Integrating Australian Jets into the Current Royal Canadian Air Force Fighter Fleet

On the same subject

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  July 30, 2019 | Information, C4ISR

  Global Military Sensors Market to Reach $33.2 Billion by 2025, Growing from $24.7 Billion in 2019 at a CAGR of 5.1% During 2019-2025

  The military sensors market is projected to grow from USD 24.7 billion in 2019 to USD 33.2 billion by 2025, at a CAGR of 5.1% between 2019 and 2025. This market study covers the military sensors market across various segments and sub-segments. It aims at estimating the size and growth potential of this market across different segments based on platform, application, component, and region. This study also includes an in-depth competitive analysis of the key players in the market, along with their company profiles, key observations related to their product and business offerings, recent developments undertaken by them, and key market strategies adopted by them. Major players operating in the military sensors market are Honeywell International Inc. (US), TE Connectivity Ltd. (US), Thales Group (France), Curtiss-Wright Corporation (US), Raytheon Company (US), Esterline Technologies Corporation (US), Kongsberg Gruppen ASA (Norway), and BAE Systems plc (UK), among others. Increasing demand for unmanned vehicles and ongoing military modernization programs are expected to fuel the growth of the military sensors market across the globe Some of the factors that are expected to fuel the growth of the military sensors market are increased defense spending of different countries to strengthen their defense capabilities. However, the formulation and implementation of various rules and regulations related to the transfer of weapons and associated technologies are expected to act as restraints for the growth of the market. The electronic warfare segment of the market is projected to grow at the highest CAGR from 2019 to 2025 Based on application, the electronic warfare segment of the market is projected to grow at the highest CAGR during the forecast period. The growth of this segment can be attributed to the increased procurement of fighter jets. For instance, in June 2019, the US Government and Lockheed Martin entered into an agreement worth USD 34.0 billion for the procurement of 470 F-35 fighter jets. The software segment of the military sensors market is projected to grow at the highest CAGR during the forecast period Based on component, the software segment is projected to grow at the highest CAGR from 2019 to 2025. Increasing demand for real-time processing and analyzing of data through artificial intelligence and machine learning is expected to drive the growth of the software segment of the military sensors market during the forecast period. With the development of artificial intelligence and machine learning, the software used in military sensors can distinguish between two objects. The North American region is estimated to account for the largest share of the military sensors market in 2019 The North American region is expected to lead the military sensors market in 2019. The market in the region is highly competitive, owing to the presence of a large number of Original Component Manufacturers (OCMs) and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) such as Raytheon Company (US), Curtiss-Wright Corporation (US), and TE Connectivity Ltd. (US) in the region. Increasing the procurement of guided munition and military aircraft is expected to fuel the growth of the military sensors market in North America. Market Dynamics Drivers Increasing Demand for Battlespace Awareness Among Defense Forces Ongoing Advancements in MEMS Technology Increasing Use of UAVs in Modern Warfare Restraints Lack of Accuracy & Operational Complexities in MEMS Inertial Navigation Sensors Rules & Regulations Related to the Transfer of Weapons and Their Associated Technologies Declining Defense Budgets of Several Countries of North America & Europe Opportunities Demand for New Generation Air and Missile Defense Systems Integration of Anti-Jamming Capabilities With Navigation Systems Challenges Cybersecurity Risks Complexity in the Designs of Military Sensors Companies Profiled BAE Systems PLC Esterline Technologies Corporation Honeywell International Inc. Imperx Kongsberg Gruppen Lockheed Martin Microflown Avisa B.V. Raytheon Rockwest Solutions TE Connectivity Ltd. Thales Ultra Electronics Vectornav Technologies, LLC Viooa Imaging Technology For more information about this report visit https://www.researchandmarkets.com/r/a91ey1 https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190729005354/en

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  July 22, 2019 | Information, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security, Other Defence

  Capturing the value of Industry 4.0 technologies

  With some aerospace and defense organizations lagging in the adoption of Industry 4.0, what can A&D companies do better to achieve digital transformation? INDUSTRY 4.0 technologies could be the key to unlocking future competitiveness. There is a clear and compelling case for aerospace and defense (A&D) companies to leverage these technologies and incorporate digital transformation throughout their organizations. In a global survey conducted by Deloitte to assess the current state of Industry 4.0 adoption across manufacturing industries, 84 percent of A&D executives said they consider leveraging new digital technologies as key to market differentiation—yet only a quarter of the A&D companies are currently using these technologies and tools to access, manage, analyze, and leverage data from their digital assets to inform decision-making in real time.1 Industry 4.0-driven technologies can impact every company that operates within the A&D industry, from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to small suppliers. However, not all companies seem to be taking advantage of these technologies, whether for growing revenues or improving profitability. Designing new products and business models remains a significant challenge for most A&D companies, with 40 percent of the surveyed A&D executives identifying the establishment of new business or delivery models as the top challenge their organization faces as they pursue digital transformation initiatives.2 Furthermore, despite implementing Industry 4.0 technologies in areas such as factory manufacturing and supply chain, many A&D companies have been slow in adopting broader digital transformation initiatives that span the entire enterprise.3 This is because many surveyed companies in the industry note that they have not made Industry 4.0 a priority across the enterprise; rather, they have primarily invested in specific, focused technology implementations. Limiting the digital strategy to a few business functions may increase the risk of A&D companies being left behind in today's digital era. It is important, therefore, that companies across the industry understand and harness the power of new technologies to benefit from the opportunities of Industry 4.0 transformation. A&D companies, especially mid- and small-sized, could start small but scale enterprisewide to maximize the benefits of these technologies. Instead of viewing new technologies as an add-on to existing processes and practices, A&D executives should rethink how they do business leveraging those technologies. This report explores the lessons A&D companies appear to have learned in their journey in becoming digitally transformed enterprises and recommends how they could thrive in this age of Industry 4.0. For the full text of this article : https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/focus/industry-4-0/aerospace-defense-companies-digital-transformation.html

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  August 27, 2019 | Information, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Avoiding past mistakes: Are the Army’s modernization plans on the right course?

  By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — To avoid past mistakes that have all but crippled the Army's ability to procure new equipment, the service should ensure its top modernization priorities are aligned with its emerging warfighting doctrine, which could mean rearranging some of its top efforts, conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation is arguing in a new report. The assessment comes at a time when the Army is preparing to release a new modernization strategy in short order. “From 2002 to 2014, for a variety of reasons, nearly every major modernization program was terminated,” the report's author Thomas Spoehr writes. Spoehr is the director of the Center of National Defense at Heritage. His former Army career was partly spent helping to develop the service's future year financial plans. Spoehr acknowledges that with the advent of a new four-star command — Army Futures Command — the programs envisioned to modernize the Army “are well-conceived,” but urges the services to look through a lens of how its priorities measure up in Multi-Domain Operations — a concept under development that will grow into its key warfighting doctrine. Spoehr also warns the Army's leaders that there needs to be a balance “of the lure of technology with the necessity" to buy new equipment. The service is steadfastly marching down a path to modernize and develop its capability in Long-Range Precision Fires, Next-Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the network, air-and-missile defense and soldier lethality, in order of importance. But Spoehr is proposing to drop NGCV and FVL to the bottom of the list because they would serve less effective roles when carrying out operations in an environment where territory is well defended against enemies like Russia and China. “The need for long-range precision fires and a precision-strike missile with a range of 310 km, for example, is grounded in the need to strip away Russian surface-to-air missile batteries and gain access,” Spoehr writes. “The linkages of other programs and initiatives are not as obvious and would benefit from an Army effort to make the connections either more explicit or reconsider requirements.” Spoehr points out that it's not clear, for example, how a Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft and a Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft “might survive against near-peer sophisticated integrated air defense capabilities like the Russian's capable Pantsir-S1 SA-22 system. “Even if the aircraft's speed is doubled or tripled, it will not outrun the Pantsir's 9M335 missile,” he writes. “Nowhere in the MDO concept is a compelling case made for the use of Army aviation, combined with a relative youth of Army aviation fleets,” he adds. Instead, Spoehr said, the priorities “should be based on an evaluation of current versus required capabilities, assessed against the capability's overall criticality to success, and all tied to a future aim point-2030, by a force employing MDO doctrine.” This means, he argues, that the Army's network should be prioritized just below LRPF, followed by AMD and soldier lethality. Ranked at number five and six would be NGCV and FVL, respectively. According to Spoehr, “nothing has come forward to suggest that there is a technological advancement that will make a next generation of combat vehicles significantly better.” Additionally, the Army should not try to force the key requirement of making its Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle replacement — the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle — robotically operated or autonomous until the network matures to support the capability, the report notes. The Army needs a network “that is simple, reliable and less fragile than its current systems,” Spoehr says. “These capabilities may need to come at the expense of capacity,” which the Army appears to be doing, he notes. Spoehr also suggests that the Army invest less in hypersonic offensive capability and more in defensive capability. But ensuring effective modernization of the force and avoiding past failures is just as much a management challenge as it is overcoming technological and cost hurdles. One of the phenomena Spoehr observed during his time serving in the military, particularly at the Pentagon, is what he calls “groupthink,” where those who spend time together begin to think alike and make decisions without those around them questioning actions. Additionally, subordinates tend to avoid disagreeing with those in charge. Groupthink has been the culprit when it comes to major failure in development and acquisition programs in the past, so the Army should “zealously promote critical thinking and avoid groupthink,” Spoehr writes. The service should “promote a free and open dialogue in journals and forums” and “exercise caution when senior leaders endorse specific system attributes or requirements to avoid closing down discussion.” The report acknowledges that the Army “is making a concerted effort to change to meet the future,” such as standing up AFC and aligning its future doctrine with materiel solutions more closely. It's important the Army keep sight of what it's actually trying to do with its future capability, the report warns. “Rather than seeking to match and exceed each of our adversary's investments, the Army must focus on enabling its own operational concepts and seeking answers to tough operational and tactical problems,” it states. Elsewhere in the overarching analysis, Spoehr recommends growing the force, as well ensuring its effective modernization to include roughly 50 Brigade Combat Teams and an end-strength of at least 540,000 active soldiers. He suggests reducing investment in infantry brigade combat teams in favor of armored BCTs, but also to keep capability to fight in a counter-insurgency environment as well, such as keeping the Security Force Assistance Brigades. The third such formation is preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. The Army also needs to grow faster and must find ways to resolve recent problems with recruiting, Spoehr said, recommending that the service grow at a rate faster than 2,000 regular Army soldiers per year. And force allocation should also be reconsidered, Spoehr argues, recommending that the Army should create a new field headquarters in Europe and, when appropriate, do so in the Indo-Pacific. Overall, “the task for the Army is no less than to develop a force capable of deterring and defeating aggression by China and Russia, while also remaining prepared to deal with other regional adversaries (Iraq and North Korea), violent extremist organizations, and other unforeseen challenges,” Spoehr said. What's hard for the Army is that it lacks “the certainty of a single principal competitor” — the Soviet Union in 1980s, during the last buildup, for example, he noted. Because of the complicated global environment, Spoehr advocates for the Army to shift from thinking about a 20-year lead time for new, transformative capabilities and instead take a constant iterative and evolutionary approach to building the force. Under AFC, the Army is attempting to do just that. The Army can't wait “until the future is clear before acting,” he adds. “When dealing with a 1-million-person organization, equipping, training, and leader development typically takes at least a decade to make any substantive change,” Spoehr said. “The Army must therefore make bets now to remain a preeminent land power.” https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/08/22/avoiding-past-mistakes-are-the-armys-modernization-plans-on-the-right-course/