16 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Autre défense
James Chew
The recently published viewpoint “Can the Pentagon Spend More Smartly?” (AW&ST Aug. 31-Sept. 13, p. 58) highlights the consequences of increased dependence on technology to maintain an edge. In fact, the core issue of the exponential growth in cost associated with the linear growth in technology capability is highlighted in Norman Augustine's 1982 book Augustine's Laws. Specifically, two of “Augustine's laws” focus on what needs to be avoided within the Defense Department acquisition community.
One of the laws states: “In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy three and a half days each per week, except for leap year when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.”
Additionally, the book highlights the Defense Department's growing dependence on electronic systems with this law: “After the year 2015, there will be no airplane crashes. There will be no takeoffs either, because electronics will occupy 100% of every airplane's weight.”
Even if these laws seem outlandish, the book's underlying lessons still ring true today.
For decades, the Pentagon was the driving force behind the development of microelectronics until, interestingly, the commercial sector ultimately ended up in the driver's seat.
To share a little history, the Army-funded Micromodule project was the precursor of the integrated circuit and the Very-Large Scale Integration project created today's electronic design automation companies and resulted in the development of multichip wafer fabrication technology. The fact is, today's microelectronics technology would not exist, or would almost certainly be less sophisticated, if not for a few brave and visionary Defense Department project officers.
The electronics industry is likely the most visible and significant example of a commercial market that not only transitioned from but significantly advanced technology developed by the U.S. military. Without the government investment, the device on which I am writing this article, and the one on which you are reading it, would perhaps not exist.
There are lessons to be learned from both the public and private sectors, and best practices from each can certainly be applied cross-functionally to optimize outcomes.
For example, the commercial electronics industry has enabled electronic systems companies to develop high-quality, sustainable and modernizable products on a “can't-miss-Christmas” schedule. Much of the industry's success is due in large part to an adherence to “first-pass success” and the computational software tools and processes that enable it. These tools and processes have been developed by companies that invest significant portions of their annual sales—some up to 40%—into research and development (that is “IR&D” to you in the Pentagon) and are a result of the intense competition within the unforgiving consumer electronics market. These tools and processes, which have institutionalized the product development practice of “emulate before you fabricate,” make up the foundation of on-schedule, on-cost product development.
The best-case scenario is that the current Defense Department and defense industry electronic development process matches up with the commercial electronics development process, where they both seek to achieve “first-pass success.” Even if all things were equal, which they aren't, the commercial timeline would still be around 30% that of the defense timeline. Eliminating the need for prototype hardware and the associated tests and reworks is a major reduction in design time and cost.
So, after so many years of funding research into electronic design and development, why have the Defense Department and defense industry turned away from the commercial processes that stemmed from that investment? Why aren't these processes being adopted?
Congress appreciates that transitioning to commercial electronics best practices is the basis for the much-desired firm, fixed-price acquisition. The fiscal 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, reinforced by the fiscal 2021 Defense Appropriations Act, has an entire section on transitioning to commercial electronics best practices. Program offices and some individuals within the defense industrial base are seeking to better understand the commercial industry-proven way to design electronics that reduce design schedules by at least 70%, producing “first-pass success” electronic system designs that are immediately sustainable and agilely modernizable.
The answer is out there—adopt commercial best practices to save time and money. With nontraditional companies entering the picture (what's the name of that space company?), the public sector should have plenty of motivation to implement tools and processes that are prevalent and successful in today's private sector.
19 novembre 2021 | International, Naval
The Navy's schedule for getting hypersonic weapons on submarines has slipped from 2025 to 2028 ' but the service is trying to leverage learning elsewhere in the program to accelerate that schedule.
21 janvier 2019 | International, Aérospatial
By: Mike Yeo MELBOURNE, Australia — The Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter appears to have secured another export success, with Singapore announcing that it has identified the type “as the most suitable replacement” for the Republic of Singapore Air Force's fleet of F-16s. In an announcement on Friday, Singapore's defense ministry said that it made the decision following the completion of a technical evaluation conducted together with the Southeast Asian island nation's Defence Science and Technology Agency. It added that “the technical evaluation also concluded that the RSAF should first purchase a small number of F-35 JSFs for a full evaluation of their capabilities and suitability before deciding on a full fleet.” According to the ministry, Singapore will next discuss details with relevant parties in the United States before confirming its decision to acquire the F-35. Singapore's defense minister Ng Eng Hen added that this process is expected to take “nine to 12 months.” The deal would almost certainly be through the United States Foreign Military Sales program. Ng had previously said that the F-16s will start to be retired around 2030, although neither he nor the ministry's announcement indicated how many F-35s will initially be acquired. Also not revealed was the variants that Singapore would buy. A ministry spokesperson declined to provide further details when asked by Defense News. Singapore has been a security cooperative partner in the F-35 program since 2003, and first disclosed its interest in the F-35 in 2013. Subsequent reports suggested it was keen on the short take-off and vertical landing F-35B variant. It is believed Singapore has a requirement of 40-60 aircraft, or enough to make up two or three squadrons. Singapore, which is a regional security partner of the United States, currently operates a fleet of 60 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D/D+ Fighting Falcon multirole fighters. These are a mix of 40 Block 52 C/D aircraft and a further 20 newer F-16D+ Advanced Block 52s acquired in four batches between 1994 and 2001. Deliveries started in 1998, which would make the oldest of these 32 years old by 2030. Twelve of the older Block 52s serve with a training detachment based at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona embedded within a mixed USAF-RSAF squadron conducting continuation training for RSAF pilots with the remainder distributed among three Singapore-based squadrons. Singapore's fleet of F-16s are currently being upgraded to F-16V standard, with the program expected to be completed in 2022 or 2023. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/01/18/singapore-wants-the-f-35-to-replace-its-f-16s/
18 novembre 2019 | International, C4ISR
By: Mark Pomerleau Department of Defense officials routinely talk about the need to more fully embrace machine learning and artificial intelligence, but one leader in the Marine Corps said those efforts are falling short. “We're not serious about AI. If we were serious about AI we would put all of our stuff into one location,” Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, said at an AFCEA Northern Virginia chapter lunch Nov. 15. Smith was broadly discussing the ability to provide technologies and data that's collected in large quantities and pushed to the battlefield and tactical edge. Smith said leaders want the ability to send data to a 50-60 Marine cell in the Philippines that might be surrounded by the Chinese. That means being able to manage the bandwidth and signature so that those forces aren't digitally targeted. That ability doesn't currently doesn't exist, he said. He pointed to IBM's Watson computer, noting that the system is able to conduct machine learning and artificial intelligence because it connects to the internet, which allows it to draw from a much wider data pool to learn from. Military systems aren't traditionally connected to the broader commercial internet, and thus are limited from a machine learning sense. “We have stovepipes of excellence everywhere from interagency, CIA, NSA. The Navy's got theirs, Marine Corps' got theirs, everybody's got theirs. You can't do AI when the machine can't learn from one pool of data,” he said. Brown noted that he was not speaking on behalf of the entire department. Pentagon leadership has come to similar conclusions. Top officials have noted that one of the critical roles the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure cloud program will do is provide a central location for data. “The warfighter needed enterprise cloud yesterday. Dominance in A.I. is not a question of software engineering. But instead, it's the result of combining capabilities at multiple levels: code, data, compute and continuous integration and continuous delivery. All of these require the provisioning of hyper-scale commercial cloud,” Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, director of the Joint AI Center, said in August. “For A.I. across DOD, enterprise cloud is existential. Without enterprise cloud, there is no A.I. at scale. A.I. will remain a series of small-scale stovepipe projects with little to no means to make A.I. available or useful to warfighters. That is, it will be too hard to develop, secure, update and use in the field. JEDI will provide on-demand, elastic compute at scale, data at scale, substantial network and transport advantages, DevOps and a secure operating environment at all classification levels.” Overall, Smith said that industry should start calling out DoD when policies or technical requirements hinder what it can offer. “If we're asking for something that is unobtanium or if our policies are keeping you from producing something we can buy, you've got to tell us,” he said https://www.c4isrnet.com/artificial-intelligence/2019/11/15/one-way-for-the-pentagon-to-prove-its-serious-about-artificial-intelligence/