16 janvier 2024 | International, Aérospatial

US Navy looks for cost-saving ideas in Running Fix efficiency effort

Leaders want feedback on where the service can spend more efficiently and repurpose its funds.

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/01/16/us-navy-looks-for-cost-saving-ideas-in-running-fix-efficiency-effort/

Sur le même sujet

  • U.S. Army Upgrades Vision For Future Vertical Lift Programs

    27 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    U.S. Army Upgrades Vision For Future Vertical Lift Programs

    Steve Trimble In piecing together a delicate plan to field two advanced rotorcraft simultaneously within a decade, the U.S. Army chose its priorities carefully. The Army could load the first Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) and Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) with advanced new systems and weapons needed for operations in the 2030s or keep to existing or highly mature technologies and field both aircraft years earlier. Ultimately, the Army selected an acquisition strategy based on the latter. Increment 1 versions of the FLRAA and FARA are now scheduled to enter service together in the third quarter of fiscal 2030. More advanced Increment 2 versions of both should enter service in 2034 and 2035, respectively. U.S. Army FVL Vision: Competition, open systems and incremental upgrades Empty weight and costs emerge as early concerns But the key to fielding both increments for each new type on time may depend less on rotor systems and drivetrains than on software architecture and resolving industry concerns about government demands for data rights. In a series of briefings to defense contractors the week of July 13, Army leaders laid out a vision for using the FLRAA and FARA contracts to change the aviation branch's relationship with suppliers. The Army is seeking to make the aircraft and mission systems installed on both as common as possible, with a modular open-systems architecture (MOSA) allowing the service to rapidly upgrade payloads, subsystems and design rights, thereby enabling a perpetual cycle of competitive bidding. Although the Army's commitment to the new industrial model was clear, the service's acquisition leaders acknowledged that such a strategy will force companies at all levels of the supply chain to adopt a new, unproven business model. “Most of you are thinking, ‘OK, a modular systems approach is a nice buzz term, but how do I sell that to a board of directors; how do I sell it to the [company] leadership?' Because I can potentially give up all of the future revenue streams,” says Pat Mason, the program executive officer for Army aviation. “So we owe you greater answers on that, because it's the question that you're asking, and we have to understand your perspective. From that, we then have to develop a clear business case that allows you to move forward.” In purely aircraft performance terms, the FLRAA and FARA requirements do not compromise on performance. Any of the four candidates selected by the Army in March to compete for both contracts—Bell's V-280 and Boeing/Sikorsky's SB-1 for the FLRAA; Bell's 360 Invictus and Sikorsky's Raider X for the FARA—would enter service in 2030 exceeding the 170-kt. speed limit for most conventional helicopters. But despite appearances, speed is not everything in the Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program that spawned the FLRAA and FARA contract competitions. The FVL initiative is seeking to introduce a revolutionary leap in how the Army acquires the evolving array of software, electronics, sensors and weapons that come with an aircraft and represent an increasingly important share of its overall capability. With schedule and cost driving the acquisition strategy, the Army will seek to deliver the FARA and FLRAA with as many common electronic systems and payloads as possible, along with a MOSA for software. To minimize schedule and cost risk, FARA and FLRAA aircraft entering service in 2030 will be designed with electronics and systems already available or due to reach a high level of maturity by 2024. More advanced systems capabilities still at the laboratory stage mid-decade will be considered for Increment 2 versions of both types. The Increment 2 version of the FLRAA is scheduled for delivery in fiscal 2034. A year later, the FARA program plans to field an Increment 2 version. Limiting development activity during Increment 1 to the airframe is the Army's goal. “One of the key things we're trying to do with Increment 1 is get the ‘truck' right—the vehicle,” says Jason Lucas, the Army's FLRAA technical division chief. “We need to get us an air vehicle platform that can take us into the future. The other thing that we absolutely have to get right is our architecture, and our modular open-system approach to enable us to integrate advanced technologies [and] keep up with the pace of threats. “One of the things you didn't hear me say is that we need to develop a lot of advanced mission system equipment, a lot of new development” in Increment 1, Lucas adds. “We are going to take existing mission equipment.” The Army's risk-averse approach comes after decades of frustration over new aircraft development. Three failed attempts to field a scout helicopter to perform a mission similar to FARA's weigh on current program leaders. Col. Gregory Fortier, FARA project manager, notes that as a younger officer he had been told to expect an assignment in a Sikorsky/Boeing RAH-66 squadron, a Bell ARH-70 squadron and an Armed Aerial Scout test squadron. “As we know, those three did not come to fruition,” Fortier says, adding that avoiding a fourth program failure requires having “critical and difficult conversations” with industry up front. Such discussions came up during the industry day event. As a possible consequence of relying on existing maturing systems and payloads for the Increment 1 versions of the FARA and FLRAA, Army program managers are growing concerned about aircraft weight estimates. “I'm still seeing very heavy empty weights across our air vehicles, which I don't enjoy,” says Brig. Gen. Walter Rugen, director of the Army's FVL cross-functional team. FLRAA and FARA technology “should be lighter and lower-cost,” he says. “You all may say I'm asking for the impossible, but I think it's nuanced. At the end of the day, we're in a hypercompetitive environment with budgets, and if we don't bring things in that are leap-ahead and fully capture the deflationary nature of the technology and get lighter and cheaper, I think we may find ourselves on the outside looking in.” Another difficult conversation inside the programs concerns the Army's plan to demand ownership of more of the intellectual property and data rights for technologies installed in the aircraft. As each of the armed services seeks a greater share of the ownership rights on future weapon systems, the defense industry is being forced to adapt to a new paradigm in the government-industry relationship. “We realize this runs contrary to some of the legacy business models, such as, ‘Here's a box. We want to integrate it and then we want to sustain it for 30 years,' ” says Michael “Ski” Horrocks, integration project manager for FLRAA and FARA mission systems. “So we do have teams working right now brainstorming how to create new collaborative and sustainable business models.” The in-service date for the FLRAA and FARA may be a decade away, but the Army is already facing critical decision points by year-end. The most important is creation of the FVL Architecture Framework (FAF) to define the interfaces and standards for the common mission systems architecture of both. Last year, the Army stood up a body composed of military, industry and academic experts called the Architecture Control Working Group to deliver the FAF by November 2020 for scheduled approval the following month. “We see Increment 2 as an opportunity to provide advanced mission system solutions to help tackle some of the most significant threats and integrate some innovation,” Lucas says. The Army's schedule calls for selecting the FLRAA developer in fiscal 2023 and the FARA prime contractor in fiscal 2024, with limited user tests of production aircraft beginning for each program four years later. But a lesson from the Army's painful experience with new aircraft development suggests little tolerance for costly technology, even if the contractors can deliver better performance. “We can develop and design and deliver this tremendous capability at the end of this fiscal 2028 timeframe,” Fortier says. “But if it's not affordable, they're walking away from it.” https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/us-army-upgrades-vision-future-vertical-lift-programs

  • Coronavirus: les industriels de défense plaident pour un "plan de relance"

    24 avril 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Coronavirus: les industriels de défense plaident pour un "plan de relance"

    Par AFP ,publié le 23/04/2020 à 19:52 , mis à jour à 19:52 Paris, 23 avr 2020 - Les industries de défense jugent "fondamental" un plan de relance de l'économie dont elles bénéficieraient face à l'épidémie de coronavirus, mettant en avant les emplois en jeu en France et la concurrence internationale, ont affirmé jeudi leurs représentants. "Nous proposons un plan de relance pour soutenir la base industrielle et technologique de défense à l'image de ce qui avait été réalisé après la crise de 2008 pourtant beaucoup moins forte", a plaidé Stéphane Mayer, président du Conseil des industries de défense française (Cidef) lors d'une audition par les députés de la commission des Forces armées. Il était entendu en tant que président du Groupement des industries françaises de défense et de sécurité terrestres (Gicat) au côté de ses homologues du Gifas (industries aéronautiques et spatiales), Eric Trappier, et du Gican (constructions navales), Hervé Guillou. Le volet défense du plan de relance lancé en 2008 représentait 2,4 milliards d'euros. Il avait notamment donné lieu à la commande d'un porte-hélicoptères supplémentaire, le Dixmude, qui croise aujourd'hui dans les Antilles pour y apporter soutien logistique et matériel sanitaire face à l'épidémie de Covid-19. Un tel plan de relance est aujourd'hui "absolument fondamental", selon eux. "La commande publique est le meilleur moyen de redémarrer l'économie", a jugé Hervé Guillou. "Il faut être capable de relancer notre économie au risque sinon de voir déferler une vague relativement forte de problématiques d'emplois, de problématiques d'activités qui serait désastreuses", a observé Eric Trappier pour le Gifas. Les salariés des industries de défense sont estimés à au moins 165.000 personnes, pour beaucoup très qualifiés et répartis sur l'ensemble du territoire. "Avant de parler de relocalisations, l'industrie de défense est déjà localisée en France, donc un euro dans le budget français va directement dans l'emploi en France et l'export c'est du budget étranger qui donne de l'emploi en France", selon M. Trappier. Le secteur est contributeur net à la balance commerciale, mais fait face à une forte concurrence internationale, notamment d'Allemagne, de Chine ou des États-Unis. "Or, nos principaux concurrents se sont mis dans une situation de redémarrage [de l'activité] qui pourrait très rapidement tuer nos parts de marché", a estimé Hervé Guillou. Entendue par les sénateurs le 10 avril, la ministre des Armées Florence Parly avait affirmé que son ministère, "premier investisseur de l'État", aurait "un rôle particulier à jouer lorsqu'il s'agirait de relancer l'économie française". https://lentreprise.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/actualites/coronavirus-les-industriels-de-defense-plaident-pour-un-plan-de-relance_2124513.html

  • Study sees British defense sector hurting after Brexit

    20 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Study sees British defense sector hurting after Brexit

    By: Martin Banks   BRUSSELS – A report predicts that Brexit will be “more harmful and long-lasting” for the British army and U.K.'s defense sector than for the European Union. The exhaustive study by the Warsaw Institute, a leading European think tank, warns that the U.K.'s exit from the EU means existing arrangements and defense cooperation agreements “will need to be reassessed, completely changing the defense landscape of Europe.” It says, however, that an extension to the current transition period, set to end on Dec. 31, would “mitigate damage” caused by the split. Conversely for the EU side, it suggests that the British departure may have a “healing result,” as both France and Germany will be able to pursue “more comprehensive” defense policies for the remaining member countries. Such moves, it adds, was often blocked by the UK, “which believed that NATO would be sufficient as European peacekeeper.” Publication of the report by the Polish Institute is timely as the 1 July deadline set by both the EU and U.K. for deciding if there will be an extension to the talks is fast approaching. The document paints a largely grim picture for the post-Brexit defense sector, pointing out that companies from across Europe buy or sell parts to various British companies. A no-deal Brexit, which, given the lack of progress in the ongoing trade talks, most analysts currently say is by far the most likely outcome at the end of the year, “would mean price hikes and possible delays in European projects relying on British parts or know-how.” Companies likely to be impacted include industry giants like Airbus and products as “complex and important” for European security as the Eurofighter Typhoon. The independent institute, which specializes in geopolitics and international affairs, notes, “The expected crisis can be averted either by a free trade agreement or, should this option not be possible, a bilateral trade agreement between UK and several if not all EU27 states abolishing tariffs and border checks. “Should these measures not be in place, many projects run by European companies may be hit with delays or even cancellations.” The predicted consequences of Brexit for the British army and U.K.'s defense sector are more harmful and long-lasting than those expected to be felt by the EU. This, the non-profit Institute argues, is because Brexit “will strip the U.K. from valuable training opportunities and will take away some of its international power-projection abilities.” “The U.K. will no longer be able to affect the policies that are agreed upon as the part of the Common Security and Defence Policy," or CSDP. But the “biggest downside” of the divorce will be that fewer resources will be available to make up the future peacekeeping and advisory operations run by the EU worldwide. “There will also be less finances available for these operations coming from the CSDP as there will be less contribution paid towards it.” The third round of talks between the two sides concluded last Friday with little progress being made. The UK government has ruled out an extension to the transition period. David McAllister, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the European Parliament, said, “From the very beginning, it was to be expected that the negotiations would not be easy. But we started them from a position of certainty, goodwill, shared interests and purpose.” The German MEP, also chair of the UK Coordination Group in the Parliament, added, “In my opinion, there is still a strong, shared interest of both the EU and the U.K. to sign an ambitious and comprehensive new partnership governing their future relations.” https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/05/19/study-sees-british-defense-sector-hurting-after-brexit

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