Siemens, 29 others added to Air Force's $950 million JADC2 contract

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  20 juillet 2020 | International, C4ISR

  Augmented reality: Seeing the benefits is believing

  Lt. Col. Brett Lindberg and Jan Kallberg There is always something taken away when there are added functionalities. Does the concept of wearing augmented reality that digitally provides situational awareness create an upside that outweighs what it takes away for rifleman skills? The supercharged hearing, six senses for those equipped, broader view of sight, picking up smells, changes in lights and shadows, slightest change in the near environment: With all these close-action skills, will augmented reality create more distraction than enhancement? Is it too early to push digital situational awareness all the way down to the soldier in maneuver units? Is the upside present? Naturally, all new defense technology takes time to find its place in the fight. The helicopter was invented in the 1930s, and it found a limited military role in the Korean War, not meeting the military expectation of higher impact. But 15 years later, it played a pivotal role in the war in Vietnam. New technology is not only technology — the human component to properly implement it is likely slower than the technological advancements. It is always easier to question than explain, and we understand that many thoughts and thousands of work hours have gone into designing the early augmented reality systems. However, still we find our questions worth discussing because once fielded, utilized and put into action in a conflict, it is too late to raise any concerns. This is the time to discuss. How reliable are the sensors? Can the sensors be easily spoofed? Is it too early to push it all the way down to the individual soldier? A technologically advanced adversary will likely devote research already in peacetime to develop one-time use, tossable, simple, low-cost devices that can — in close combat — create spurious sensor data and derail augmented reality. If the integrity of the sensor data is in question, it will likely force commanders to refrain from using augmented reality. A similar, relevant issue is the extent of the augmented reality technology's electromagnetic signature. Will the interconnectivity of the squad's augmented reality compromise the unit and deliver information to the enemy? What we do not want to face is a situation where adversaries can pinpoint the location or proximity to U.S. forces by simple detection measures. So, worst-case scenario, inexpensive devices can nullify a significant U.S. investment in technology, training and tactics. Added to the loss of usable augmented reality equipment, the soldiers could be “HUD-crippled.” Navy aviators use the term “HUD-cripple” to visualize a complete dependency of heads-up displays in the cockpit. The “HUD-cripple” is the loss of traditional Navy aviator skills such as landing on an aircraft carrier without the heads-up display. Will soldiers have retained the skills to fight effectively without augmented reality if it goes down? Technical advancements bring us new options and abilities, and they increase mission success. But as with all uncharted territory, they also bring surprises and unanticipated outfalls. During the war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, military aviation instruments took a significant leap forward, going from World War II-styled gauges in fixed-winged Douglas A-1 Skyraider planes to an earlier version of today's instrumentation in McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle fighter jets rolled out as the war in Vietnam came to an end. Parallel with the military advancements, these avionic upgrades were transposed into civilian cockpits with increased complexity and variations, as jetliners are multi-engine airframes, where the number of information points and alarms became numerous in the jetliner cockpit. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, civilian aviation faced several accidents that were hard to explain with standard aviation physics and crash evidence. Instead, the conversations recorded in the black boxes revealed these fatal air crashes. Several of the deadly crashes could have had another outcome if the pilots had not become overwhelmed by all the blinking lights, alarms, buzzers and avionics grabbing their attention, so the pilots lost situational awareness and focus. The warnings, avionics and buzzers had the correct information, but the presentation was a tsunami of red blinkers and alarming sounds, lacking any hints on how to prioritize what needs to be done to recover from a dangerous in-flight emergency. In our view, the key to effective augmented reality is to structure and segment what matters and when. Units — and it varies from soldier to soldier — have different experience levels, so information has a variation in value down to the soldier level. In research design, you seek to explain as much as you can with as little as you can without losing rigor. The same challenge goes for augmented reality, where rigor could be said to be the integrity of the information. Transferred to the ground-fighting world, are we, as an engineering-driven nation, so technology-happy that instead of creating tools for increased survivability and mission success, we initially increase the risks for the war fighter and only correct these after we suffered a surprise in combat? We understand that implementing augmented reality is a long process that is just now at the stage of proving the concept; with setbacks and successes, where are we on the learning curve? In our view, synthetic learning environments have already matured and provide an ample opportunity to use the augmented reality technology with a high return on investment. The opportunities reside in knowledge transfer, sharing experiences, preparing for an ever-changing operational environment, and by doing so, increasing soldiers' survivability and ensuring mission success. The question is: Are we ready to rely on augmented reality in combat? Lt. Col. Brett Lindberg is a research scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a simulation operations officer. Jan Kallberg is a research scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, and an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, the U.S. Military Academy or the U.S. Defense Department. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/07/17/augmented-reality-seeing-the-benefits-is-believing/

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  20 août 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Terrestre

  US Missile Defense Agency boss reveals his goals, challenges on the job

  By: Jen Judson HUNTSVILLE, Alabama — The Missile Defense Agency has a new director, Vice Admiral Jon Hill, who will be tasked to carry out major missile defense endeavors laid out in the Missile Defense Review released in January. Hill is the son of an Army air defender and became deputy director of the agency in 2016. Prior to that he served as the U.S. Navy's Program Executive Officer for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) beginning in 2014. The new director will have to guide the agency through a series of major decisions in the coming years —from refining its approach to a global, layered missile defense, to tackling advanced threats like hypersonic missiles, upgrading homeland defense to protect against, ballistic missiles, to designing, developing and initiating a space-based sensor layer, just to name a few. With his expansive plate full, Hill said he's prepared to ensure the agency has investment in the right places and that efforts move as quickly as they can to outpace current and emerging missile threats. Defense News sat down with Hill in an exclusive interview at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, to discuss his goals and the challenges ahead. What are your major priorities as you take up your post as Missile Defense Agency director and what do you believe will be your biggest challenges on the job? I would say the number one challenge is the poorly defined term of “transfer to the services.” After looking at this problem very closely, considering congressional language, looking at how it's interpreted differently, I really do think that, we, as a country, need to say what is the right thing to do to take care of the war fighter. That should be the number one issue here. So there's been lots of discussion about the [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System]and the SM-3 [missile] transfer to the services. What does that mean? If it's operations and sustainment, that's done. Put it in the done pile. The Army invests heavily in the operations and sustainment of THAAD. I don't know what more we would want out of them. ... The [Army and Navy] are not running away from the mission. They want to execute the mission, and again, they do operations and sustainment very well. I often hear that we don't know how to transfer. Look at the Aegis ships today. Navy procures those ships with Ballistic Missile Defense capability. The Navy has come in and said, “Hey, we're going to build a multi-mission radar to include BMD capability in SPY-6.” Man, what's wrong with that? That's fantastic. You look at the SM-6, where the Navy procures, produces that missile. It's a multi-mission missile. We insert sea-based terminal capability. So it tends to come down to those two systems that are BMD focused — SM-3 and THAAD — and so that's why it gets suspicious when we don't have a fully defined term because all it really results in is fracturing a program during a time where it's most critical to have those programs stable and taking care of the warfighter. What are some other priorities and challenges you will tackle? I would say the bigger challenge though is really driven by the threat today and Dr. [Michael] Griffin [under secretary for research and engineering in the Office of the Secretary of Defense] speaks about the Space Development Agency. We're aligned with the strategy, we're aligned with their architecture and their engineering of [a space] constellation because we bring the capability for hypersonic and ballistic tracking. We have support from Congress to do that. The department wants and needs us to go do that. It's just important to get that deployed as soon as possible. So we have to maintain stable investment. We need to get to a near-term, on-orbit demo as fast as we can, and then we need to build out the constellation in concert with the Space Development Agency. If we do that, we're in a great place. And in parallel, we need to start looking at our existing systems, which we have been doing. We're making modifications to today's sensors, both terrestrial and in space today on ships, on land, and we're modifying those today to deal with that new, high-end threat. We're also looking at existing weapons. What can they do? Somewhere in that battle space though, there's probably the need for more capability and that's really the next step and where we as a country need to go. You advocated for a Hawaiian missile defense radar and noted that while the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System, designed to protect the homeland, is a good system, more radars need to be in place. Can you talk more about the advanced threat and the need to enhance missile defense sensing capability? When you look at a ballistic flight for example, you boost, you have things like V-Bands and separation mechanisms, you've got staging, you've got post-boost vehicles, and you've got the lethal object; that's messy from the standpoint of a radar. So when the radar's staring at all that mess — the word discrimination means, “Hey, I've have got to discriminate all the garbage and make sure I'm pointing at the right thing.” Reduce the amount of radar energy I'm putting on all the garbage, so I've got to very quickly discriminate. So discrimination's important. And as they become more complex, the radar, in a sense of the architecture we have today, is not ready to take on larger numbers coming in and more complexity. Having a large radar on the island allows you to see out far. So the bigger the aperture is, the more fine detail it gets too. I think we owe it to the Hawaiian people. We owe it to that state. It's part of this country and they deserve to be defended and they want to be defended. We have great congressional support. So at the federal level we're good, at the state level, we're good. We're at the sensitive level now where the local communities are concerned about what it means for the environment and we understand that. So we're working very closely with them. It's an important capability. It fills out the sensor architecture and takes us to the next level in terms of central architecture in that region. Why do we need a space-based missile defense sensor layer? We're running out of islands to put radars on and the ships that the Navy has, they are equipped with 360-degree radars, very powerful radars that can discriminate. But ... we need to free up those ships as much as we can and get as much persistent sensor coverage as we possibly can. And space really answers the mail on all those aspects, it frees up those other assets that we can go use for other missions. An analysis of alternatives has been completed on hypersonic defense. Is there anything you can share about the findings in the AOA and how that is guiding the path forward? For that space mission you have to look at the sum total of the detection, the control and the engagement. [It is] the sensors, it is the command-and-control, it is the fire control and it is the weapons, whether they're hard kill or non-kinetic. So, it's all of that. It provides the department a broad view: here is the threat space we're dealing with, here's the architecture, here are the pieces of that architecture that do detection, control and engagement. And now Department of Defense, where shall we put our next dollar? Could be that next dollar goes to space. It could be that next dollar goes toward fire control improvements so that you can handle something that's flying this fast, greater than Mach 5. It could be that we're going to put another dollar on improving an existing system or that we need a new engagement system. So that's what it does. It's really a tool. It's not the answer. I've seen a lot of the reports that say, “Oh my God, it's so expensive. We'll never execute it.” The intent is never to go fully execute what's in an AOA. It's the full trade space. Now we've got to go pick from that trade space and so we finished up a [Cost Assessment Program Evaluation] sufficiency review. Not only have we done the work to do the alternatives ... the CAPE has come in and they've costed those out to say, here's what's a reasonable set. The department can make a decision as to what would be best. Is the SM-3 Block IIA missile test that goes up against an intercontinental ballistic missile threat still scheduled for next year? It is still scheduled for next year. Now what you should know is that Congress has sent us some messaging that says maybe we don't want to do that, maybe we should more fully explore the battle space for which the missile was designed. ... Congress first told us to go against an ICBM. That's what we're focused in on. And so if the appropriations come through and there's a change, then we have to go back and replan. Would the delay in the test result in overall program delays? It wouldn't delay the program. But it makes it difficult for us to say that there is a potential for an underlay. So, if we want to give the combatant commanders a layered defense against ICBMs, it kind of takes that off the table or it delays that for awhile and we'll use the IIAs for their intended battle space and we won't try to expand it. What's happening with the “strategic pause” on the Redesigned Kill Vehicle for the GMD system? We're still in a decision space. ... Dr. Griffin is going through the end-game of discussions now within the building. We're in full support and in the end we'll make a decision and we'll press forward with that. Do you have a timeline for making a decision on the RKV? We're definitely pressured and what drives that pressure is the fact that we were on a path to deliver the additional 20 [ground-based interceptors]. ... We're building out the missile field. So there is pressure to come to a decision quickly so that we can then get back to work. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/19/us-missile-defense-agency-boss-reveals-his-goals-challenges-on-the-job/

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  3 octobre 2024 | International, Terrestre

  Netherlands prioritises army in defence budget spending hike

  Netherlands Ministry of Defence expanded on future spending plans in a breakdown of the increased defence budget.