Embraer strengthens its Industrial Cooperation with the Czech Republic

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  14 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Air Force Lacks ‘Adequate’ Plan For Next-Gen Reaper: HAC-D

  By THERESA HITCHENSon July 13, 2020 at 2:45 PM WASHINGTON: House appropriators are worried that the Air Force's latest try to replace the MQ-Reaper isn't fully baked and might lead to a capability gap between the service's planned divestiture of the venerable hunter/killer drone and any follow-on. “The Air Force's fiscal year 2021 budget request proposes to terminate production of MQ–9 aircraft, citing an excess of aircraft compared to projected operational requirements. The Committee does not accept this proposal and recommends additional funding for 16 MQ–9 aircraft. The Committee is concerned that the Air Force has reached this decision without adequate planning for a follow-on system,” the House Appropriations defense subcommittee (HAC-D) wrote in their report accompanying the draft 2021 DoD spending bill. The full committee will mark up the draft bill tomorrow, which adds $343.6 million for procurement of 16 MQ-9s — 16 more than the Air Force asked for, after it announced in February plans to terminate production at prime contractor General Atomics. The HAC-D's insistence on continuing the program echoes strong support from the House and Senate Armed Services Committees for continuing the Reaper program. The SASC version of the NDAA added $50 million to the program; the HASC added $108 million. The HAC-D noted that, while the Air Force has initiated a replacement program called the “Next Generation UAS ISR/Strike Platform,” initial operating capability isn't planned until 2031. (And everyone knows the likelihood of maintaining the originally planned IOC on a brand new program is slim.) Indeed, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) already has extended the response time for interested vendors to offer concepts in response June 3 request for information (RFI) from July 15 to July 24, according to a July 7 announcement on beta.SAM. The RFI notes the effort is “still in the very early requirements definition phase and is conducting market research to inform our acquisition strategy.” Air Force acquisition czar Will Roper told the HASC in March that the service is currently studying a family of systems, ranging from high-end and expensive drones that would be highly survivable in peer conflicts to low-end, “attritable” aircraft that might be commercially acquired. “The purpose of this RFI is to research potential solutions for the Next Generation UAS ISR/Strike platform, the Next Generation Medium Altitude UAS and potential follow-on program to the MQ-9 weapon system. The Air Force is also interested in researching alternative ways to support future lower-end, lower-cost ISR missions which may include initiatives to modernize, augment, and/or replace existing systems. This RFI inquires about unique and innovative practices that can deliver relevant capability efficiently, timely and at a reduced life-cycle cost,” the RFI states. The HAC-D, however, wants the Air Force to pick up the pace and is demanding that Air Force Secretary Barbara Barrett submit a report to Congress with the 2022 budget request “on an MQ–9 follow-on program to be designated as MQ–Next.” “The goal of the MQ–Next program should be to accelerate the development and fielding of a next-generation medium altitude unmanned aerial system,” the committee adds. “The report shall detail the desired features of such a system, the cost and timeline required to achieve development and fielding, proposed measures to ensure full and open competition, and an explanation of how such a system would fulfill the goals of the National Defense Strategy. Ironically, MQ-X was the name of the service's first effort to replace the Reaper, which was cancelled in 2012. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/07/air-force-lacks-adequate-plan-for-next-gen-reaper-hac-d/

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  3 décembre 2023 | International, Terrestre

  Amazon taps SpaceX's Falcon 9 rocket to help launch Kuiper satellites | Reuters

  Amazon on Friday said it booked three Falcon 9 launches with Elon Musk's SpaceX to help deploy the ecommerce giant's Project Kuiper satellite network, tapping a rival in the satellite internet business for its multi-billion dollar launch campaign.

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  19 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Huge Deficit = Defense Budget Cuts? Maybe Not

  The congressional calendar and strategic inertia may come together to keep the defense budget relatively high. The calendar helps because the fiscal 2021 defense budget will likely be passed while Congress is in a free-spending mood. By MARK CANCIAN The current Washington consensus sees deep defense budget cuts in the face of soaring deficits driven by the emergency legislation to stabilize the American economy as it reels from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. It may be wrong. The congressional calendar and strategic inertia may come together to keep the defense budget relatively high. The calendar helps because the fiscal 2021 defense budget will likely be passed while Congress is in a free-spending mood. The next administration — Republican or Democratic — will develop budgets beyond that, but the constraints of long-standing strategy will prevent major changes to force structure and acquisition that would drive deep budget cuts. The Challenge The conventional narrative holds that the defense budget will be squeezed as the debt level rises, and the public focuses inward on rebuilding the country's health and economic position. These are reasonable concerns. The deficit in fiscal 2020, initially projected to be about one trillion dollars ― itself getting into record territory without emergency spending― is now projected to be $3.7 trillion, and Congress is not finished spending. Debt held by the public will rise to 101 percent of GDP, a level not seen since World War II. Even if the world is willing to take US debt, rising interest payments will squeeze the rest of the budget. Simultaneously, the electorate is likely to focus inward. The pandemic is already the leading popular concern, not surprisingly. The economic devastation caused by restrictions on normal commercial activities has produced the greatest downturn since the Great Depression. It would be reasonable to put these factors together and project a substantially reduced defense budget. However, the congressional calendar and the inertia of a long-held strategy will likely mitigate any downturn. The Calendar The calendar will help because Congress is likely to pass the 2021 appropriation this fall, when the government will still be operating under emergency conditions. Congress has already passed four bills for pandemic response and economic stimulus and is developing another in the multi-trillion range. There are a few voices for fiscal constraint, but they are overwhelmed by a sentiment to “do more.” Indeed, some lawmakers and commentators are proposing increases to the defense budget to stimulate the economy, enhance deterrence of China, or protect the defense industrial base. Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has indicated his reluctance to do more than protect the industrial base, but a future stimulus bill could include such enhancements as part of a bipartisan deal. Finally, last year's bipartisan budget agreement set levels for defense and domestic spending in fiscal 2021. Undoing that agreement would be a major lift, requiring a bipartisan consensus that does not seem to be occurring. Even if the Democratic left wanted to make such cuts, defense hawks in the House and Senate could block them. Thus, in the near-term proposals for enhancements seem to be offsetting thoughts about cuts. As both the House and Senate consider their authorization acts, they seem to be aiming at roughly the level of the president's proposal and the bipartisan budget agreement. Strategic Inertia The United States has had some variation of the same national security strategy since the end of the Second World War (or perhaps more accurately, since the Korean War and publication of NSC 68, which enshrined a long term competition with the Soviet Union). That strategy involves global engagement, forward-deployed forces, alliances to offset global competitors, and commitment to maintaining an international system of free trade, human rights and secure borders. Scholars can argue about the details and how well the United States has implemented such a strategy, but the major elements have been constant. President Trump has chafed at many of these elements but has generally gone along, however reluctantly. One would expect such reluctant continuity in a second Trump administration, should that occur One would also expect strategic continuity in a Biden administration. Biden was, after all, vice president during the Obama administration, which, after the shocks of 2014, laid out a strategy of confronting five threats: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism. One would expect Biden to implement something like that strategy if he were in office. That does not mean that a Biden administration would do everything a Trump administration would do. The left-wing of the Democratic party would push some level of cuts, perhaps 5 percent, and take aim particularly at nuclear modernization, foreign arms sales, and Middle East conflicts. But this longstanding strategy of global engagement will put a floor on defense cuts. Remaining engaged with NATO, supporting our Asian allies like Japan and South Korea, and maintaining some presence in the Middle East, even if scaled back, takes a lot of forces. These need to be at a relatively high level of readiness to deploy globally and be credible. The all-volunteer force needs to maintain compensation and benefits at a sufficient level to compete for labor in a market economy. Competing with China and Russia requires investment in a wide variety of high technology―and costly―new systems, as well as the R&D foundation to support these innovations. Other strategies are certainly possible. Members of the Democratic left and Republican right, as well as some elements of the academic and think tank community, have proposed strategies of “restraint”, whereby the United States would significantly scale back overseas engagements. Such strategic change would produce a substantial cut in the defense budget. However, neither major candidate has supported such a change, and the national security policy community (aka “the blob”) is adamantly opposed. Despite this relatively optimistic assessment, the future is still cloudy. The president's budget proposal forecasts a level budget in constant dollars. That meant that the defense buildup was over, even if Republicans continued in office. Such budgets do not come close to the 3 to 5 percent real growth that defense officials had talked about to implement the National Defense strategy and would entail choices between readiness, force structure and modernization. A Democratic administration, with a notional 5 percent cut in the defense budget, would not constitute the deep cut that a Sanders or Warren administration might have entailed, but the $35 billion that a 5 percent cut would entail is still a lot of money. Forces would get smaller, likely wiping out all the recent force expansion, and new programs would be delayed. Bottom line: Defense may not be heading into a budget hurricane, but it is not heading into sunlight either. It faces the friction that occurs when expensive plans collide with constrained resources. Mark Cancian, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, was a Marine colonel and senior official at the Office of Management and Budget before he joined CSIS. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/huge-deficit-defense-budget-cuts-maybe-not/