Army Fears If ‘Future Vertical Lift’ Falters, Serious Fallout For Industry Might Follow

The U.S. Army is leading what looks to be the biggest rotorcraft program in history. Called Future Vertical Lift, it could eventually buy thousands of aircraft to replace over a dozen different helicopters in the joint inventory.

FVL, as it is usually called, has been a long time coming. So long that technologies now commonplace in commercial aviation such as “fly-by-wire” flight controls are nowhere to be found in the Army fleet. So long that the Army was forced to retire all of its aged scout helicopters even though it lacked a replacement.

The U.S. Army is leading what looks to be the biggest rotorcraft program in history. Called Future Vertical Lift, it could eventually buy thousands of aircraft to replace over a dozen different helicopters in the joint inventory.

FVL, as it is usually called, has been a long time coming. So long that technologies now commonplace in commercial aviation such as “fly-by-wire” flight controls are nowhere to be found in the Army fleet. So long that the Army was forced to retire all of its aged scout helicopters even though it lacked a replacement.

The bad news is that if Future Vertical Lift falters the way some past efforts have, much of the U.S. rotorcraft industry might falter with it. FVL isn't the only game in town, but it is by far the biggest. If production of legacy rotorcraft ceases to make room for new ones and then FVL fails to deliver, industry might not have enough cashflow to sustain essential skills and suppliers.

Army leaders are acutely aware of the potential industrial-base fallout. I know that because earlier this month my colleagues and I at the Lexington Institute had a lengthy exchange with the two top Army officials managing FVL. They are Brigadier General Walter T. Rugen, leader of the service's cross-functional team for vertical lift, and Mr. Patrick H. Mason, the Army's program executive officer for aviation.

I thought we would spend most of the conversation discussing the Army's need to “overmatch” future adversaries in the air. But early on, Gen. Rugen observed that Future Vertical Lift “isn't just about overmatch, it's about the industrial base.”

It was a theme he kept coming back to throughout the exchange, noting that top Army leaders have been briefed on the consequences for industry if FVL doesn't come to fruition. Apparently those consequences are potentially grave, particularly at lower levels of the supply chain, where fragile, single points of failure support the entire sector.

That phrase—single points of failure—was used frequently in an interagency assessment of the defense industrial base prepared early in President Trump's tenure. It detailed how a domestic industrial complex once dubbed the “arsenal of democracy” has gradually hollowed out in recent decades as manufacturers moved offshore.

There has been concern about the loss of skills and suppliers in the rotorcraft industry for some time. The U.S. Army is by far the biggest operator of rotorcraft in the world, but since the Cold War ended 30 years ago it has mainly been upgrading what it already had rather than developing new helicopters. It isn't easy to sustain design and engineering talent when your top customer never buys anything genuinely new.

So in addition to addressing the increasingly harsh operational environment in which Army Aviation will need to wage future wars, FVL must also provide most of the resources needed to revitalize a key part of the domestic aerospace industry.

So far that effort is progressing nicely, using paperless design techniques, digital modeling and prototyping to develop strikingly new rotorcraft that will take the place of retired Kiowa scouts and Black Hawk assault helicopters in the future. The service has recently made awards to two industry teams for each effort, which will competitively develop solutions for final down-selects in a few years.

The service has also awarded funding for developing a new helicopter propulsion system, and has made steady progress in developing an electronic architecture for future combat rotorcraft. One way of controlling costs and assuring interoperability on the battlefield is to equip diverse airframes with the same hardware and software for functions such as communication and navigation.

It will likely take another 8-10 years before new rotorcraft developed by FVL begin reaching the operational force in large numbers, but managers have been thinking since the program's inception about how to make them reliable and maintainable for users. A big part of the affordability challenge unfolds after production, when 68% of life-cycle costs are incurred.

One facet of this challenge is how and where to provide maintenance for the future fleet. There is a long-running debate in military circles about how best to sustain rotorcraft in the operational fleet, with warfighters and legislators usually favoring organic depots over industry sources for much of the maintenance. But doing that requires access to data and intellectual property generated by the companies that build the airframes.

This inevitably creates tension with industry, which is as eager to protect its intellectual property in the rotorcraft sector as in other sectors. Intellectual property is a crucial source of competitive advantage. However, Rugen and Mason emphasize that FVL is trying to strike a reasonable balance between military and industry needs in securing access to sensitive information.

As one of them put it, “The Army recognizes industry's need for cashflow and adequate returns. It doesn't want to undermine industry's business model.” So while they have carefully analyzed the impact of intellectual property access on the ability of the Army's organic support base to do its job, they are mindful of the need not to impair the capacity of suppliers to make money.

This is not the way the Army has typically looked at such matters in the past. Its usual approach has been to find the best deal for warfighters and taxpayers, and let industry fend for itself. But what comes through in a conversation with FVL managers is a recognition that the business pressures faced by companies must be taken into account if the Army is to have an adequate industrial base for its aviation initiatives in the future.

They are also working hard to find overseas partners who might be customers for the rotorcraft that FVL ultimately produces. The bigger the international footprint that Future Vertical Lift has, the cheaper each aircraft will likely be for the Army and the more business there will be for American industry. But what Rugen and Mason would most like in the near term is a multiyear funding commitment from Congress to keep FVL on track, because if the program falters the outlook for both Army Aviation and the domestic rotorcraft industry will be bleak.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2020/05/26/army-fears-if-future-vertical-lift-falters-serious-fallout-for-industry-might-follow