European Tensions Prompt Denmark To Keep F-16s Longer

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  13 octobre 2022 | International, Autre défense

  Ukraine makes it obvious DoD has to change how it buys weapons

  The scale at which '€œdual-use'€ technologies is used should make us urgently rethink the way the Department of Defense does business.

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  16 juillet 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  The key to securing the defense industrial base is collaboration

  Teresa Shea With cyber threats constantly evolving and increasing in sophistication, a strong national cybersecurity posture has never been more important. COVID-19 is causing an uncertainty across industry sectors, and criminals as well as adversaries are increasing their cyber-attacks and taking advantage of our increased digital work from home dependence. It is especially important to protect the organizations that comprise the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. Defined as the “worldwide industrial complex that enables research and development, as well as design, production, delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and components or parts, to meet U.S. military requirements,” Defense industrial base networks host mission-critical information and operational assets vital to national security. If infiltrated, the ramifications could plague the U.S. national security strategy, hamper our warfighting edge, create chaos within the critical infrastructure and ultimately undermine adversary deterrence. To effectively protect the Defense Industrial Base, the government and private sector must both work to secure the U.S. critical infrastructure. Organizations should prioritize collaboration to bolster the nation's cyber resiliency and collectively defend against malicious cyber actors' intent on doing us harm. Proactively defend networks It's widely known that, in an ideal world, organizations should stop threats before they reach their targets. However, to deter effectively, organizations need to have real-time situational awareness of their network infrastructure and supply chain, which can be a difficult undertaking. Threat intelligence information sharing between the government and the private sector companies that comprise the Defense Industrial Base is essential to achieving a strategic view of an advanced threat actor. Today, targets can only know what is happening to their own assets without insight into the attacker's intent. The Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Program allows both the DoD and private companies to share cyber threat information, mitigation and remediation strategies, which helps key players in both sectors increase cyber situational awareness and be more proactive in their security efforts. However, this program is currently voluntary, meaning that the crucial information uncovered within the program is only available to those who proactively join the program. Moving forward, both the public and private sectors must work to enact policies that require collaboration. It is no longer acceptable to rely on incident response protocols, performance assessments of existing systems and one-off reactions to threats without coordination. Increased information sharing is key to staying one step ahead of our adversaries. Follow government-suggested guidelines The U.S. government has dedicated time and resources to help secure the Defense Industrial Base, and organizations must act upon the recommendations provided. Earlier this year, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission released a report on the U.S. government's cyber readiness, which found that “the U.S. is currently not designed to act with the speed and agility necessary to defend the country in cyberspace.” The commission's findings place an emphasis on protecting the Defense Industrial Base's intellectual property, and called on Congress to require that these firms share threat data with the DoD and conduct threat hunting on their networks. Both sharing threat data and conducting threat hunting are proven to result in increased defense of our networks. A secure future As noted in a recent LawFare blog, “Cyber-enabled intellectual property theft from the DIB and adversary penetration of DIB networks and systems pose an existential threat to U.S. national security.” Given the abundance of cyber-attacks focused on Defense Industrial Base networks, penetrating them is high on our adversaries' target list. They're currently zeroing in on the U.S. critical infrastructure, attempting to poach the intellectual property that secures our very nation. Until we are willing to come together across sectors to share threat data, and commit to hiring strong talent, we will remain at a disadvantage. Fundamentally, it is about trust and our ability to put the greater defense above individual interests. If accomplished, the U.S. cybersecurity posture and resiliency will remain strong, deterring malicious cyberattacks against our Defense Industrial Base. https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/07/15/the-key-to-securing-the-defense-industrial-base-is-collaboration/

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  10 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Army Study Asks: How Much Modernization Can We Afford?

  The Army's drive to modernize by 2035 is too big for traditional five-year spending plans, acquisition chief Bruce Jette said. So he's reviving long-term economic forecasting used in the Cold War. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on June 09, 2020 at 12:37 PM WASHINGTON: The Army's acquisition chief says the service is sticking with its 34 top-priority programs – in the face of budget pressure from the pandemic. But most of those programs will only move from prototypes to mass production in the second half of the 2020s; then they stay in service for decades with repeated upgrades. So, assistant secretary Bruce Jette says, the Army needs to exploit new technologies like 3D printing and modular upgrades to reduce long-term costs – but also revive long-term economic forecasting techniques largely neglected since the Cold War. “At this point, we're remaining on schedule with the ‘31 plus 3,'” Jette said during an Association of the US Army webcast yesterday. (The Army divides the 34 programs this way because 31 of them, from intermediate-range missiles to smart rifles, are managed by Army Futures Command, but three of the most technologically challenging – hypersonic missiles and two types of missile defense lasers – belong to the independent Rapid Capabilities & Critical Technologies Office). But the service needs to do more planning: “A second thing in the background that we are doing is taking a look at a holistic model, an economic model of the Army.” “We are taking some steps to provide additional data in case there's a prioritization that does come down the road, due to changes in the budget profiles,” Jette said. “That business requires us to have this long-term full understanding of economics, which is what we're focused on trying to develop over the next year.” That study will help inform Army leaders if they have to make a hard choice on which of the 34 priority programs to put first – and, while Jette didn't say so aloud, which may be cut back or canceled entirely. Beyond 2026 The Pentagon normally builds its annual budget two years ahead of time. Congress is now considering the 2021 request, largely drafted in 2019. Those budgets include a less-detailed annex, called the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) that outlines the five years ahead. Now, some of the Army's new weapons will enter service in that timeframe, in limited numbers, including new hypersonic and intermediate-range missiles in 2023. But many, including some of the most expensive, will take longer. So new armored vehicles won't enter service until 2028, new high-speed aircraft not until 2030. Actually building enough to equip a sizable combat force takes even longer. The Army aims to build a decisive counter to Russian aggression by 2028, but expect a force adequate to counter China only by 2035. “I have to have a much longer view of the battlespace, the economic battle space,” Jette said. “The objective [is] to lay a foundation upon which we can take a serious look at what the long-term implications of owning a piece of equipment,” he said. So “I'm working with the G-8 [the Army's deputy chief of staff for resourcing]. In fact, we just had a meeting on this last week to pull out some models that were actually used more in the Cold War, that we sort of let wane [during] Iraq and Afghanistan.... Next week I go up to West Point to have ORSA [Operations Research/Systems Analysis] cell up there that specifically is focused on economics.” New Tricks Now, the Army doesn't plan to simply repeat its Cold War past. The Reagan-era “Big Five” – the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley armored vehicles, Apache and Black Hawk helicopters, and Patriot missile defense system – have been repeatedly upgraded since their inception. But these platforms are running out of room for more horsepower, armor protection, and firepower, and they were never designed to allow the constant upgrades required to keep pace with modern advances in electronics. The M1 Abrams, for instance, is literally hard-wired. “There are literally, in a tank, over a couple of tons of cabling, all tremendously expensive and all very, very structured,” said Jette, a former tanker himself. “So if you want to change something ... you have to re-cable large portions of it.” The Army must account not only for the up-front cost to research, develop, and build the new weapons, Jette emphasized, but also the much larger long-term bill to operate, maintain and upgrade them. “If we don't think about how it's going to be enhance-able, upgradable, and modified for different uses over a period of time,” he said, “we're missing things, because we do keep them for 30, 40 years. “For industry, if you have a good idea and a new component, how do we get them in a vehicle without having to replace half of the components?” he asked. That requires a new approach called modular open systems architecture that allows you to plug-and-play any new component as long as it meets certain technical standards. “By getting this much more open architecture in place on these vehicles,” he said, “we think that we're going to be able to keep them growing to the future over that 30 to 40 year period.” The Army is also eager to use digital designs, 3D printing, and other advanced manufacturing techniques so it can print out spare parts as needed, rather than stockpile vast quantities of everything it might need for every system. (Jette just visited the Army's 3-D printing hub at Rock Island Arsenal, he said enthusiastically). But this vision raises complex issues of not only managing the technical data but wrangling out the legal rights to use it. Many companies depend on the long-term revenue from selling spares and upgrades, and they're not It's a knotty intellectual property issue that Jette is keenly aware of, being a patent-holder and former small businessman himself. “I do understand ... what type of risk it is. I'll frankly admit that many of the people in the military who fundamentally only been in the military don't understand,” Jette said. “If the risk is totally on you, and it makes no economic sense, I recommend you not answering the RFP.” If too few companies respond to an official Request For Proposals, Jette said, that provides valuable feedback to the Army that maybe it's doing something wrong – feedback he can use in his own quest to educate the service. “Sometimes,” he said, “challenges to RFPs are a good way for you to help me to make sure that people understand that this is too much risk we're asking of industry.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/army-study-asks-how-much-modernization-can-we-afford