NATO Innovation Challenge – The invisible threat: Countering cognitive warfare//Défi de l’innovation de l’OTAN – La menace invisible : Contrer la guerre cognitive

Sur le même sujet

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  4 octobre 2018 | Local, Aérospatial

  Sea King disposal underway

  by Lisa Gordon The 55-year reign of the Canadian Sea King is coming to a close. In December, a crew from 443 Maritime Helicopter Squadron in Patricia Bay, B.C., will fly the CH-124 Sea King on its last flight for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). Earlier this year, their counterparts at 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron in Shearwater, N.S., marked the aircraft's final East Coast mission on Jan. 26, 2018. While five helicopters are still operational until the end of the year in B.C., Canada's remaining 23 Sea Kings have been retired and are currently making their way through the fleet disposal process. Administered by the Department of National Defence (DND) and Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), this process aims to repurpose, sell or otherwise dispose of the old helicopters in a safe and environmentally responsible manner. While final arrangements for the aircraft are subject to change, DND told Skies on Oct. 2 that eight of the 28 remaining aircraft will be publicly displayed by the Canadian Armed Forces at various military bases and museums across the country. Another airframe will be retained by the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) as a training aid, and one will be displayed at the Canada Aviation and Space Museum in Ottawa. Three aircraft were demilitarized and scrapped due to their poor condition, with components being recycled where possible. The remaining 15 Sea Kings and their associated parts — 12 are currently located at 12 Wing Shearwater and three are at Patricia Bay — are now for sale, a process that is being administered by PSPC. “Essentially, we have a website that is used to source interest for controlled and sensitive assets that are for sale,” explained Josée Doucet, manager of the GCMil group at PSPC, which deals with the disposal of surplus Canadian military goods. “In this case, we put the Sea Kings up for sale. Once we had expressions of interest, we held a bidders' conference on Sept. 26 in Shearwater, to showcase those aircraft. It gave bidders the chance to look at them, ask questions regarding the assets, and gave them an idea of what they are bidding on.” The helicopters are being sold in “as is, where is” condition. Doucet said she was very pleased by the number of potential bidders who attended the Shearwater event. “Now, the interested parties will receive a package from my office and be invited to submit a bid. There will be a timeline as to when we will start reviewing offers.” While Doucet said that timeline has not yet been finalized with DND, she indicated the goal would be to have a purchase agreement in place by the time the Sea Kings cease flying on Dec. 31. “It's a very aggressive timeline, so the offer to purchase dates will respect that.” Preparing for Sale Before the Sea Kings went on the market, controlled goods and military equipment were removed from the airframes wherever possible. Doucet said all Canadian bidders must be registered in the Controlled Goods Program. Interested foreign purchasers must be enrolled in their nation's equivalent program, which allows them to view military assets. “We have a number of processes. We only deal with registered Canadian companies, pre-approved foreign governments or authorized representatives of original equipment manufacturers. Only then would they be allowed to bid.” While Doucet declined to estimate the Sea Kings' worth, she said a myriad of factors are considered when selecting the winning bid. These include single-asset or full-lot bids, depreciation, condition of the fleet, and the costs to DND to maintain the helicopters as they await sale. “We also look to see if a bidder has an approved clear end use for the helicopters. What is the likelihood of obtaining export approval, as well as third-party approval from the country of acquisition — in this case the United States. We look at all that, because we don't want to exert efforts in an area that would not be fruitful.” Ultimately, she said fleet value will be driven by market demand. “I would have to say that from a commercial application perspective, the Sea King fleet has a lot of life left in it. Whether the fleet will be used as a gap measure, or to refurbish and resell, or to convert to commercial applications, the value will be subject to its intended end use.” A Lasting Legacy Canada accepted its first CH-124 Sea King at the Sikorsky plant in Connecticut on May 24, 1963. Since then, the maritime helicopter has earned its legendary status in the Canadian Armed Forces, serving with distinction on Her Majesty's Canadian Ship Bonaventure (the country's last aircraft carrier, retired in 1970), as well as on St. Laurent-class destroyer escorts, Iroquois-class destroyers, auxiliary oiler replenishment ships, and Halifax-class frigates. No other aircraft in Canadian service has ever commanded such a lasting multi-generational legacy. While 15 Sea Kings are destined for new homes, nine will remain on public display to ensure its story will never be forgotten. It's a fitting tribute to a King that ruled the waves for more than half a century. https://www.skiesmag.com/news/sea-king-disposal-underway

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  16 mars 2021 | Local, Naval

  DND can’t allow a quarter-trillion-dollar program to proceed unchallenged

  Both the U.S. Department of Defense, and DND's costing manual utilize a ratio of long-term support costs to acquisition costs of 2:7. Applying this ratio to the PBO's acquisition costs, the projected life-cycle costs for the CSC will be $286-billion.

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  17 décembre 2020 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Matt Gurney: Supporting local industry shouldn't be the first consideration in military procurement

  Rather than worrying about where things are built, a better question is: will Canadian soldiers be properly equipped? That's all that matters Matt Gurney Dec 16, 2020 • Last Updated 22 hours ago • 5 minute read It is almost a truism in Canadian public policy: We are terrible at military procurement. You hear that often. I've said it often. But it really isn't true. We only think we're terrible at military procurement because we are confused about what we're trying to do. Our military procurements are not about actually procuring equipment for the military. They're about creating jobs and catapulting huge sums of money into key ridings across the country. Once you shift your perspective and look at it that way, you realize very quickly that our military procurement system is amazing. It bats a thousand. The problem isn't with the system. We've just labelled it badly. If it were called the Domestic Defence Industry Subsidy Program instead of our military procurement system, we'd all be hailing it as a shining example of a Canadian public policy triumph. This is terrible. It has cost us the lives of our soldiers, and probably will again. But it's undeniable. Canadian politicians, Liberals and Conservatives alike, have long had the luxury of seeing defence as a cash pool, not a solemn obligation. And they sure have enjoyed that pleasure. Two recent stories by my colleague David Pugliese for the Ottawa Citizen have explored this theme: Our efforts to replace our fleet of frigates with 15 newer, more powerful ships is turning predictably complicated. The 15 new combat ships are part of a major overhaul of the Canadian fleet, which was neglected for many years and now must be modernized all at once. In February of 2019, the government chose American defence giant Lockheed Martin to produce the ships in Canada, using a British design. (How Anglosphere of us.) Companies that weren't selected to be part of the construction or fitting out of the ships are unhappy, Pugliese noted, and aren't bothering to hide it, even though they've abandoned their legal challenges. The sniping has continued, though, with spurned industry figures talking to the media about problems with the program. Jody Thomas, deputy minister of the Department of National Defence, reportedly told industry leaders to knock it off. “There's too much noise,” she reportedly said, adding that it was making the job of getting the new fleet built “very difficult.” Some of Thomas's irritation is undoubtedly the automatic hostility to scrutiny, transparency and accountability that's far too common for Canadian officials — our bureaucrats are notoriously prone to trying to keep stuff tucked neatly out of public view. But some of what Thomas said is absolutely bang-on accurate: Defence industry companies know full well that the government mainly views military procurement as a jobs-creation program, so are understandably put out to not get what they think is their fair share. Some Canadian companies have designed and developed critical communication and sensor gear for modern warships, Pugliese noted. This gear was developed with taxpayer assistance and has proven successful in service with allied fleets, but was not chosen for the new Canadian ships. And this is, the companies believe, a problem. Why aren't Canadian ships using Canadian-made gear? It's a good question, until you think about it for a moment. Then you realize that the better question is this: will the Canadian ships be properly equipped? That's it. That's all that matters. Will the new ships be capable of doing the things we need them to do? If yes, then who cares where we got the gear? And if no, well, again — then who cares where we got the gear? The important thing isn't where the comm equipment and sensors were designed and built. It's that the systems work when our ships are heading into harm's way. Assuming we have many viable options to choose from, then there are plenty of good ways of making the choice — cost, proven reliability, familiarity to Canadian crews, and, sure, even whether it was made in Canada. But supporting the local industry needs to be the last thing on the list. This stuff is essential. The lives of our sailors may depend on it working when needed. Cost matters, too, of course, because if the gear is too pricey, we won't have enough of it, but effectiveness and reliability are first. Treating military procurement as just another federal jobs-creation program is engrained in our national thinking But we talk about them last. Because we value it least. There probably is some value in preserving our ability to produce some essential military equipment here in Canada. The scramble earlier this year to equip our frontline medical workers with personal protective equipment is instructive. In a war, whether against a virus or a human enemy, you can't count on just buying your N-95 masks, or your torpedoes and missiles, from your normal suppliers. Unless Canada somehow gets itself into a shooting war without any of our allies in our corner, any time we are suddenly scrambling to arm up, our much larger allies are probably also scrambling to arm up, and they'll simply outbid us. (See again our current efforts to procure vaccines for an example of this unfolding in real time.) But we aren't at war now, and we can buy the damn ships from anyone. To the government's credit, it seems to be doing this; the pushback against the program seems mostly rooted in the government's decision to let the U.S.-British consortium chosen to build the new ships equip them as they see fit. The program may well derail at some point — this is always a safe bet with Canadian shipbuilding — but insofar as at least this part of the process goes, we're doing it partially right. Yes, we're insisting on building the ships here, but we aren't getting picky about the equipment that goes into them. That's probably wise. But that's about as far as the wisdom goes. Treating military procurement as just another federal jobs-creation program is engrained in our national thinking. It would have been good if COVID had knocked a bit of sense into us and forced us to, at long last, grow up a bit. But no dice. Oh well. Maybe next time. https://nationalpost.com/opinion/matt-gurney-supporting-local-industry-shouldnt-be-the-first-consideration-in-military-procurement