4 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial
By THERESA HITCHENSon June 03, 2020 at 12:48 PM
WASHINGTON: The Trump administration should unilaterally declare that it will no longer subject drone sales to export control restrictions under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), says a new Mitchell Institute study.
And Congress should use the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to redefine unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as aircraft, which not only remove them from MTCR restrictions but also would ease US domestic export controls, asserts the paper, “”Modernizing UAV Export Policy for Effective Coalition Forces,”.
“The US Congress should craft language in the 2021 NDAA that defines UAVs as aircraft, not cruise missiles, but as aircraft, and subject to the same export considerations as any other military aircraft,” said Heather Penny, senior resident fellow at Mitchell and the paper's author, during a webinar today. “We believe that this language, a statute, would be sufficient to be able to remove UAVs from being subject to the MTCR guidelines.”
The 35-nation MTCR agreement requires a “strong presumption of denial” for sales of so-called Category 1 drones — those that can carry a 500 kilogram payload more than 300 kilometers. The Category 1 definition is considered as the minimum capability a missile needs to carry a nuclear warhead. Smaller unmanned aerial vehicles also are covered under MTCR's Category 2 rules, but those export restrictions are less stringent.
Even the treaty-hating Trump administration sees the MTCR — a political agreement rather than a treaty — as a key tool in preventing the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles. This is despite its long-standing efforts to ease drone sales to allies, including through revamping US domestic law to allow “Direct Commercial Sales” by companies, rather than requiring all sales to go through the formal Foreign Military Sales process that requires approval by DoD, the State Department and Congress.
Indeed, over the past year the administration tried — and failed — to convince its MTCR partners to revamp the rules to allow drones flying less than 800 kilometers per hour to slip out from under the Category 1 rules, said Penny.
Washington is now expected to try again at the annual MTCR signatories meeting, she said, instead suggesting a 600 kph speed limit as the line of demarcation between the two categories of export restrictions. (The meetings are usually held in the fall, although there has yet to be an announcement of the 2020 dates.)
But, Penny argued, even if this new effort comes to fruition, it would fail to fix the underlying problem of allowing allies to buy high-end US combat drones — and preventing them from fully integrating with US operations. Secondly, she asserted, complying with MTCR rules “distort the market” in favor of Chinese sales, she said, since China is not a member of the MTCR and has few formal restrictions on arms exports.
“Continuing to adhere to and apply MTCR guidelines to UAVs facilitates Chinese strategic interests,” Penny said. “It's working against US interests.”
Keith Webster, former DoD head of defense cooperation, agreed — calling efforts to revise the MTCR as a “Band-Aid” that would soon loose viability because of the rapid pace of technology improvement.
“I wish we would act unilaterally,” he told the Mitchell Institute webinar. “We have the ability to act unilaterally. And I would like to see us do so very soon. I have great hopes that this administration, with its bold unilateral actions on so many fronts, would take unilateral action with this regime on UAVs.”
That doesn't mean, Webster hastened to add, pulling out of MTCR itself. “Stay in the MTCR,” he said. “It served its purpose.”
The experts acknowledged that a unilateral US move to exempt UAVs from MTCR could spur other nations to do the same for their own weapons systems that could exacerbate nuclear proliferation.
Penny stressed that it was key for the US to renew its commitment to nonproliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, and support MTCR's rules for those systems.
Saying that “we need to be honest with ourselves about the implications” while seeking “creative solutions” to the UAV issue, Webster seemed to suggest that ultimately the US may decide the MTCR itself isn't worth the trade off. “There are challenges with compliance within the regime with at least one member,” he warned.
As Breaking D readers know, US military leaders and Congress have sounded the alarm on the proliferation of cruise missiles by Russia (an MTCR member) and China that can more easily slip through US ballistic missile defense systems. This is especially true for hypersonic missiles, which have speeds above Mach 5 and while visible on radar are extremely hard to target.
31 mai 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
U.S. President Joe Biden’s first budget request for the Department of Defense slashes procurement by $8 billion, whacking scores of legacy weapons and systems as a way to deliver a $5.5 billion boost for the development and testing of cutting-edge technologies that could deter China.
21 juin 2019 | International, C4ISR
By: Nathan Strout Inmarsat Government Inc. has been awarded a contract worth as much as $246 million over five years to provide commercial satellite communication services for the U.S. military. The single-award blanket purchase agreement with the Defense Information Systems Agency was announced June 18. The initial award covers a one-year span from June 19 to June 18, 2020, with four option years. The contract provides for commercial satellite bandwidth for U.S. Africa Command. “The government expects to order Ku-band services sufficient to support airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and command and control missions,” a DISA spokesperson said in an email June 20. According to the announcement, DISA received two bids for the contract. Inmarsat declined to comment on the award until after the protest period was over. The company has faced issues due to protests in the recent past. In September 2015, DISA awarded Inmarsat a potential five-year $450 million contract to provide worldwide commercial telecommunications services on the Ku, Ka and X-Band for the Navy's Commercial Broadband Satellite Program. That award was protested by Intelsat, who successfully convinced the Government Accountability Office that DISA had given different companies different bid requirements. That decision led to a stop-work order on the new contract, though DISA ultimately lifted the stop work order through a contract modification in July 2016. A DISA spokesperson confirmed that the two contracts are not mission related. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/2019/06/20/inmarsat-awarded-246-million-contract-for-satellite-services/
9 avril 2018 | International, Aérospatial
By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The Block III Super Hornet is getting a marginal increase in stealth capability, but if you're expecting the invisible aircraft of President Donald Trump's dreams, think again. Building a “stealthy” Super Hornet has been one of Trump's talking points since he was elected to the presidency. During a March trip to Boeing's plant in St. Louis, he claimed the U.S. military would buy Super Hornets with “the latest and the greatest stealth and a lot of things on that plane that people don't even know about.” Trump was referring to one of the Super Hornet's Block III upgrades slated to be incorporated on jets rolling off the production line in 2020: the application of radar absorbent materials or RAM, also known as stealth coating. But far from being “the latest and greatest,” the company has already used the exact same materials on the on the Block II Super Hornet to help decrease the chances of radar detection, said Dan Gillian, who manages Boeing's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and E/A-18G Growler programs. Block III jets will get “a little more” of that coating applied to them, “and in a few different areas to buy a little bit more performance,” Gillian told Defense News in a March interview. All in all, those improvements will reduce the aircraft's radar cross section by about 10 percent, and with very low risk, he said. Although the general public tends to think of stealth like the invisibility cloak from Harry Potter or Wonder Woman's invisible plane, stealth is more of a continuum that is enabled and affected by many factors, experts told Defense News. “It's not a Romulan cloaking device,” said Richard Aboulafia, a Teal Group aviation analyst, referencing a technology from Star Trek that allowed spaceships to be invisible to the naked eye and electro-optical sensors. “It's about reducing the likelihood that an adversary will see you first. And seconds count, so if it buys a little extra time, then it helps.” The most important contributors to low observability are the aircraft's shape and the use of LO coatings, with airframe shape commonly seen as twice as important as the coatings, he said. Stealth fighters from the oddly angled F-117 to the F-22 and F-35, with their rounded edges, were all designed to bounce radar waves away from an aircraft, sometimes at the expense of aerodynamic performance or other attributes, said Brian Laslie, an Air Force historian and author. That being said, the Super Hornet, with it's external stores and pylons, is not going to replicate the low observability of the joint strike fighter, which was designed from the beginning with stealth in mind. “But just because it's not a pure LO aircraft doesn't mean that the designers weren't concerned with the radar return,” said Laslie, who added that it's “reasonable” to expect a 10 percent decrease to the aircraft's signature by augmenting Block III jets with additional RAM coating. Shining a spotlight on the Super Hornet's low observable attributes may have helped sell Trump on future orders, Aboulafia speculated. “It might be useful in the real world too, but in a much more marginal way,” he said. One of those benefits, according to Laslie, is that the LO performance upgrade could also enable the Navy to be more flexible in its mission planning. An aircraft can be more or less easily detected by radar depending on how it is positioned or the route used by the plane, so having more radar-absorbing materials on the Super Hornet could give the pilot more options. “I think what the Navy is doing is trying to maybe reduce enough of the cross section of the F-18 in high intensity combat scenarios,” Laslie said. “I don't think they're trying to make the F/A-18 a stealth aircraft,” he continued. “But if they can reduce the radar cross section enough that in certain scenarios it is more difficult to pick the Super Hornet up, that would be of benefit to the Navy.” While the president has done much to focus public attention on the Super Hornet's upcoming LO upgrade, the Block III actually offers a relatively modest increase in stealth compared to earlier concepts floated by Boeing. In 2013, when the company began evaluating how to attract future sales from the Navy as production slowed, it started promoting an “Advanced Super Hornet” configuration that would have improved the aircraft's signature by 50 percent. That version of the jet included structural enhancements and an enclosed weapons pod, but Boeing ultimately stepped away from that concept. “Those big compromises you have to make to get the higher levels of stealth like putting your weapons in a bay, we don't think that's a necessary part of the Block III story for the Super Hornet,” Gillian said. https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/navy-league/2018/04/09/how-stealthy-is-boeings-new-super-hornet/