27 janvier 2023 | International, C4ISR
The contract is an extension following a successful pilot and follow-on service program in the government’s FY22
6 janvier 2023 | International, Terrestre
The United States said on Thursday that it will send Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine to bolster Kiev's fight against Russia's invasion. The delivery, expected to total around 50 units, comes alongside a commitment from Germany to send its own armored vehicles to Ukraine and a similar move by France last week.
14 avril 2020 | International, Naval
By: Bryan Clark Anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, is one of a navy's most difficult missions. Sonars detect submarines with only a fraction of the range and precision possible using radars or visual sensors against ships above the water. Submarines can carry missiles able to hit targets hundreds of miles away, requiring searches to cover potentially vast areas. And the torpedoes that aircraft and surface ships use to sink submarines need to be dropped right on the submarine to have any chance of sinking it. These challenges led the Cold War-era U.S. Navy to rely on a sequential approach for tracking enemy submarines. Electronic or visual intelligence sources would report when an opposing sub was leaving port, and it would hopefully get picked up by sound surveillance, or SOSUS — sonar arrays on the sea floor — as it entered chokepoints, like that between Iceland and the United Kingdom. Patrol aircraft would then attempt to track the submarine using sonar-equipped buoys, or sonobuoys, and eventually turn it over to a U.S. nuclear attack submarine, or SSN, for long-term trail. The U.S. ASW model broke down, however, in the decades following the Cold War as U.S. submarine and patrol aircraft fleets shrank, the Chinese submarine fleet grew, and Russian submarines became quieter. Today, the U.S. Navy devotes enormous effort to tracking each modern Russian submarine in the western Atlantic. During the 2000s, the strategy of full-spectrum ASW started an essential shift in goals, from being able to sink submarines when needed to being able to defeat submarines by preventing them from accomplishing their mission. Full-spectrum ASW and other current concepts, however, still rely on aircraft, ships and submarines for sensing, tracking and attacking enemy submarines to bottle them up near their own coasts or sink them in the open ocean. Although SOSUS has improved since the Cold War and is joined by a family of new deployable seabed arrays, the next link in the U.S. ASW chain is still a P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, or a U.S. SSN. These platforms are in short supply around the world, cost hundreds of millions to billions of dollars to buy and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars a day to operate. With defense budgets flattening and likely to decrease in a post-COVID-19 environment, the U.S. Navy cannot afford to continue playing “little kid soccer” in ASW, with multiple aircraft or ships converging to track and destroy submarines before they can get within missile range of targets like aircraft carriers or bases ashore. The Navy should instead increase the use of unmanned systems in ASW across the board, which cost a fraction to buy and operate compared to their manned counterparts. Unmanned aircraft could deploy sonobuoys or stationary sonar arrays, and unmanned undersea or surface vehicles could tow passive sonar arrays. Unmanned surface vehicles could also deploy low-frequency active sonars like those carried by U.S. undersea surveillance ships that can detect or drive off submarines from dozens of miles away. Although autonomous platforms will not have the onboard operators of a destroyer or patrol aircraft, improved processing is enabling small autonomous sensors to rapidly identify contacts of interest. Line-of-sight or satellite communications can connect unmanned vehicles and sensors with operators ashore or on manned ASW platforms. A significant shortfall of today's ASW concepts is “closing the kill chain” by attacking enemy submarines. Air- or surface-launched weapons have short ranges and small warheads that reduce their ability to sink a submarine, but their cost and size prevents them from being purchased and fielded in large numbers. Unmanned systems could address this shortfall in concert with a new approach to ASW that suppresses enemy submarines rather than destroying them. During World War II and the Cold War, allied navies largely kept submarines at bay through aggressive tracking and harassing attacks, or by forcing opposing SSNs to protect ballistic missile submarines. The modern version of submarine suppression would include overt sensing operations combined with frequent torpedo or depth-bomb attacks. Although unmanned vehicles frequently launch lethal weapons today under human supervision, the small weapons that would be most useful for submarine suppression could be carried in operationally relevant numbers by medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs or medium unmanned surface vessels. Moreover, the large number and long endurance of unmanned vehicles would enable the tracking and suppressing of many submarines over a wide area at lower risk than using patrol aircraft or destroyers. Today the U.S. Navy uses unmanned systems in ASW primarily to detect submarines. To affordably conduct peacetime surveillance and effectively defeat submarines in wartime, the Navy should increase the role of unmanned systems. Using manned platforms to conduct command and control, and unmanned vehicles to track, deter and engage submarines, could significantly reduce the costs of ASW operations and enable the Navy to scale its ASW efforts to match the growing threat posed by submarine fleets. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is an expert in naval operations, electronic warfare, autonomous systems, military competitions and war gaming. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/13/us-navy-should-turn-to-unmanned-systems-to-track-and-destroy-submarines/
20 juin 2019 | International, Autre défense
By: Kelsey Reichmann WASHINGTON — The U.S. agency responsible for making explosive materials used in nuclear weapons is facing challenges that could impact the country's planned modernization of its nuclear arsenal, according to a report by the Government Accountability Office. The National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous agency within the Energy Department, is facing three main challenges, according to the report: a dwindling supply of explosive materials, aging and deteriorating infrastructure, and difficulty in recruiting and training qualified staff. This report comes amid congressional debate over the cost of modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, an effort driven by President Donald Trump. NNSA's supply of materials, which are “highly specialized” with specific chemical and physical characteristics, are in low supply, the report says. Furthermore, the NNSA is lacking the knowledge base to produce the materials, as the recipes to make them were not well-documented, or the processes themselves infrequently practiced, the report notes. Challenges in obtaining materials is not a new issue for the NNSA, the watchdog notes. The agency experienced a similar situation with a material known as “Fogbank,” and the GAO reported in March 2009 that the NNSA lacked the knowledge to manufacture the material — leaving the process for Fogbank “dormant for about 25 years." Fogbank is used in the production of the W76-1, a warhead for the Navy's Trident ballistic missile. Under the Trump administration's plans for a new low-yield nuclear weapon, the U.S. is making a W76-2 variant, which entered production earlier this year. The GAO notes that when the NNSA is actually able to replicate formulas for materials, procuring those materials has proved challenging, given the irregular and small order specifications to contractors. But the GAO identifies aging infrastructure as the greatest risk to the NSSA. “The NNSA 2019 Master Asset Plan states that 40 percent of the explosives infrastructure of NNSA's sites is insufficient to meet mission needs, which can lead to contamination of explosive products or limit the use of facilities,” the report says. It notes that contamination has already occurred from rust falling off rafters and grass blowing through cracks in the walls, contaminating batches of explosives. Aging facilities must receive updates to modern safety standards to protect employees, the GAO says. The Los Alamos High Explosives Chemistry Laboratory, for example, was built in the 1950s and has struggled to adopt to modern instrumentation, according to the report. Facilities also deal with limited storage, the report says, meaning explosives can be stored in a single location where they could potentially cause a chemical reaction. The report also cites NNSA documents that describe challenges in recruiting qualified staff, who often must have a security clearance. For example, Pantex, a contractor hired by the agency, in 2018 estimated it would need 211 full-time staff members. However, in November that year, it reported only 172 full-time employees. Officials with agency contractors told the GAO that the problem is largely due to the competitive industry; in particular, Pantex competes with oil and gas companies in Texas. The company has now expanded its recruitment efforts to include local colleges and universities, the report says. In a written response to the report, the head of the NNSA, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, said the “GAO's observations and recommendations are consistent with [the Department of Energy]/NNSA's recent efforts to centralize management of energetic material." The Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations previously identified many of the infrastructure data issues presented in the report and developed a series of actions aimed at improving the accuracy of asset data,” she wrote. “These efforts have already resulted in improved data quality, and the accuracy and consistency of data will continue to improve as additional actions are completed.” https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2019/06/19/government-watchdog-finds-3-issues-disrupting-us-nuclear-modernization-efforts/