9 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

Turkey develops AI-based simulator for light fighter jet

ANKARA, Turkey — Turkish Aerospace Industries says it has developed Turkey's first artificial intelligence-based simulator, which will be used in the design and development phases of Hurjet, a locally designed light assault aircraft.

TAI said the engineering simulator, Hurjet 270, is designed to collect feedback from test pilots to make the design of Hurjet “better, more solid and more efficient.” The simulator is also meant to detect design faults at the development stage. Company officials said the simulator will feature “human eye-level resolution.”

Atilla Dogan, TAI's deputy general manager for aircraft design, told the state news agency Anadolu that Hurjet 270 will help engineers improve designing flight control algorithms and avionics software based on feedback from test pilots.

The armed trainer Hurjet is a jet engine version of the turboprop Hurkus, Turkey's first indigenous basic trainer aircraft. TAI launched the Hurjet program in 2018, with a target of having the aircraft's maiden flight in 2022.

The Hurjet will have a maximum speed of Mach 1.2 and can fly at a maximum altitude of 45,000 feet. The aircraft will have a maximum payload of 3,000 kilograms, including ammunition, radar and camera.

Hurkus-C, the armed version of the base variant of Hurkus, features locally developed ammunition including CIRIT, TEBER, HGK and LGK. It can also use INS/GPS-guided bombs, conventional bombs, non-guided rockets and machine guns.

Hurkus-C also features armored body parts, a self-protection system, a data link, laser tacking, an electro-optical and infrared pod, an external fuel tank, and advanced avionics.

With a 1,500-kilogram payload that can be used through seven external hardpoints, the Hurkus-C can perform light-attack and armed reconnaissance missions.

https://www.c4isrnet.com/artificial-intelligence/2020/09/08/turkey-develops-ai-based-simulator-for-light-fighter-jet/

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