Largest order in company history: Rheinmetall receives framework contract for 155mm artillery ammunition for the Bundeswehr with a total gross value of up to €8.5 billion

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  19 décembre 2024 | International, Terrestre

  Remarks made by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly at the launch of the Arctic Foreign Policy

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  1 octobre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR

  Here is what Marines really need for realistic simulations training

  By: Todd South MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO, Va., ― Last year at the annual military expo here, Commandant Gen. Robert B. Neller told industry his vision for simulations is a kind of Star Trek-like holodeck in which any Marine could fight any battle on any terrain in virtual reality. Since then, Secretary of Defense James Mattis has said that close combat infantry units should fight 25 battles before they ever taste real combat. This year one of the Marines in charge of bringing those simulation dreams to reality laid down some of the tangible needs of the Corps now and in the near-term. Lt. Col. Byron Harder, with Training and Education Command's capabilities division, told the audience at this year's Modern Day Marine military expo that while live training will always remain the standard against which a unit's readiness is measured, even live training has its limits. It costs a lot of money to ship Marines out to Twentynine Palms or other areas. It costs money to fire munitions. Some of those munitions can't be fired in most areas. Some of the advanced weapons, such as cyber and electronic warfare types, can't be used for fear of damaging civilian networks or facilities in the United States. And some really advanced weapons can't be demonstrated where just anyone can see them in action, thus revealing our tech to adversaries. And that is where simulations can help bridge the gap. But first, there's a list of things that must come to fruition. Much of that is going to be software and bandwidth, basically getting better versions of terrains and simulations that are more realistic and can accommodate as much as a division's worth of players and an equally complex, simulated adversary. But some items are smaller and more hands-on, like better virtual reality and augmented reality headsets. Those headsets are key since the Marines want them to work not as they do now, with pounds of cabling in bulky indoor shooting simulators but light with long-lasting batteries that can be taken in the field and on deployment. Harder said a goggle that is about twice the weight of existing eye protection, perhaps with its power source somewhere on the body, is likely five to 10 years away based on his survey of the field. There's another an ongoing need: better drones. But instead of longer flying, large-scale drones that can coordinate complex fires and sensors for the operational environment, what Harder said simulations needs are smaller drones that can fly lower, giving Marines a street-level, detailed view of the battlespace so they can create their own terrain maps and fight the simulated fight in the areas they'll really be operating in. And those video feeds that are now on every ISR platform in the real world? Simulations need them too, to be realistic. That means game designers have to have human-like activity going on in areas instead of some digital “blob” representing enemies. That way, when a commander wants to zoom in on a tactical frame in the game, they'll be able to do it just like in theater. Which brings it to one of the more ambitious items beyond terrain and hardware: getting simulations to act more like humans. As it works now, unit commanders set up their forces, work their mission sets and then the virtual “forces” collide and often a scripted scenario plays out. Not too realistic. What's needed is both civilian simulations to act like civilian populations might act in the real world and the same for the enemy, taking advantages, fighting and withdrawing. But one step further is key: The enemy has to talk back. When a commander finishes the fight, they should be able to query the virtual enemy and figure out why it did what it did, how it gained a certain advantage. And it shouldn't take a programmer to “talk” with the simulation. Units communicate via voice and chat. That's how simulations users must be able to talk with their simulated civilians, allies and enemies, in plain language. These pursuits are not happening in a vacuum. This April for the first time Marine pilots at both Yuma, Arizona, and Camp Pendleton, California, ran flight simulations coordinated with ground units at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California. Those were done at a battalion level with a short prep time, far different than the large-scale Marine Expeditionary Unit or Marine Expeditionary Brigade-sized training that is typical. That is part of a larger effort to create a “plug-and-play” type of training module that any battalion, and later smaller units, can use at home station or on deployment to conduct complex, coordinated training. What made that work new was pairing legacy systems with a variety of software and operating systems between them. That's another example of what needs to be fixed. Marines and other services are, in many cases, using systems that were designed decades apart and creating a labyrinth of patchwork methods to get the hardware to work together when it wasn't built for that type of operation. The new systems must be open architecture so that new tech, new weapons and new terrain can be added on the fly. But also secure enough to operate across networks and not be spied upon by those who would want a peek at our tactics. Across the infantry battalions Marines received new gear last year called Tactical Decision Kits. These allow for squad to company-sized elements to do video game-play for their unit exercises, complete with NFL-style replay of engagements and decisions. That's a low-level example of one thing that's lacking in current training, Harder said. Right now the main piece of tech for a Marine commander conducting an after action review is a pen and paper pad. But with ISR drones, body cams and sensors, Marines in the near-term future should be able to monitor individual Marine's energy and hydration levels, where they pointed their weapon, when they fired, how many rounds, if they hit their target, even where their eyes were looking while on patrol. And, if on deployment, Marines can't rely on a cadre of civilian contractors back home to run their hardware. To that end, the Corps began two courses last year, the Simulation Professional Course and the Simulations Specialist Course. Both give Marines in infantry units experience setting up simulations and running the games for their units. They input training objectives and can understand and put together training for the unit staff or just for their fire team back in the barracks. https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/09/28/here-is-the-current-checklist-for-marine-corps-simulations-training

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  24 mai 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité, Autre défense

  Europe de la défense: entre Paris et Berlin, des ambitions et de la méfiance

  Char, avion de combat du futur: Paris et Berlin travaillent sur d'ambitieux projets industriels communs dans la défense, mais les rapports restent teintés de méfiance et marqués par des divergences de vue autour de la question des exportations d'armement. Face au Brexit, au rel'chement des liens transatlantiques sous l'ère Trump, et malgré une mauvaise passe dans la relation franco-allemande, Emmanuel Macron a fait de l'Europe de la défense l'un de ses grands chevaux de bataille, qui figure en bonne place dans le programme des candidats de son camp aux élections européennes de dimanche. Réunis par un même besoin de renouveler leurs capacités militaires à horizon 2035-2040, Français et Allemands ont convenu à l'été 2017 de développer main dans la main deux programmes d'équipements majeurs: le système de combat aérien du futur (SCAF), sous leadership du français Dassault, pour remplacer les Rafale et les Typhoon, et le char de combat du futur ayant vocation à remplacer les Leclerc et les Lepoard, sous leadership allemand. Concernant le SCAF, dont le premier contrat d'architecture a été notifié à Dassault et Airbus en janvier, Paris et Berlin comptent annoncer "cet été" le lancement des études de recherche et développement destinées à jeter les bases des démonstrateurs, pour un montant de 150 millions d'euros sur deux ans, selon des sources concordantes. - pas d'annonce au Bourget? - Il n'est toutefois pas certain que l'annonce soit faite mi-juin au salon aéronautique du Bourget comme initialement prévu, admet Paris. Objectif: développer un démonstrateur d'ici 2026 -- pour un coût estimé entre 2 et 3 milliards d'euros -- avant une entrée en service en 2040 de ce système associant avion de combat, drones, futurs missiles de croisière et drones évoluant en essaim. Pour le char, "les industriels préparent une offre pour l'étude d'architecture à horizon de l'été", indique-t-on de source gouvernementale française. Pour continuer à avancer, reste à venir à bout des inquiétudes et grincements de dents de part et d'autre du Rhin. Parmi les motifs de friction figure le partage des compétences de pointe censées alimenter ces grands programmes communs d'armement. En France, où le groupe Dassault a conduit seul le programme-phare du Rafale, certains ne cachent pas leur méfiance. "Il ne faudrait pas que les Allemands profitent de cette coopération pour chiper notre savoir-faire stratégique", glisse-t-on de source proche du dossier. En Allemagne, des parlementaires de la coalition au pouvoir reprochent au gouvernement d'Angela Merkel d'avoir mal négocié la répartition industrielle du projet SCAF et critiquent les exigences françaises en matière de propriété intellectuelle, affirme jeudi le quotidien allemand Die Welt. "Au regard des enjeux industriels et économiques du projet, j'attends de Mme Merkel et de Mme von der Leyen (ministre allemande de la Défense) qu'elles prennent en main ce dossier et en fassent une priorité, comme l'a fait le président Macron", déclare au journal le responsable défense du parti social-démocrate allemand (SPD), Thomas Hitschler. - ventes d'armes aux Saoudiens - "Des débats sur le partage des technologies, les questions de propriété intellectuelle peuvent exister mais ils sont en train de se résoudre. C'est normal que ça tiraille, derrière il y a des enjeux financiers et de compétences industrielles", relativise-t-on à Paris, où l'on préfère vanter "la rapidité" avec laquelle un projet de cette ampleur s'est mis en route. Autre obstacle à franchir: la question des conditions d'exportation des armements, objet de frictions ouvertes entre Paris et Berlin. Depuis l'assassinat fin 2018 du journaliste saoudien Jamal Khashoggi à Istanbul, le gouvernement allemand a décidé de geler les exports d?armes à destination de l'Arabie Saoudite, client controversé de l'industrie française de défense. Une décision vertement critiquée par Emmanuel Macron, puis par l'ambassadrice de France en Allemagne, qui a déploré fin mars "la politisation croissante du débat allemand sur les exportations d'armements", susceptible selon elle de "faire peser un risque sur la coopération de défense européenne". "On ne peut pas se mettre d'accord sur des projets d'une telle envergure sans trouver une position commune sur les conditions d'exportation", renchérit un haut responsable français. Or le sujet est politiquement ultra-sensible en Allemagne. "L'opinion publique allemande est vent debout contre les exports d'armement. Quel est l'homme politique allemand qui se risquera à aller contre ça?", souligne Gaëlle Winter, chercheuse associée à la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS). Paris accuse en outre Berlin de pratiquer un double jeu en feignant d'ignorer la livraison d'armement à Ryad par l'industriel allemand Rheinmetall, via ses filiales à l'étranger. "J'entends dans certaines capitales les protestations de vertus offusquées lorsqu'il s'agit d'exportations françaises, mais j'observe que les mêmes responsables ignorent volontiers ce que font les filiales ou les joint ventures de leurs champions nationaux de l'armement", s'est récemment agacée la ministre française des Armées Florence Parly. Sollicité par l'AFP, le ministère allemand de la Défense n'a pas donné suite. https://www.courrierinternational.com/depeche/europe-de-la-defense-entre-paris-et-berlin-des-ambitions-et-de-la-mefiance.afp.com.20190523.doc.1gt4y7.xml