12 mars 2019 | International, Terrestre
By: Jen Judson
Update: This story has been updated to reflect Lt. Gen. Eric Wesley's correct title.
WASHINGTON — The Army is preparing to make what it deems as necessary, and major, organizational changes to its force structure within the next five years, according to the Futures and Concepts Center director.
“There is going to be a fundamental change in the organizational structure to fight the way we are describing,” Lt. Gen. Eric Wesley told an audience at the Center for a New American Security in Washington on March 4.
“The Army has relied on counterinsurgency operations over the past 15 years that depended greatly on the Brigade Combat Team. But now, with a new focus on large-scale ground combat operations anticipated in the future operating environment, “that will require echelons above brigade, all of which will solve unique and distinct problems that a given BCT can't solve by itself,” Wesley said.
A new organizational structure is necessary, according to Wesley, to align better with the service's new warfighting doctrine under development — Multidomain Operations or MDO.
The Army rolled out the first iteration of its new doctrine over a year ago and debuted a revised version — MDO 1.5 — shortly after the Association of the U.S. Army's annual convention in Washington last fall.
The new doctrine addresses how the service plans to operate in the future against adversaries that have learned to engage in provocative behavior in a gray zone that doesn't quite classify as conflict, and who have gone to school on U.S. capabilities, developing equipment and operating concepts that threaten the U.S.'s long-standing capability overmatch.
The Army is now focused on ensuring that its capabilities match its new doctrine, standing up a new four-star command in Austin, Texas — Army Futures Command — to accomplish such a goal and syncing its other major commands together to focus on six top modernization priorities.
Wesley noted that the organizational realignment needed would “probably be even a bigger problem than the materiel requirements" to create a force designed for multidomain operations.
“You will see us seek to build out echelons above brigade — the Division, the Corps, even potentially a field Army — to get into theater that can manage these theater problems that otherwise wouldn't be achieved,” he added.
The Army will likely have to make trades across the active and reserve forces, Wesley said, “so we have the ability to have a force posture that can rapidly transition if necessary.”
But with all of these other dramatic changes, it's inevitable that the force structure change with it, according to Wesley, and that is going to have to happen sooner rather than later, he stressed.
The Army has to “dive in” and start putting plans in place in the next five-year budgeting cycle “because if you want to achieve what the secretary and the chief has said, to be an MDO capable force by 2028, you have to start doing some of these organizational changes early,” Wesley told a group of reporters following the event at CNAS.
And organizational changes need to align with the service's plans to field first units with newly modernized equipment and in some cases, units are slated to receive this equipment in very short order, according to Wesley.
“You need some place for that stuff to land,” he said. “When you talk about long-range precision fires, for example, having an appropriate theater fires command. When you talk about air-and-missile defense and first unit equipped, what kind of force structure do we have to enable that? And it can't just be at the brigade level ... It has to transcend echelons.”
Wesley said while he couldn't discuss specifics yet, he believed evidence of major organizational changes will likely be seen toward the end of the next five-year budget period.
The three-star also said he believed the Army would need to increase the level of units stationed abroad.
“The National Defense Strategy talks about the contact and blunt forces,” Wesley said. “Contact are those that are in theater all the time — either rotational or permanent — and blunt [forces] are those that can rapidly move into theater as necessary.”
Getting the right mix between contact and blunt forces will be necessary, Wesley said.
"You have to have contact forces. What we are working on is how to optimize what that balance is. You have to have headquarters and fires commands and that can be a deterrent effect immediately.”
Over the next few years, the Army plans to war-game the right mix, but “regardless, I think you are going to find that at some point there will have to be a debate on the degree to which we have forward presence, potentially increased, in the future,” Wesley said.
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/03/06/major-army-force-structure-changes-afoot/
17 octobre 2022 | International, C4ISR
The government may require commercial planes and ships conducting military operations to carry tech that lets them navigate even amid attempts to jam them.
20 août 2018 | International, C4ISR
By: Mark Pomerleau For the first time in recent history, the intelligence community has established a common vision with common operating principles that reaches all of its disparate agencies. “The leaders of the intelligence community about a year ago got together and we – for the first time I can recall – got together and established a common vision for ourselves called IC 2025,” Sue Gordon, principal deputy director of national intelligence, said Aug. 15 at the DoDIIS conference in Omaha, Nebraska. The vision, she said, explains what the community needs to fulfill the IC's mission and how the community must work together. Gordon had previously discussed these priorities during a presentation at the GEOINT symposium in April. The priorities include: ♦ Relying on Automated Intelligence using Machines, or AIM. The IC is establishing an AIM center – in concert with the Department of Defense's Joint Artificial Intelligence Center – to help the community harness the power of technology. Gordon said she prefers the “AIM” lexicon because she is interested in outcomes, not technology. One such outcome is the commitment that no U.S. or allied service member will ever be at a disadvantage on the battlefield because and adversary can make better use of data, she said in Omaha. ♦ Developing the right workforce. Gordon said in April that if the intel community is going to harness the power of machines to use more of the data productively, then they have to invest more in humans. ♦ Developing a comprehensive cyber strategy. Cyber is not a thing, it is a vehicle by which so many imperatives are addressed, Gordon said in April, adding that it includes cyber protection. “If you hear about it in public it's who's in charge. I think that is a total misnomer,” she said. “We really have to address the cyber attack and the cyber posturing that is happening to us every day and help this administration figure out the response we need.” ♦ Creating a modern data management infrastructure. Pursing data without a purpose, Gordon said at the GEOINT symposium, is probably not going to get the community there but not understanding that data management is the key to any of the elements of success they portend will not put efforts in the right area. ♦ Increasing and leveraging partnerships with the private sector. This is an area most all leaders in the defense and intelligence space acknowledge is necessary for success. ♦ Improving acquisition agility. Part of this comes from security clearance reform, she said in April, describing security clearance reform at DoDIIS as one of the existential threats within the IC. Full article: https://www.c4isrnet.com/show-reporter/dodiis/2018/08/17/here-are-the-intelligence-communitys-top-6-priorities
2 février 2021 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By: Sean Kennedy The Biden administration has the opportunity to institute reforms in several crucial areas at the Department of Defense. First and foremost, it should eliminate the overseas contingency operations account. The continued justification for the OCO has reached the stage of parody. Originally intended for emergency spending in response to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the account has transitioned into a slush fund designed to inflate spending at the DoD far above the baseline budget and for purposes unrelated to foreign wars. In fiscal 2015, approximately 50 percent of OCO funding was for nonemergency items. An August 2019 Congressional Budget Office report noted that approximately 85 percent of funding for the OCO in FY20 and FY21 “is designated for base-budget and ‘enduring' activities,” funding maintenance in support of foreign operations that will continue regardless of force size. OCO spending has long outpaced the military's presence in combat zones. In FY08, the U.S. deployed an average of 187,000 troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. OCO spending topped $187 billion that year, equating to $1 million per service member. The DoD currently has approximately 5,000 troops stationed in these countries, meaning the $70.7 billion in OCO spending in FY20 equates to $14.1 million in funding per service member — more than 14 times the amount in FY08. With President Joe Biden unlikely to substantially increase the military's footprint in Afghanistan and Iraq, outsized OCO spending will continue in FY21 and beyond, barring reform. The DoD has received approximately $2 trillion from the OCO since 2001. Were it considered to be a federal agency, the FY20 OCO funding would make it the fourth largest, dwarfing spending at all other agencies except the departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs. The incoming administration must also expand efforts to make DoD finances more transparent and accountable. The bookkeeping is so abysmal that areas within the DoD have been on the Government Accountability Office's list of programs at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement since 1995. The financial black hole is nowhere more evident than in the DoD's inability to pass a clean audit, unlike every other federal agency. On Nov. 16, 2020, the Pentagon announced that for the third straight year it failed its financial review. Progress has been incremental, with seven of 24 DoD agencies thus far producing clean audits. However, the DoD estimates that it will not be able to pass an audit before 2027, or 37 years after it was required to do so by law. The DoD must also determine the replacement mechanism for the chief management officer position, which was the No. 3 civilian slot until it was eliminated in the FY21 National Defense Authorization Act. Despite identifying $22.3 billion in savings between FY18 and FY21, legislators bowed to Pentagon pressure, distributing the duties and responsibilities of the role to various existing positions with far less authority. The acquisition side is also a mess, including several infamous procurement disasters that epitomize the Pentagon's systemic problems. The foremost example is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The program has been under continuous development since the contract was awarded in 2001, and has encountered innumerable delays and cost overruns. Total acquisition costs now exceed $428 billion, nearly double the initial estimate of $233 billion. The total costs for the F-35 are estimated to reach $1.727 trillion over the lifetime of the program. On Jan. 14, 2021, then-acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller labeled the Joint Strike Fighter a “piece of sh*t.” Enough said. Many of the problems with the F-35 program can be traced to the decision to develop and procure the Joint Strike Fighter simultaneously. Whenever problems have been identified, contractors needed to go back and make changes to aircraft that were already assembled, adding to overall costs. Of course none of this has stopped the Pentagon from asking for Joint Strike Fighter funding, and members of Congress from supplying it, oftentimes exceeding the request from the DoD. This trend continued in FY20, when legislators added $2.1 billion in earmarks to fund the acquisition of 22 Joint Strike Fighters beyond the amount requested by the Pentagon, bringing the total amount of earmarks for the program to $8.9 billion since FY01. Lastly, the Biden administration would do well to introduce some stability into Pentagon leadership. Every defense secretary brings to the job different priorities for the government's largest bureaucracy. President Donald Trump burned through two confirmed and four acting secretaries, the most for any administration. President Biden should endeavor to reverse this churn. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/02/01/these-five-items-should-top-bidens-defense-priorities/