29 novembre 2019 | International, Autre défense

Produire local, passage obligé des entreprises partant à l'international

Grandes et petites entreprises doivent se plier aux exigences croissantes des États de produire sur place une partie de leurs gros contrats. Y compris Dassault Aviation pour vendre son Rafale en Inde. Enquête.

Difficile d'y échapper. Les exigences de compensations industrielles, ou offsets, occupent une place croissante dans la négociation des grands contrats. Elles sont presque autant l'apanage de pays émergents, qui cherchent à accélérer la montée en gamme de leur industrie domestique, que de pays développés. Dans le seul secteur de la défense, le montant global des offsets a progressé de 25 % entre 2012 et 2016, pour représenter près de 2,5 % des dépenses militaires.

Pour décrocher le contrat de 36 avions Rafale en Inde, Dassault a dû s'engager à réinvestir 50 % de sa valeur dans le pays, sous

forme de fabrication locale et d'approvisionnement auprès de sous-traitants indiens. Il a ouvert un site pour produire ses avions d'affaires Falcon et le Rafale avec l'indien Reliance. DCNS a consenti à transférer une partie de sa production et de ses compétences en Australie, dans le cadre du "contrat du siècle" de 12 sous-marins. Politique du "make in India" en Inde, "Buy american act" aux États-Unis, droits de douane exorbitants sur les importations de véhicules pour forcer les constructeurs à réaliser l'assemblage sur place... Au-delà de la défense et de l'aéronautique, le parapétrolier, le ferroviaire et la filière nucléaire font aussi face à des contraintes similaires, plus ou moins structurées. "La plupart des nouveaux contrats en Afrique prennent en compte la volonté de transférer des équipes et de produire localement ", remarque Pedro Novo, le directeur de l'international de Bpifrance.

Accompagner les PME et les ETI

"Les compensations industrielles étaient auparavant supportées par les seuls intégrateurs. Mais à mesure qu'elles augmentent et que les grands groupes externalisent davantage, elles descendent de plus en plus dans la supply chain", pointe Philippe Advani, un ancien d'Airbus, qui préside le comité sur les offsets des conseillers du commerce extérieur. Avec le groupement des industries françaises aéronautiques et spatiales (Gifas), il a publié en juillet un guide pour aider ETI et PME à naviguer dans les contraintes de transfert de savoir-faire ou de production – souvent complexes – fixées par les gouvernements. Pour les sous-traitants, l'opération n'est pas sans risque. En Inde, le spécialiste de l'ingénierie aéronautique Ametra, qui emploie 700 salariés, a sauté le pas l'an passé en créant une coentreprise avec un partenaire indien à Hyderabad, dans le sud du pays. "Cela demande du cash, et un pillage de propriété intellectuelle peut être plus dramatique pour une petite entreprise", reconnaît Philippe Advani.

"Devenir indien en Inde, par exemple, implique d'accélérer la structuration de sa société, de revoir la logistique et la gestion des flux de données, d'impliquer le conseil d'administration. Il faut un accompagnement pour mettre ces contraintes à la portée des PME", énumère Pedro Novo, qui a lancé il y a un an le fonds Build-up International afin de co-investir dans des filiales à l'étranger d'ETI françaises et étudie une vingtaine de dossiers. Certains ont fait de ces contraintes un nouvel axe de leur stratégie. Depuis deux ans, le fabricant de c'ble marnais Axon'Cable surveille les obligations de compensations industrielles des grands contrats militaires pour implanter ses nouvelles usines. "Il est plus facile de vendre à nos grands clients car ils ne trouvent pas leurs fournisseurs habituels et nous en profitons pour démarcher des industriels locaux", pointe son président, Joseph Puzo, qui a ouvert en 2016 une filiale au Brésil et prépare un bureau en Australie pour 2020. L'ETI, qui possède déjà une usine low cost en Inde, a créé en début d'année une deuxième coentreprise, Dhruv, avec un partenaire local, afin d'obtenir le statut d'"offset indien partner", qui permet de répondre aux demandes de compensation industrielle. Produire localement ne supprime pas pour autant tous les échanges. Seul l'assemblage final est réalisé à proximité du client. Les composants les plus sensibles restent exportés depuis la France. Le meilleur moyen de protéger ses innovations.

Latécoère suit Thales et Dassault en Inde

S'implanter en Inde ne faisait pas partie des plans initiaux de Latécoère. "Je savais que l'Inde était un pays compliqué et bureaucratique. Nous serions certainement allés dans un autre pays d'Asie s'il n'y avait pas eu les contreparties du contrat Rafale", reconnaît volontiers Yannick Assouad, la PDG de l'équipementier aéronautique. Son usine de c'blage de Belagavi, dans l'État du Karnataka, a démarré sa production en septembre. Pour vendre ses 36 avions de combat, Dassault a dû s'engager à des compensations industrielles, dont l'ouverture d'un site à Nagpur, dans l'État du Maharashtra, pour produire des pièces pour le Rafale et le Falcon. En 2017, Latécoère a décroché auprès de Dassault la fourniture de harnais électriques pour le Falcon 2000 en s'engageant à suivre l'avionneur en Inde. "Se localiser dans un pays d'offset n'était pas suffisant pour remporter le contrat car il faut avant tout être compétitif. Mais c'était la cerise sur le g'teau", reconnaît Yannick Assouad. Dans la foulée, sa nouvelle usine indienne a permis à l'ETI de décrocher un deuxième contrat auprès de Thales, lui aussi tenu à des offsets, pour son système de divertissement à bord. De quoi atteindre plus vite que prévu le seuil de rentabilité de l'usine de 300 salariés. En attendant que Dassault implante sa chaîne d'assemblage du Falcon en Inde, Latécoère exporte toute sa production indienne vers la France et les États-Unis pour Thales et se fournit en France. "Nous allons progressivement démarcher des clients locaux et essayer d'évaluer la supply chain", précise la PDG.

https://www.usinenouvelle.com/editorial/produire-local-passage-oblige-des-entreprises-partant-a-l-international.N907464

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