheon Technologies for the foreseeable future. We're hearing from Wall Street that you're expected to sell off the Forcepoint business. Forcepoint is a commercial cyber business Tom Kennedy created when he brought a couple of companies together about five years ago. It has some great technology, but it clearly doesn't fit in the portfolio. We'll figure that out in the next six months. How is the integration going? Nothing went according to plan except the merger itself. We sent everybody home the week of March 12 [because of COVID-19], and we were still three weeks away from the merger. So we had to complete the merger and all of the integration remotely. And we had to spin off Carrier and Otis. All of that came to fruition on time and exactly as we had planned while working from home. The resilience and the ingenuity of our folks to figure all this out has probably been the most pleasing. There was some concern that the cultures at Raytheon and the commercial guys at Pratt and Collins would never come together. That is the last thing I worry about. Everything we laid out has gotten done. We're on track for synergies in cost, technology and revenue. The difference is I have yet to have a staff meeting in person. I've got 17 people who work for me, and we do everything on Zoom. Each one of our three board meetings since the merger has been done on Zoom. If you had told me 3-4 months ago that we would be working from home for a good deal of time, I'd have really panicked. But we figured it out. https://aviationweek.com/ad-week/ad-week-video-interviews/raytheon-technologies-ceo-riding-out-covid-19-crisis

Tony Osborne July 10, 2020 https://aviationweek.com/ad-week/closer-look-european-aerospace-defense-programs

HASSAN MEDDAH RAFALE , COVID-19 , L'USINE AÉRO , AÉRONAUTIQUE , HAUTS-DE-SEINE PUBLIÉ LE 10/07/2020 À 11H06 Quand l'activité civile flanche, le marché militaire peut prendre le relais. À condition d'avoir déjà un pied dans la place et une vision à long terme. A Villeneuve-la-Garenne (Hauts-de-Seine), la vingtaine de compagnons de la PME Rafaut ne chôme pas. Dans leur atelier de mécanique et d'intégration, ils assemblent des emports, d'imposantes pièces mécaniques destinées à Dassault Aviation. Ces pièces qui se placent sous les ailes des Rafale servent à transporter soit des bombes, soit des réservoirs d'appoint. "Notre dualité est un facteur de robustesse, particulièrement appréciable dans cette crise du secteur aéronautique", se réjouit Bruno Berthet, le président de Rafaut. Les activités de défense ont représenté un véritable amortisseur pour cette PME de 400 salariés, dont les commandes pour Airbus (palonnier, freins de rotors...) se sont écroulées avec la crise du secteur aérien. Rafaut présente le profil quasi parfait de l'entreprise dite duale, avec ses 93 millions d'euros de chiffre d'affaires, répartis équitablement entre les activités civiles et militaires. Le groupe a, certes, fait appel à des mesures de chômage technique, mais de manière modérée en mettant 30 % de son personnel en activité partielle pour deux tiers de leur temps de travail. Pour les autres PME du secteur aéronautique, la défense peut-elle constituer une bouée de sauvetage ? Le ministère des Armées veut y croire et met la main à la poche. À l'occasion de l'annonce du plan de sauvetage de la filière aéronautique, début juin, Florence Parly, la ministre des Armées, a annoncé l'accélération de 600 millions d'euros de commandes militaires. L'armée de l'air a commandé trois long-courriers A 330 qui seront transformés en avions ravitailleurs MRTT. Initialement prévus en 2026, ils seront livrés à partir de l'an prochain. Le troisième exemplaire de l'avion léger de surveillance et de reconnaissance qui devait être livré en 2027 le sera en 2023. Les hélicoptéristes ne sont pas oubliés. L'armée va acheter par anticipation huit hélicoptères Caracal. Ils sont destinés à remplacer les Puma dès 2023, soit avec cinq ans d'avance. Enfin, les PME devraient être les principales bénéficiaires d'une commande de drones de surveillance pour la marine à livrer dès 2022. Des accréditations spécifiques "L'ensemble de ces commandes répond à un besoin opérationnel existant de nos forces armées. Nous allons simplement aller plus vite. Cette anticipation nous permettra de sauvegarder plus de 1 200 emplois pendant trois ans, et cela, partout en France", a précisé Florence Parly. L'initiative n'est pas totalement désintéressée. Le ministère ne voudrait surtout pas voir disparaître des fournisseurs stratégiques emportés par la crise économique. Depuis plusieurs semaines, ses équipes pilotent une task force interministérielle forte d'une centaine de personnes. À charge pour elles de quadriller le territoire, visiter les usines et les bureaux d'études, et d'identifier les entrepreneurs et les domaines à risque. Au total, près de 1 500 entreprises seront visitées. Les entreprises tentées de se diversifier vers la défense doivent impérativement avoir une vision de long terme... comme celles des armées qui s'appuient sur une loi de programmation militaire pluriannuelle. Sur la période 2019-2025, le ministère a consacré la part du lion de son budget à l'aéronautique pour renouveler ses flottes d'appareils, d'hélicoptères, de drones. Soit un montant de 19 milliards d'euros ! Toutefois, il serait illusoire de croire que toutes les PME de l'aéronautique pourront en bénéficier d'un simple claquement de doigts. "Pour servir les armées, les fournisseurs doivent passer par des dispositifs d'accréditation. C'est un long processus. Par ailleurs, ce n'est pas simple d'intégrer comme fournisseur un programme d'armement déjà lancé comme le Rafale ou l'A400M. Les tickets d'entrée sont chers", avertit Matthieu Lemasson, expert des questions aéronautiques et défense pour le cabinet PWC. Le cluster Normandie AeroEspace (NAE), qui regroupe plus d'une centaine de PME de l'aéronautique, est bien conscient de la difficulté. Il a lancé des actions tous azimuts pour accélérer leur diversification et notamment une formation pour obtenir une habilitation et une accréditation défense, sésames indispensables pour travailler dans le domaine de l'armement. Le cluster monte également des rencontres avec des représentants du ministère des Armées, de la Direction générale de l'armement (DGA), des grands industriels de l'armement pour connaître les opportunités à saisir... Avec un exemple à suivre : la PME Gauthier Connectique, fabricant de raccords électriques. Cette société (40 salariés, 5 millions d'euros de chiffres d'affaires) était, il y a dix ans encore, exclusivement positionnée sur l'aéronautique. Déjà présents sur le Rafale, ses raccords électriques sont en passe d'être homologués pour monter sur le M51, le missile stratégique de la dissuasion nucléaire. L'entreprise s'est également diversifiée dans le secteur spatial qui représente un tiers de son activité. "Entre la décision de se diversifier, et les premières commandes, il faut compter environ trois ans. Le fait d'avoir déjà comme clients Dassault Aviation, Safran et Thales nous a beaucoup aidés", souligne son président Luc Sevestre. La PME ne compte pas s'arrêter en si bon chemin. L'entreprise adapte sa technologie au milieu marin et terrestre et tente de séduire Naval Group, de même que Nexter, le fabricant du char Leclerc. Boeing mieux armé qu'Airbus pour traverser la crise ? Airbus va-t-il souffrir plus que son concurrent Boeing pour traverser la crise actuelle ? Si l'avionneur américain traîne le boulet du 737MAX, il a un atout considérable par rapport à son concurrent européen : le soutien du Pentagone, le premier acheteur au niveau mondial d'équipements militaires. Pour les forces armées américaines, Boeing livre à foison des avions de combats (F15 et F18) et des ravitailleurs (KC 46), des hélicoptères d'attaque et de transport de troupe (Chinook, Apache), des missiles... Au total, les activités de la branche défense, sécurité et espace ont pesé pour 34 % de son chiffre d'affaires en 2019, soit 76 milliards de dollars. Pour Airbus, l'activité défense pèse moins de 15 % des activités du groupe, soit 10 milliards d'euros de chiffres d'affaires en 2019. Le groupe avait raté l'occasion historique en 2012 de fusionner avec le britannique BAE Systems. Une telle opération aurait permis d'équilibrer les activités civiles et militaires de l'avionneur, le rêve de Louis Gallois, le président du groupe Airbus (alors EADS) entre 2007 et 2012. « À l'époque, les mauvaises langues disaient qu'il n'y avait pas d'intérêt et peu de synergies à cette opération. Cela aurait probablement constitué un ensemble plus robuste pour traverser la crise actuelle et permis de trouver des synergies utiles aussi bien en matière de gestion des effectifs que des programmes », souligne Matthieu Lemasson, expert des questions aéronautiques et défense pour PWC. https://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/la-defense-planche-de-salut-de-la-filiere-aeronautique.N982761