24 février 2020 | International, Aérospatial
Jen DiMascio
The Pentagon is in the midst of a massive upgrade of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, designed to protect the U.S. against an attack by an ICBM.
The new Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI) would modernize GMD, arming it with an all-up round that can counter more sophisticated ICBMs. In pursuing the new program, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will end the planned purchase of 20 current-generation GMD Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI), after already having canceled a key aspect of that system, the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV). While it works on NGI, the MDA also intends to supplement its defense of the U.S. against ICBMs with shorter-range interceptors that provide regional defense.
The change in course will not be cheap. GMD itself has cost more than $68 billion over its lifetime. In its fiscal 2021 budget request, the MDA is asking for $664 million in fiscal 2021 for NGI and another $4.3 billion through fiscal 2025.It is an amount that will grow over time and that some worry could pull funding from other urgent priorities, as the type and number of missile threats from other countries evolves to include more sophisticated ballistic missiles and hypersonic weaponry.
The MDA is poised to issue a classified request for proposals to sponsor two contractors through a preliminary design review (PDR) of a new interceptor and kill vehicle—the part of the interceptor that defeats an incoming missile while in space. MDA Director Vice Adm. Jon Hill says the agency plans to award contracts by the end of 2020, with the intention of starting testing in the mid-2020s and putting NGIs in silos by 2027, 2028 or beyond.
“Right now we're funded through PDR, and you know there's plenty of arguments out there that you [have] got to go all the way to the [critical design review (CDR)]. We'll have that conversation when the time is right,” says Hill.
The release of the budget solidifies a plan that has been slowly percolating in the background. Last March, Boeing was put on notice after the RKV—a projectile launched by the GBI booster that is tasked with locating and defeating the incoming ICBM in space—did not meet the needs of its CDR. The Government Accountability Office noted problems with the program meeting its cost and schedule goals “with no signs of arresting these trends.”
By August 2019, Mike Griffin, the Pentagon's top research and engineering official, stopped work on the RKV after the MDA had spent more than $1 billion to develop it, as it was not proving to be reliable. These RKVs were to ride atop the next 20 GBIs, a project overseen and integrated by Boeing, which Congress had approved in 2018 after a spate of North Korean missile tests.
In concert with ending the RKV, Congress rerouted that funding to the NGI, and the MDA conducted a review of options for the interceptor. Coming out of that assessment, budget officials say they will not buy the 20 new GBIs as the military embarks on NGI development. New NGIs are so far being planned to be placed in silos that were to be inhabited by GBIs, according to Hill. “The current intention is for the Next-Generation Interceptors to be able to work with both current and future sensor systems,” says MDA spokesman Mark Wright.
From a security standpoint, existing GBIs will still protect the U.S. from foreign missile threats, says Hill, but he adds that over time their reliability will begin to fall off. While the NGI program works its way through development, the MDA plans to supplement GMD with a layered network of theater-range systems—the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) and the Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block 2A—to fill any gaps in defending the U.S. from North Korean missile attacks.
“What this budget really does for us is it starts to say, ‘Let's take advantage of these regional systems that have been so successful and are very flexible and deployable,'” Hill says.
In 2020, the MDA will test the SM-3 Block 2A missile against an ICBM.
“When we prove that we can take out an ICBM with an Aegis ship or an Aegis Ashore site with an SM-3 Block 2A, then you want to ramp up the evolution of the threat on the target side, right? We'll want to go against more complex threats,” Hill says.
That will require upgrading the combat system used by Aegis ships so it can process data from new sensors and engage with a missile. Adding the ability to launch SM-3 Block 2A missiles on ships or from Aegis Ashore sites will give combatant commanders the additional flexibility they have sought, he adds. A future commander could then choose to launch a GBI, THAAD, SM-3 or, when it is ready, NGI.
Such an interim solution using regional systems is still far from a reality.
The Pentagon is requesting $139 million in its fiscal 2021 budget to “initiate the development and demonstration of a new interceptor prototype to support contiguous U.S. defense as part of the tiered homeland defense effort,” the MDA's budget materials state. That involves developing hardware and software and conducting demonstrations leading to a flight test in fiscal 2023.
One other potential gap in the missile defense architecture is in Pacific-based radars that would have cued GBIs to protect against an attack on Hawaii.
The “Pacific radar is no longer in our budget,” Hill says. Today, forward-deployed AN/TPY-2 radars and a deployable (sea-based X-band) radar work with the GMD system in that region. Plus, Aegis ships can be repositioned, he adds. “We realize we need to take another look at that architecture,” he says, which will focus on the Pacific region.
Missile defense experts are not unsupportive of the effort to build a new NGI. But they do question whether the cost will leach funding for other important priorities.
Frank Rose, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, points out that GBIs are built using 1990s technology and as a development prototype tasked for an operational mission. That means that requirements such as reliability, survivability and suitability were afterthoughts.
Despite the sound logic involved in moving toward a new interceptor, “I see a couple of challenges,” he says. That includes that the Pentagon's budget request was flat for fiscal 2021, a trend likely to continue. In the years ahead, the military will have big bills for its nuclear modernization budget and to recapitalize its conventional forces, which will hit about the time budgets for NGI would need to swell to support procurement of the system.
Meanwhile, in the near-to-midterm, the U.S. is likely to be dealing with a limited North Korean threat. Over time, the threats will grow in number and sophistication. Given challenges with the budget—not to mention technical challenges with developing a successful kill vehicle—Rose wonders if that money could be applied elsewhere.
Kingston Reif, director of disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association, is skeptical the MDA can deliver an NGI on its current timeline. “Congress must be extremely wary of allowing the Pentagon to repeat the mistakes that have plagued the GMD system in the past,” he says. “In particular, the development, procurement and fielding of the NGI should not be schedule-driven but based on the maturity of the technology and successful testing under operationally realistic conditions. Accelerating development programs risks saddling them with cost overruns, schedule delays, test failures and program cancellations—as has been the case with the GMD program and other missile defense programs to date.”
The expansion of U.S. homeland missile defense may be viewed as a provocation by Russia and China “and likely prompt them to consider steps to further enhance the survivability of their nuclear arsenals in ways that will undermine the security of the United States and its allies,” Reif says. “The costs and risks of expanding the U.S. homeland defense footprint in this way greatly outweigh the benefits.”
But like all proposals, it will be up to lawmakers to decide and is likely to be a point of interest in the year ahead.
“This is the single biggest muscle movement in the 2021 budget proposal, and Congress will be scrutinizing carefully whether the administration has a compelling vision and realistic funding stream for the short, medium and long term,” says Tom Karako, director of the missile defense project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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Steve Trimble In piecing together a delicate plan to field two advanced rotorcraft simultaneously within a decade, the U.S. Army chose its priorities carefully. The Army could load the first Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) and Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) with advanced new systems and weapons needed for operations in the 2030s or keep to existing or highly mature technologies and field both aircraft years earlier. Ultimately, the Army selected an acquisition strategy based on the latter. Increment 1 versions of the FLRAA and FARA are now scheduled to enter service together in the third quarter of fiscal 2030. More advanced Increment 2 versions of both should enter service in 2034 and 2035, respectively. U.S. Army FVL Vision: Competition, open systems and incremental upgrades Empty weight and costs emerge as early concerns But the key to fielding both increments for each new type on time may depend less on rotor systems and drivetrains than on software architecture and resolving industry concerns about government demands for data rights. In a series of briefings to defense contractors the week of July 13, Army leaders laid out a vision for using the FLRAA and FARA contracts to change the aviation branch's relationship with suppliers. The Army is seeking to make the aircraft and mission systems installed on both as common as possible, with a modular open-systems architecture (MOSA) allowing the service to rapidly upgrade payloads, subsystems and design rights, thereby enabling a perpetual cycle of competitive bidding. Although the Army's commitment to the new industrial model was clear, the service's acquisition leaders acknowledged that such a strategy will force companies at all levels of the supply chain to adopt a new, unproven business model. “Most of you are thinking, ‘OK, a modular systems approach is a nice buzz term, but how do I sell that to a board of directors; how do I sell it to the [company] leadership?' Because I can potentially give up all of the future revenue streams,” says Pat Mason, the program executive officer for Army aviation. “So we owe you greater answers on that, because it's the question that you're asking, and we have to understand your perspective. From that, we then have to develop a clear business case that allows you to move forward.” In purely aircraft performance terms, the FLRAA and FARA requirements do not compromise on performance. Any of the four candidates selected by the Army in March to compete for both contracts—Bell's V-280 and Boeing/Sikorsky's SB-1 for the FLRAA; Bell's 360 Invictus and Sikorsky's Raider X for the FARA—would enter service in 2030 exceeding the 170-kt. speed limit for most conventional helicopters. But despite appearances, speed is not everything in the Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program that spawned the FLRAA and FARA contract competitions. The FVL initiative is seeking to introduce a revolutionary leap in how the Army acquires the evolving array of software, electronics, sensors and weapons that come with an aircraft and represent an increasingly important share of its overall capability. With schedule and cost driving the acquisition strategy, the Army will seek to deliver the FARA and FLRAA with as many common electronic systems and payloads as possible, along with a MOSA for software. To minimize schedule and cost risk, FARA and FLRAA aircraft entering service in 2030 will be designed with electronics and systems already available or due to reach a high level of maturity by 2024. More advanced systems capabilities still at the laboratory stage mid-decade will be considered for Increment 2 versions of both types. The Increment 2 version of the FLRAA is scheduled for delivery in fiscal 2034. A year later, the FARA program plans to field an Increment 2 version. Limiting development activity during Increment 1 to the airframe is the Army's goal. “One of the key things we're trying to do with Increment 1 is get the ‘truck' right—the vehicle,” says Jason Lucas, the Army's FLRAA technical division chief. “We need to get us an air vehicle platform that can take us into the future. The other thing that we absolutely have to get right is our architecture, and our modular open-system approach to enable us to integrate advanced technologies [and] keep up with the pace of threats. “One of the things you didn't hear me say is that we need to develop a lot of advanced mission system equipment, a lot of new development” in Increment 1, Lucas adds. “We are going to take existing mission equipment.” The Army's risk-averse approach comes after decades of frustration over new aircraft development. Three failed attempts to field a scout helicopter to perform a mission similar to FARA's weigh on current program leaders. Col. Gregory Fortier, FARA project manager, notes that as a younger officer he had been told to expect an assignment in a Sikorsky/Boeing RAH-66 squadron, a Bell ARH-70 squadron and an Armed Aerial Scout test squadron. “As we know, those three did not come to fruition,” Fortier says, adding that avoiding a fourth program failure requires having “critical and difficult conversations” with industry up front. Such discussions came up during the industry day event. As a possible consequence of relying on existing maturing systems and payloads for the Increment 1 versions of the FARA and FLRAA, Army program managers are growing concerned about aircraft weight estimates. “I'm still seeing very heavy empty weights across our air vehicles, which I don't enjoy,” says Brig. Gen. Walter Rugen, director of the Army's FVL cross-functional team. FLRAA and FARA technology “should be lighter and lower-cost,” he says. “You all may say I'm asking for the impossible, but I think it's nuanced. At the end of the day, we're in a hypercompetitive environment with budgets, and if we don't bring things in that are leap-ahead and fully capture the deflationary nature of the technology and get lighter and cheaper, I think we may find ourselves on the outside looking in.” Another difficult conversation inside the programs concerns the Army's plan to demand ownership of more of the intellectual property and data rights for technologies installed in the aircraft. As each of the armed services seeks a greater share of the ownership rights on future weapon systems, the defense industry is being forced to adapt to a new paradigm in the government-industry relationship. “We realize this runs contrary to some of the legacy business models, such as, ‘Here's a box. We want to integrate it and then we want to sustain it for 30 years,' ” says Michael “Ski” Horrocks, integration project manager for FLRAA and FARA mission systems. “So we do have teams working right now brainstorming how to create new collaborative and sustainable business models.” The in-service date for the FLRAA and FARA may be a decade away, but the Army is already facing critical decision points by year-end. The most important is creation of the FVL Architecture Framework (FAF) to define the interfaces and standards for the common mission systems architecture of both. Last year, the Army stood up a body composed of military, industry and academic experts called the Architecture Control Working Group to deliver the FAF by November 2020 for scheduled approval the following month. “We see Increment 2 as an opportunity to provide advanced mission system solutions to help tackle some of the most significant threats and integrate some innovation,” Lucas says. The Army's schedule calls for selecting the FLRAA developer in fiscal 2023 and the FARA prime contractor in fiscal 2024, with limited user tests of production aircraft beginning for each program four years later. But a lesson from the Army's painful experience with new aircraft development suggests little tolerance for costly technology, even if the contractors can deliver better performance. “We can develop and design and deliver this tremendous capability at the end of this fiscal 2028 timeframe,” Fortier says. “But if it's not affordable, they're walking away from it.” https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/us-army-upgrades-vision-future-vertical-lift-programs