2 juin 2022 | International, Naval
The more the Navy experiments with unmanned systems, the more it's learning what it needs ' and what it doesn't.
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/05/19/whats-new-in-navy-and-marine-corps-unmanned-boats/
7 janvier 2022 | International, Aérospatial
Small armed devices, often bought for a few hundred dollars online, are a big battlefield problem for the U.S. military, and developing a defense that is cost-effective against swarms of them is a conundrum. Laser and microwave weapons are among the new options.
14 janvier 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval
by Michael Peck “The Navy continues to struggle with rebuilding the readiness of the existing fleet due to enduring maintenance and manning challenges,” the report finds. “As the Navy seeks to expand its fleet by 25 percent, these challenges will likely be further exacerbated and the Navy will likely face additional affordability challenges.” The Navy must fix the teething troubles of a new and complicated aircraft that lacks sufficient spare parts: in 2017, only 15 percent of Marine F-35Bs were rated fully mission-capable. “The Navy and the Marine Corps may have to decide whether they are willing to accept less reliable and maintainable aircraft than originally planned,” GAO warned. How can the U.S. Navy buy more ships and planes when it can't maintain the ones it has? That's the question posed by a new Government Accountability Office report . “The Navy continues to struggle with rebuilding the readiness of the existing fleet due to enduring maintenance and manning challenges,” the report finds. “As the Navy seeks to expand its fleet by 25 percent, these challenges will likely be further exacerbated and the Navy will likely face additional affordability challenges.” Auditors point to seven problems that GAO, Congress's watchdog agency, have highlighted over the past several years, but which have yet to solved: Training: After a series of embarrassing collisions at sea in 2017, which led to fears that Navy has forgotten basic ship-handling skills, training was revamped along with fewer waivers for required training. Still, “while the Navy has demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that crews are certified prior to deploying, training for amphibious operations and higher-level collective training may not be fully implemented for several years.” Maintenance backlogs: Between 2012 and 2018, only 30 percent of maintenance was completed on schedule. In particular, most Navy attack submarines have suffered maintenance delays. The backlog is caused by insufficient capacity in public shipyards as well as shortages of shipyard workers. Overworked sailors: In 2017, GAO concluded that the Navy was underestimating how many sailors were needed to man ships, leading to undersized crews and overworked sailors. The Navy says it is aiming for surface ships based overseas to have a minimum of 95 percent of their complement, but GAO auditors who interviewed crews in Japan were told that “the Navy's methods for tracking fit and fill do not account for sailor experience and may be inaccurately capturing the actual presence of sailors onboard and available for duty on its ships. Moreover, sailors consistently told us that ship workload has not decreased, and it is still extremely challenging to complete all required workload while getting enough sleep.” Unrealistic budgeting: The Navy wants to boost the number of ships by 25 percent, and is planning to buy 301 new ships between now and 2048 as well as extending the life of older destroyers and submarines. But GAO and the Congressional Budget Office have calculated that the Navy “has consistently and significantly underestimated the cost and timeframes for delivering new ships to the fleet. For example, the Navy estimates that buying the new ships specified in the fiscal year 2019 plan would cost $631 billion over 30 years while the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that those new ships would cost $801 billion—a difference of 27 percent.” Aging aircraft: Numerous aircraft models across the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps have been plagued by low availability rates due to aging aircraft, lack of spare parts for older planes, and too few mechanics. Too few pilots: The shortage of Marine Corps fighter pilots quadrupled to 24 percent between 2006 and 2017, while the Navy has been scrambling to fill pilot vacancies. “Further compounding their pilot shortages, we also found that the services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect an increased fighter pilot workload,” said GAO. “As a result, the reported shortage actually could be greater.” The F-35: The Navy must fix the teething troubles of a new and complicated aircraft that lacks sufficient spare parts: in 2017, only 15 percent of Marine F-35Bs were rated fully mission-capable. “The Navy and the Marine Corps may have to decide whether they are willing to accept less reliable and maintainable aircraft than originally planned,” GAO warned. Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/sink-feeling-navys-7-big-problems-one-f-35-41502
10 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial
June 9, 2020 - Contested environments: Threat levels are rising due to the increasing development and dissemination of Anti Access/Areal Denial means. European air forces and navies need to prepare themselves for potential large scale high tempo operations in contested environments. To maintain air superiority and minimize attrition levels, Europe's Future Combat Air System (FCAS) will be a system of systems leveraging manned and unmanned collaborative combat, bringing the next level of Air Power. Decisive tactical edge: FCAS will ultimately require a New Generation Fighter in 2040, which will be more sophisticated with very low observability, cutting edge passive and active sensors, on board smart applications and human machine collaboration. Such a New Generation Fighter will be a battle management platform capable of operating deep within enemy space. When teaming with unmanned modular platforms, named Remote Carriers, New Generation Fighters will have the needed scalable and flexible force multipliers to open new fields of tactics based on deception and numeric superiority. Accelerated operational tempo: European air forces and navies will need to accelerate the operational tempo to complete OODA (Observe Orient Decide Act) loops faster than the adversary and take control of the situation. The interoperable Air Combat Cloud will provide common situational awareness by instantaneously capturing, sharing, merging and processing massive amounts of data from all connected manned and unmanned platforms. The Air Combat Cloud's warfare analytics and real-time coordination will provide better situational awareness, tactical options, decisions and collaborative effects to speed-up the OODA loop. Better effects paths: Operating as a system of systems orchestrated by an Air Combat Cloud, FCAS will allow the OODA loop to be distributed across platforms allowing the dynamic combination of sensing, shooting and battle management capabilities. With a distributed OODA loop, FCAS will provide European air forces and navies with better, faster and more resilient effects paths under human supervision. Incremental journey: FCAS will be an incremental journey. In a world with increasing threats, Airbus and its industrial partners need to start providing from 2025 the first capabilities to maintain European and National sovereignty. FCAS will lead to a doctrinal and technological change. Using such new capabilities will be a huge challenge for European air forces and navies, which cannot be instantaneously achieved. New doctrines, processes and skills need to be gradually developed in alignment with the planned arrival of FCAS capabilities and meeting the related technological challenges. FCAS will require a step by step approach to be jointly tackled by European air forces, navies and industry. More on FCAS here View source version on Airbus: https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/stories/Ensuring-Future-Air-Power-Capability.html