Symposium in Finland brings industry and experts together to strengthen NATO’s responses to hybrid threats

Sur le même sujet

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  10 juin 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  How did the two offerings competing to be the US Army’s future engine measure up?

  By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — Cost appears to have played a major role in the Army's decision to pick GE Aviation's T901 engine for its future helicopter engine, based on a look at documents laying out the service's post-award analysis, obtained by Defense News. Yet, other factors not shown could have also contributed to the Army's choice, which the Government Accountability Office upheld following a protest from losing team Advanced Turbine Engine Company (ATEC) — a partnership between Honeywell and Pratt & Whitney. The GAO is expected to release a redacted version of its decision next week, which could shed more light on how the Army decided to move forward with GE. While the cost of GE'S engine seems to have been a deciding factor, the document outlining the service's criteria to determine a winning engine design to move into the engineering and manufacturing development phase states that “all non-cost/price factors when combined are significantly more important than cost/price factor.” According to that chart, the Army said it would primarily measure the engine submissions against its engine design and development, followed by cost/price, followed by life-cycle costs and then small business participation in order of importance. The Army assessed ATEC's and GE's technical risk as good and gave ATEC a risk rating of low while it gave GE a risk rating of moderate when considering engineering design and development for each offering. Both GE and ATEC had moderate risk ratings when it came to engine design and performance. And while GE received a technical risk rating of moderate for component design and systems test and evaluation, ATEC received low risk ratings for both. Almost all other technology risk assessments and risk ratings were the same for both engine offerings. GE scored “outstanding” in platform integration capabilities. Based off the chart, it appears ATEC won, so its likely the documents are not an exhaustive representation of how the Army decided to move forward with GE. While both ATEC and GE offered prices within the Army's requirements, GE came in 30 percent lower in cost. And according to Brig. Gen. Thomas Todd, the program executive officer for aviation, in an interview with Defense News in April, GE was also working on trying to shrink the timeline within the EMD phase by roughly a year. But, in ATEC's view, the charts show it had offered the best value product to the Army. ATEC's president, Craig Madden, told Defense News that the company took the Army's selection criteria laid out in the request for proposals seriously across the board from engineering design and development factors to cost to even small business participation, where it scored higher than GE in the analysis chart. “We did come in higher in cost but this was considered a best value evaluation and not lowest price, technically acceptable,” Madden said. “I think low price is good for a plastic canteen or a bayonet, it's not good for a highly technical turbine engine.” And despite coming in at a higher cost, Jerry Wheeler, ATEC's vice president said, the up front cost in the EMD phase will be higher but the delta would shrink when considering life-cycle costs of both engine offerings. Both ATEC and GE received good technical ratings and were given risk ratings of low. When just going by the chart, GE's four moderate risk ratings in key categories means “they could have disruption in schedule, increased cost and degradation of performance,” Madden said. He added ATEC was also focused on lowering risk, so that, although the Army offered incentives to finish the EMD phase earlier than 66 months, ATEC presented a plan to complete at 66 months with a plan to look at acceleration wherever possible. ATEC is now pushing to be a part of the EMD phase, essentially extending the competition, so that more data on engines can be garnered. The Army had periodically weighed keeping the EMD phase competitive with two vendors, but ultimately chose to downselect to one. For GE, the Army made the right decision and had enough data to do so. “The U.S. Army competitively selected GE's T901 engine over ATEC T900 engine after more than 12 years of development,” David Wilson told Defense News in a statement. “Those 12 years included the Advanced Affordable Turbine Engine (AATE) program, during which both companies ran tow full engine tests,” he said. Additionally, both companies executed a 24-month technology maturation and risk reduction contract where GE self-funded and successfully completed and tested a third engine, a full-sized T901 prototype engine, with successful tests on all components, Wilson said. “We've done three full-engine tests and provided an unprecedented amount of test data to the Army for them to determine which engine was the best to move forward with in EMD,” he added. Funding a second engine through EMD would cost more than twice as much and delay critical Army modernization by at least two years, Wilson argued. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/06/07/how-did-the-two-offerings-competing-to-be-the-us-armys-future-engine-measure-up/

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  24 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Le gouvernement allemand valide l’acquisition de 31 hélicoptères NH-90 MRFH

  Le Bundestag a ratifié en fin de semaine dernière la décision de la Marine allemande en faveur de l'acquisition de 31 hélicoptères multi-rôle NH-90 MRFH (Muti-Role Frigate Helicopter). L'appareil avait été préféré par l'Allemagne, à l'été 2019, face à l'AW 159 Wildcat d'Agusta et au MH-60R Seahawk de Sikorsky, dans le cadre du programme Sea Tiger. Moins de 15 mois se sont écoulés entre le choix définitif de la Marine allemande et la signature du contrat, précise Air & Cosmos. Air & Cosmos du 24 novembre

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  25 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Securing technological superiority requires a joint US-Israel effort

  By: Bradley Bowman   The United States is now engaged in an intense military technology competition with the Chinese Communist Party. The ability of U.S. troops to deter and defeat great power authoritarian adversaries hangs in the balance. To win this competition, Washington must beef up its military cooperative research and development efforts with tech-savvy democratic allies. At the top of that list should be Israel. Two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee understand this well. Sens. Gary Peters, D-Mich., and Tom Cotton, R-Ark., introduced S 3775, the “United States-Israel Military Capability Act of 2020,” on Wednesday. This bipartisan legislation would require the establishment of a U.S.-Israel operations-technology working group. As the senators wrote in a February letter to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, the working group would help ensure U.S. “warfighters never encounter a more technologically advanced foe.” Many Americans may be surprised to learn that they can no longer take U.S. military technological superiority for granted. In his new book, “The Kill Chain,” former Senate Armed Services Committee staff director Chris Brose notes that, over the last decade, the United States loses war games against China “almost every single time.” To halt this trend, the Pentagon must shift its ongoing modernization efforts into high gear. Early cooperative R&D with the “Startup Nation” can help in this regard. Israel is one of America's closest and most technologically advanced allies. The country boasts an “innovative and agile defense technology sector” that is a “global leader in many of the technologies important to Department of Defense modernization efforts,” as the legislation notes. Some may deem the working group unnecessary, citing the deep and broad cooperation that already exists between the United States and Israel. But, as the legislation explains, “dangerous United States military capability gaps continue to emerge that a more systematic and institutionalized United States-Israel early cooperative research and development program could have prevented.” Consider the fact, for example, that the Pentagon only last year acquired for U.S. tanks active protection systems from Israel that had been operational there since 2011. Consequently, U.S. soldiers operated for years in tanks and armored vehicles around the world lacking the cutting-edge protection Washington could have provided against missiles and rockets. That put U.S. soldiers in unnecessary risk. Such examples put the burden of proof on those who may be tempted to reflexively defend the status quo as good enough. Given the breakneck speed of our military technology race with the Chinese Communist Party, it's clear the continued emergence of decade-long delays in adopting crucial technology is no longer something we can afford. One of the reasons for these delays and failures to team up with Israeli partners at the beginning of the process is that U.S. and Israeli defense suppliers sometimes find it difficult to secure Washington's approval for combined efforts to research and produce world-class weapons. Some requests to initiate combined U.S.-Israel R&D programs linger interminably in bureaucratic no-man's land, failing to elicit a timely decision. Confronted by deadly and immediate threats, Israel often has little choice but to push ahead alone with unilateral R&D programs. When that happens, the Pentagon misses out on Israel's sense of urgency that could have led to the more expeditious fielding of weapons to U.S. troops. And Israel misses out on American innovation prowess as well as on the Pentagon's economy of scale, which would lower unit costs and help both countries stretch their finite defense budgets further. Secretary Esper appears to grasp the opportunity. “If there are ways to improve that, we should pursue it,” he testified on March 4, 2020, in response to a question on the U.S.-Israel working group proposal. “The more we can cooperate together as allies and partners to come up with common solutions, the better,” Esper said. According to the legislation, the working group would serve as a standing forum for the United States and Israel to “systematically share intelligence-informed military capability requirements,” with a goal of identifying capabilities that both militaries need. It would also provide a dedicated mechanism for U.S. and Israeli defense suppliers to “expeditiously gain government approval to conduct joint science, technology, research, development, test, evaluation, and production efforts.” The legislation's congressional reporting requirement would hold the working group accountable for providing quick answers to U.S. and Israeli defense supplier requests. That's a benefit of the working group that will only become more important when the economic consequences of the coronavirus put additional, downward pressure on both defense budgets. Once opportunities for early cooperative U.S.-Israel R&D are identified and approved, the working group would then facilitate the development of “combined United States-Israel plans to research, develop, procure, and field weapons systems and military capabilities as quickly and economically as possible.” In the military technology race with the Chinese Communist Party, the stakes are high and the outcome is far from certain. A U.S.-Israel operations technology working group represents an essential step to ensure the United States and its democratic allies are better equipped than their adversaries. Bradley Bowman is the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/22/securing-technological-superiority-requires-a-joint-us-israel-effort/