The Next Chapter for Bell’s H-1 Helicopters Begins

Sur le même sujet

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  7 novembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Ce qu’est l’Europe de la défense. Ce qu’elle n’est pas

  (B2) Alors que le serpent de mer de l'armée européenne ressurgit par la gr'ce d'Emmanuel Macron (*), il n'est pas inutile de revenir sur terre. Ce qui existe aujourd'hui ... et ce qui n'existe pas en matière de défense au niveau européen. La réalité inscrite dans les Traités européens actuels est la politique (européenne) de sécurité et de défense commune (PeSDC). Ou en langage commun, l'Europe de la défense. Elle n'est cependant pas comparable à ce qui se définit au plan national comme une politique de défense. Que ce soit dans le langage des pro ou des anti-intégrations européennes, cet aspect est bien souvent gommé. Or, il est primordial d'avoir une vue ‘honnête' et ‘objective' de la situation actuelle. Une politique nationale de défense D'un point de vue national, une politique de défense se définit tout d'abord par une autorité qui imprime sa marque et un circuit décisionnel court (comme en France avec un président de la république acteur principal) ou plus long (comme en Allemagne avec une décision du gouvernement, une approbation du parlement). Elle répond à une stratégie de défense, qui est élaborée par strates successives, en répondant à des antécédents historiques et une logique politique. Elle se développe ensuite dans un budget d'investissement d'une armée, des équipements militaires, des troupes, une logique d'action et une légitimité dans l'opinion publique qui accepte, plus ou moins, un engagement militaire intérieur ou extérieur, à risque ou non. L'Europe de la défense : un projet politique L'Europe de la défense est tout d'abord un projet politique, qui vise à affirmer la place de l'Europe dans le monde, au service d'une politique étrangère. Elle ne consiste pas ainsi à assurer la défense du territoire ni la protection des citoyens (malgré les déclarations politiques en ce sens). Elle ne procède que d'une coordination des efforts des États membres. Son circuit décisionnel repose ainsi toujours, à toutes les étapes, de l'initiative à l'approbation puis au commandement et au contrôle, sur un accord de tous les États membres, de façon collégiale. Mettre tout le monde d'accord au même moment sur un enjeu commun est un véritable ‘challenge'. Elle a comme objectif unique d'avoir une capacité d'intervention, limitée, dans des missions ou opérations de paix ou de consolidation de l'état de droit. Elle n'est pas ainsi une force d'intervention tout azimut, n'a pas de commandement militaire direct (national) ou intégré (comme l'OTAN), ni de troupes ou de forces disponibles en permanence ni en propre. Elle ne peut intervenir qu'à l'extérieur des frontières, avec le consentement des États concernés (ou au moins de leurs gouvernements) et de la communauté internationale. On est ainsi très loin des ‘fondamentaux' d'une armée européenne. Quand on met face à face ainsi les principes d'une défense nationale et ceux de l'Europe de la défense, il est inévitable que la seconde soit moins efficace que la première. On peut considérer qu'il s'agit d'une faiblesse temporaire, due aux personnalités politiques du moment. Ce peut être le cas parfois. Mais il ne faut pas minorer les faiblesses structurelles dû à un fait principal : l'Europe n'est pas un État mais une structure juridique et économique de concertation et de coopération avant tout. Si on veut donner un aperçu plus mathématique, j'ai évalué, sous forme d'une note — sur une échelle de 0 à 3 — quels points remplit l'Union européenne, une fois mis en place tous les projets évoqués ces derniers temps. On va ainsi d'une note de 0 à 3 selon les thèmes : de 0 pour les équipements et les forces disponibles à 2 pour le budget de recherche, en passant par le mode de décision et le consensus politique que je cote à 1 sur 3. Article complet: https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2018/11/07/ce-quest-leurope-de-la-defense-ce-quelle-nest-pas/

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  27 février 2024 | International, Terrestre

  Here are the winners and losers in US Army’s force structure change

  High-tech units focused on multidomain operations are in; formations for counterinsurgency are out, in the Army's new force structure design.

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  27 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Army Fears If ‘Future Vertical Lift’ Falters, Serious Fallout For Industry Might Follow

  The U.S. Army is leading what looks to be the biggest rotorcraft program in history. Called Future Vertical Lift, it could eventually buy thousands of aircraft to replace over a dozen different helicopters in the joint inventory. FVL, as it is usually called, has been a long time coming. So long that technologies now commonplace in commercial aviation such as “fly-by-wire” flight controls are nowhere to be found in the Army fleet. So long that the Army was forced to retire all of its aged scout helicopters even though it lacked a replacement. The U.S. Army is leading what looks to be the biggest rotorcraft program in history. Called Future Vertical Lift, it could eventually buy thousands of aircraft to replace over a dozen different helicopters in the joint inventory. FVL, as it is usually called, has been a long time coming. So long that technologies now commonplace in commercial aviation such as “fly-by-wire” flight controls are nowhere to be found in the Army fleet. So long that the Army was forced to retire all of its aged scout helicopters even though it lacked a replacement. The bad news is that if Future Vertical Lift falters the way some past efforts have, much of the U.S. rotorcraft industry might falter with it. FVL isn't the only game in town, but it is by far the biggest. If production of legacy rotorcraft ceases to make room for new ones and then FVL fails to deliver, industry might not have enough cashflow to sustain essential skills and suppliers. Army leaders are acutely aware of the potential industrial-base fallout. I know that because earlier this month my colleagues and I at the Lexington Institute had a lengthy exchange with the two top Army officials managing FVL. They are Brigadier General Walter T. Rugen, leader of the service's cross-functional team for vertical lift, and Mr. Patrick H. Mason, the Army's program executive officer for aviation. I thought we would spend most of the conversation discussing the Army's need to “overmatch” future adversaries in the air. But early on, Gen. Rugen observed that Future Vertical Lift “isn't just about overmatch, it's about the industrial base.” It was a theme he kept coming back to throughout the exchange, noting that top Army leaders have been briefed on the consequences for industry if FVL doesn't come to fruition. Apparently those consequences are potentially grave, particularly at lower levels of the supply chain, where fragile, single points of failure support the entire sector. That phrase—single points of failure—was used frequently in an interagency assessment of the defense industrial base prepared early in President Trump's tenure. It detailed how a domestic industrial complex once dubbed the “arsenal of democracy” has gradually hollowed out in recent decades as manufacturers moved offshore. There has been concern about the loss of skills and suppliers in the rotorcraft industry for some time. The U.S. Army is by far the biggest operator of rotorcraft in the world, but since the Cold War ended 30 years ago it has mainly been upgrading what it already had rather than developing new helicopters. It isn't easy to sustain design and engineering talent when your top customer never buys anything genuinely new. So in addition to addressing the increasingly harsh operational environment in which Army Aviation will need to wage future wars, FVL must also provide most of the resources needed to revitalize a key part of the domestic aerospace industry. So far that effort is progressing nicely, using paperless design techniques, digital modeling and prototyping to develop strikingly new rotorcraft that will take the place of retired Kiowa scouts and Black Hawk assault helicopters in the future. The service has recently made awards to two industry teams for each effort, which will competitively develop solutions for final down-selects in a few years. The service has also awarded funding for developing a new helicopter propulsion system, and has made steady progress in developing an electronic architecture for future combat rotorcraft. One way of controlling costs and assuring interoperability on the battlefield is to equip diverse airframes with the same hardware and software for functions such as communication and navigation. It will likely take another 8-10 years before new rotorcraft developed by FVL begin reaching the operational force in large numbers, but managers have been thinking since the program's inception about how to make them reliable and maintainable for users. A big part of the affordability challenge unfolds after production, when 68% of life-cycle costs are incurred. One facet of this challenge is how and where to provide maintenance for the future fleet. There is a long-running debate in military circles about how best to sustain rotorcraft in the operational fleet, with warfighters and legislators usually favoring organic depots over industry sources for much of the maintenance. But doing that requires access to data and intellectual property generated by the companies that build the airframes. This inevitably creates tension with industry, which is as eager to protect its intellectual property in the rotorcraft sector as in other sectors. Intellectual property is a crucial source of competitive advantage. However, Rugen and Mason emphasize that FVL is trying to strike a reasonable balance between military and industry needs in securing access to sensitive information. As one of them put it, “The Army recognizes industry's need for cashflow and adequate returns. It doesn't want to undermine industry's business model.” So while they have carefully analyzed the impact of intellectual property access on the ability of the Army's organic support base to do its job, they are mindful of the need not to impair the capacity of suppliers to make money. This is not the way the Army has typically looked at such matters in the past. Its usual approach has been to find the best deal for warfighters and taxpayers, and let industry fend for itself. But what comes through in a conversation with FVL managers is a recognition that the business pressures faced by companies must be taken into account if the Army is to have an adequate industrial base for its aviation initiatives in the future. They are also working hard to find overseas partners who might be customers for the rotorcraft that FVL ultimately produces. The bigger the international footprint that Future Vertical Lift has, the cheaper each aircraft will likely be for the Army and the more business there will be for American industry. But what Rugen and Mason would most like in the near term is a multiyear funding commitment from Congress to keep FVL on track, because if the program falters the outlook for both Army Aviation and the domestic rotorcraft industry will be bleak. https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2020/05/26/army-fears-if-future-vertical-lift-falters-serious-fallout-for-industry-might-follow