17 décembre 2023 | International, Terrestre

Symposium in Finland brings industry and experts together to strengthen NATO’s responses to hybrid threats

Allied experts and representatives met with industry at the NATO Hybrid Symposium in Helsinki, Finland to address the challenges posed by adversarial use of hybrid tools (12-13 December 2023). At the two-day event, members of NATO’s Counter Hybrid Support Teams (CHST) convened for a training session, boosting the Alliance’s ability to respond to challenges and strengthening cooperation in the hybrid community. The Symposium also had a session with private sector representatives, to look at further collaboration between NATO and the private sector.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_221179.htm?selectedLocale=en

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  • Financement de l’industrie de défense française : quelles solutions hors du secteur bancaire ?

    17 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Financement de l’industrie de défense française : quelles solutions hors du secteur bancaire ?

    DEFENSE Financement de l'industrie de défense française : quelles solutions hors du secteur bancaire ? La Tribune consacre un article détaillé au problème du financement de l'industrie de défense, les entreprises se trouvant exclues «de plus en plus souvent», selon le ministère des Armées, du bénéfice de financements (prêts et crédits) par le secteur bancaire français. Des refus motivés par des raisons d'image, selon la sénatrice Hélène Conway-Mouret. Interrogé le 21 octobre par les sénateurs lors d'une audition à la commission des affaires étrangères et de la défense, le Délégué général pour l'armement (DGA), Joël Barre, a confirmé que «les entreprises de défense se heurtent de plus en plus fréquemment à un phénomène de frilosité bancaire». Un constat partagé par deux sénateurs de la commission des affaires étrangères et de la défense, Pascal Allizard (Les Républicains) et Michel Boutant (PS), auteurs d'un rapport d'information sur la base industrielle et technologique de défense (BITD). Le ministère dispose d'outils de soutien et d'accompagnement des PME, ETI et start-up de défense, à travers les fonds Definvest et Definnov. Pascal Allizard et Michel Boutant estimaient toutefois dans leur rapport qu'il manque à ce jour «un ou des fonds français de taille à financer ce type d'investissements, dès lors que l'entreprise en question aurait été jugée stratégique». Les entreprises du secteur peuvent également bénéficier du prêt Sofired-PME Défense géré également par Bpifrance, qui finance les projets de développement ou de croissance externe des PME à hauteur d'un prêt participatif de 100 000 à 1 million d'euros, en complément d'un cofinancement bancaire. L'Agence de l'innovation de défense (AID) dispose également d'un outil de financement dédié aux PME, le Régime d'Appui pour l'Innovation Duale (RAPID). Au niveau européen, Le Fonds européen de défense (FED), qui doit être doté de 9 milliards d'euros dans la proposition de Cadre financier Pluriannuel 2021-2027 de l'Union européenne, vise à apporter un soutien financier notamment via l'octroi de subventions aux projets, collaboratifs en matière de défense. Ce fonds valorise la participation de PME aux projets, et dispose de capacités à accompagner certains projets portés exclusivement par des PME. La Tribune du 17 novembre

  • Project Convergence: Linking Army Missile Defense, Offense, & Space

    19 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    Project Convergence: Linking Army Missile Defense, Offense, & Space

    The Army wants to do a tech demonstration in the southwestern desert – COVID permitting – of how the new weapons systems it's developing can share data. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. WASHINGTON: As the Army urgently develops its 31 top-priority technologies for future war, service leaders are studying a proposal to field-test some of them together later this year, Army officials told me. The technology demonstration, known as Project Convergence, is still tentative, a spokesperson for the Army's Pentagon headquarters cautioned me. There's no guarantee it will even happen this year, in no small part because the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted field testing, wargames, and training exercises across the Army. If it does happen, it's far from settled which systems will be involved. Nevertheless, from what I've gleaned, Project Convergence will probably try to form a “sensor-to-shooter” network that shares data between systems being developed in at least three of the Army's Big Six modernization portfolios: Long-Range Precision Fires, the Army's No. 1 modernization priority, which aims to rebuild the artillery with new long-range cannons and surface-to-surface missiles to hit ground targets; The Army Network, priority No. 4, which will link Army units using everything from software-defined digital radios to new Low Earth Orbit satellites; and Air & Missile Defense, priority No. 5, which is developing its own specialized, high-speed network, IBCS, to relay targeting data on fast-flying threats with split-second accuracy. I've not heard specifically about systems from the Army's other three major modernization portfolios: armored vehicles (priority No. 2), high-speed aircraft (No. 3), and soldier gear (No. 6). But the Army envisions all of them as sharing intelligence over the network. “The Next Generation Ground Vehicle is an important sensor and observer for Long-Range Precision Fires,” said Brig. Gen. John Rafferty, the LRPF director at Army Futures Command. “Same with Future Vertical Lift, same with the Army's space strategy led by APNT, and the network enables all of this.” In fact, the Army ultimately wants to connect its units to the Air Force, Marines, Navy, and Space Force through a future network-of-networks called JADC2. That's short for Joint All-Domain Command & Control, a vision of seamlessly coordinating operations across the five official “domains”: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. “We have to make sure that what we technically demonstrate later this year fits into a larger JADC2 architecture,” Rafferty told me in a recent interview. “I view this as kind of the ground portion of JADC2. How do we meet JADC2 in the middle? We're going to start from the ground up, they're going from space down.” “We have to have a capability to converge these different systems at the decisive place and time,” he said. “We have to have a network.” Many of the necessary network technologies are ones under consideration for what's called Capability Set 23, a package of network upgrades set to enter service in three years. The first round of upgrades, CS 21, goes to infantry units next year. But CS 23, focused on far-ranging armored formations, aims to add extensive new long-range communication capabilities using Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) and Mid-Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites. “Every two years we're developing a new set of kit that we deliver as part of those capability sets,” Col. Shane Taylor told last week's C4ISRnet online conference. “We've got Project Convergence that we're working with the Network CFT this fall out in the desert, and you're gonna see a lot of MEO work out there.” Taylor works for Program Executive Office (PEO) Command, Control, & Communications – Tactical (C3T), which is independent, by law, of Army Futures Command but works closely with it to develop and build the network. Satellites are essential to connect units that can't form direct radio links because of intervening mountains, buildings, or the horizon itself. But LEO and MEO are particularly valuable for communications, because they can relay signals with less lag and greater bandwidth than high-altitude satellites in Geosynchronous (GEO) orbits. “In some cases, it's almost having fiber optic cable through a space-based satellite link,” Army Futures Command's network director, Maj. Gen. Peter Gallagher, told me in a recent interview. That kind of network capacity is particularly crucial for connecting “sensors to shooters.” Sure, old-fashioned radio or more modern chat-style systems work okay for reporting where a unit is moving or what supplies are running low. But targeting data, especially for moving targets, requires much more precision and becomes out of date much more quickly. “It's the second oldest challenge for artillery,” Rafferty told me, ever since 19th century cannon began to shoot over the horizon at targets their gunners couldn't see. “The oldest challenge is shooting farther, the second challenge is the sensor to shooter part: How do you minimize the time between the observation of the target and the delivery of the effects?” For the longest-range new weapons the Army is developing, like ground-based hypersonic missiles and thousand-mile superguns, the sensor-to-shooter problem is even harder, because the Army doesn't have any sensors that can see that far. Nor does it intend to build them: The service's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, has said publicly the Army doesn't need its own reconnaissance satellites. So while the Army is buying new Grey Eagle -Extended Range scout drones with an estimated range of 200 miles, longer-range shots will rely on Space Force satellites and Air Force and Navy reconnaissance planes to spot targets. Another potential source of information for long-range offensive fires, Rafferty said, is the Army's air and missile defense force. While air and missile defense radars are designed to track flying targets, they can also often calculate where missiles and artillery shells are being fired from, and those enemy batteries are prime targets for the Army's own long-range weapons. It's also much easier to blow up an enemy launcher on the ground – ideally before it fires – rather than try to shoot down projectiles in flight, so, where possible, the best missile defense is a good offense. “I started to really think about this a few years ago when I did an exercise in Europe, called the Austere Challenge, when I was still a brigade commander,” Rafferty told me. “It was an eye-opening exercise for me because I'd never really operated at the theater level.... I started to see the importance of that teamwork between the theater-level [offensive] fires and the theater-level air defense systems.” Training and modernization for both offensive and defense fires are based out of Fort Sill, Okla. “We're lucky because the Air and Missile Defense Cross Functional Team is right downstairs,” Rafferty said. Rafferty's counterpart for air and missile defense is Brig. Gen. Brian Gibson. “It's about connections and access to the data,” Gibson told me in a recent interview. “Sharing the right data with the right user at the right time, along latency timelines that are useful... is really where the trick to this puzzle lies.” “The most important part,” Gibson said, “where most of the work has gone on, is to understand where the linkages need to occur” between the Army's general-purpose Integrated Tactical Network (ITN) – that's what CS 21 and CS 23 are building — and the specialized, high-performance network for air and missile defense, IBCS. As hard as it is to hit a moving target on the ground, it's exponentially more difficult to hit one in the air, especially a supersonic cruise missile or ballistic missile moving at many times the speed of sound. If your targeting data is a millisecond out of date, you may miss entirely. So, explained Gibson and his acquisition program partner, Maj. Gen. Robert Rasch (PEO Missiles & Space), you can't add anything to the IBCS network without making very sure it won't slow that data down. But IBCS can certainly output the data it's already collecting for other systems to use, including long-range precision fires. “They can be a consumer of IBCS,” Rasch told me. And since ground targets don't move as fast as missiles, he said, IBCS wouldn't have to send updates to offensive artillery batteries at the same frenetic pace that air and missile defense units require. “It doesn't have to be in milliseconds,” he said. “It can be in seconds.” Yes, seconds seem like a long time in missile defense, but to someone shooting at ground targets, that's lightning-quick. “We've got great opportunities to leverage IBCS,” Rafferty said. “The way I view it, that's another sensor, with very capable radars, and that integrated air defense network is reliable and fast.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/project-convergence-linking-army-missile-defense-offense-space

  • To maintain tech edge, US seeks export controls on AI

    21 novembre 2018 | International, C4ISR

    To maintain tech edge, US seeks export controls on AI

    By: Kelsey D. Atherton In just two words, the phrase “artificial intelligence” captures a deep techno-utopian promise, the notion that through craftsmanship humans can create learning and thinking machines outside the processes of organic life. AI is typically the realm of technologists and science fiction writers. Now it is also in the world of export controls prohibitions and restrictions on technologies as overseen by the Department of Commerce. In a proposed rule announced Nov. 19, the Bureau of Industry and Security wants to set out guidelines establishing “criteria for identifying emerging technologies that are essential to U.S. national security.” The stated goals of such controls are tied to both security and protectionism for existing American industry, especially the science, technology, engineering and manufacturing sectors. The proposed rules encompass 14 technologies, covering brain-computer interfaces to advanced surveillance technology. Nestled in that list of technologies is “artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning technology,” which is further broken into 11 related tools. Here is a list of all the kinds of AI that the new rules seek to put under Commerce export controls: Neural networks and deep learning (e.g., brain modelling, time series prediction, classification) Evolution and genetic computation (e.g., genetic algorithms, genetic programming) Reinforcement learning Computer vision (e.g., object recognition, image understanding) Expert systems (e.g., decision support systems, teaching systems) Speech and audio processing (e.g., speech recognition and production) Natural language processing ( e.g., machine translation) Planning (e.g., scheduling, game playing) Audio and video manipulation technologies (e.g., voice cloning, deepfakes) AI cloud technologies AI chipsets Several of these are as much mathematical concepts, or processes, as they are distinct, controllable technologies. Others, like AI cloud technologies, suggest always-online servers, which by the very nature of the internet, are difficult to control within borders. Tackling an entire technological field, especially one with as low a barrier to entry as coding, is a tricky proposition, even in the instances where the technology is clearly defined. Why might the White House go through all this trouble? “These revisions could compose an important element of a strategy of targeted countermeasures against the near-term threat posed by China's tactics for tech transfer and the long-term challenge of China's emergence as a powerhouse in innovation,” said Elsa B. Kania, adjunct fellow at the Center for New American Security. “However, the revision of this traditional mechanism for today's challenges is inherently challenging, particularly when development is driven by commercial technologies.” Unlike, say, controlling the components and designs of missiles in the Cold War, many of the technologies covered under these proposed rules have both commercial and military applications. We need not look abroad to find this. Project Maven, the tool Google created to process images collected from drones, was built on top of an open-source library. Identifying objects in images is hardly a military-specific task. Should companies within the United States be restricted in how they create, sell and share those same tools with researchers and commercial companies outside American borders? “China's national strategy of military-civil fusion, which seeks to create and leverage synergies among defense, academic, and commercial technological developments in dual-use technologies, increases the ambiguity and uncertainty of tech transfer and collaboration,” Kania said. “That is, the boundaries between defense and commercial technologies can become quite blurred as a result of the nature of these technologies and the Chinese government's strategy for their integrated development.” Putting in place controls to hinder the free flow of AI between American companies and businesses abroad may mitigate that risk somewhat, but countries set on acquiring the tools can pursue research by other means, including technology transfers, espionage, theft through hacking, or even straightforward investment and acquisition. Staying ahead in artificial intelligence likely cannot be done through commerce restrictions alone. “The U.S. must recognize that such controls may slow and hinder China's advances in these emerging technologies, but China's emergence as a powerhouse and would-be superpower in such emerging technologies will remain a critical long-term challenge,” Kania said. “We must not only pursue such defensive countermeasures, but also undertake a more offensive approach to ensuring future American competitiveness through investing in our own innovation ecosystem.” https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2018/11/20/to-maintain-tech-edge-us-seeks-export-controls-on-ai

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