4 juin 2024 | International, Sécurité
House lawmakers propose $1.3 billion for Pentagon innovation
The bill would add more than $500 million for DIU initiatives to quickly deliver capabilities to combatant commands and the military services.
3 juillet 2018 | International, C4ISR
By: Mark Pomerleau
Cyber has been an official domain of warfare for nearly a decade, yet the Department of Defense is still learning how to integrate it with operations. And some members of Congress are concerned the traditional military intelligence organs to this day don't understand intel support to cyber ops.
The House Armed Services Committee is directing that a briefing on the subject must take place by December 1, 2018. The briefing — delivered by the under secretary of defense for intelligence, in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the military services — is expected, according to a provision in the committee's annual defense policy bill, to address multiple issues, including:
“The committee is concerned about the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's ability to provide the cyber community with all-source intelligence support, consistent with the support provided to operations in other domains,” the provision, called an “item of special interest,” says.
In some cases, other intelligence disciplines, such as human intelligence or signals intelligence, might be needed to help enable a cyber operation. A committee aide noted that the goal is to get DoD to think about cyber operations just as operations in any domain and build the infrastructure to support that.
According to Gus Hunt, Accenture Federal Services cyber strategy lead, cyber as a domain is really no different than the others from an intelligence support perspective.
The objective of intelligence, he told Fifth Domain in a recent interview, is to ensure it provides timely information about the adversary, who they are, the status of their capabilities and any information about the threats that are there.
“I think what you're seeing ... is that people are asking the question are we appropriately structured or resourced and focused to be as effective as we possibly can in this new realm of cyber and cyber operations,” Hunt, who previously served as the chief technology officer at the CIA, said.
“Because they're asking the question, I think the obvious answer is ... we're not structured as effectively as we possibly can be ... [but] it's really good that people are sitting there asking.”
The Army is experiencing similar problems, especially when it comes to experimenting with force structure changes and bringing cyber effects to the tactical edge, which currently don't exist.
“We're not seeing a corresponding growth in the intel organizational structure with the cyber and” electronic warfare, Lt. Col. Chris Walls, deputy division chief for strategy and policy in the cyber directorate of the Department of the Army G-3/5/7, said at the C4ISRNET conference in May.
“The existing intel force structure is really going to be stressed when we put this EW and cyber capability into the field unless they have a corresponding growth and capability as well,” Walls said of tactical cyber effects and teams.
https://www.fifthdomain.com/congress/2018/07/02/does-dod-know-how-to-supply-intel-for-cyber-ops/
4 juin 2024 | International, Sécurité
The bill would add more than $500 million for DIU initiatives to quickly deliver capabilities to combatant commands and the military services.
27 juin 2019 | International, Aérospatial
RACHEL S. COHEN Performance and professionalism in the Air Force's nuclear ranks has improved in the last few years following a spate of personnel issues, but there's always more work to be done to ensure the men and women who watch the arsenal are at their best, the service's top uniformed officer said this week. “I believe we've come a long way,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein said at a June 26 AFA Mitchell Institute breakfast. “We've all had to make sure that we keep our foot on the gas on this. I'm optimistic, but I'm not comfortable.” Nuclear operators have hit rough patches over the past several years: low morale and lost focus coupled with reports of drug use, weapons mismanagement, a proficiency test cheating scandal, and frequent staff turnover. In response, theservice launched programs to revamp training and regulations and to keep missileers in their jobs longer, rather than send them to other specialties after a few years. The Air Force has also made a conscious effort to offer bonuses, tout missileers' work, and visit the three nuclear missile bases spread across rural Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana. Now, the service wants to develop its missile-managing employees' leadership skills at the same time as it develops new nuclear weapons and Northrop Grumman's B-21 bomber. Some airmen at Air Command and Staff College are taking a yearlong course focused on the nuclear enterprise in one effort to bolster leadership in those career fields. “One of the tasks I gave them was to ... give us some fresh thinking on, how do we do command and control if nuclear weapons were inserted into a conventional fight?” Goldfein said. “We built our nuclear command and control to be separate from our conventional command and control.” If the Russians deployed a low-yield, “tactical” nuclear weapon in combat, regional commanders would need the ability to integrate nukes into their otherwise conventionally armed battle plan. However, Goldfein emphasized that a “nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon,” saying many don't believe there is such a thing as a tactical nuke. “Our command-and-control systems right now are not as agile as they need to be,” he continued. “This group of scholars have been doing some extraordinary work, writing papers and thinking about what is the command-and-control mechanism and how does that need to feed into [nuclear command, control, and communications]?” The Air Force's NC3 Integration Directorate has been mulling the idea of dual-use command and control for at least two years, and points to the concept as one of the most complicated security hurdles it faces in bringing the NC3 enterprise into the digital age. Goldfein argues efforts to modernize decades-old NC3 systems also need to dovetail with the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System, envisioned as a network of conventional C2 assets spread across air, land, and space sensors and platforms, as well as with the push into commercial space capabilities. http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2019/June%202019/Missileer-Improvements-Hit-Mark-but-Still-More-to-Do.aspx
6 octobre 2021 | International, Naval
Austal USA won its first steel shipbuilding contract ahead of opening a new steel manufacturing line in April.