12 décembre 2017 | Information, Aérospatial

Intégration de chasseurs australiens à la flotte actuelle de l’Aviation royale canadienne

Document d'information

De Défense nationale

Le 12 décembre 2017 – Ottawa (Ontario) – Défense nationale/Forces armées canadiennes

Le Canada a annoncé récemment son intention de faire l'acquisition de chasseurs F-18 australiens pour compléter sa flotte actuelle. Ces appareils sont d''ge et de configuration similaires aux CF-18 de la flotte canadienne, et pourront donc être intégrés rapidement avec peu de mises à niveau, de formation et de modifications d'infrastructures.

Afin d'intégrer ces chasseurs aux opérations de l'Aviation royale canadienne (ARC), les étapes suivantes seront franchies. Une fois terminées, les chasseurs acquis de l'Australie s'intégreront sans difficulté dans la flotte actuelle de CF-18.

Mise à niveau et prolongement de la durée de vie utile

Les F-18 seront modifiés et des travaux techniques seront réalisés pour que leur configuration soit similaire à celle des CF-18 canadiens, et pour veiller à ce qu'ils soient disponibles pour compléter la flotte de CF-18 jusqu'à l'acquisition d'une nouvelle flotte de chasseurs. Le Canada a beaucoup d'expérience dans ce type de modification avec sa flotte actuelle de chasseurs.

La mise à niveau et l'entretien de la flotte actuelle de CF-18 seront toujours nécessaires. Le gouvernement du Canada a évalué la nature des travaux requis et les coûts associés pour entretenir la flotte actuelle et les appareils supplémentaires.

Au fil des ans, l'Australie et le Canada ont fait d'importants investissements dans le développement de modifications structurelles et de capacités qui ont permis de prolonger la durée de vie structurale de leur flotte de F-18. Récemment, le Canada a investi dans le développement de modifications structurales supplémentaires, ce que l'Australie n'a pas fait. Ces modifications sont actuellement appliquées sur les appareils canadiens, et elles le seront également sur les avions australiens acquis par le Canada, ce qui permettra de prolonger leur durée de vie utile.

Ces appareils sont actuellement employés dans le cadre d'opérations. Les inspections menées ont confirmé que leur durée de vie peut être prolongée et qu'ils peuvent être mis à niveau pour s'intégrer à notre flotte actuelle.

Acquisition de pièces de rechange

Le Canada fera aussi l'acquisition auprès du gouvernement australien de pièces de rechange pour maintenir en puissance les appareils supplémentaires et la flotte actuelle de CF-18 jusqu'à ce qu'une nouvelle flotte de chasseurs soit prête à l'action. Le Canada dispose également d'une chaîne d'approvisionnement déjà établie pour les pièces de F-18, qu'il continuera d'utiliser.

Formation et personnel

La formation requise pour piloter un F-18 australien est la même que pour la flotte actuelle de CF-18. Un plus grand nombre d'aéronefs requiert un plus grand nombre de pilotes, et plus de techniciens pour les entretenir. Tel qu'indiqué dans la politique de défense du Canada, Protection, Sécurité, Engagement, des efforts soutenus sont déployés en matière de recrutement et de maintien en service pour répondre aux besoins en personnel.

Opérations

Dans le cadre de la politique de défense du Canada, Protection, Sécurité, Engagement, les Forces armées canadiennes sont appelées à remplir leurs missions au pays, en Amérique du Nord et ailleurs dans le monde, et ce, simultanément. En ce qui concerne la capacité des chasseurs canadiens, l'Aviation royale canadienne doit pouvoir générer un nombre suffisant d'avions prêts à être déployés pour pleinement respecter les engagements pris par le Canada envers le NORAD et l'OTAN.

À l'heure actuelle, le Canada ne dispose pas de suffisamment d'avions, ni de personnel pour respecter ces engagements simultanément. L'ajout d'avions supplémentaires permettra d'obtenir la capacité requise pour respecter nos engagements sans difficulté avec notre flotte actuelle.

On prévoit que les premiers avions seront prêts à l'action au début des années 2020, après l'achèvement des mises à niveau structurelles pour les intégrer à la flotte de CF-18.

Infrastructures

Les appareils seront employés à la 4e Escadre Cold Lake et à la 3e Escadre Bagotville. Le MDN examine actuellement quels sont les besoins en matière d'infrastructures pour accueillir les nouveaux appareils. On s'attend à ce que les modifications requises soient minimales, étant donné que les chasseurs supplémentaires sont d''ge et de configuration similaires aux CF-18.

Documents connexes

Lien pertinent

CF-188 Hornet

Contact

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Ministère de la Défense nationale
Téléphone : 613-996-2353
Sans frais : 1-866-377-0811
Courriel : mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca

https://www.canada.ca/fr/ministere-defense-nationale/nouvelles/2017/12/integration_de_chasseursaustraliensalaflotteactuelledelaviationr.html

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