“Innovations for FCAS”: Airbus concludes cooperative pilot phase with startup companies in Germany

Sur le même sujet

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  9 mai 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Smart drones to command and launch smarter missiles

  By: Kelsey D. Atherton The future of war is a synergy in euphemisms, launched as a co-branding event. AeroVironment — maker of missile systems, including the one-way guided flying “switchblade” missile — announced May 7 that it is partnering with Kratos, maker of target and combat drones. The desired effect is cheap but smart drones to launch cheaper but smart missiles. It's an attempt at answering a question that has plagued the United States since the dawn of the jet age: As the costs of piloted craft go up, can anything be done to restore a numerical advantage in the sky? “AeroVironment tube-launched small unmanned aircraft and tactical missile systems to be integrated with Kratos high-speed, low-cost attritable drones to dramatically enhance situational awareness and system effectiveness,” reads the announcement. Switchblade is tube-launched, and it flies like a small unmanned aircraft up until the point where it hits its target and explodes. “Tactical missile system” is the formal term, though it's also known as a kamikaze drone or a suicide drone. Its flight time is too short to lump it in with the larger category of “loitering munitions,” but they're kindred spirits in function. As sensors got cheap and powerful and small, smart missiles with drone-like navigation systems became possible. The high-speed low-cost attritable drone made by Kratos is the Mako, an adaptation of the company's BQM-167 Aerial Target. Like the roughly $900,000 apiece target it's based upon, the Mako is designed to be cheap enough that it can be fielded in numbers and replaced without straining the Pentagon's budget. (In 2017, the combat-capable Mako was pitched as costing between $1.5 million and $2 million each. Not cheap in most senses, but relative to the going rate for a fifth-generation fighter, it's a bargain.) Taken together, the Switchblade and the Mako could be “attritable aerial assets,” flying things that are useful, but not so expensive that losing them drastically alters the ability of commanders to direct fights or of pilots to win them. Cheap and flying alone doesn't win much on its own; the craft have to prove that they can actually perform the tasks assigned them. Here, here is that crucial synergy. Kratos and AeroVironment are working together to see if the Mako can launch, communicate with and control Switchblades. The larger drone would serve as a node in a network between a human and the airborne munition. The exact location of control, between the drone and the flying munitions and the human directing them, is unclear. Would the Switchblades seek targets based on what the Mako's sensors could spot? Would that information get relayed to the human controller in time to approve of or call off the strike? These are questions that can be answered in the course of a development. If the combination of drone mothership and munition wingmates works, it could reduce the overall material cost of conducting an airstrike, while likely leaving unchanged the potential human toll. https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2019/05/08/smart-drones-to-command-and-launch-smarter-missiles

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  11 décembre 2023 | International, Aérospatial

  SpaceX postpones planned launch of US military's secretive X-37B spaceplane

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  12 novembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre

  Rust Costs the Pentagon $21 Billion Per Year

  By Aaron Boyd, The Defense Department isn't doing a good job determining how much to spend to prevent damage from nature's basic chemical reactions. Rust costs the Pentagon more money annually than many of its most expensive weapons systems—up to $21 billion per year, according to a Defense Department-commissioned audit released in March. The report indicates the corrosion of metals that make up modern weapons systems like fighter jets, ships, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons can sometimes approach one-third of the total operations and maintenance costs of those systems. The problem is so large, in 2002, the department established the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to ensure big-dollar weapons systems weren't taken offline by oxidation and to help branches determine how much money ought to be spent on rust prevention. But the data being reported by the military branches has been inconsistent and the office has yet to issue guidance on how funding levels should be categorized, according to a related audit released Thursday by the Government Accountability Office. For example, “In fiscal year 2017, the Army and Navy used direct costs, such as salary and training costs, to identify their funding levels, but the Army also included other associated costs. The Air Force used the prior year's funding level and adjusted it for inflation,” the report states. These different methods led to funding requests based on different criteria, making it difficult for Congress to determine what an appropriate funding level should look like. It has also led to vastly different funding requests. In 2017, the Army requested $2.4 million and the Air Force $3 million, while the Navy only requested $220,000. Similarly, all three branches either failed to accurately report the supporting data or, in the Air Force's case, did not provide any data at all some years. “The Army data GAO received did not reconcile with data presented in the Corrosion Office annual reports to Congress for five of eight fiscal years,” auditors wrote. “The Navy data did not reconcile for two of eight fiscal years, and there was no supporting documentation identifying how these figures were calculated. Air Force officials did not provide any figures or supporting documentation for four fiscal years, stating that these figures were not available.” Army officials told GAO they're not able to accurately report how much is spent preventing or combating corrosion because many of those duties are performed by personnel who do many other things, as well. This includes the Army's lead corrosion executive, who also serves as the aviation logistics and safety officer for the Army G-4 logistics organization. “The corrosion-related costs of conducting the corrosion executive role are not separated from this other function,” they told GAO. The Navy had a similar issue but took a different tack. The Navy merely requested $220,000 for the corrosion executive's salary, despite the fact that “this method does not capture other costs, such as personnel assigned to other offices that provide support to the corrosion executive.” The misreported numbers don't appear to be malfeasance, according to the GAO report, but a natural consequence of a lack of direction from the Corrosion Office on how to identify funding needs and properly report that data. GAO made three recommendations to the Defense Department: Issue guidance for identifying and reviewing funding levels for performing corrosion executive duties. Ensure that the Corrosion Office develops a process to maintain documentation of its reviews of corrosion planning. Ensure that corrosion executives establish guidance on reviewing the adequacy of corrosion planning. Defense officials agreed with all three recommendations. https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2018/11/rust-costs-pentagon-21-billion-year/152709/